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The objective of this study is to explain family firm payout decisions based on socioemotional wealth (SEW) considerations.

A sample of publicly listed Canadian companies is examined for the period from 2003 to 2008. Distinguishing family firms from nonfamily firms, a Probit regression is used to analyze the likelihood of making a payout. For payout firms, regressions are used to analyze the relationship between payout level (dividends and share repurchases) and payout mix and family firms.

Results indicate that family firms are more likely to make a payout than nonfamily firms. Among payout firms, the level of payout among payout firms is lower for family firms than for nonfamily firms and their portion of payout in the form of dividends is higher. Lone founder family firms have a lower likelihood of making payouts than other family firms. However, among payout firms, they pay out more than other family firms and have a smaller percentage of their total payout in dividends than other family firms.

Results are impacted by the definition of what constitutes a family firm. Family ownership was used as a proxy for the underlying SEW considerations. Future research could involve interviews with family firm representatives to investigate the relative importance of SEW considerations in their payout decisions.

In providing an alternative theoretical framing of family firms’ payout policies, the study suggests that payout differences between family and nonfamily firms may be driven in part by SEW considerations.

The purpose of this article is to empirically explore the sensitivity of payouts to cash flows and the other financing decisions, such as debt and investment, of firms.

Using panel regressions based on COMPUSTAT data for 7,544 public firms during the period 1973–2013, we estimate the sensitivity of total payouts. Specifically, following the theory presented in Lambrecht and Myers (2012), we test the interdependent financing decisions of the firm. First, we compute total payout as the sum of cash dividends and net stock repurchases; second, we examine the sensitivity of total payouts to changes in the firm’s net income, debt and investment. Furthermore, we present several tests to demonstrate the robustness of our results.

We suggest evidence in support of the theory in Lambrecht and Myers (2012) showing that there is a negative relationship between total payouts and investment. Furthermore, we find that total payouts are positively associated with net income and debt of the firm.

Previous research has shown how cash flows affect different financing decisions, but it is not clear how total payouts are sensitive to other financing decisions. The focus of this paper is the response of total payouts to investment policy, debt financing policy and changes in cash flows.

This study aims to explore the relationship between promoter share pledging and the company’s dividend payout policy in India. Furthermore, this study also analyses the moderating impact of family involvement in business on the association between share pledging and dividend payout.

A sample of 236 companies from the S&P Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive (BSE) 500 Index (2014–2023) has been analysed through fixed-effects panel data regression. For additional testing, robustness checks include alternative measures of dividend payout and promoter share pledging, as well as alternative methodologies such as Bayesian regression. Lastly, to address potential endogeneity, instrumental variables with a two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) methodology have been implemented.

Upholding the agency perspective, a significantly negative impact of promoter share pledging on corporate dividend payouts in India has been uncovered. Moreover, family involvement in business moderates this relationship, highlighting that the negative association between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts is more pronounced in family companies. The findings are consistent throughout the robustness testing.

The present study represents a pioneering endeavour to empirically analyse the link between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts in India. It enhances the theoretical underpinnings of the agency relationship, particularly by substantiating the existence of Type II agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. The findings of this research bear significant implications for investors, researchers and policymakers, particularly in light of the widespread prevalence of promoter-controlled entities in India.

This study examines whether dividend payout, an internal corporate governance mechanism, is a substitute for or an outcome of product market competition, an external corporate governance mechanism. The sample includes firms in six of the world’s most prominent economies. We find that firms in more competitive industries pay less in the way of dividends to their shareholders, which is consistent with the notion that dividends and competition are substitutes. We also determine that the above negative relationship is weaker in countries with stronger regulation protecting minority shareholders against corporate self-dealing. Furthermore, the relationship has attenuated following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that increased regulation and enhanced governance standards. Collectively, our findings provide consistent evidence across countries that the two corporate governance mechanisms examined in the study are substitutes, and greater regulation weakens the substitution effect. Our empirical findings are robust to alternative measures of dividend payout, industry definition, and shareholder protection.

The manner in which publicly traded companies’ management teams handle their firm’s free cash flows (FCF) has been an issue for many decades, because it is difficult to determine whether these management teams work for their own benefit or for that of their shareholders. Recent financial scandals have heightened mistrust of management. This mistrust, in turn, may have increased the pressure to reduce the portion of FCF left under management’s control. Boards of directors control dividend payout decisions, thus determining the portion of FCF available to corporate management. This paper examines whether the 2002 legal response to corporate financial reporting scandals, which came in the form of many new initiatives and requirements imposed by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on all publicly traded firms, was relevant to dividend payouts. This question is investigated by noting that the impact of these new requirements differed among firms. Some firms had already introduced the use of independent directors and fully independent committees prior to SOX making them compulsory in 2002. This paper examines whether these “pre-adopters” experienced less change in their dividend payout policies than those firms that were forced to change the composition of their board and committees.

This investigation examines the effect on dividend payouts for listed firms attributable to the SOX and concurrent changes in stock exchange regulations that compelled increased use of independent directors and fully independent committees. To study the impact of SOX and the associated, required, changes in the composition of boards of directors for many firms, the difference-in-differences methodology is employed to overcome the endogeneity concerns that have consistently challenged prior governance studies. This was accomplished by examining the effects on dividend payouts associated with the exogenously forced addition of independent directors to the boards of publicly listed firms. The results reveal that there is a significant positive relationship between firms that were compelled by law to change their boards and increases in average changes in dividend payouts and percentage changes in dividends paid, when compared to firms that had pre-adopted the Sarbanes–Oxley corporate board composition requirements. A further exploratory analysis showed that the same significant positive relationship is detected for increases in average changes in total dollars distributed, where stock repurchase dollars are combined with dividend payouts. These findings imply that these board composition changes led to decisions that increased dividend payouts in percentage terms, as well as dividend payouts and total dollars distributed in aggregate dollar amount terms.

This study aims to investigate the mediating role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the link between board independence, board diversity and dividend payouts underpinning the agency theory perspective. As boards are ultimately responsible for decision-making, it includes CSR, dividend payouts and other strategic decisions.

Board independence and board diversity (female director, female independent director) are used as explanatory variables, CSR scores as a mediator and dividend payout explained variables. The relevant data were collected from 159 listed firms of the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) from 2013 to 2019, consisting of 1,113 year-firm observations. For empirical estimation, the study used the Tobit regression analysis and Sobel test to check the significance of the mediation to confirm the hypothesis.

The results confirm that independence and diversity on the board are positively related to dividend payouts. Further, CSR partially mediates the link between independence and diversity on board-dividend payouts, which confirms the argument that firms with involvement in CSR practices are also associated with dividend payouts.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is novel to address whether CSR mediates the link of the board’s independence and diversity and dividend payouts in Pakistan’s setting. The results of this study have restricted generalizability due to the specific nature of the sample characteristics; future researchers can extend the research scope.

Theoretically practically, the results imply that CSR spending also enhances the distribution to firms' shareholders, thus becoming attractive to investors. This study enriches the literature on board attributes-dividend policy nexus, which strengthens through CSR practices and is relevant to practice in line with sustainable development in an emerging context.

CSR practices are an understudied but significant factor that links stakeholders' beliefs about firms' decision-making strategies, enhancing dividend announcements. In doing so, this study's findings contribute to the literature, regulators, shareholders and investor at various levels.

This study attempts to examine the relationship between board characteristics and dividend payout decisions of conventional and Islamic banks.

This study employed unbalanced panel data of both Indonesian conventional and Islamic banks over the period 2008–2021, estimated using tobit and logit models. Dividend payout decisions were measured using the dividend payout ratio and probability to pay dividends. Meanwhile, board characteristics were represented by board size, board independence, board gender diversity, board meeting, board chairman tenure and board chairman tenure.

The results show that, in the context of conventional banks, board meetings, board chairman tenure and board chairman tenure are correlated with higher dividend payout decisions, while board gender diversity indicates lower dividend payout decisions. On the other hand, in the context of Islamic banks, board size and board meetings are associated with higher dividend payout decisions, while board independence and board chairman tenure are related to lower dividend payout decisions.

This study fills the gaps in the literature on bank dividend policy. It also provides additional insights regarding the relationship between board characteristics and dividend payout decisions in the context of conventional and Islamic banks. In addition, this study gives essential contributions to regulators and investors of both banks, especially in a developing country, Indonesia.

This study is one of the first to provide empirical results regarding the relationship between board characteristics and dividend payout decisions of conventional and Islamic banks. Board characteristics are indicated as one of the fundamental factors that determine dividend payout decisions of both conventional and Islamic banks in Indonesia.

The characteristics of businesses change with the change in ownership structure of the business. This study examines the change in ownership structure of the firm after the departure of lone founders, and its influence on dividend payout decisions of the firm.

The authors employed 4,302 firm-year observations of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period 2007–2021. To test the hypotheses, the authors employed ordinary least squares regression, and additionally, generalized method of moments estimation and fixed effect analysis were applied to check for the robustness of results.

Using the lens of agency theory and social identity theory, the authors report that the presence of lone founder (family owners) is negatively (positively) associated with dividend payout, however, transition of lone-founder ownership to family-owned and family-managed firm leads to more dividend payout, whereas its transition to family-owned and non-family-managed firm results in lesser dividend payments.

This study provides novel insight into the strategic behavior of lone founders and extend the limited family business heterogeneity literature by examining the effects of ownership transition and its influence on firm's dividend payout decisions.

This study aims to investigate the effects of peers on corporate payout policies in one of the largest emerging markets – India. It also examines the motives for mimicking payout decisions.

The sample is composed of 3,024 non-financial and non-government firms listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) and Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) for the period 1995 to 2020. To encounter the endogeneity problem, the instrumental variable technique based on peer firms' idiosyncratic risk is used to estimate the effects of peers on firms' payout policy. To define peer reference groups, the authors use the basic industry classification of the firms.

The results indicate a significant positive impact of peers on firms' dividend policies in India. A firm with all dividend-paying peers is more likely to declare dividends than the one with no dividend-paying peers. Further, peer effects are found to be more pronounced amongst larger and older firms, thus supporting the rivalry theory of mimicking.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, the present study is the first of its kind that attempts to understand peer effects on payout decisions in an emerging market India, that offers a unique institutional setting. Moreover, the authors extend the existing literature by investigating the peer effects on a firm's payout policies considering various firm-level characteristics, such as growth opportunity, cash holding, financial constraint and profitability, which previous studies have not taken into consideration. These results provide additional insights into the heterogeneity and motives behind peer effects.

This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance on firms' dividend payout policy in sub‐Saharan Africa. The study also aims to examine how dividend payout influences corporate governance.

Using a sample made up 27 Ghanaian firms, 177 Nigerian firms, 51 Kenyan firms, and 270 South African firms covering the period 1997‐2006, the paper employs a simultaneous panel regression model in its estimation.

The results show that board composition and board size exhibit significantly positive relationship with dividend payout in Kenya and Ghana, respectively. Institutional ownership positively influences dividend payout among South African and Kenyan firms. In the case of Nigeria, all the corporate governance measures show significantly negative effects on dividend payout. The findings clearly suggest that, with respect to South Africa, Kenya and Ghana, good corporate governance structures lead to high‐dividend payout, probably due to easy access to and low cost of external finance. However, in Nigeria, improving the governance structures may be associated with high‐earnings retention or low‐dividend payment in order to reduce cost of external finance. We found in the case of Ghana that, dividend payout positively affects board composition, suggesting that Ghanaian firms with high‐payout tend to adopt good corporate governance structures in order to ensure protection of shareholder interest. The findings of this study certainly have important policy implications.

This present study contributes to the corporate governance literature by looking at the importance of corporate governance in influencing firms' dividend behaviour in selected African countries.