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This study delves into the dynamics between Agile Response to Change (AR), Adaptive Scoping (AS), Stakeholder Engagement (SE) and Project Performance (PP), with a special focus on the moderating influence of Project Complexity (PC). The research, grounded in a thorough literature review, identifies critical gaps in these areas and examines the extent to which PC moderates the effects of AR, AS and SE on PP, offering new perspectives for managing complex projects.

The research develops a conceptual model based on a critical analysis of existing literature. A comprehensive questionnaire was designed, incorporating 28 items to measure AR, AS, SE, PP and PC. Data was collected from 136 project managers across various industries, and the responses were analysed using structural equation modelling (SEM) to explore the complex interplay between these variables.

The analysis revealed that internal AR (ARint) significantly enhances both quantitative (PPqt) and qualitative aspects of PP (PPql). AS and SE were found to positively influence PPql, but their impact on PPqt was not significant. Interestingly, PC was observed to negatively moderate the relationship between ARint and PPql, while its moderating effect on the relationship between ARint and PPql was not significant. The study also notes that PC does not significantly alter the positive correlations between AS, SE and PPql.

This research contributes to the existing body of knowledge by elucidating the relationships between ARint, AS, SE and different dimensions of PP. It uniquely explores the role of PC as a moderating variable in these relationships, offering valuable insights for practitioners and researchers in the field of complex project management.

The British North American colonies were the first western economies to rely on legislature-issued paper monies as an important internal media of exchange. This system arose piecemeal. In the absence of banks and treasuries that exchanged paper monies at face value for specie monies on demand, colonial governments experimented with other ways to anchor their paper monies to real values in the economy. These mechanisms included tax-redemption, land-backed loans, sinking funds, interest-bearing notes, and legal tender laws. I assess and explain the structure and performance of these mechanisms. This was monetary experimentation on a grand scale.

In The Changing Body (Cambridge University Press and NBER, 2011), we presented a series of estimates showing the number of calories available for human consumption in England and Wales at various points in time between 1700 and 1909/1913. We now seek to correct an error in our original figures and to compare the corrected figures with those published by a range of other authors. We also include new estimates showing the calorific value of meat and grains imported from Ireland. Disagreements with other authors reflect differences over a number of issues, including the amount of land under cultivation, the extraction and wastage rates for cereals and pulses and the number of animals supplying meat and dairy products. We consider recent attempts to achieve a compromise between these estimates and challenge claims that there was a dramatic reduction in either food availability or the average height of birth cohorts in the late-eighteenth century.

Because, for George Herbert Mead, the “social act” is the basic unit of analysis for understanding human social existence, and thereby, his entire body of thought, it demands much more critical attention than it thus far has received from sociologists. Here, his notion of the social act will be critically examined – in terms of his definition of social action, the underlying organizing principle he uses to explain it, the different fundamental forms of social action he identifies, and the basic operating elements that he contends comprise these forms – for the purpose of developing a better conception of social action than he provided. Mead sees social action as organized on the basis of “sociality,” expressing itself in two fundamental forms – “cooperative” and “conflictive.” He also views the cooperative form as comprised of five basic elements – attitudes, roles, significant symbols, attitudinal assumption, and common social objects – while the conflictive form is comprised of only the first four elements. After a critical examination of Mead’s social act is completed, an alternative and improved conception of social action, with domination as its organizing principle, is proffered. More importantly, it is argued that this new notion of social action, termed the “collective act,” provides the grounds for the development of a novel interactionist perspective, dubbed here “radical interactionism,” which is based on the principle of domination rather sociality. Thus, this new interactionist perspective, is dramatically different from the traditional interactionist perspective Mead and Blumer developed.

The main purpose of this essay is to reflect on the nature of justification. To this end, the analysis draws on Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s De la justification. Les économies de la grandeur ¹ [On Justification: Economies of Worth ² ]. More specifically, the article aims to examine the extent to which Boltanski and Thévenot’s conceptual framework, widely known as ‘the sociology of critical capacity’, ³ permits us to demonstrate that processes of justification ⁴ are vital to the symbolically mediated construction – that is, to both the conceptual and the empirical organization ⁵ – of social life. In order to prove the validity of this contention, the inquiry explores the meaning of ‘justification’ in relation to the following dimensions: (1) existence, (2) ethics, (3) justice, (4) perspective, (5) presuppositions, (6) agreement, (7) common worlds, (8) critique, (9) practice and (10) justification itself. By way of conclusion, the article maintains that processes of justification constitute an essential ingredient of human reality.

In this paper, I compare Theodore Schatzki’s practice theory, the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger upon whom Schatzki drew in its formation, and my own theory of institutional logics which I have sought to develop as a religious sociology of institution. I examine how Schatzki and I both differently locate our thinking at the level of practice. In this essay I also explore the possibility of appropriating Heidegger’s religious ontology of worldhood, which Schatzki rejects, in that project. My institutional logical position is an atheological religious one, poly-onto-teleological. Institutional logics are grounded in ultimate goods which are praiseworthy “objects” of striving and practice, signifieds to which elements of an institutional logic have a non-arbitrary relation, sources of and references for practical norms about how one should have, make, do or be that good, and a basis of knowing the world of practice as ordered around such goods. Institutional logics are constellations co-constituted by substances, not fields animated by values, interests or powers.

Because we are speaking against “values,” people are horrified at a philosophy that ostensibly dares to despise humanity’s best qualities. For what is more “logical” than that a thinking that denies values must necessarily pronounce everything valueless? Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” (2008a, p. 249).

Against the grain of the paradigmatic postcolonial analytics of the colonial state, this chapter presents a non-dichotomous comparison of two regimes within the late 18th century Danish empire, which are commonly presumed to be of essentially different kinds – namely the colonial state in Tranquebar in South East India and the metropolitan government of rural Danish society. By focusing, firstly, on practices of policing and, secondly, on the general technology of power that targeted these significantly different socio-political spheres, it is argued that these regimes were governing according to similar strategies: seeking, on one hand, to deploy societal mechanisms of self-regulation and, on the other, to provide a balance and order to the otherwise chaotic forces of the population. On the basis of a Foucauldian vocabulary of government, it is thereby argued that colonialism, at this time and place, had not yet clearly constituted itself as a particular form of rule.

This chapter takes a deeper look into understanding an increasingly popular advertising tool – product placement (PP) – by defining it, examining its usage and measuring its consequences, both from a marketing and a consumer welfare perspective. It also tries to reconcile these contradictory perspectives to achieve a common ground and a positive outcome for all stakeholders.

A literature review of current research findings, from both a marketing and public policy perspective, is used to arrive at a more balanced viewpoint of PP.

Public policy makers are advised to improve the consistency of current regulations in terms of PP disclosure in the media, regardless of where a programme is produced or broadcast, to help create savvier consumers. Marketers are advised not to fight against PP regulations, but rather to develop their creativity in order to avoid consumers rejecting the disclosed placement.

We address consumers’ ability to raise a protective shield when they encounter a PP situation. We explain how certain disclosures regarding the commercial intent of PP may be more effective than others, thereby empowering consumers to manage their behaviour and make informed decisions. We then describe how PP can be used to educate consumers about pro-social issues in an entertaining, non-patronising way.

This chapter proposes to go beyond the usual divide between advertisers and policy makers to arrive at a balanced view, considering the positive role that PP may play in education, while mitigating its potential negative impacts through effective consumer training.