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Firms may suffer differently from the patent thickets in a particular technology field. This paper explores how patent thickets affect the financial performance of firms with different patent propensities and technological leadership.

From the perspective of patent strategy, the authors study how patent propensity, the possibility that a firm applies for patents, affects the patent thickets and financial performance. Additionally, this paper uses patent stock to measure technological leadership, the degree to which a firm can develop, maintain and enhance technology and product innovation, to study the impact of patent propensity on firms. A three-way interaction model is used to explore the relationship among patent thickets, patent propensity, technological leadership and financial performance based on an unbalanced panel of 69 Chinese telecommunication equipment firms from 2008 to 2019.

The authors find that patent propensity positively moderates patent thickets and financial performance. Notably, technological leadership negatively moderates the moderating effect of patent propensity.

This paper enriches the heterogeneous literature of patent thickets and financial performance. It sheds light on the fact that firms with different technological leadership may use different patent strategies to cut through patent thickets.

The paper's aim is to build a model that predicts the optimum tactics for capitalizing on inventions within the context of competitive interaction among large firms. For patenting, the paper seeks to show how invention value and firm rivalry drive the tactics of competing, deterring competitors, retreating from markets, and cooperating. It also aims to explore the effects of the contingencies of patent bulking, technology complexity, spheres of influence, resource similarity, and complementary‐resource tacitness.

The work is conceptual.

The base model shows that patenting can be used to protect markets where there is high invention‐value and high rivalry. When both invention‐value and rivalry are low, the best tactic is to cooperate. When value is high and rivalry low, patenting can be used as a signaling and deterring mechanism, but when value is low and rivalry is high the best option is to let patents lapse and retreat from markets. The moderating effects of patent bulking, technology complexity, spheres of influence, resource similarity, and complementary‐resource tacitness affect rivalry and the amount of patenting that will be done.

The paper provides propositions for empirical testing that are predictive of firm performance, rivalry, and patent bulking. Despite the authors' attention to key contingencies, it is impossible to be completely comprehensive in addressing all contingencies.

The framework provides tactics for competing and, consequently, maximizing income and minimizing costs.

The work synthesizes extant thinking on patents and multipoint competition. While the base model should be valuable for managers, the overall work should be valuable for academics.

Intellectual property rights and competition policy are intimately related. In this chapter I survey the economic literature analyzing the interaction between intellectual property law and competition law and how the boundary between these two policies is drawn in practice. Recognizing that intellectual property rights and competition law can interact in many different ways, the presentation focuses on several key issues. The economic literature on the interaction between competition law and intellectual property rights shows that these regulatory systems are consistent in terms of basic principles. Significant tensions exist, however, and it is difficult to balance IPR and competition law in practice. The significant differences in approach between the United States and the European Union simply reflect the underlying reality that efforts to achieve a sensible balance do not result in policy harmonization.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a system for regularly offered government-sponsored technology prizes. Such prizes would preserve the incentive to invent without the barriers to entry that come with the patent system. This is of particular interest to entrepreneurs as they lack the patent portfolio that incumbent firms can leverage into derivative technology.

After reviewing various efficiency concerns with the patent system, the author describes how technology prizes could work alongside the patent system. Such prizes are best when the sponsor can capture as much of the technology spillover as possible – i.e. through a government agency. This paper provides a framework for a practical prize structure while paying special attention to combating the logistical and public choice concerns of creating a prize.

This paper focuses on two methods to prevent inefficiency in government-sponsored prize: truth-bonding and information markets. Each mechanism helps combat different kinds of problems. Various complications to this system are explored and addressed.

The paper suggests that an efficient prize system is a possible policy and, if implemented, would embolden technology-focused entrepreneurship and other subsequent technological development.

While previous work has noted the benefits of technology prizes over patents, few attempts have been made to outline an incentive-compatible system for doing so. This paper is the first of its kind to propose a practical and efficient government-sponsored prize system.

This chapter discusses current issues raised by the use of patents in university-industry technology commercialization. After introducing how patent laws operate in the global marketplace, this chapter provides an overview of the U.S. patent system, describing aspects of the process by which patents are obtained and enforced. The focus of the chapter then turns to some of the benefits and costs to academia of the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act, which allows universities to capture returns from federally funded research. The chapter identifies some of the challenges created by the expanding scope of subject matter eligible for patent protection and concludes with a discussion of some of the issues and opportunities associated with the strategic licensing and enforcement of patents that may impact invention and innovation in the academy and beyond.

This chapter provides a selective survey of the theoretical and empirical literature to date on the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and measures of innovation and international technology transfer. The chapter discusses the empirical implications of theoretical work, assesses the theoretical work based on the evidence available, and identifies some gaps in the existing literature.

Scholars of business, economics, and law have long recognized that rights to intellectual property (IP) intimately shape innovative activity and the pursuit of profits. More than 60 years ago, Michal Polanyi voiced the following concerns about awarding property rights to creations of the “intellect”:The law…aims at a purpose which cannot be rationally achieved. It tries to parcel up a stream of creative thought into a series of distinct claims, each of which is to constitute the basis of a separately owned monopoly. But the growth of human knowledge cannot be divided into such sharply circumscribed phases. Ideas usually develop gradually by shades of emphasis, and even when, from time to time, sparks of discovery flare up and suddenly reveal a new understanding, it usually appears that the new idea has been at least partly foreshadowed in previous speculations. (Polanyi, 1944, pp. 70–71)

This article explores the effect of technological similarity in acquisitions on invention quantity and quality. In doing so, we confirm previous findings in the literature suggesting that technological similarity exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with innovative output and a negative relationship with average invention quality. However, we identify the nature of the technology as an important moderating factor for both relationships. We distinguish between two types of technologies, complex and discrete, and suggest that at high levels of technological similarity, invention quantity and average quality increase more in complex technology industries as compared to discrete technology industries. These effects are attributed to innovation cumulativeness and the interdependencies developed between patent rights in complex technology settings. A study of acquisition and patenting activity in two industries over a sixteen-year period provides empirical support to our claims.

Neoliberal political leaders such as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990) and President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) heralded entrepreneurs as capitalist heroes, yet for the most part, the policies they enacted did not help real entrepreneurs. Their image of a self-made entrepreneur who thrives in the absence of government action was fundamentally flawed. Their ideology impaired their ability to promote entrepreneurship because they viewed support for entrepreneurs primarily in negative terms as the removal of government tax and regulatory burdens rather than in positive terms as the cultivation of a dynamic market infrastructure. This article presents this argument in four steps, focusing on the US case: (1) how neoliberal reforms embodied internal contradictions; (2) how reforms to market governance undermined entrepreneurship; (3) how other neoliberal policies also failed to support entrepreneurs; and (4) how policies that violated neoliberal principles, such as industry and technology policies, were actually more supportive of entrepreneurs.

Purpose – This chapter examines the licensing behavior of patent pools when they are unconstrained by antitrust rules.

Design/methodology/approach – Patent pools allow competing firms to combine their patents and license them as a package to outside firms. Regulators today favor pools that license their patents freely to outside firms, making it difficult to observe the unconstrained licensing strategies of patent pools. This chapter takes advantage of a unique period of regulatory tolerance during the New Deal to investigate the unconstrained licensing decisions of pools. Archival evidence suggests that – in the absence of regulation – pools may not choose to license their technologies.

Findings/originality/value – Eleven of twenty pools that formed between 1930 and 1938 did not issue any licenses to outside firms. Three pools granted one, two, and three licenses, respectively, to resolve litigation. Six pools issued between 9 and 185 licenses. Archival evidence suggests that the pools studied in this chapter used licensing as a means to limit competition with substitute technologies.