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The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of non-commercial banking institutions’ simultaneous holdings of equity and debt in the same firm (hereafter, dual holdings) on financial covenants in debt contracts.

By using the DealScan database, this study tests how dual holdings affect the number of financial debt covenants.

This study finds that the presence of dual holders is positively associated with the number of financial covenants in general, suggesting that the use of financial covenants is reduced when the interests between shareholders and creditors are aligned. This study also finds that dual holder participation does not reduce the number of financial covenants in leveraged loans as much as it does in investment-grade loans. Additionally, when a dual holder has a large portion of equity stakes and loan claims in a borrowing firm, the effect of dual holdings on financial covenants is more pronounced.

This study contributes to debt market research by showing that dual holder participation reduces the number of financial covenants in debt contracts.

The doctrine of illegality in the law of contract generally is complex. Furthermore, a great deal of it is not directly relevant to employment law. Any discussion on the doctrine of illegality in the law of contract generally would therefore be irrelevant in a work treating solely illegality of the contract of employment. Cases concerning aspects of illegality relating to contracts of employment have at times come before industrial tribunals and the courts. It is therefore proposed to limit the discussion to those aspects which concern solely contracts of employment. For a reader reading on the subject the reader is referred to the standard textbooks.

Loan officer decisions are of particular importance to entrepreneurial firms which rely heavily on debt financing as a primary source of capital. The authors investigate whether social purpose in these firms impact loan officer response to the violation of a debt covenant and whether there is a differential response in decision making between loan officers that work at local banks and those that work at national banks.

In total 332 loan officers from cities in the South and Midwest United States participated in a quasi-experiment comparing entrepreneurial firms that violated their debt covenants. The loan officers were asked to evaluate loan materials and decide whether they would enforce loan covenant provisions of renegotiated interest rate and by what magnitude. In the treatment group, the loan officer evaluated loan materials of an entrepreneurial firm that included information related to the firms social purpose within their community. In the control group, the evaluation materials did not include this information.

Consistent with social capital theory, the results suggest that loan officers view community involvement as beneficial to entrepreneurial firm value. Loan officers were less likely to increase interest rates among firms that demonstrated social purpose. Loan officers that decided to increase interest rates punished socially purposeful firms less severely than non-socially purposeful firms. Additionally, loan officers at community banks were less likely to increase interest rates than those at national banks.

While the prior literature examines loan covenant violations, the authors focus on the impact of loan officer decision making in entrepreneurial firms specifically around covenant enforcement. Loan officer decisions have important implications for debt financing but are typically not observable to researchers. Prior work examining the relationship between social purpose and debt financing focuses on large public firms. This study recognizes that social purpose in entrepreneurial firms is less formalized and explicit and thus should be studied separately from large firms.

Aims to investigate the reliability of two of the criteria commonly used by banks in assessing the risks associated with lending on a commercial property project. The two criteria to be examined are loan to value and income to interest cover covenants. In the light of the research, suggests improvements and modifications on how these and other criteria are used to aid lenders in their decision‐making process. The time period chosen for this study is 1984 to 1994, a decade which saw the banks enter and then retreat from the property lending market on a scale hitherto unknown in the UK, with a number of these institutions incurring unprecedented losses. Compiled initially from an analysis of published property statistics on yields, capital values and interest rates, theoretical conclusions were then made on the reliability of the two criteria under discussion. Having identified the years 1984, 1987 and 1989 as being key turning‐points in the property cycle, these conclusions were “tested” by empirical research. Between May and July 1994 13 interviews were carried out with banks that had been active in commercial property lending for all or part of the relevant period. The interviews were based on a questionnaire which established the banks′ attitude to lending at each of the specified dates. Thus it was possible to identify how the banks′ attitude changed and how reliable the covenants proved to be in practice. First, demonstrates the fluctuations in interest rates, yields and capital values between 1984 and 1994, which resulted in the reliability of loan to value and income to interest cover covenants being examined. Second, presents the findings of the interviews with the banks for each of the years 1984, 1987 and 1989. Third, reaches conclusions and makes recommendations as to the use of the two covenants under discussion as well as considering additional criteria that are important to commercial property lending.

The study aims to investigates which form of classification shifting is preferred by firms to avoid the violation of debt covenants and whether the higher-audit quality constraints the shifting practices of firms incentivized to avoid covenant violations or not.

A sample of 1,644 Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE)-listed firms during the period 2009–2021 has been used in this study and tested through panel data regression models. Two forms of classification shifting, namely expense shifting and revenue shifting have been taken into account. The findings are validated through the propensity-score matching technique.

The findings deduced from the empirical evidence demonstrate that firms prefer revenue shifting over expense shifting to avoid covenant violations, consistent with the notion of the ease-need-advantage-based shifting framework, where firms are found to prefer a shifting tool with greater relative advantage. Further, the author finds that superior audit quality has a constraining effect on expense shifting, but not on revenue shifting, indicating the partial effectiveness of high-quality auditors in curbing the corporate misfeasance of classification shifting. These results are robust to the problem of endogeneity and self-selection bias.

The paper provides new evidence on debt market incentives behind classification shifting, where firms are found to substitute classification shifting forms to avoid covenant violations. Further, the study is among pioneering attempts to investigate the impact of audit quality on revenue shifting and document the non-constraining effect.

This paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, it examines if option and stock compensations raise creditor's risk, and which one is more important than the other. Second, it explores if CEO's compensation interacts with CEO overconfidence to raise creditor's risk. Third, it investigates how banks use different loan terms to alleviate their credit risk.

This study used advanced regression analysis and use of generalized methods of moment methodology.

The results show that option compensation is more important than stock compensation in raising credit risk; option compensation interacts with CEO overconfidence, giving rise to a much higher credit risk; and covenant usage is more important than other loan contract terms in mitigating credit risk given that covenant use could not be substituted away by using other loan contract terms such as increasing interest rate, reducing principal or shortening loan duration. This paper has practical implications for credit markets.

The main implication is that hand-collect data are available up to 2010.

It informs creditors the potential sources of loan risk emanating from option rather than stock incentives; it informs creditors that option incentive interacts with CEO overconfidence rendering the credit risk bigger than expected, and it informs creditors the importance of using covenants vis-à-vis other loan contract terms for mitigating compensation and overconfidence risk.

Banks are alerted to the risk due to the interaction between overconfidence and compensations, implying that overconfident managers remunerated with options compensations are more risky than overconfident managers who are not remunerated as such.

This paper is original: (1) The authors show that option compensation is more risky than stock compensation from viewpoint of creditors. This has not been assessed. (2) Interaction between managerial compensation and managerial overconfidence has not been assessed before. (3) Use of different loan contract terms to alleviate risk from overconfident managers (who are prone to over investment but who are innovative according to the literature) has not been evaluated.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between the purpose of a loan and the type of debt covenants, separated into balance sheet-based and income statement-based covenants.

Using private loan deal observations obtained from the DealScan database over the period between 1996 and 2013, the authors classify the sample loan deals into three categories based on the purpose of borrowing, namely, borrowings for corporate daily operating purposes, financing purposes and acquisition and investing purposes. The authors conduct multinomial logistic regression analysis to test the relationship between the choice of financial ratios in a debt covenant and the purpose of a loan, controlling for financing constraints and other factors that have been identified as important to debt covenant analysis in prior studies.

The results provide evidence that the purpose of the loan is significantly associated with the type of debt covenants, suggesting that the lender and the borrower have considered the loan purpose when structuring their debt agreements. More specifically, the results indicate that the loans borrowed to fund acquisitions or long-term investment projects are more likely to have income statement-based covenants and less likely to have balance sheet-based covenants. In contrast, the loans borrowed for corporate daily operating purposes or financing purposes are more likely to contain balance sheet-based covenants relative to income statement-based covenants.

The authors show that loan purpose is significantly associated with the choice between income statement-based and balance sheet-based covenants. This result further illustrates ways in which accounting information improves contracting efficiency. The results are limited to the US market with its institutional structure. In future studies, it would be interesting to perform similar investigations on firms in other countries.

The findings contain important and economically significant implications indicating that loan lenders and borrowers agree to include different types of accounting information (that is, income statement- versus balance sheet-based financial ratios) in their loan covenants for different purpose loans.

Overall, the results provide important evidence regarding the connection between debt covenant structure and loan purpose. In doing so, it contributes to the literature on debt contract design (Dichev and Skinner 2002; Chava and Roberts 2008; Demerjian 2011; Christensen and Nikolaev 2012). Despite much interest in debt contract design, Skinner (2011) argues that there still exists incomplete knowledge of the economic factors that structure debt contracts. Income statement-based covenants depend on measures of profitability and efficiency and act as trip wires that transfer control rights to lenders when borrowing firms’ performance deteriorates. On the other hand, balance sheet-based covenants rely on information about sources and uses of capital and align interests between borrowing firms and lenders by restricting the borrower’s capital structure. The authors show that loan purpose is significantly associated with the choice between income statement-based and balance sheet-based covenants. This result further illustrates ways in which accounting information improves contracting efficiency.

This study is the first to identify differences in trends over time for the use of income statement- and balance sheet-based covenants as it relates to different loan purposes. The authors build on prior research to examine the degree to which loan purpose is associated with the choice between income statement-based and balance sheet-based covenants.

We investigate the interaction of debt covenants and tax accounting on the adoption of Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48). We examine how firms respond to the potential tightening of covenant slack upon FIN 48 adoption and whether these actions are penalized by creditors and anticipated by equity markets. We find that upon FIN 48 adoption, the majority of sample corporate borrowers increase their tax reserves and reduce equity. Firms close to debt covenant violation were even more likely to increase tax reserves upon FIN 48 adoption; however, the size of the adjustment was relatively smaller, suggesting that the FIN 48 standards limited, but did not eliminate, firms use of discretion in reporting uncertain tax positions to avoid costly covenant violations. For firms near net worth debt covenant violation, the act of decreasing equity upon FIN 48 adoption imposes real economic costs, as the average cost of debt increased by 43 basis points. Finally, we extend prior research on the market response to FIN 48 by showing how the market response to FIN 48 adoption is a function of debt covenant slack and tax aggressiveness. Specifically, the cumulative abnormal return at the FIN 48 exposure draft release date is negative only for tax aggressive firms that are close to debt covenant violation.

This study has two primary objectives. First, it analyzes the information content of confidentiality strictness in corporate loan credit agreements. Second, it examines how confidentiality strictness impacts covenant design, lending syndicate structure and loan pricing.

Using a sample of 6,327 loan credit agreements originated by US public firms in the period of 1996–2017, this study measures the confidentiality strictness in loan contracts using textual analyses that capture the appearance of confidentiality-related words and the length of confidentiality provision. All regressions include relevant loan characteristics, firm-specific accounting variables, industry and year fixed effects. To address the endogeneity concern, the paper uses borrowing firms' rival cash holdings and R&D expenditures to instrument for confidentiality strictness in two-staged least square regressions.

Borrowers which have higher R&D and operate in more competitive product markets have tighter confidentiality policies. Furthermore, this study reveals that confidentiality strictness is negatively associated with the imposition of financial covenants, especially performance covenants. Loan contracts for borrowers with stricter confidentiality on average have more relaxed covenant intensity, measured by the number of covenants. The study also shows that stricter confidentiality attracts finance companies, which have strong expertise in product markets of their parent firms, into the lending syndicate. However, confidentiality-conscious borrowers with higher degree of information asymmetry are subject to higher loan spreads.

This study provides the first examination of confidentiality policies in loan contracts and supports the idea that loan provisions are not simply made of “boilerplate” language. The results suggest that, for confidentiality-sensitive borrowers, the greater exposure to product market competition helps control managerial slack and substitute monitoring from financial markets.

To report inflated operating performance indicators, such as operating revenue and operating profit, managers vertically reposition revenue and expense items inside the income statement. This study aims to investigate the relationship between credit market incentives and these practices.

This study examined a sample of 1,592 Bombay Stock Exchange-listed companies from 2009 to 2021 and tested them using panel data regression models. The propensity score matching method and different measurements of classification shifting practices are used to validate the results.

The conclusions drawn from the empirical data show that firms prefer revenue shifting over expense shifting to prevent debt covenant violations. It shows that the firm’s classification-shifting practices are driven by credit market incentives. This finding is consistent with the notion of positive accounting theory that firms engage in classification shifting (earnings management) to avoid violation of debt covenants. Further, the firm’s preference for revenue shifting is in line with the ease-need-advantage-based shifting framework where firms choose the shifting tool based on costs and constraints associated with each tool.

The finding suggests that if managers heavily rely on revenue shifting to avoid debt covenant violations, the firm may end up breaking these covenants based on its actual operating performance. Managers may use aggressive accounting techniques to prevent covenant violations, which can be a warning indicator of financial difficulties or operational problems. It highlights the necessity for creditors and investors to carefully evaluate a company’s financial stability outside of the financial statements that are publicly disclosed. Authorities should create separate forensic accounting standards for auditors to check revenue items and stop the corporate misfeasance of revenue shifting.

The study is among the earlier attempts to provide empirical evidence on credit market incentives behind classification shifting practices. It is the first study that documents the substitution relationship between classification shifting forms for avoiding violation of debt covenants.