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This paper aims to understand the relationship in developing countries between fiscal consolidation and public investment – a flexible part of the budget that is easier to cut during consolidation effort, but with potentially negative growth effects. Analyzing in detail the case of Peru, the paper explores alternative fiscal rules and frameworks that might help create fiscal space for infrastructure investment.

The paper analyses trends in public and total infrastructure investment in six large Latin American economies, in the light of fiscal developments since the early 1980s. In particular, the paper explores the association between fiscal consolidations (improvements in the structural fiscal balance) and public infrastructure investment rates. In the second part, the paper analyzes recent changes in the fiscal framework of Peru and shows how they were conductive in creating additional fiscal space.

The authors argue that post-crisis fiscal frameworks, notably fiscal rules that are increasingly popular in the region, should not only consolidate the recent progress towards debt sustainability, but also create the fiscal space to close these infrastructure gaps. These points are illustrated in a detailed account of recent developments in the fiscal framework and public investment in the Peruvian case.

The paper contributes new evidence to the literature on fiscal consolidation and the composition of government expenditures. While the literature based on evidence from the 1990s has argued that fiscal consolidation plans in Latin America have almost always led to a significant reduction in public infrastructure investment, the paper finds less clear cut evidence when extending the analysis backwards (1980s) and forwards (2000s). The example of the case of Peru is used to explore fiscal institutions and rules that might be useful for other developing countries that face important infrastructure gaps.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the motivations behind the accession of Latin American countries to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with a focus on the cases of Brazil and Chile.

The author collected data using a case study methodology, primarily through semi-structured interviews with decision-makers and through official government documentation.

The findings identified that, overall, the Brazilian politicians who made the decision to join the bank had an unclear perception of its economic benefit and believed that the clearest benefit from accession is political (to support China's initiative). After years of domestic political turmoil and economic crisis, Brazil experienced delayed incorporation into the bank, slow ratification processes in the domestic arena and a reduction in its capital commitment. Chilean decision-makers, on the other hand, seemed to have a clearer idea of the benefits from accessing the bank, which explains that their ratification process has been faster and smoother. Yet, a surprising socio-political crisis delayed incorporation into the bank. Both countries have delayed their accession to the bank due to domestic crises.

Three policy implications can be drawn from this study. First, the entry of Latin American countries into the bank reflects the persuasiveness of Chinese diplomacy in this region. Second, the author finds that interviewees are not always able to differentiate the AIIB from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and hold the misguided idea that the AIIB is subordinated to the BRI rather than complementary to it. This might set overly high expectations of the benefits of entering the AIIB. Third, the author foresees that the largest potential of the AIIB in Latin America lies in the possibility of participating in co-financed projects, in particular with the Inter-American Development Bank and the Development Bank of Latin America.

Research on the AIIB has boomed in recent years, yet there are few in-depth studies about Latin American prospective members. The value of this study lies in offering in-depth data for two of the eight prospective members from this region.

Commenting on the Mexican Revolution in 1938, Trotsky argued that the country might achieve “national independence,” understood as a break with dependency relations. Whether this might occur depended – Trotsky continued – on “international factors.” Though not engaging with Mexico, Antonio Gramsci made a similar theoretical point. It is hence from this perspective that this chapter analyses the Mexican Revolution, asking whether it led to a break in dependency relations and the attainment of “national independence” or what I refer to as “relative geopolitical autonomy.” Presenting a framework of analysis largely based on the work of Gramsci that highlights its continuity with the thought of Marx, the chapter will answer negatively to this question. The chapter starts from the idea that Porfirio Díaz’s regime was unable to adapt the economic structure (still pre-capitalist) to the complex superstructures (capitalist), that is, to realize an historic bloc. It would be this job that the emergent Mexican bourgeoisie sought to finish. However, the situation is complicated by the powerful emergence of social movements from below, constituted largely by landless peasants, and to a lesser extent, the industrial proletariat. I will therefore argue that the revolution has been both “passive” and “bounded.” The term passive revolution will be applied to the last phase of the revolution as the emerging bourgeoisie successfully coopted the demands of the popular masses thereby “passivizing” them. But crucially, the revolution was also “bounded” because international factors, and especially US influence, played a conditioning role throughout the revolutionary process. At the same time, it would be the very “passive” nature of the revolution that would contribute to the reproduction of relations of dependency. Hence the chapter concludes that the period Trotsky commented upon (the Cárdenas period) is the highest level of “independence” Mexico achieved, only to decrease again over the years.

This chapter is about an analysis and reflection on the actions, programs, and regulatory frameworks of the Mexican government for the promotion of entrepreneurial activity during the twentieth century. A documentary review is presented based mainly on the presidential reports available in the virtual legal library of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, the Center for Documentation, Information, and Analysis of the Chamber of Deputies (Cámara de Diputados), and various publications of experts on economic history, considering the twentieth century: from the year 1900 with the end of the Porfiriato until the six-year term of Ernesto Zedillo that ended in 2000. The public policies of these 100 years were reviewed and based on this, was analyzed the importance assigned to the creation, development, and consolidation of companies and their importance in public policies. Special emphasis is given to instruments for the creation of new businesses or the development and strengthening of small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Since the early modern age, the debt of the State was a constant source for concern to the Spanish governments. Episodes of defaults caused by enormous expenditure to keep the Empire slowly faded out until a certain reorganization of public finance was attained in the central decades of the nineteenth century. The core idea that finance ministers and economists, in general, had at that time was to balance the public budget controlling expenses, in order to handle the problem of public debt. However, alternative views on government finance existed. Focusing on a crucial period for the consolidation of Spanish liberal regime and its public finance, this chapter shows that, among a predominant concern for reducing public expenditure as the best way to stabilize the economy and promote economic growth, the character of Luis María Pastor emerges to support government expansionary policies financed with credit. Far from fearing deficit, Pastor, one of the leaders of the Spanish liberal school of economic thought, believed that investment in infrastructures financed through debt was the key to economic growth. Through a multiplicative effect, a program of public investment would enhance economic growth, eventually solving the long-term insufficiency of Spanish finance. This gives evidence that ideas on public finance of classical liberal economists were far from uniform, contributing to a more precise view on the body of doctrines of this school.

The aim of this research is to analyse the literature on drinking water management in Mexico City and Singapore, considering water supply, institutional organisation and management, and rates so as to propose recommendations for improvement in the water management of the Mexico City.

The preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analysis (PRISMA) methodology is used to review the literature on drinking water management in Mexico City and Singapore in time periods from 1325 to 2021 and from 1819 to 2021, respectively, emphasising the contemporary part. The information search was realised through different prestigious databases and official documents from the governments of Mexico and Singapore, as well as international organisations. After analysing, 40 documents were included to discuss the results.

There is a contrast between water management in Singapore and Mexico City because Singapore has strong institutions coordinated with each other along with the private and social sectors and has efficient fundraising and infrastructure investment systems. Although they are cities that developed in different circumstances, a comparison between them allowed to glimpse some aspects that may be useful to replicate in Mexico City.

This research is novel because there is no comparative analysis like the one presented in the literature, so it is suggested to continue delving into the topics covered in future research to have more elements that allow improving drinking water management in Mexico City.

This essay explores the critical vision of Francisco Barrera Lavalle about the Mexico’s Monetary Reform of 1905. In his critique, Barrera inserts an argument about the nature of the balance of payments in the Mexican economy: the disequilibria in Mexico’s trade balance were structurally recurrent given the characteristics of what the country exports: commodities and raw materials. Barrera believed that the authorities made the mistake of overvaluing the peso, assigning it a value higher than what silver currency was worth at the time on international markets. Barrera also dismissed the idea that monetary stability could be achieved by suspending the free coinage of silver currency. Finally, Barrera held that banks should be obligated to pay their banknotes in gold, as they were in Great Britain and in the United States, not in silver coins.

This article evaluates contemporary Cuban economic policy and development prospects after a decade of market experimentation in a socialist context. An introductory historical review assesses the successes and failures of Cuban development policy in the 1970s and 1980s and describes the staggering dimensions of the economic crisis triggered by the abrupt disruption of Cuba's relations with the Soviet bloc in 1989–1991. The next section, “To the market in the 1990s,” examines Cuban efforts to stabilize the economy in the early 1990s while maintaining a strong social safety net. The historic policy shift toward limited market liberalization within a state-dominated economy is analyzed and the key market concessions described. The economic turnaround of the late 1990s and Cuban macroeconomic and industrial performance over the past decade are then examined. The final part of the article evaluates the coherence and sustainability of Cuba's emerging economic model and assesses prospects for the survival of some form of Cuban socialism.