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The potential of biotechnology to cure disease and feed the Third World has not eased public disquiet about its safety. In the rush to commercialization, can lessons be learnt from the introduction of nuclear power a generation ago? While France’s nuclear programme stayed on track, America’s was derailed by accidents and corporate secrecy. So is an industry under state control safer than one in private hands? And in the absence of clear evidence about the long‐term effects of genetic manipulation, how can we design a consultation process that addresses public concerns?

This paper aims to examine the intensifying efforts by China and the West to harness the clean, limitless energy of nuclear fusion. However, it argues that this “holy grail” of a fusion future is only achievable through an optimal combination of mission-oriented public–private cooperation and genuine intergovernmental cooperation.

This study deploys a case-study approach, augmented by relevant literature, to analyse the advances in fusion technology.

Despite purported recent advances in fusion technology, these advances remain largely “proof of concept” experiments rather than commercially viable technologies that enable us to truly harness the infinite power of these “artificial suns”. To achieve the moonshot goal of delivering practicable “net energy gain” from fusion power, this study advocates shedding hubristic political “one-upmanship” amongst rival governments. Further, it urges focussing the ingenuity, along with the financial and scientific resources of all stakeholders (both public and private) across the globe to bring about this “fusion dawn”. Moreover, efforts to deliver fusion power face significant competition from other clean energy sources (wind, solar power and nuclear fission reactors) that are not only technically far less challenging but also economically more viable with their declining cost structures.

This study is possibly one of the few social science papers that examines the prospect of clean, limitless fusion power along with the challenges it faces and its societal implications.

India became a NWS (Nuclear Weapons State) most reluctantly in May 1998 despite her demonstration of nuclear weapons capability 24 years earlier in May 1974. Having assumed the new status as the sixth overt nuclear weapons state, India also declared her principled policy governing use of nuclear weapons in the event of a national security threat. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine was called “minimum deterrence” by the BJP-led NDA government, but the Congress-led UPA government in 2004 renamed it as “credible deterrence.”

But the heart of the vibrant Indian nuclear doctrine is its commitment to No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were invented by the United States (U.S.). First-ever use of atom bomb is also made by the Americans and a philosophic foundation for the discussion on NFU was also laid in the U.S. However, having put the NFU in the philosophic parlance, the U.S. in the Cold War International environment professed the doctrine for First Use (FU) of nuclear weapons. It is China that made a first public commitment to the NFU after it became the fifth nuclear weapons state.

This chapter proposes to discuss Indian commitment to NFU as a first step on the long path toward global nuclear disarmament—or No Use (NU) of nuclear weapons. India saw Partial Test Ban treaty of 1963 as a step toward NU and also saw the discussions on NPT as another step toward nuclear disarmament as much as it wanted the big powers to see the CTBT too as a device aimed at putting world into NU bind. West, led by the U.S., was however only interested in using the CTBT to deny nuclear weapons status to threshold states, particularly India.

As a self-declared nuclear weapons state, India has, in nuclear doctrine, committed itself to nuclear disarmament. Can there be an international treaty between the declared nuclear weapons states? Can India and Russia come together on the issue? Can they convince China to join? With three Asian nuclear weapons states committing themselves to NFU, U.S. can see economic sense in an international treaty on NFU. Is it possible to create a global public opinion in favor of NU of nuclear weapons? The questions will be answered based on research conduct on the subject.

The conclusion of the Cold War's U.S.‐Soviet superpower rivalry may have ended the threat of a global nuclear military confrontation involving these powers. It did not, however, result in the termination of international regional conflicts or of military threats to U.S. national security. The collapse of a world political and strategic system ostensibly polarized between two ideologically contrasting superpowers has resulted in the emergence of numerous threats to regional and global order.

The design, construction, and operation of a nuclear power plant (NPP) pose technological and R&D challenges for the organisations concerned. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the sources of innovation and the technological developments throughout the construction and commissioning processes for Atucha II NPP.

Studying a high-risk organisation that is reliable in practice poses several research questions the authors consider in this work. What kind of R&D processes can take place in a mature industry like the nuclear sector in Argentina? How have technological challenges been overcome since the restart of the completion phase of Atucha II NPP? Primary data were mostly gathered through semi-structured interviews. Grounded theory was the methodological approach adopted.

Multiple sources of technological developments arise, an incremental R&D pattern being the most salient. Atucha II NPP seems to be a case of network innovation in a triple helix innovation scheme led by the Argentinian state. In effect, one of the outcomes of the construction of the Atucha II NPP was the development of the Argentinian nuclear sector together with the development of organisational capabilities. In this sense, the third Argentine NPP follows the socio-technical path of the Argentine nuclear industry.

Too little is known about R&D processes in high reliability organisations (HROs), especially in the nuclear sector of a Latin American country such as Argentina as there seem to be no organisational studies analysing HROs’ impact on innovation, reliability, and economic development.

Diseñar, construir y operar una central nucleoeléctrica plantea desafíos tecnológicos y de innovación a las organizaciones involucradas. Este artículo analiza las fuentes de innovación y los desarrollos tecnológicos del proceso de construcción y puesta en marcha de la central nucleoeléctrica Atucha II.

Abordar el estudio de una organización concebida desde la teoría como altamente riesgosa pero confiable en la práctica plantea múltiples interrogantes. ¿Qué tipo de procesos de I+D se pueden dar en una industria madura como la nuclear civil, en Argentina? ¿Cómo se afrontaron los desafíos tecnológicos a partir de la reactivación de un proyecto abandonado durante más de una década? La entrevista semi-estructurada a interlocutores clave fue el instrumento de intervención predominantemente utilizado. Se adoptó el enfoque metodológico de la teoría fundada.

Del análisis del caso surgen diversas fuentes de desarrollos tecnológicos prevaleciendo un patrón de I+D incremental. Se trata de un caso de innovación en red en el marco de un modelo de triple hélice liderado por el Estado. En efecto, una de las resultantes de la construcción de Atucha II es el desarrollo del entramado del sector nuclear argentino junto con el desarrollo de capacidades organizacionales. En ese sentido, la tercera central nuclear de potencia argentina retoma la trayectoria socio-técnica del sector nuclear argentino.

Resultan escasos los conocimientos sobre los procesos de I+D en organizaciones de alta confiabilidad (HROs), especialmente del sector nuclear de un país latinoamericano como Argentina así como se carece de estudios organizacionales que analicen el impacto de las HROs en la innovación, la confiabilidad y el desarrollo económico.

The purpose of this paper is to make recommendations for policy makers, promotors and project managers on how to structure and deliver new nuclear build programmes, by drawing on the megaprojects literature and salutary lessons from previous megaprojects.

This paper is underpinned by the extant literature and an analysis of public domain data from three proposed new nuclear power plants in the UK. It identifies the main challenges facing new nuclear build projects and subsequently proposes lessons that can be learnt from megaprojects, in order to plan, structure and deliver new nuclear build programmes successfully.

The paper argues that megaprojects are simultaneously trait-making, rather than trait-taking, possess a temporality and timescale in excess of typical infrastructure projects, suffer from high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity, are organisationally complex, costly and are highly likely to destroy rather than create value. Second, it argues that the challenges facing new nuclear build are not merely technological but also institutional, political and societal in nature. The nature of these challenges is exemplified using three proposed new nuclear build projects in the UK.

This is the first paper to draw on both extant megaproject theory and on an analysis of the public domain data from three proposed new nuclear power plants in the UK. It makes contributions to megaprojects theory and practice, and specifically to nuclear new build projects. Importantly, it proffers recommendations for how new nuclear build programmes around the world might be structured, planned and delivered to minimise the risks of failure.

Nuclear energy is a contested topic, requiring trade-offs in energy independence, ethicality and uncertainty. Anthropogenic climate change complicates these decisions further, with nuclear energy competing with other low-carbon and sustainable energy sources. Decisions about nuclear energy’s role, as part of a sustainable energy system, must be made in cooperation with all stakeholders. However, it is unclear how the public is involved in these decisions in the UK. This study aims to address this gap, exploring the degree to which public participation has occurred in the UK.

This paper conducted a scoping review of public participation in UK nuclear energy decision-making in the context of sustainable energy transitions, where the government retains and promotes nuclear energy as part of a sustainable energy system. Following a systematic literary search, this paper reviewed 28 academic and grey literature documents.

Public participation has primarily been conducted as consultations rather than active participation. There is limited evidence that consultations have meaningfully contributed to politically and socially responsible (i.e. individuals and groups working together for community benefit) decision-making, with public opinion on nuclear energy’s role being divided and is influenced by how it is framed.

Social aspects of nuclear energy development have historically received less attention than environmental and economic elements; the role of engagement and participation is relatively rare. Modern literature reviews in this context are largely absent, a gap this paper originally contribute to. This paper suggest ways in which how effective, inclusive engagement process could contribute to a fairer, responsible decision-making process and energy system in the UK.

Is the nuclear sky falling? It appears so. With the quantitative and qualificative improvements in nuclear stockpile, a proliferation-pessimism finds expression in metaphors about nuclear dominoes, chains etc. With a number of threshold states, the catch-phrase is ‘credible deterrence’. However, much of the zero-sum cold war thinking on strategic defence has now become anachronistic. A phased adaptive approach, leading to universal disarmament is necessary, especially in India’s strategic interest. A nuclear weapon-free world could ensure a safer regional security environment for India. It’s all the more imperative in view of China’s interest to emerge as the strategic leader in Asia, even well beyond Asia.

New START initiatives are positive developments in this regard. However, it is necessary to bring into this fold other nuclear powers. (China has rejected the US and Russian levels of nuclear ‘transparency’ as part of its defence calculus; it has already crossed the multiple warhead Rubicon. It may also install a National Missile Defence System by 2020.)

Though a Nuclear Weapon-Free World (NWFW) cannot emerge instantaneously, an NWFW can evolve, if the following measures are evolved:

• (i)

  Change the mind-set devaluing nuclear weapons by strategically displacing ‘disbelief’ with ‘faith’ in the efficacy of nuclear abolition.

• (ii)

  Change the perception of  the utility and prestige associated with nuclear weapons.

• (iii)

  Redraft nuclear doctrines to restrict their role and break the ‘feed-back paradigm of the need for nuclear deterrence’.

• (iv)

  Take measures to build confidence in multilateral initiation on NWFW.

• (v)

  Ensure universal acceptance of ‘no first use’ (NFU) through a legally binding, universally accepted agreement.

• (vi)

  Have agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

• (vii)

  Devise agreements for controlling the continuous qualitative upgradation.

• (viii)

  Establishment of a Safeguard Regime with thorough organizational and institutional mechanism.

• (ix)

  Use advanced surveillance and monitoring technology to ensure compliance.

• (x)

  Implement effective enforcement strategy to penalize delinquent.

Change the mind-set devaluing nuclear weapons by strategically displacing ‘disbelief’ with ‘faith’ in the efficacy of nuclear abolition.

Change the perception of  the utility and prestige associated with nuclear weapons.

Redraft nuclear doctrines to restrict their role and break the ‘feed-back paradigm of the need for nuclear deterrence’.

Take measures to build confidence in multilateral initiation on NWFW.

Ensure universal acceptance of ‘no first use’ (NFU) through a legally binding, universally accepted agreement.

Have agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Devise agreements for controlling the continuous qualitative upgradation.

Establishment of a Safeguard Regime with thorough organizational and institutional mechanism.

Use advanced surveillance and monitoring technology to ensure compliance.

Implement effective enforcement strategy to penalize delinquent.

It is in India’s interest to pursue universal disarmament with universal focus on economic and social cohesion for war prevention as the key to long-term security.

As the first Asian country to build a nuclear reactor, and as one among the handful of countries with full nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, India should strive to bring about universal disarmament of nuclear weapons so that world can meet spiralling demand for power through nuclear reactors, which pose no threat to the world peace.

The strategic standoff, known as mutual assured destruction (MAD) by the USA and nuclear parity by Russia, has been overtaken by the advance of technology and the demise of the Soviet Union. Pacing technology is being exploited by an increasingly mature missile defense. If implemented comprehensively, it could have widespread and revolutionary ramifications. This paper seeks to address these issues.

The article describes the historical background of America's nuclear strategy, from Eisenhower to the Obama Administration. It then traces the history of missile defense and arms limitation and develops the context of the interaction between them. It is found that nuclear arsenals should not be reduced to zero because that would put rogue nations in a position where they could intimidate the world. Finally, the evolution of computer chip technology, as embodied by Moore's law, is traced. The recommendation is made to proceed with the reduction of nuclear stockpiles to the level of a few hundred each, and to proceed with the implementation of comprehensive missile defenses.

The most important is the practicality of reducing nuclear arsenals to a few hundred on either side. That strategy is called “moral deterrence” herein. It is moral because, as opposed to MAD, it does not hold extensive civilian populations of the world hostage. At the same time, it is a sufficiently strong deterrent to prevent rogue nations from acquiring and threatening with illicit nuclear weapons. Moral deterrence is a better strategic option than the “nuclear‐free world” advocated by the Obama administration since nuclear‐free does not preclude intimidation by rogues.

Technology enabling reliable missile defense is based on high‐speed, large‐capacity, miniaturized computer chips. It permits fast and reliable computations that can process real‐time data from radar, infrared, and optical sensors so that a hit‐to‐kill capability can be realized. It also permits the implementation of deformable mirrors for the adaptive optics used in high‐energy lasers. Much of the technology for modern missile defense flowed from the Strategic Defense Initiative; it was not predicted by the critics of three decades ago.

The principal aspects of originality involve the analytical tradeoffs between the nuclear stockpiles of the principal powers and the viability of missile defense. The analysis indicates that if the stockpiles are reduced to a few hundred each, then even imperfect missile defense is very effective in providing protection, providing it is triply redundant. Stockpiles reduced to ten or less leave the principal powers vulnerable to intimidation by rogue nations, and should be avoided. The article also finds that missile defense has been enabled technologically by Moore's law, and that it can be expected to improve further by the year 2020.