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The authors examine the role of stock liquidity in CEO equity compensation design. For a sample of publicly traded firms from 2007 to 2020, the authors find that greater stock liquidity is associated with a higher proportion of stock awards relative to the proportion of options in CEO equity compensation. The results of this study suggest that stock price informativeness on the grant date has a differential effect on the preference for the type of equity compensation awarded to CEOs. The empirical results are supported by multivariate analyses using alternative measures of stock liquidity and a two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification that alleviates endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, the authors document that the firm-specific increase in the proportion of stock awards compared to the proportion of stock options is associated with a firm-specific increase in stock liquidity. Collectively, the analyses suggest that stock liquidity as a measure of stock price informativeness contributes to the choice of CEO equity compensation design.

Press reports have indicated that firms frequently underprice restricted stock and employee stock options. I test for underpricing of stock and options.

I examined a sample of 5,333 private firm stock and option issuances between 1985 and 2017. I tested for underpricing using two approaches: assuming investors have no special market-timing ability and assuming instead they have perfect market-timing ability.

I find evidence of widespread stock and option underpricing by private firms before they go public reflecting large discounts that exceed reasonable compensation for lack of marketability. Unreported underpricing is more frequent in the last pre-IPO private equity transactions that offer the last opportunity to give such discounts before the stock is publicly traded, but the discounts are greater in the earlier pre-IPO transactions where unreported discounts are presumably tougher for the SEC to detect. Underpricing is still detected even when the actual DLOMs are tested against a benchmark that assumes investors have perfect market-timing ability.

Firms frequently underprice restricted stock and employee stock options. Firms tend to underprice stock options more frequently than restricted stock, but restricted stock tends to be priced at deeper discounts when recipients are assumed not to have any special market-timing ability.

Private firms issue restricted stock and options as incentive compensation. Lowballing the valuation transfers wealth from outside stockholders to employees/insiders. Wealth transfers take place through the issuance of equity claims to employees/insiders before firms go public. I found that more than a quarter of the DLOMs exceed the theoretical maximum by, on average, between 16% (median) and 20% (mean). This finding raises two questions worthy of investigation. First, to what extent do the frequency and magnitude of DLOMs above the theoretical maximum depend on whether a board of directors obtains an independent appraisal of a stock’s fair market value? Second, if DLOMs above the theoretical maximum are observed even when the stock is independently appraised, how do appraisers justify such large DLOMs?

The wealth transfers that take place through the issuance of equity claims to employees/insiders before firms go public benefit employees/insiders at the expense of outside shareholders.

My paper is the first to furnish evidence of widespread stock and option underpricing by private firms before they go public; demonstrate that the unreported underpricing is more frequent in the last pre-IPO private equity transactions that offer the last opportunity to give such discounts before the stock is publicly traded and show that the discounts are greater in the earlier pre-IPO transactions where unreported discounts are presumably tougher for the SEC to detect.

Recent studies suggested the ratio of option to stock volume reflected the private information. Informed traders were drawn to the options market for its leverage effect and relatively low transaction costs. Informed traders use different intervals of option moneyness to execute their strategies. The question is which types of option moneyness were traded by informed traders and what information was reflected in the market. In this study, the authors focused on this question and constructed a method for capturing the activity of informed traders in the options and stock markets.

The authors constructed the daily measure, moneyness option trading volume to stock trading volume ratio (MOS), to capture the activity of informed traders in the market. The authors formed quintile portfolios sorted with respect to the moneyness option to stock trading volume ratio and provided the capital asset pricing model and Fama–French five-factor alphas. To determine whether MOS had predictive ability on future stock returns after controlling for company characteristic effects, the authors formed double-sorted portfolios and performed Fama–Macbeth regressions.

The authors found that the firms in the lowest moneyness option trading volume to stock trading volume ratio for put quintile outperform the highest quintile by 0.698% per week (approximately 36% per year). The firms in the highest moneyness option trading volume to stock trading volume ratio for call quintile outperform the lowest quintile by 0.575% per week (approximately 30% per year).

The authors first propose the measures, moneyness option trading volume to stock trading volume ratio, that combined with the trading volume and option moneyness. The authors provide evidence that the measures have the predictive ability to the future stock returns.

This paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, it examines if option and stock compensations raise creditor's risk, and which one is more important than the other. Second, it explores if CEO's compensation interacts with CEO overconfidence to raise creditor's risk. Third, it investigates how banks use different loan terms to alleviate their credit risk.

This study used advanced regression analysis and use of generalized methods of moment methodology.

The results show that option compensation is more important than stock compensation in raising credit risk; option compensation interacts with CEO overconfidence, giving rise to a much higher credit risk; and covenant usage is more important than other loan contract terms in mitigating credit risk given that covenant use could not be substituted away by using other loan contract terms such as increasing interest rate, reducing principal or shortening loan duration. This paper has practical implications for credit markets.

The main implication is that hand-collect data are available up to 2010.

It informs creditors the potential sources of loan risk emanating from option rather than stock incentives; it informs creditors that option incentive interacts with CEO overconfidence rendering the credit risk bigger than expected, and it informs creditors the importance of using covenants vis-à-vis other loan contract terms for mitigating compensation and overconfidence risk.

Banks are alerted to the risk due to the interaction between overconfidence and compensations, implying that overconfident managers remunerated with options compensations are more risky than overconfident managers who are not remunerated as such.

This paper is original: (1) The authors show that option compensation is more risky than stock compensation from viewpoint of creditors. This has not been assessed. (2) Interaction between managerial compensation and managerial overconfidence has not been assessed before. (3) Use of different loan contract terms to alleviate risk from overconfident managers (who are prone to over investment but who are innovative according to the literature) has not been evaluated.

The current study aims to investigate the mediating role of executive stock options in the nonlinear relationship between financial constraints and research and development (R&D) investment through two measures of financial constraints.

This study is based on a sample of 90 French firms for the period extending from 2008 to 2020. The authors employ a panel threshold method to analyze whether the impact of financial constraints on R&D investment depends on the level of financial constraints or not.

Using SA index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) and FCP index (Schauer et al., 2019) as measures of financial constraints, the authors demonstrate that the relationship between financial constraints and R&D investment is nonlinear. Moreover, the authors find that executive stock options mediate partially the relationship between financial constraints and R&D investment. More specifically, the authors show that stock options could play two roles depending on the level of the financial constraints; inconsistent mediation for firms with low/medium level of financial constraints and partial mediation for highly constrained firms.

This paper is the first to the best of the authors' knowledge to investigate the nonlinear relationship between financial constraints and R&D investment as well as the mediating role of executive stock option using dynamic panel threshold models.

This study delves into the nuanced implications of short-sale constraints on stock prices within the context of stock market efficiency. While existing research has explored this relationship, inconsistencies persist in their findings. The purpose of this study is to conduct a comprehensive review of literature to elucidate the reasons behind these disparities.

A systematic review of existing theoretical and empirical studies was conducted following the PRISMA method. The analysis centered on discerning the factors contributing to the divergence in projected stock prices due to these constraints. Key areas explored included assumptions related to expectations homogeneity, revisions, information uncertainty, trading motivations and fluctuations in supply and demand of risky assets.

The review uncovered multifaceted reasons for the disparities in findings regarding the influence of short-sale constraints on stock prices. Variations in assumptions related to market expectations, coupled with fluctuations in perceived information uncertainty and trading motivations, were identified as pivotal factors contributing to differing projections. Empirical evidence disparities stemmed from the use of proxies for short-sale constraints, varied sample periods, market structure nuances, regulatory changes and the presence of option trading.

This study emphasizes the significance of not oversimplifying the impact of short-sale constraints on stock prices. It highlights the need to understand these effects within the broader context of market structure and methodological considerations. By delineating the intricate interplay of factors affecting stock prices under short-sale constraints, this review provides a nuanced perspective, contributing to a more comprehensive understanding in the field.

Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the legal system impacts the relationship between CEO compensation and bank stability across countries.

To test the study hypotheses, the authors use panel data of 74 banks operating in ten OECD countries during the period 2009–2016 and apply the generalized moments method regression model to better remediate the endogeneity problem.

The findings confirm that a country’s banking regulations significantly affect its bank stability. Common law countries have less bank stability than civil law countries. This result can be interpreted by the fact that, in common-law countries, banks’ CEO are strongly protected by the law, so they allocate a large part of bank assets to risky loans to improve their variable remuneration.

The research can help policymakers understand bank stability in one country. Any legal reform would require prior knowledge of how risk-taking may arise in executive compensation.

The contribution is to explain the controversial effect of executive compensation on bank stability in the framework of legal theory. The authors argue that regulators should monitor compensation structures and that the country’s legal origin of law shapes the CEO compensation structure and is a determinant of bank stability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies exploring this field. So, this study tries to shed more light on the dark side of CEOs’ behavior when undertaking risky projects to maximize their remuneration.

This paper studies the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck as well as the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay in which good luck is rewarded but bad luck is not penalized symmetrically. We further explore the impact of the regulatory changes on executive compensation taking effect in the 2000s on CEO pay for luck and asymmetry.

In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO compensation. The sample consists of DJIA component companies over a 71-year period from 1950 to 2020. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity.

We find that an increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity as measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity leads to an increase in the degree of CEO pay for luck but tends to reduce the level of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, we find that the major pay-related regulatory changes in recent years have mitigated the degree of CEO pay for luck and pay asymmetry, in which CEO pay structure and the associated CEO pay-performance sensitivity are major mechanisms through which the regulatory changes take effect.

Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that both optimal contracting and rent extraction should be considered as important determinants of CEO compensation.

When a firm designs the pay packages for its CEO to align CEO wealth to firm performance, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is expected to improve. However, the improved CEO PPS can also lead to an increased CEO pay for non-performance (Luck), which is an undesired outcome from the shareholder view. Therefore, a firm should thoroughly consider various advantages and disadvantages when compensating its top executives. Third, pay-related regulations have indeed achieved some intended outcomes such as the diminished pay for luck and asymmetry, but they also exacerbated the positive relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. It seems that executive pay-related regulations cannot achieve perfect outcomes without side effects. Continuous reforms and regulations on corporate governance should be a dynamic process under various changing situations.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck and asymmetry in several ways. First, our study is among the few studies empirically testing the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry. We find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity tends to increase the degree of CEO pay for luck but reduce the level of asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. These findings partly support the rent extraction theory grounded on the managerial power hypothesis and partly support the optimal contracting theory. Our findings confirm that the optimal contracting theory and the rent extraction theory are both important for explaining the practices and historical trends of CEO compensation.

The purpose of this study is to analyse and compile the literature on various option pricing models (OPM) or methodologies. The report highlights the gaps in the existing literature review and builds recommendations for potential scholars interested in the subject area.

In this study, the researchers used a systematic literature review procedure to collect data from Scopus. Bibliometric and structured network analyses were used to examine the bibliometric properties of 864 research documents.

As per the findings of the study, publication in the field has been increasing at a rate of 6% on average. This study also includes a list of the most influential and productive researchers, frequently used keywords and primary publications in this subject area. In particular, Thematic map and Sankey’s diagram for conceptual structure and for intellectual structure co-citation analysis and bibliographic coupling were used.

Based on the conclusion presented in this paper, there are several potential implications for research, practice and society.

This study provides useful insights for future research in the area of OPM in financial derivatives. Researchers can focus on impactful authors, significant work and productive countries and identify potential collaborators. The study also highlights the commonly used OPMs and emerging themes like machine learning and deep neural network models, which can inform practitioners about new developments in the field and guide the development of new models to address existing limitations.

The accurate pricing of financial derivatives has significant implications for society, as it can impact the stability of financial markets and the wider economy. The findings of this study, which identify the most commonly used OPMs and emerging themes, can help improve the accuracy of pricing and risk management in the financial derivatives sector, which can ultimately benefit society as a whole.

It is possibly the initial effort to consolidate the literature on calibration on option price by evaluating and analysing alternative OPM applied by researchers to guide future research in the right direction.

The purpose of this study is to examine the association between carbon emissions and earnings management (EM). This study also considers the effect of female CEOs on the association between carbon emissions and EM.

This study uses the carbon disclosure project (CDP) for carbon emissions data, the Compustat database for financial information and the ExecuComp database for female CEOs. The empirical sample of this study consists of 1,692 firm-year observations in the USA that voluntarily participated in the CDP survey from 2007 to 2015. Regression analysis and robustness tests are conducted for this study and both accrual and real EM are considered.

This study provides evidence that firms with female CEOs who voluntarily disclose their carbon emissions information engage in less real EM. Thus, the presence of female CEOs moderates the association between carbon emissions and EM. This study/paper also finds a positive association between carbon emissions and real EM, although there is an insignificant association between carbon emissions and accruals EM.

The association between carbon emissions and EM has important implications for investors, regulators and policymakers. This study suggests that policymakers should improve the conditions that promote inclusion of females in the top management positions to constrain EM.

This study focuses on the USA, which is one of the major contributors to carbon emissions in the world. The presence of female CEOs moderates the association between carbon emissions and EM and firms with female CEOs show a greater impact on EM.