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The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between related party transactions and both accrual and real earnings management practices in Jordanian industrial public-listed companies, taking into account the uniqueness of the Jordanian company ownership structure.

Data were collected from Jordanian industrial public-listed companies for the period 2011–2017. Accrual earnings management is measured by using the modified Jones model, whereas real earnings management and related party transactions are measured by using relevant proxies. A regression model is developed and used to assess the relation between related party transactions and earnings management, taking into account the effects of ownership concentration, family ownership and institutional ownership levels of the companies involved.

Accrual earnings management is negatively associated with related party transactions. Regarding the role of ownership structure, the presence of institutional investors is positively associated with using both related party transactions and real earnings management, whereas ownership concentration plays an efficient role to mitigate the use of both accrual earnings management and related party transactions. No statistically significant relations between real earnings management and related party transactions exist.

This study has direct practical implications for the Jordanian regulatory authorities to enact regulations to limit the misuse of related party transactions and earnings management transactions and ensure sufficient monitoring of these transactions because of their prevalence. Jordanian companies should also enhance their corporate governance systems to better approve and monitor such transactions, including enhancing the role of independent and non-controlling board members in this process.

Related party transactions are considered as a major concern of financial reporting quality in developed countries, and such transactions are found to be relatively more problematic in developing countries, where corporate governance is generally weak, and there is limited disclosure and transparency in financial reporting. From this perspective, this study is one of the very few studies in developing countries that explore the issue of related party transactions and their association with earnings management practices. Thus, the findings of this study can arguably be to some extent generalized to other developing country contexts, because of relatively similar business environment conditions, and therefore potentially fill a gap represented by the paucity of similar studies in developing countries.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate two related questions. First, is earnings management behaviour in private firms related to managerial ownership and if so, what form does the relationship take. Second, is there evidence of opportunistic earnings management behaviour in private firms.

This study uses univariate and multivariate (regression) methodologies to examine the association between managerial ownership and earnings management in private firms. The study employs a data set of 1,223 large private UK firms.

Evidence is presented indicating opportunistic earnings management behaviour in private firms. Specifically, firms with low managerial ownership appear to engage in more earnings management when faced with poor performance. Further, when firms report income-increasing discretionary accruals, the magnitude of abnormal accruals varies non-linearly with managerial ownership.

This study is limited by availability of data on sample firm ownership. This study uses cross-sectional data due to these limitations. Further research could investigate the relationships between earnings management and classes of shareholders other than managers in private firms.

Policy implications of this work suggest that non-managing shareholders in private firms face considerable agency costs, in particular where managerial ownership is very low or very high.

Pervasiveness of earnings management in private firms compared to public firms is well documented in the literature. There is limited extant research on the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management in private firms. The novel aspect of this study is to present findings on the association between this behaviour, managerial ownership and firm performance in private firms.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between internal corporate governance mechanism and earnings management of Jordanian companies. More specifically, the author examines several hypotheses regarding the relationships between ownership and earnings management.

This study measures the magnitude of discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management using the cross-sectional modified Jones model. A number of econometric techniques are used including ordinary least squares and generalized least squares to test the relationship between company ownership and earnings management, using a sample of 62 companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange.

The results revealed that insider managerial ownership, institutional ownership, external blockholder, family ownership and foreign ownership have superior influence on financial reporting quality, as it is, to a greater extent, potentially able to curtail earnings management. The findings contended that the aspects of ownership structure have a significant influence on earnings management, which is in agreement with the theories of corporate governance and opinions that have been highlighted through a number of international bodies.

Due to lack of data, the paper depends on cross-sectional data applied to isolate abnormal accruals.

The evidence may be conceivably beneficial as a supporting fundamental for regulatory action, particularly those that affect the ownership structure. The findings have significant implications for regulators as well as supervisors, who will benefit by the comprehension of how ownership structure affects earnings management and enhance financial reporting quality.

The current research produced its essential contribution through empirically displaying that ownership structure has different implications on earnings management. Moreover, the results recommended that both policymakers and researchers would no longer contemplate ownership structure as a whole, given that ownership structure has different implications on earnings management, measured by the discretionary accruals.

Conventional studies discuss the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance and have conflicting findings. This paper seeks to find divergent mutual effects existing between managerial ownership and firm performance.

The three‐stage‐least squares method and simultaneous equation model is adopted to obtain more efficient coefficient estimation. Both firm‐year observations and company mean variables are used to capture the structural relation and mutual effects between ownership structure and firm performance.

This paper finds divergent mutual effects existing. In a diffused ownership structure, better firm performance may induce management to hold more stockholding. Management with mid‐range of stockholdings has a positive effect on firm performance but not vice versa. For highly concentrated ownership structure, a negative mutual effect exists.

These findings provide the investment purpose as an alternative explanation for insiders' stockholding that agrees with investors' risk aversion attitude in practice. For highly concentrated ownership, possible management entrenchment behavior resulting from dominant control power should be carefully considered and monitored to protect minority shareholders.

This paper provides new evidence that complicated mutual effects may exist between managerial ownership and firm performance. It offers insights for both investors and researchers in corporate governance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption complements corporate governance factors (e.g. ownership structure) in monitoring managers’ discretional behavior in an emerging market context.

The paper relies on a sample of listed companies in the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, South Africa and the Philippines during an eight-year period on average (four years of pre-adoption period and four years of post-adoption period).

The authors find no evidence of lower earnings management after the switch to IFRS reporting, suggesting that managerial discretional behavior is insensitive to a firm’s IFRS adoption. However, the authors document effective monitoring role of a firm’s ownership structure on earnings management. More interestingly, institutional investors are effective in constraining earnings management when holding a high level of ownership. Moreover, the effect of blockholders and institutional blockholders varies as their ownership rises following a non-linear pattern.

First, the assumption that discretionary accruals are adequate measure of earnings management may be criticized in different ways. Second, the findings, performed on listed companies in the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, South Africa and the Philippines, should be interpreted with caution and cannot be generalized to all emerging market countries.

Standards setters and market authorities should be aware of earnings management determinants to set adequate and fitting accounting standards limiting opportunistic behavior of managers and mainly to set up training programs to accounting professionals improving the IFRS implementation. Moreover, considering specific features of firms in emerging market countries related to ownership structure, international investors may rely on such criteria to evaluate firms. Finally, auditors should be aware of different incentives for earnings management in order to be able to detect eventual manipulation of accounting earnings.

This paper provides a timely contribution to the continuous debate of the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management in a poorly exploited setting, emerging market context. When investigating, additionally, the eventual non-linear effect of institutional ownership, block ownership, institutional block ownership and non-institutional block ownership on earnings management, a major contribution is that it brings to light the finding of a differential influence of ownership levels on earnings management.

This paper aims to propose a strategy to analyze management governance in China.

This paper incorporates data on 989 Chinese listed firms over 2006 to 2016. A fixed effects model with panel data and an F-test are applied to exploit the relationship between management ownership and firm performance. A threshold model is introduced to explore the impacts of other governance mechanisms on management governance.

This paper finds an inverted U-shaped relationship between management ownership and firm performance. Furthermore, the threshold model demonstrates that large shareholders strengthen the positive effects of management governance and attenuate its negative effects; board size strengthens the positive effects of management governance but cannot attenuate its negative effects; and independent directors attenuate the negative effects of management governance.

This paper indicates that increasing management ownership could motivate managers to ameliorate the agent’s moral hazard problem which link the firm value premium when management ownership is less than 20.286 per cent. However, equity incentives are very rare in China. Thus, the authors expect that equity incentives will be a common phenomenon in Chinese listed firms.

This paper contributes to corporate governance literature by shedding some light on management ownership to explore the effects of management ownership. Specifically, this paper explores the effects of management ownership on firm performance and the impacts of other governance mechanisms on management governance to shape the management governance in China.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of audit committee independence, board ethnicity and family ownership on earnings management in Malaysia.

The effect of audit committee independence, board ethnicity and family ownership on corporate governance is investigated via 1,206 firm-year observations between the fiscal years of 2004 and 2009 of Bursa Malaysia listed firms. Panel data regression analysis is used to analyze the relationship.

The findings of this study fail to associate the role of audit committee independence as proposed under RMCCG (2007) in curtailing earnings management activities, thus supporting the findings on power distance scores that power granted to the top management may result in less effective independent directors. Nonetheless, in support of the alignment effect theory, family ownership is found to reduce earnings management activities. The findings show that corporate governance is more effective in developing country family firms due to their long history of family reputation and the importance of institutional culture factors.

This study focuses on board ethnicity, family ownership and its influence on earnings management.

This study offers insights into the importance of family institutional structures on corporate governance reforms in Malaysia as Malaysian family firms are mostly traditional firms that have built their reputation and strength in the industry for many generations.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether ownership structure affects earnings management in the banking industry of emerging markets.

The empirical study is conducted using a sample of 134 banks from 12 Middle Eastern and North African countries. Econometrically speaking, the study used a panel data regression analysis.

The authors found convincing evidence that banks with more concentrated ownership use discretionary loan loss provisions to manage their earnings. The authors also found that state and institutional owners encourage earnings management, while family owners reduce this practice.

The findings would be valuable for investors since they should take into account ownership structure in order to reach a better investment decision. Moreover, regulatory reforms in emerging markets should push for more transparency about ownership structure, high levels of supervision, and external audit quality.

This study presents international evidence on the prominent role of owners in earnings management in emerging markets with weak shareholder rights protection.

This paper aims to examine the association of corporate social responsibility (CSR), family ownership and earnings management.

The authors specifically examine mining companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2012-2014. Total observations are 105 firm-years. Research data are collected from sustainability reports, annual reports and annual financial statements. Data are analysed using panel data regression.

The evidence suggests a negative association between corporate social responsibility disclosures (CSRDs) and earnings management. The authors also examine the direct and moderating role of family ownership. The authors find a positive association between family ownership and earnings management. In addition, family ownership strengthens the negative association between CSR and earnings management.

This research only examines mining companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange, which limit the generalisation of the results.

The results should useful for: investors wishing to use the level of CSRD as an indicator of firm ethics, especially in relation to family-owned firms; capital-market regulators wishing to improve market transparency by introducing requirements to encourage more CSRD; and other users of financial statements, especially financial analysts to consider ownership structure, specifically family ownership.

Previous studies have mainly focussed on companies in the USA. This paper adds to the body of knowledge regarding whether the positive relationship between family ownership and CSR is also present outside the USA, especially in emerging countries. Further, this study examines the effect of family ownership on the association of CSR and earnings management, which rarely examined in previous studies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether real estate companies manipulate their earnings through the brokerage fee across ownership expropriation or not.

This study considers Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange listed real estate firms to investigate how the brokerage fee in the real estate industry might affect the earnings management of firms across its ownership expropriation. Using annual report data, the authors investigate the associations over a panel for the period 2008−2012. Robust panel regression is used to divulge the probability values with reference by probit regression.

Overall, the results show that high brokerage fees would drive more events of earnings management and that, generally, the ownership concentration among Malaysian real estate firms significantly affects the earnings management of the firms.

This study shows that firm profitability and brokerage fees enhance the probability of firm’s earnings management. A low brokerage fee would reflect low revenue to the company. Therefore, management would opt to manipulate earnings in order to overstate earnings, which garners more interest from investors.

Real estate values in Malaysia have climbed steadily over the years due to a combination of reasons giving companies a higher brokerage fee. Earnings management has become a big issue for property investors. The study demonstrates the relationship between earnings management and brokerage fee across ownership expropriation which can be considered by shareholders in their own strategic planning and investors in their own investing.