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1 – 10 of over 6000Richard A. Lord, Yoshie Saito, Joseph R. Nicholson and Michael T. Dugan
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship of CEO compensation plans and the risk of managerial equity portfolios with the extent of strategic investments in…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship of CEO compensation plans and the risk of managerial equity portfolios with the extent of strategic investments in advertising, capital expenditures and research and development (R&D). The elements of compensation are salary, bonuses, options and restricted stock grants. The authors proxy the design of CEO equity portfolios by the price performance sensitivity of the holdings and the portfolio deltas.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use the components of executive compensation and portfolio risk as the dependent variables, regressing these against measures for the level of strategic investment. The authors test for non-linear relationships between the components of CEO compensation and strategic investments. The sample is a broad cross-section from 1992 to 2016.
Findings
The authors find strong support for non-linear relationships of capital expenditures and R&D with CEO bonuses, option grants and restricted stock grants. There are very complex relationships between the components of executive compensation and R&D expenditures, but little evidence of a relationship with advertising expenditures. The authors also find strong complex relationships in the design of CEO equity portfolios with advertising and R&D.
Originality/value
Little earlier research has considered advertising, capital expenditures and R&D in a unified framework. Also, testing for non-linear associations provides much greater insight into the relationship between the components of executive compensation and strategic investment. The findings represent a valuable incremental contribution to the executive compensation literature. The results also have normative policy implications for compensation committees’ design of optimal annual CEO compensation packages to incentivize or discourage particular strategic investment behavior.
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Sedki Zaiane, Halim Dabbou and Mohamed Imen Gallali
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between stock options compensation and firm strategic risk-taking, employing a quantile regression (QR) model. This study…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between stock options compensation and firm strategic risk-taking, employing a quantile regression (QR) model. This study aims to analyze whether the impact of stock options on firm strategic risk-taking changes across various quantiles and investigates the moderating role of firm performance.
Design/methodology/approach
This study is based on a sample of 90 French firms for the period extending from 2008 to 2019. To deal with the non-uniform association, the authors use a panel quantile method.
Findings
The results reveal that the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) stock options on firm strategic risk-taking varies across risk-taking quantiles. More specifically, the study’s results show a positive association at low quantile levels of strategic risk-taking, measured by research and development (R&D) and a negative linkage at high levels. The authors also find that firm performance moderates the impact of CEO stock options on strategic risk-taking.
Research limitations/implications
The non-uniform relationship between CEO stock options and firm strategic risk-taking shows that the weight of CEO stock options in the total compensation can be a major determinant of the firm's strategic risk-taking attitude.
Originality/value
This study extends existing research on executive compensation and strategic risk-taking. Thus, this study has the potential to help stakeholders, board of directors and regulators, who are attempting to understand how the compensation contract – in particular, stock option pay – is related to the risk behavior of the agents and guide them to structure the executive compensation in an optimal way.
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Outlines previous research on the role of executive compensation contracts in reducing conflicts of interest between ownership and control; and develops hypotheses on the effects…
Abstract
Outlines previous research on the role of executive compensation contracts in reducing conflicts of interest between ownership and control; and develops hypotheses on the effects of chief executive officer stock options and share ownership on subsequent firm performance. Suggests that since options do not create losses when share prices decline, they encourage more risk taking than share ownership. Explains the methodology used to test these ideas on 1994‐1996 data for a sample of large US firms and presents the results, which suggest that both stock options and share ownership are positively linked to later firm performance but that the link is stronger for ownership in high risk situations, but lower performance where risk is high. Considers the implications for corporate governance and consistency with other research; and calls for further research.
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Sedki Zaiane, Halim Dabbou and Mohamed Imen Gallali
The purpose of this study is to examine the nonlinear relationship between financial constraints and the chief executive officer (CEO) stock options compensation and to analyze…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine the nonlinear relationship between financial constraints and the chief executive officer (CEO) stock options compensation and to analyze whether the impact of financial constraints on the CEO stock options compensation changes at certain level of financial constraints or not.
Design/methodology/approach
This study is based on a sample of 90 French firms for the period extending from 2008 to 2019. To deal with the non-linearity, the authors use a panel threshold method.
Findings
Using different measures of financial constraints [KZ index (Baker et al., 2003), SA index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) and FCP index (Schauer et al., 2019)], the results reveal that the impact of the financial constraints (SA index and FCP index) is positive below the threshold value and it becomes negative above.
Research limitations/implications
The non-linearity between financial constraints and CEO stock options shows that the level of financial constraints can be a major determinant of the CEO compensation structure. More specifically, this study sheds light on the key role played by the level of financial constraints and how this latter influence management decisions.
Originality/value
This paper is the first to the best of the authors' knowledge to examine the nonlinear relationship between financial constraints and the CEO stock options compensation using a panel threshold model.
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Luis Gomez-Mejia, J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler, Maria Belda-Ruiz and Gregorio Sanchez-Marin
The purpose of this paper is to provide an extension of the behavioral agency model (BAM) by focusing on the moderating role of CEO gender on the relationship between CEO stock…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to provide an extension of the behavioral agency model (BAM) by focusing on the moderating role of CEO gender on the relationship between CEO stock options and risk “systematic vs idiosyncratic” and the performance consequences “positive vs negative” of these option incentives.
Design/methodology/approach
Data on CEO’s stock option portfolios are collected from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) ExecuComp. This paper uses a panel data analysis for matched samples of CEOs in S&P’s 1,500 listed firms over the period 2006-2013.
Findings
The results indicate a more conservative, risk-averse posture in the case of female CEOs than for male CEOs when they are compensated with stock options for idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risk. The results also confirm that female CEOs in low systematic risk contexts, although more conservative, take more prudent risks that produce better long-term outcomes as compared to their male counterparts.
Practical implications
Important implications for the design of optimal CEO’s compensation packages emanate from this study. Findings provide useful tools for board of directors to design CEO’s pay packages that take into account the different risk behavior of male and female CEOs with the aim of enhancing firm performance.
Originality/value
This paper provides new evidence within the area of stock option-based compensation by focusing on the distinction between systematic and idiosyncratic risk when the effect of CEO stock option is analyzed and performance implications of awarding options to male and female CEOs.
Objetivo
El objetivo de este trabajo es proporcionar una extensión del modelo comportamental de agencia o Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) centrada en el papel moderador del género del CEO en la relación entre la retribución basada en opciones o stock options y los niveles de riesgo –sistemático e idiosincrático– y en las consecuencias –positivas o negativas– sobre el resultado de la empresa.
Diseño/metodología/aproximación
Los datos sobre stock options de CEOs se recopilan de la base de datos Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp. Este estudio utiliza un análisis de datos de panel para muestras emparejadas de empresas incluidas en S&P 1500 durante el período 2006-2013.
Resultados
Los resultados indican una postura más conservadora de las mujeres CEO en términos de niveles de riesgo idiosincrático en comparación con la llevada a cabo por los CEOs hombres cuando se les retribuye con stock options. Los resultados también confirman que las mujeres CEO en contextos de riesgo sistemático bajo, aunque más conservadoras, asumen riesgos “de mayor calidad” que producen mejores resultados a largo plazo en comparación con sus homólogos masculinos.
Implicaciones prácticas
Importantes implicaciones para el diseño de paquetes de retribución óptimos para el CEO emanan de este estudio. Los resultados mostrados proporcionan herramientas útiles para el Consejo de Administración a la hora de diseñar paquetes de retribución para CEOs. Se deben tener en cuenta los diferentes comportamientos relacionados con la asunción de riesgos de CEOs hombres y mujeres con el objetivo de mejorar el resultado de la empresa.
Originalidad/valor
Esta investigación proporciona nueva evidencia dentro del área de la retribución basada en stock options al centrarse tanto en la distinción de riesgos (sistemático e idiosincrático) como en las implicaciones sobre el resultado de la empresa de las stock options dadas como parte de su retribución a hombres y mujeres que ocupan la posición de CEO.
Palabras clave Modelo comportamental de agencia, Opciones sobre acciones, Género, Riesgo sistemático, Riesgo idiosincrático, Resultado
Tipo de artículo
Artículo de investigación
Objetivo
O objetivo deste artigo é fornecer uma extensão da perspectiva do Modelo de Agência Comportamental (BAM) focada nas opções de ações examinando as influências e consequências do desempenho do CEO, considerando a distinção entre risco sistemático e idiossincrático sobre o efeito das opções de ações. em comportamento de risco.
Design/metodologia/abordagem
Os dados sobre portfólios de opções de ações do CEO são coletados do Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp. Este documento utiliza uma análise de dados em painel para amostras correspondentes de empresas listadas no S&P 1500 no período 2006-2013.
Resultados
Os resultados indicam uma postura mais conservadora, avessa ao risco, no caso de CEOs do sexo feminino do que para CEOs do sexo masculino, quando eles são compensados com opções de ações para o risco idiossincrático (específico da empresa). Os resultados também confirmam que as CEOs do sexo feminino em contextos de baixo risco sistemático, embora mais conservadoras, assumem riscos mais prudentes que produzem melhores resultados a longo prazo, em comparação com os seus homólogos masculinos.
Implicações práticas
Implicações importantes para o projeto de pacotes de remuneração de CEOs ideais emanam deste estudo. Os resultados fornecem ferramentas úteis para o conselho de diretores, a fim de projetar pacotes de remuneração do CEO que levem em conta o comportamento de risco diferente dos CEOs do sexo feminino e masculino, com o objetivo de melhorar o desempenho da empresa.
Originalidade/valor
Este documento fornece novas evidências dentro da área de remuneração baseada em opções de ações, concentrando-se tanto no tipo de risco como determinante do seu efeito de risco quanto nas implicações de desempenho da concessão de opções a CEOs do sexo feminino e masculino.
Palavras-chave Modelo de agência comportamental, Opções de ações, Gênero, risco sistemático, Risco idiossincrático, Atuação
Tipo de artigo
Artigo de pesquisa
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Chialing Hsieh, Vivek Pandey and Hongxia Wang
The purpose of this paper is to examine CEO compensation in immigrant-founder firms vs CEO compensation in non-immigrant-founder firms.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine CEO compensation in immigrant-founder firms vs CEO compensation in non-immigrant-founder firms.
Design/methodology/approach
Univariate and multi-variate tests are implemented. CEO compensation is designed as a function of the origin of a firm’s founder (immigrant or native), executive characteristics and firm characteristics with firm and year fixed effect regressions. CEO compensation is measured with cash pay, equity-based pay and total compensation.
Findings
CEOs of immigrant-founder firms receive higher equity-based compensation and higher total pay than CEOs of non-immigrant-founder firms and the levels of their equity-based and total compensation are contingent upon their stock ownership. CEOs in high-growth immigrant-founder firms receive higher stock-based pay than their counterparts in non-immigrant-founder firms. Immigrant-founder family firms compensate their CEOs with higher equity-based pay than immigrant-founder non-family firms.
Practical implications
The paper provides some explanations on the success of immigrant-founder firms. CEO compensation designs in immigrant-founder firms can be adopted in other firms.
Social implications
The paper provides some rationale for immigration legislation to encourage the talented to come to the USA and start their business in the USA.
Originality/value
This paper is the first to study executive compensation practice in immigrant-founder firms. The findings provide some practical and policy implications on immigration reform.
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The current study aims to investigate the mediating role of executive stock options in the nonlinear relationship between financial constraints and research and development (R&D…
Abstract
Purpose
The current study aims to investigate the mediating role of executive stock options in the nonlinear relationship between financial constraints and research and development (R&D) investment through two measures of financial constraints.
Design/methodology/approach
This study is based on a sample of 90 French firms for the period extending from 2008 to 2020. The authors employ a panel threshold method to analyze whether the impact of financial constraints on R&D investment depends on the level of financial constraints or not.
Findings
Using SA index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) and FCP index (Schauer et al., 2019) as measures of financial constraints, the authors demonstrate that the relationship between financial constraints and R&D investment is nonlinear. Moreover, the authors find that executive stock options mediate partially the relationship between financial constraints and R&D investment. More specifically, the authors show that stock options could play two roles depending on the level of the financial constraints; inconsistent mediation for firms with low/medium level of financial constraints and partial mediation for highly constrained firms.
Originality/value
This paper is the first to the best of the authors' knowledge to investigate the nonlinear relationship between financial constraints and R&D investment as well as the mediating role of executive stock option using dynamic panel threshold models.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the contrasting moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between the two types of long-term incentives (stock…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the contrasting moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between the two types of long-term incentives (stock options/stock ownership) for the chief executive officers and a firm’s long-term performance. Even though the two types of incentives are designed to improve long-term performance, the degrees of impact on long-term performance differ. Based on behavioral agency theory, this study theoretically and empirically examines the role of a firm’s exploration on the above relationship.
Design/methodology/approach
This study used three archival sources to obtain data on stock options, stock ownership, patents and exploration, financial measures, and others. Based on a sample of 1,963 firms in various industries from 1995 to 2006, this study tested the moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between stock options/ownership and a firm’s performance.
Findings
This study reveals the contrasting moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between stock options/ownership and a firm’s long-term performance: a positive moderating effect on the relationship between stock options and performance and a negative moderating effect on the relationship between stock ownership and performance. In addition, empirical evidence was added on the inverted U-shaped relationship between stock ownership and a firm’s long-term performance.
Originality/value
There is little research on a firm’s internal characteristics that strengthen or weaken the effects of stock options and stock ownership on firm performance. This study demonstrates the differential moderating effects of exploration on the relationship between stock options/stock ownership and long-term performance. Such effects of exploration come from the different risk features of stock options and stock ownership. The key implication is that stock options could be more effective than stock ownership to enhance a firm’s long-term performance when a firm has a strong exploration orientation.
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This study aims to elaborate on how firms manage research and development (R&D) activities by examining the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate R&D…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to elaborate on how firms manage research and development (R&D) activities by examining the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate R&D investment, as well as the moderating role of stock options in this relationship.
Design/methodology/approach
The study sample comprised 354 Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2019, and the Tobit model and the system GMM test are used to check robustness.
Findings
The results reveal that ownership concentration and R&D investment have an inverted U-shaped relationship. In the presence of stock options, this inverted U-shaped relationship is significantly weaker.
Originality/value
The results have important managerial implications for firms that aim to grant stock options and improve the impact of ownership concentration on R&D investment strategies.
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Robert Martin Hull, Sungkyu Kwak and Rosemary Walker
The article aims to explore if stock derivative types (stock options and stock warrants) are associated with stock returns for firms undergoing seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).
Abstract
Purpose
The article aims to explore if stock derivative types (stock options and stock warrants) are associated with stock returns for firms undergoing seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).
Design/methodology/approach
The authors regress stock returns against stock derivatives for periods around SEO announcements with standard errors clustered at the month level.
Findings
The authors find that lower stock derivatives holdings for the fiscal year after the SEO are associated with superior pre-SEO returns. This can be explained by owners exercising their derivatives to capitalize on the pre-SEO price run-up. The authors find that greater stock option holdings by insiders for the fiscal year after the SEO are associated with superior post-SEO returns for up to ten years after the SEO announcement. This new finding does not hold for stock warrants.
Research limitations/implications
Stock derivatives are supplied by Capital IQ. Given their description, the authors infer that stock options are owned largely by insiders. Thus, the insider conclusions for stock options depend on this implication.
Practical implications
Stock options and stock warrants can be used strategically to reward stock derivative owners of strong performing firms for past performance. Stock options can be used to motivate insiders (primarily key executives) to achieve superior future performance.
Originality/value
This study is unique in comparing the influence of holdings for stock options and stock warrants on stock price performance around SEOs. The authors show that the sign of the association depends on whether the test includes pre-SEO periods.
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