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This study aims to study research on franchise chain performance that has focused on franchisors’ efforts to align their interests with those of franchisees to address partner uncertainty. In contrast, the question of what a franchisor should do to address another type of uncertainty and task uncertainty remains understudied. The authors suggest a franchisor’s coordination as a key means of alleviating task uncertainty and ongoing support and plural form as two mechanisms of coordination. The authors also posit that aligned interests between the franchisor and the franchisee improve, whereas one-sided interest impedes, chain performance. Furthermore, providing greater ongoing support or deploying plural form amplifies the positive effect of aligned interests on chain performance.

The authors relied on secondary data to test the hypotheses. The authors collected data for analysis from Bond’s franchisee guide and Nation’s Restaurant News restaurant database. They also tested the framework by analyzing 17-year, panel data of 71 restaurant chains operating in the USA and Canada using system generalized method of moments.

Results show that aligning interests does improve chain performance, but that the positive effect is amplified when aligned interests are matched with a chain’s provision of ongoing support or use of plural form.

The authors explicate why it is not enough to address the misaligned interests or lack of coordination alone; a chain manager needs to address both of these problems together. In addition, the authors explicate how two franchisee coordination mechanisms – ongoing support and plural form – help a chain augment the beneficial effect of aligning interests on chain performance. Without solving the twin problems of misaligned interests and coordination simultaneously, a chain is unlikely to achieve its full performance potential.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of family ownership on investment-cash flow sensitivity and on firm performance.

The author uses panel data to examine the relationship between investment and cash flow and between family ownership and the firm performance of Thai listed firms from 2001 to 2008. To account for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable, the investment equation is estimated by the generalized method of moments, following Arellano and Bond (1991).

The presence of family owners reduces the sensitivity of investment and cash flow. At low and high levels of family ownership, an increase in family shareholding leads to lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. In contrast, firms with medium family ownership levels have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. Only at high levels of family ownership is firm performance positively related to family shareholding.

The ownership levels of family shareholders affect the investment-cash flow sensitivity in an S-shaped relation, supporting the interest alignment and entrenchment effects. When family shareholders have high ownership incentives, their interest alignment reduces the agency costs of free cash flow problems and leads to higher firm performance.

This study aims to empirically investigate the effect of managerial ownership on bank value concerning conventional and Islamic bank. The analysis uses a balanced panel data set based on a sample consisting of 480 bank-year observations between 2003 and 2017.

Ordinary least squares, fixed effect and random effect have been used primarily to examine the relationship between managerial ownership and banks' value. Later, the authors validate the core results by using the generalized linear model.

This study provides general support for the claim of interest alignment that encourages bank standards with a high level of managerial ownership and partly opposes the view of the entrenchment effects.In addition, the study finds a U-shaped and insignificant relation between managerial ownership and bank value. This indicates that initially, managerial ownership is a blessing, and later, it becomes a curse in considering bank value. Moreover, bank value affects managerial ownership positively both for conventional and Islamic banks.

A good number of studies are available in the current literature, which examine the impact of managerial ownership on either bank performance or risk-taking. However, very few studies are found that examine the bidirectional relationship between managerial ownership and banks' value. Moreover, to the best of authors’ knowledge, there is a dearth of literature on this topic that is built on the comparative analysis between conventional and Islamic banks.

This paper aims to provide a systematic framework for organizations to analyze their knowledge reuse processes, and balance codification and personalization within their knowledge strategy according to cost/benefit analysis.

This paper divides knowledge reuse process into a sequence of five stages, and accordingly analyzes costs/benefits under codification and personalization strategies. Markov decision process, a mathematical framework for multi-stage decision-making, is employed to optimize a mixed strategy for knowledge reuse processes within an organization.

Organizations need to consider factors such as the number of reusable knowledge items, reuse patterns, and intra-organizational interest alignment which are critical to determine their optimal mix between codification and personalization. Companies should determine a knowledge strategy based on their knowledge reuse contexts instead of following success cases blindly.

This paper presents an illustrative example to show how this framework might be applied by an organization. However, the validity and reliability of strategic decision-making also depends on the accuracy of the model's parameter values. Firms can adopt many methods as surveys, Delphi method, to determine the parameter values.

The proposed framework offers an opportunity for firms to gain insights by setting the model's parameters to their own reuse contexts/characteristics and conducting what-if analysis.

This paper proposes a formal framework for analyzing knowledge reuse processes and offers organizations guidelines about decision-making of knowledge strategies.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between financial decisions and ownership structure by using the control contests on a sample of Italian listed companies.

The analysis adopts a balanced panel data set of 984 firm-year observations for the period of 2002-2013, with estimation using a generalized method of moments.

The results appear to confirm both the hypotheses of the alignment of interests and the entrenchment effect. The entrenchment and alignment effects are not found to be alternatives but rather are found to co-exist. The presence of a coalition of minority shareholders acts as a tool to control agency costs, particularly when the coalition is instrumental in the contestability of corporate control.

These findings suggest that minority shareholders may have a larger impact than previously identified by strategically aligning with other shareholders to form coalitions. This study provides several practical implications. First, dividend payout is not necessarily a good instrument to control and monitor agency costs. This is because the payout can be used to expropriate benefits from the minority shareholders. Second, high ownership concentration does not always reduce agency costs. Third, a non-collusive coalition can be more useful in the monitoring of agency costs than other tools, such as the debt level.

This study shows that there is considerable value to the firm when individual blockholders come together in a contestable environment and become instrumental in making business decisions. The results support the contention that contestability is an excellent deterrent to dampen the expropriation of benefits to minority shareholders. This study also provides evidence that cash holding can be a good substitute for dividends and debt in the effort to limit agency costs.

This study investigates whether listed firms using equity incentive plans (EIPs) adopt more conservative accounting in China's unique corporate setting.

Based on a sample of 2,243 listed firms and 9,950 firm-year observations for the period of 2008–2017, this study employs piecewise cross-sectional regression models with year and industry fixed effects to examine the associations proposed in the research hypotheses.

This study finds a positive relationship between the adoption of EIPs and accounting conservatism in listed Chinese firms. Further analyses reveal that this positive relationship is more pronounced when listed Chinese firms use restricted stock units (RSUs), instead of stock options, in their EIPs.

Unlike many early studies, this paper empirically investigates the impacts of two different types of equity incentives – stock options and RSUs – and thus contributes to accounting and corporate governance literature by providing a better understanding of the impacts of different types of equity incentives on financial reporting quality. However, this study does not consider other alternative equity incentive measurements because of the limited data regarding Chinese firm's executive compensation.

This study offers investors and policymakers in China some insight into how accounting conservatism in listed firms might be shaped by equity incentives used in their managerial compensation schemes.

This study is one of the few that examines the effects of using equity incentives in a large emerging market. It offers support for the view that the recent introduction of policies on EIPs by the Chinese government has an overall positive impact on listed firm's financial reporting quality, as reflected by greater degrees of accounting conservatism.

This study aims to investigate the effect of high insider ownership on firms’ internal controls over financial reporting. In particular, it examines how high insider ownership affects the likelihood of an adverse Sarbanes–Oxley Act Section (SOX Section 404) opinion and its subsequent remediation.

Tests of hypotheses use ineffective controls and remediation models. The initial tests in this study use ineffective internal controls over financial reporting probit regression models to investigate how high insider ownership affects the ex-post likelihood of an adverse 404 opinion. Two remediation models – a multinominal probit regression and probit regression model – are used to investigate the effect of high insider ownership on the likelihood of successfully remediating an adverse 404 opinion.

Results show that while the ex-ante likelihood of an adverse SOX Section 404 auditor’s internal control opinion increases with high insider ownership, high insider ownership firms are more likely to remediate ineffective 404 controls. This study rationalizes these diverse findings by asserting that prior to an adverse 404 opinion, entrenched managers avoid internal control financial reporting oversight and monitoring. After an adverse opinion, however, and within the context of an imminent and explicit value reducing 404 opinion, powerful high insider owner managers are motivated to remedy ineffective controls.

This research synthesizes existing streams of literature on insider ownership and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting quality to provide new information on the effects of high insider ownership on firms’ internal controls.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance (CG) on chief executive officer compensation (CEO COMP) and pay–performance relationship (PPR) in Indian listed firms.

A sample of 196 companies listed on the S&P BSE 500 (Standard and Poor's Bombay Stock Exchange 500) Index has been analyzed using the panel (random effects) regression technique over the period 2010–2019. In addition, the system GMM technique was used to deal with the endogeneity issue.

The study found that block ownership and ownership concentration negatively impact COMP measures and PPR. Board size also had a negative direct and moderating impact on CEO COMP; however, the linkages were generally insignificant, especially for total pay. Similarly, outsider blockholders were found to be playing an insignificant role. Further, board independence positively influences COMP levels and PPR, though the results were mixed with respect to significance. Finally, CEO duality positively and significantly influences CEO COMP and PPR. A comparison before and after the new Indian Companies Act 2013 also revealed similar results, particularly in the after period. It suggests that the new legislative initiative was not effective enough in improving the CG and, hence, the alignment of pay with performance.

This study investigates the direct and moderating impact of CG on CEO COMP in the context of emerging economy India. Further, it makes a comparison before and after the introduction of the new governance reform, that is, the Indian Companies Act, 2013. Moreover, providing support to the entrenchment effect, the study reveals that large shareholders expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by not aligning CEO pay with performance, making agency problems graver in emerging economies like India.

Although intellectual capital (IC) has been proven to be value-added for companies, the drivers of IC performance remain an under-researched area. From the perspective of corporate governance, the purpose of this paper is to examine how controlling the ownership of shareholders would influence IC performance.

This study utilized value-added intellectual capital (VAIC^TM) and its subcomponents, namely human capital, structural capital and capital employed efficiencies, to proxy for IC performance and regression analyses to assess the association between controlling the ownership of shareholders and the IC performance of Taiwanese listed semiconductor firms for the years 2009–2017.

Results show that controlling the ownership of shareholders is nonlinearly related to IC performance. Specifically, controlling their ownership positively affects the level of IC performance up to an optimal point before it turns to be a negative relationship thereafter.

The results of this study can help policy makers and other stakeholders understand the role of controlling shareholders in determining IC performance. The findings of this study suggest a nonlinear relationship between controlling the ownership of shareholders and IC.

This study provides an extended perspective in studies related to the determinants of IC by considering the resources provided by controlling shareholders. The definitions of controlling interests and IC applied in this study are compared and aligned with those found in the International Financial Reporting Standard 10 – Consolidated Financial Statements and the International Integrated Reporting Council, respectively.

The agency view of corporate governance requires effective monitoring to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal. This paper suggests that conventional proposals to reform corporate governance through legislation, codes of best practice, and the like, are necessary, but underestimate the pressures which reputational intermediaries face from inevitable conflicts of interest and bias. Various strands of the literature on corporate governance, cognitive research and behavioural economics are integrated to shed light on questions regarding the independence of boards of directors and external auditors.