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This study investigates whether listed firms using equity incentive plans (EIPs) adopt more conservative accounting in China's unique corporate setting.
Abstract
Purpose
This study investigates whether listed firms using equity incentive plans (EIPs) adopt more conservative accounting in China's unique corporate setting.
Design/methodology/approach
Based on a sample of 2,243 listed firms and 9,950 firm-year observations for the period of 2008–2017, this study employs piecewise cross-sectional regression models with year and industry fixed effects to examine the associations proposed in the research hypotheses.
Findings
This study finds a positive relationship between the adoption of EIPs and accounting conservatism in listed Chinese firms. Further analyses reveal that this positive relationship is more pronounced when listed Chinese firms use restricted stock units (RSUs), instead of stock options, in their EIPs.
Research limitations/implications
Unlike many early studies, this paper empirically investigates the impacts of two different types of equity incentives – stock options and RSUs – and thus contributes to accounting and corporate governance literature by providing a better understanding of the impacts of different types of equity incentives on financial reporting quality. However, this study does not consider other alternative equity incentive measurements because of the limited data regarding Chinese firm's executive compensation.
Practical implications
This study offers investors and policymakers in China some insight into how accounting conservatism in listed firms might be shaped by equity incentives used in their managerial compensation schemes.
Originality/value
This study is one of the few that examines the effects of using equity incentives in a large emerging market. It offers support for the view that the recent introduction of policies on EIPs by the Chinese government has an overall positive impact on listed firm's financial reporting quality, as reflected by greater degrees of accounting conservatism.
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This paper aims to examine whether high equity incentives motivate executives to avoid issuing convertible debt and/or to design convertible debt issues as anti-dilutive to…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine whether high equity incentives motivate executives to avoid issuing convertible debt and/or to design convertible debt issues as anti-dilutive to earnings-per-share (EPS).
Design/methodology/approach
Tests are conducted using the Heckman two-step probit model to control for potential self-selection bias between firms that issue straight debt and those that issue convertible debt. Further, analyses are conducted separately and jointly for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to assess the differential impact of CEOs’ and CFOs’ equity incentives on convertible debt issuance and design decisions.
Findings
Firms are more likely to design convertible debt issues as anti-dilutive to EPS when CFOs have high levels of equity incentives, but only when the firm stock price is sensitive to diluted EPS. High CEOs’ equity incentives have limited impact of convertible debt issuance and design decisions.
Research limitations/implications
The main limitation of this study is the generalizability of the findings and implications of this study due to the smaller sample size of convertible debt issues.
Originality/value
Prior research has shown that bonus incentives influence CEOs with disincentive for EPS dilution and motivate them to make anti-dilutive financing decisions. Further, there is evidence that high equity incentives motivate CEOs to manage earnings to boost short-term prices. This study extends prior literature by showing that high equity incentives provide executives with disincentive for EPS dilution and motivate CFOs to design convertible debt issues as anti-dilutive to EPS possibly to avoid reduced stock prices. Further, this study shows that CFOs have greater influence over convertible debt design choices than CEOs do.
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Caiyu Yan, Hongqu He, Juan Li, Shuang Cheng and Yanjun Zhang
This paper aims to propose a strategy to analyze management governance in China.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to propose a strategy to analyze management governance in China.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper incorporates data on 989 Chinese listed firms over 2006 to 2016. A fixed effects model with panel data and an F-test are applied to exploit the relationship between management ownership and firm performance. A threshold model is introduced to explore the impacts of other governance mechanisms on management governance.
Findings
This paper finds an inverted U-shaped relationship between management ownership and firm performance. Furthermore, the threshold model demonstrates that large shareholders strengthen the positive effects of management governance and attenuate its negative effects; board size strengthens the positive effects of management governance but cannot attenuate its negative effects; and independent directors attenuate the negative effects of management governance.
Practical implications
This paper indicates that increasing management ownership could motivate managers to ameliorate the agent’s moral hazard problem which link the firm value premium when management ownership is less than 20.286 per cent. However, equity incentives are very rare in China. Thus, the authors expect that equity incentives will be a common phenomenon in Chinese listed firms.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to corporate governance literature by shedding some light on management ownership to explore the effects of management ownership. Specifically, this paper explores the effects of management ownership on firm performance and the impacts of other governance mechanisms on management governance to shape the management governance in China.
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The fundamental change in accounting rules for equity-based compensation (EBC) instituted by SFAS 123, SFAS 123r, and IFRS 2 has allowed for new insights related to a variety of…
Abstract
The fundamental change in accounting rules for equity-based compensation (EBC) instituted by SFAS 123, SFAS 123r, and IFRS 2 has allowed for new insights related to a variety of research questions. This paper discusses the empirical evidence generated in the wake of the new regulation and categorizes it into two broad streams. The first stream encompasses research on the changed use of EBC and the incentives provided. The second stream addresses how firms account for EBC, including the underreporting phenomenon and how it was affected by the mandatory recognition of EBC expenses. I discuss where research delivers unanimous findings versus contradictory results. Using these insights, I make recommendations for further research opportunities in the area of EBC.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate how managerial risk-taking incentives affect the sensitivity of R&D investments to the availability of a firm’s internal finance.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how managerial risk-taking incentives affect the sensitivity of R&D investments to the availability of a firm’s internal finance.
Design/methodology/approach
The author studies a large panel sample of US firms from 1992 to 2013 using a dynamic structural model and estimates a system GMM estimator that accounts for unobserved firm-specific effects, and that allows the author to address the potential endogeneity of all of the financial and executive compensation variables.
Findings
Managerial risk-taking incentives, in particular CEO portfolio vega, have a significantly positive impact on the financial constraints that bind R&D investments. Moreover, the author finds that CEO portfolio vega has stronger impacts on the investment-cash flow sensitivity of R&D in firms that are more likely to face binding financial constraints.
Originality/value
Prior studies on the financial constraints of R&D investments do not consider the potential impact of executive compensation on R&D investments. The author complements this stream of literature by providing novel results showing that managerial risk-taking incentives have a significant impact on the severity of the financial constraints on R&D investments.
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Shifang Zhao, Xu Jiang and Yoojung Ahn
Research on the effect of executive equity incentives is equivocal. Based on agency theory, some scholars take the convergence of interest logic to highlight the benefits of…
Abstract
Purpose
Research on the effect of executive equity incentives is equivocal. Based on agency theory, some scholars take the convergence of interest logic to highlight the benefits of executive equity incentives. In contrast, others adopt the entrenchment logic to emphasize the increased agency costs. This study attempts to reconcile the debate on executive equity incentives and integrates the opposing views to unveil how executive equity incentives impact corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance.
Design/methodology/approach
Using the panel dataset of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2022, this study integrates the convergence of interest and entrenchment logic to examine how executive equity incentives affect CSR performance.
Findings
We find that the relationship between executive equity incentives and CSR performance follows an inverted U-shaped form. According to the convergence of interest logic, executive equity incentives reduce agency costs when allocating resources to engage in CSR activities and enable firms to increase their CSR investments, ultimately realizing increased CSR performance. After a threshold, however, the accumulation of extensive equity incentives causes the entrenchment effect, resulting in declined CSR performance. Our empirical results also shed new light on its contingent perspective – the inverted U-shaped relationship is attenuated when firms’ stock liquidity is high.
Originality/value
This study attempts to reconcile the debate on executive equity incentives and integrates the opposing views to unveil the inverted U-shaped relationship between executive equity incentives and CSR performance. Our study opens promising avenues for further research on corporate governance and CSR strategies.
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Zili Su and Constantinos Alexiou
On the basis of corporate governance and agency cost theory, using the fifth sub-indicator of Fan et al. China Marketization Index as the regional investor protection index (IPI)…
Abstract
Purpose
On the basis of corporate governance and agency cost theory, using the fifth sub-indicator of Fan et al. China Marketization Index as the regional investor protection index (IPI), the purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of equity incentives and regional investor protection on corporate payout policies and corporate performance.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper establishes ordinary least squares regression model to examine interactions between the effects of equity incentives and regional investor protection upon firms’ dividend payouts. In addition, the authors also explore whether the joint effects on payouts are altered in the presence of growth opportunities, and investigate the effects of interactions between equity incentives and regional investor protection on corporate performance.
Findings
The authors observe that firm managers appear to abuse equity incentives by increasing dividend payouts. However, regional investor protection can potentially restrain such behavior. The restraining effect depends on the firms’ growth opportunities, on the basis of which the effect on cash (stock) dividends is found to be weaker (stronger) in high-growth firms – and stronger (weaker) in low-growth firms. Further evidence indicates that the restraining effect of regional investor protection on selfish dividend-related behavior encouraged by equity incentives may also prove valuable in encouraging exploitation of these incentives so as to enhance corporate performance.
Practical implications
Since reforming investor protection laws and improving judicial quality are difficult and lengthy at a country level. Improving regional levels of investor protection, however, seems more feasible and effective. Through measures encouraging the development of intermediaries, increases in the number of lawyers – all of which seem likely to constrain behavior harmful to the interests of investors – the provincial administrations can reasonably expect to contribute toward improvements in the performance of firms and the development of the economy in their region. This paper provides encouragement to regional policy makers in China and in other developing countries.
Originality/value
This paper uses a regional index of investor protection to study the impact on corporate dividends and performance, in contrast with most previous studies, which have examined these issues at country or individual firm levels. The use of a regional-level investor IPI in this paper therefore fills a gap by coming in between the country- and firm-level indicators typically used in previous research, thus providing a new perspective on investor protection issues.
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Digital transformation is essential for commercial banks to maintain long-term competitiveness in the digital economy era. This study aims to investigate the relationship between…
Abstract
Purpose
Digital transformation is essential for commercial banks to maintain long-term competitiveness in the digital economy era. This study aims to investigate the relationship between inside debt and the bank's digital transformation.
Design/methodology/approach
This study set up a quasi-natural experiment based on implementing the executive compensation deferral system in the Chinese banking industry. Using the annual panel data of 180 commercial banks in China from 2007 to 2021, this study employed the difference-in-differences (DID) method to conduct an empirical analysis.
Findings
This study confirms a significant statistical relationship between inside debt and the bank's digital transformation, and managerial myopia is the transmission channel of inside debt affecting the bank's digital transformation. Furthermore, the development of Internet finance and the enhancement of bankers' confidence will improve the contributions of inside debt to the bank's digital transformation.
Originality/value
This study contributes to the literature on inside debt and the bank's digital transformation. It has specific policy value for the scientific design of the banking compensation mechanism and accelerating banks' digital transformation.
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This paper aims to investigate whether the non-generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) performance measures (NGMs) disclosure by high-tech initial public offering (IPO…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to investigate whether the non-generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) performance measures (NGMs) disclosure by high-tech initial public offering (IPO) firms signal firms’ efforts to maintain relatively high stock price levels before the expiration of the lock-up period to benefit insider selling.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors perform ordinary least squares and logit regressions using financial statement data and hand collected data on NGM disclosures for high-tech firms during the IPO process.
Findings
The authors find that the top executives of high-tech IPO firms with NGM disclosures are significantly more likely to sell and sell significantly more insider shares at the lock-up expiration than those of high-tech IPO firms without NGM disclosures. At the same time, while high-tech NGM firms have stock returns similar to their counterparts without NGMs for the period before the lock-up expiration, their stock returns are substantially lower after insider selling following the lock-up expiration.
Practical implications
By documenting the negative association between NGM disclosures and post-lockup expiration stock performance, the study highlights managerial deliberate optimism about the firm’s prospects which may not materialize. Hence, investors should take the NGM disclosures with a grain of salt.
Originality/value
This paper fills a notable void in the non-GAAP reporting literature by documenting a statistically and economically significant positive association between managerial equity trading incentives and NGM disclosures by high-tech IPO firms.
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Igor Filatotchev, Steve Toms and Mike Wright
The paper seeks to present a novel conceptual framework that integrates the strategic dynamics of the firm with changes in its governance systems.
Abstract
Purpose
The paper seeks to present a novel conceptual framework that integrates the strategic dynamics of the firm with changes in its governance systems.
Design/methodology/approach
The agency research agenda is extended to include other corporate governance roles, such as resource and strategy functions, alongside monitoring and control functions. Theoretical arguments are supported by empirical data related to the founder‐manager/IPO, IPO/maturity, maturity/decline and reinvention thresholds.
Findings
The paper shows that corporate governance parameters may be linked to strategic thresholds in the firm's life‐cycle. Successful transition over a threshold is accompanied by a rebalancing in the structure and roles of corporate governance compared with each previous stage in the cycle.
Research limitations/implications
In the absence of longitudinal data relating to firms as they pass through all life‐cycle stages the study has been restricted to reporting illustrative data from different studies regarding each strategic threshold. Further research might usefully undertake detailed long‐term case studies using a combination of archival and interview data to trace the evolution of firms across the four thresholds.
Originality/value
This paper develops a novel conceptual framework that integrates the strategic dynamics of the firm with changes in its governance systems. It rejects the notion of a universal governance template and argues that corporate governance parameters may be linked to transitions from one stage to another in the firm's life‐cycle. Accordingly, it argues that changes in a firm's strategic positioning may be associated with rebalancing between the wealth‐protection and wealth‐creation functions of governance.
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