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The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of industry specialization on the absorption and competitive pricing (or lack thereof) of audits of large Andersen clients (S&P 1500 companies) who switched to the remaining Big 4 international accounting firms in 2002 due to the demise of Arthur Andersen LLP (Andersen). Did the audit clients pay a premium or discount in audit fees to their new auditor who specialized in their industry?

Ordinary least squares regression is used to test hypothesis of a positive association between industry specialization and audit fees charged to former Andersen's audit clients in 2002 following Andersen's demise. This study provides more control over size effects by design. Test variables are constructed based on national market share of audit fees within an industry. Logistic regression is used to examine the likelihood of choosing new auditor that is an industry specialist.

Results support hypothesis, consistent with auditor differentiation explanation. Proportion of clients that had engaged an industry specialist in 2001 increased from 38 percent (84 clients) to 48 percent (105 clients) in 2002. No evidence of price‐gouging in 2002 although clients who aligned with industry specialist paid a 23.2 percent premium in audit fees. Large clients lost bargaining power to negotiate lower fees. Findings are robust to the inclusion of additional alternative measures of company size.

Results of logistic regression analysis imply that large audit clients with former auditor of tarnished reputation, long auditor tenure and high leverage are more likely to switch to an industry specialist to possibly signal audit/financial reporting quality. Large sample companies may limit the ability to generalize findings to smaller companies.

Mandatory audit firm rotation (currently being debated in the profession) will have costly effect on the pricing of Big 4 audits for companies wanting to signal audit and financial reporting quality to affect market perception, and large companies would likely lose their ability to bargain for lower audit fees.

The paper focus on the alignment of Andersen clients and impact on audit fees with Big 4 industry specialists resulting from the sudden increase in audit market concentration. Prior to Andersen's collapse, evidence on the association of audit fees premium and industry specialists was mixed, and little attention has been given to the influence of auditor industry specialization on both audit fees and alignment of former Andersen clients with a Big 4 specialist. This paper fills that void.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of institutional holdings and corporate debts on audit quality, proxied by auditor industry specialization.

The tests use regression analysis for a sample of 396 company-years from 2003 to 2008 and control for factors known to affect auditor industry specialization.

The results show a positive association between institutional ownership and auditor industry specialization. These results are consistent across most measures of auditor industry specialization and different thresholds of audit firm market share. In addition, a positive link is reported between corporate debt and industry specialization by auditors. This result, however, holds under the composite proxy in terms of total assets only.

The major limitation is the unavailability of data on audit fees and sales (revenues) to measure auditor market share.

Institutional investors and debtholders have preference for auditors who can enhance the credibility of financial reporting and improve the quality of financial information and the results document that the choice of specialist auditors can potentially influence this objective.

The paper provides information to academics, regulators, companies, and auditors concerning the impact of institutional investors and creditors on the choice of industry specialists. Also, it shows the importance of industry specialization on audit quality.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the intensity of accruals and auditor industry specialization. It investigates whether a client firm’s accruals intensity is a factor associated with the firm being audited by an industry specialist auditor.

This paper employs an empirical archival methodology using publicly available data. The sample consists of client firms that switched auditors from 2004 to 2014.

The results show that accruals intensity is positively associated with the choice of an industry specialist auditor, measured both at the national and the city levels. These findings imply that companies with high levels of accruals choose an industry specialist auditor to signal the quality of their accruals and to gain more credibility for their financial reporting.

This paper provides original empirical evidence of the association between accruals intensity and the choice of an industry specialist auditor. This link is new to the literature. Extant literature shows that firms with high levels of accruals are regarded as risky and suffer from reduced credibility in financial markets. This study contributes to the literature by showing that these firms choose an industry specialist auditor to alleviate investors’ credibility concerns about the high levels of accruals. These findings provide insightful information to audit firms, to managers of firms that inherently display high levels of accruals and to the capital markets participants in general.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between a company's bid‐ask spread, a proxy for information asymmetry, and auditor tenure and specialization.

The tests use clustered regression for a sample of 31,689 company‐years from 1992 to 2001 and control for factors known to impact bid‐ask spread in cross‐section.

The findings suggest that the market's perception of disclosure quality is higher and private information search opportunities are fewer for companies engaging industry specialist auditors. In addition, the paper finds that information asymmetry has a U‐shaped relation to auditor tenure. This U‐shaped relation holds for both specialists and non‐specialists; however, the bid‐ask spread for specialists tends to fall below that of non‐specialists at all tenure intervals.

The findings may directly result from auditor tenure and specialization or it may be that those auditor‐related characteristics are a subset of concurrent choices made by the company that impacts disclosure quality.

Companies have incentives to lower information asymmetry and the findings document that the choice of a specialist auditor and the length of the auditor relationship can potentially influence this objective.

The paper provides information to academics, regulators, companies, and auditors concerning the effect of auditor‐client relationships on the level of information asymmetry. In addition, it shows the importance of industry specialization and audit firm tenure on audit quality.

The purpose of this study is to examine the association between auditor industry specialization and accounting quality in the European Union (EU).

This study employs a difference-in-differences design and explores audit quality from different industry specialist perspectives and different accounting standard regimes. Specifically, this study examines accounting quality among audits performed by non-industry specialists, EU member country-level industry specialists (EUM-level), EU community-level industry specialists (EUC-level), as well as joint industry specialists.

This study finds evidence of an improvement in accounting quality among audits performed by non-industry specialists post-IFRS. There is also evidence of an improvement in accounting quality among audits performed by EUC-level industry specialists post-IFRS. In addition, accounting quality among audits performed by EUM-level industry specialists seems to be greater than that of audits performed by non-industry specialists in either the pre-IFRS period or the post-IFRS period. Overall, the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU appears to be associated with an improvement in accounting quality among some auditor groups.

Industry specialization and accounting quality are not directly observable constructs; this study inevitably employs proxy measures for both. The findings of this study are location-specific and apply to mandatory IFRS adopters only.

This study informs regulators with respect to the importance of industry specialist auditors and financial reporting quality, particularly within the context of the EU. The findings suggest that industry specialists were a significant accounting quality determinant during the mandatory adoption of IFRS. The findings have implications for regulators in the EU and beyond.

This study is among the first to investigate the impact of auditor specialization on accounting quality in the EU, particularly in connection with the adoption of IFRS.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of higher-quality auditors on corporate risk-taking.

Agency theory suggests that managers have incentives to avoid risk in the interests of perquisite consumption and self-preservation, while investors prefer that managers invest in all projects with a positive net present value, i.e. projects that generally increase corporate risk. Empirical literature finds that managerial risk-aversion is mitigated (and firm value enhanced) when investor protection is higher. The authors examine whether higher-quality auditing is one such mechanism to encourage shareholder-focused corporate risk-taking. They model measures of corporate risk as a function of whether a firm is audited by an industry specialist or not, controlling specifically for accounting quality. They then examine the incremental effect of higher-quality audits on other forms of external monitoring (analyst coverage and institutional holdings) for corporate risk.

Using a sample from 2003 to 2007, the authors document a positive relationship between local-level audit industry specialization and both the standard deviation of annual stock returns and research and development expenditures (their measures of corporate risk-taking). They then find the effect is mitigated when firms have alternative external monitoring, in the form of either higher analyst coverage or greater institutional holdings.

Given the nature of the question the authors ask, particularly in the context of the auditor–client relationship, a potential limitation is the difficulty in assigning causation. Nonetheless, this study underscores the importance of auditors as an effective mechanism for monitoring corporate managers.

This study provides novel evidence that auditors affect managerial decision making beyond a simple effect on financial statements, and should be of interest to boards of directors, regulators and investors.

This paper investigates the impact of the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) merger in Australia on existing and potential clients of the new merged firm. From prior theory it is expected that some existing clients may have an incentive to switch away from a newly merged firm as the same larger firm now audits close competitors once audited by separate firms. Prior theory also suggests that another group of potential clients should be attracted to the newly merged firm where the merger enhances or creates industry specializations. The expectation is that in both of these instances there will be increased switching activity associated with the newly merged audit firm. Contrary to expectations, a significantly lower level of switching behaviour was observed for the newly merged firm compared with that of the other Big 5 firms, suggesting that an advantage of enhanced specialization may not be the attraction of new clients but the retention of existing clients. When comparing the nature of the switches, some support was found for the view that the switches to the new firm were likely to be in enhanced areas of specialization, but no evidence was found to suggest that close competitors would switch away from this firm. The greater rate of retention of clients compared with other Big 5 firms was not associated with a more competitive audit pricing policy.

This study examines audit fee premiums from brand name, industry specialization, and industry leadership after the merger of two Big 6 audit firms, creating the Big 5 in 1998 in the Malaysian audit market. A sample of 679 companies listed at the main and second boards of Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) are investigated for audit fee premiums. Industry specialization is determined on the basis of 20 per cent share of audit market calculated by the number of audited companies in the industry. Audit fee premiums are calculated based on the Simunic (1980) model of audit fees. Results show: that Big 5 audit firms obtain 65.4 per cent audit market share for all KLSE listed companies; that Big 5 audit firms earn higher audit fees than non‐Big 5; and that industry specialization does not generate audit fee premiums. The study finds evidence for audit fee premiums derived from industry market leadership. Results also reflect the competitiveness among Big 5 audit firms in the audit market especially following the merger of Big 6 audit firms.

In this paper, we argue that the effect of diversification on performance is not homogeneous across industries, as previously assumed in the literature on diversification in strategy and finance. We provide empirical evidence that some industries are more friendly environments for diversified firms than for specialists, and vice versa. The implications of this qualification for the diversification‐performance relationship are investigated in this study. The results show that the number of specialists in an industry is an important moderator of the diversification‐performance relationship, and it determines the existence of a positive, negative, or curvilinear relationship. Diversification has a more negative impact on performance as the number of specialized firms in the industries in the sample increases. Although we find clear evidence of the curvilinear relationship between diversification and performance frequently found in strategy research, the relationship seems to be the result of not accounting for the relative dominance of diversifiers versus specialists in the industries in the sample.

This paper aims to investigate the effect of auditor switching and lowballing on conditional conservatism, particularly how different types of auditor switching, namely, upward, downward and lateral switching to/from Big 4 and industry specialists, affect earnings quality in the following selected Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand.

Using conditional conservatism as a proxy for earnings quality, this study hypothesises that upward switching from non-Big 4 to Big 4 auditors, or from non-specialist to specialist auditors, would result in high conditional conservatism, while downward switching would lead to low conditional conservatism. The study further tests whether lowballing provides a viable explanation for reduced earnings conservatism in firms that switch from Big 4 to non-Big 4 auditors, or from specialist to non-specialist auditors.

The analysis, on a sample of 28,073 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2016, shows that the decision to downgrade auditors leads to lower conditional conservatism in the year of switching, compared with other firms and the pre-switching year. The evidence further shows that, when firms downgrade their auditors, lowballing contributes to a decrease in conditional conservatism in the first year of audit switching. Further, this research finds that switching to specialist auditors will result in increased conditional conservatism, while switching from specialist auditors to non-specialist auditors will result in reduced conditional conservatism.

The findings of this study are useful to investors who are looking to diversify their investment portfolio in developing markets, as evidence about auditor switching and quality of financial reporting may be an important factor in their investment decisions. Downward auditor switches and lowballing could act as red flags to investors in the sense that these events could signal a decrease in conditional conservatism and, hence, quality of earnings.

This research offers new evidence to support the view that management decisions to switch to lower-quality auditors will force newly appointed auditors to acquiesce to clients’ demands for reporting low-quality earnings.