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In June 2016, a clear majority of English voters chose to unilaterally take the United Kingdom out of the European Union (EU). According to many of the post-Brexit vote analyses, the single strongest motivating factor driving this vote was “immigration” in Britain, an issue which had long been the central mobilizing force of the United Kingdom Independence Party. The chapter focuses on how – following the bitter demise of multiculturalism – these Brexit related developments may now signal the end of Britain's postcolonial settlement on migration and race, the other parts of a progressive philosophy which had long been marked out as a proud British distinction from its neighbors. In successfully racializing, lumping together, and relabeling as “immigrants” three anomalous non-“immigrant” groups – asylum seekers, EU nationals, and British Muslims – UKIP leader Nigel Farage made explicit an insidious recasting of ideas of “immigration” and “integration,” emergent since the year 2000, which exhumed the ideas of Enoch Powell and threatened the status of even the most settled British minority ethnic populations – as has been seen in the Windrush scandal. Central to this has been the rejection of the postnational principle of non-discrimination by nationality, which had seen its fullest European expression in Britain during the 1990s and 2000s. The referendum on Brexit enabled an extraordinary democratic vote on the notion of “national” population and membership, in which “the People” might openly roll back the various diasporic, multinational, cosmopolitan, or human rights–based conceptions of global society which had taken root during those decades. This chapter unpacks the toxic cocktail that lays behind the forces propelling Boris Johnson to power. It also raises the question of whether Britain will provide a negative examplar to the rest of Europe on issues concerning the future of multiethnic societies.

Purpose – This chapter uses the work of Oxford economist Paul Collier to explore the conditions under which financing systems can be created to support the governance and economies of fragile states. This support is especially needed in the immediacy of a crisis or as a practical strategy to potentially change the dynamics of a particularly vulnerable state. The focus is on his 2008 proposal for Haiti, for a partnership of domestic and international financial institutions. Central to the proposal is the establishment of an Independent Service Authority (ISA) to fund and implement government policy, especially in delivery of basic services. Representatives from aid donors, Haitian expatriates or diaspora and members of the government would sit on the ISA board, sharing responsibility for effectively administering public funds. This model was proposed to the United Nations in late 2008 to stabilise and transform the government and economy of Haiti (Collier, 2008, 2009b).

Methodology – The chapter explores the issues raised in the model using a case study of the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI).

Findings – “The work concludes that the RAMSI process worked well to stabilise financial systems and survived significant political challenge due to a framework of local agreements, regional or international resolutions, treaties, statutes and contracts. This suggests that such a framework will help to ‘buttress’ any mixed local–international financial institutions in the event of domestic political or legal contest in Haiti (or wherever else this model is considered).

Limitations – The chapter does not compare Haiti and the Solomon Islands as societies or economies, or go into the details of how the proposed financial institutions would operate and transition to other arrangements. Space also prevents consideration of the other international partnership models applied in Haiti from 2006–08 (e.g. the Haiti Economic Governance Reform Operation or EGRO; see the case study on Haiti by Bradford and Scott (forthcoming), 76–84). After the earthquake in January 2010, Collier re-visited Haiti and stressed the importance of longer-term economic transformation (a Haiti Marshall plan) as well as emergency relief.**Collier, P., & Warnholz, J.-L. (2010a). Haiti earthquake: Social and economic fabric must be rebuilt too. The Guardian, Sunday, 17 January. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/17/haitiearthquake-social-fabric-rebuilt; Collier, P., & Warnholz, J.-L. (2010b). We need a Marshall plan for Haiti. Globe and Mail, 13 January. Available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/we-need-amarshall-plan-for-haiti/article1430309/ A key element of the international community's assistance will be finding mechanisms to handle finances. However the details of the new proposals are yet to be made public, hence this chapter focuses solely on Collier's 2008 proposals.

Alvin Hansen and John Williams’ Fiscal Policy Seminar at Harvard University is widely regarded as a key mechanism for the spread of Keynesianism in the United States. An original and regular participant, Richard A. Musgrave was invited to prepare remarks for the fiftieth anniversary of the seminar in 1988. These were never published, though a copy was filed with Musgrave’s papers at Princeton University. Their reproduction here is important for several reasons. First, it is one of the last reminiscences of the original participants. Second, the remarks make an important contribution to our understanding of the Harvard School of macro-fiscal policy. Third, the remarks provide interesting insights into Musgrave’s views on national economic policymaking as well as the intersection between theory and practice. The reminiscence demonstrates the importance of the seminar in shifting Musgrave’s research focus and moving him to a more pragmatic approach to public finance.

Post-conflict economies are characterized by high, and often growing, levels of debt. At the same time, peace is particularly fragile in the aftermath of a conflict. This chapter studies how debt affects the risk of war in the 10 years that follow the end of a previous conflict. After controlling for per-capita income and other economic, political, and geographical factors, external debt is found to increase the risk of war. Conversely, the effect of domestic debt is negligible. The policy implication for the international community is clear: debt relief helps stabilize peace in war-torn economies.

Paul Samuelson was attracted to the irregular economic development pattern of some South American countries because of the links between economic performance and political factors. He discussed the influence of “populist democracy” on Argentina’s relative economic stagnation, which, he argued in the 1970s and early 1980s, served as a dangerous paradigm for the American economy under stagflation. Stagflation phenomena marked the end of Samuelson’s “neoclassical synthesis.” Moreover, he applied his concept of “capitalist fascism” to deal with military dictatorships in Brazil and (especially) in Chile. The Brazilian translation of his Economics in 1973 brought about a correspondence with Brazilian economists about the “fascist” features of the regime. The main variable behind the South American economic and politically unstable processes discussed by Samuelson was economic inequality, which became also a conspicuous feature of the American economy since the adoption of market-based policies in the 1980s and after.

Peace, war and international security is an area in which economists are often conspicuous by their absence, to a degree that rivals the importance of economic issues to the problems at hand. It is getting to the point where the supposed ‘imperialism’ of economics in the social science (Fine, 2001) is reversed and the political scientists, international relations and other such groups exclude the economists and take on the economics themselves. It is not unusual to find studies of post-conflict reconstruction in which economics is surprisingly found to be important. In the case of the World Bank, it came as a great shock to the other social scientists when economists started to argue that economics might have a major role to play in understanding civil wars (Collier et al., 2003). Economists do have the gift of overstatement and a tendency to state unpleasant truths in a clear and precise way that can disturb other social scientists, whose indignation and overreaction reflected this. More recently the debate has reached a more civilised recognition of the complexity of such issues (Arnson & Zartman, 2005; Berdal & Malone, 2000).

We propose that the ambiguity of discourse around a category – rather than being problematic – improves the longevity of that category. This is especially true in the creative industries. Using methods and theories drawn from sociology and art history, we tested this thesis using swing as a case study. Based on three years of archival research we found 70 co-existing definitions of swing and 89 different uses of the term. These multiple meanings enabled various understandings to come in and out of focus over time, contributing to swing’s longevity. Our findings extend to other categories within the creative industries.