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The objective of this research study is to investigate the impact of auditor dismissals and resignations on commercial lending decisions. The study also examines whether a reason given for a dismissal or resignation affects commercial lending decisions. Eighty-five commercial loan officers were given a scenario involving a hypothetical company loan applicant and were first asked to assess the level of risk associated with granting a line of credit. Next, they were asked to assess the probability that they would grant the line of credit. Five different questionnaire versions were created by varying information about an auditor change and the reason for the change. The study finds that risk assessments of and the probability of granting credit to the applicant company do not significantly differ due to knowledge about auditor changes. In addition, participants did not view auditor resignations differently than auditor dismissals. Finally, disclosure of a disagreement as a reason for an auditor change did not have an impact on lending decisions.

This paper aims to first investigate auditor change following mismatch by focusing on the number of times mismatch occurred prior to auditor change and on clients mismatched continuously with auditors for two or more years. Subsequently, it studies the relation of mismatch in the current year with auditor change for clients mismatched in the past year. These issues are important because of the call for regulatory intervention in auditor selection. If market forces achieve improvement in matching, then those forces should be relied upon in auditor selection.

This paper adapts the literature to estimate mismatch and uses logistic regressions on an auditor change model to study the timing of auditor change by mismatched clients and on a mismatch model to examine improvement in matching following auditor change.

This paper finds that the more frequent mismatches occurred in the past four years, the higher the likelihood of switching in the current year. Clients mismatched continuously for two or more years are more likely to change auditors. This paper also reports that mismatched clients who switch auditors are less likely to be mismatched again after the switch.

Because market forces reduce mismatch through auditor change, free choice by clients and auditors should be allowed, and regulatory intervention should be introduced cautiously. As investors and other users of financial statements have an interest in seeing that clients get the appropriate auditors for the audit, they will be assured that market forces could achieve the purpose. Thus, the results of this paper address public concern in the regulatory regime and support current audit market practices.

Prior studies assume a one-year time frame for auditor change to follow mismatch. This paper relaxes this assumption, to better reflect audit market practices, by showing that clients who are more often mismatched with auditors or those mismatched continuously for two or more years could also change auditors. Furthermore, prior studies find that mismatching motivates auditor change, but they do not show that matching improves after the change. This paper extends the literature by shedding new light to show that auditor change improves auditor–client matching.

This paper aims to provide evidence on the hypothesis that auditors differ in how they constrain discretionary accruals (DAs) of their clients. The paper seeks to analyze changes in DAs for clients of Laventhol and Horwath associated with the appointment of a successor auditor.

The study uses regression and archival data to separate a firm's accounting accruals into discretionary and non‐DAs. The study then examines changes in a firm's DAs associated with a change in auditors.

Replacing LH with a new auditor resulted in a statistically significant decrease in DAs. This result is contrary to prior research and could be due to the prior research using voluntary auditor changes where variables such as financial distress and opinion shopping could drive the results.

The study provides results that differ from prior research. This study shows that the auditor change is associated with a systematic decline in the level of a firm's DAs. The results could be due to the forced nature of this auditor change as opposed to voluntary auditor changes used in prior research.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of ethnicity on auditor choice for Malaysian listed companies.

This study evaluates the effects of various independent variables on auditor choice behaviour, particularly ethnicity of auditor and ethnicity of management, using a logistic regression analysis approach for 300 companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange‐KLSE) over an 18 year period.

Auditor choice is shown to be significantly influenced by client firm's characteristics, notably changes in management, complexity, and financial risk, lending support to the findings of previous survey studies. Ethnicity was found to be a significant factor influencing auditor choice only for auditor switches between non‐Big 4 and Big 4 firms.

A number of important variables such as corporate governance characteristics, audit fees, client size, and growth that might enhance an understanding of auditor choice behaviour in Malaysia were not incorporated in the regression models, and might be considered in future studies.

The results presented in the paper have important implications for both the auditing profession and regulators in Malaysia.

Auditor changes are not alarmingly high in Malta but have been rising of late and the driving forces in this regard could be particular to a small‐island state. This paper seeks to elicit the perceptions of behavioural, economic or other factors that influence auditor‐client realignments in Malta. It does this mostly by a mail questionnaire responded to by 97 Maltese companies. Such findings were complemented by 15 interviews with companies that actually changed their auditor. The study concludes primarily that behavioural forces provide the principal motivators of auditor changes in Malta. Deterioration in the working relationship with the auditor and lack of accessibility feature as foremost concerns. Economic forces, albeit being important triggers of auditor changes, come only secondary in importance. Underlying this, there is evidence of differences in the attitudes of clients and non‐clients of Big 4 audit firms as well as between small and large companies.

This paper aims to examine the effect of financial restatement on changing the auditor in the following years.

The study uses data of 105 companies (735 company-years) listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange collected during the period 2008-2014. Logistic regression is used to test the hypotheses.

The results of hypotheses present that restatement does not cause auditor changes and that as the severity of a restatement increases, the auditor change in the following year of restatement also does not increase. Restating companies having strong governance do not go for auditor changes as compared with other companies. In addition, in companies that are restating, non-big auditor changes are not more likely than a big auditor. Also, in companies restating simultaneous with a CEO turnover, there is no possibility of auditor change. Furthermore, multinomial logistic regression showed that the adjustments resulting from the correction of errors and changes in procedures and the amount of adjustments do not cause auditor change in the following year. So, the results have shown that the restatement is not an important factor in changing auditor the next year.

The current study analyses the impact of financial restatement on auditor changes in a deep manner in a developing country like Iran.

Competitive pressures in the audit market have led to aggressive fee renegotiation and tendering by companies. This paper reviews microeconomic tender theory and finds it to be of limited value in the audit context. Content analysis of semi‐structured interviews conducted with the finance directors of 12 UK listed companies which had recently tendered and/or changed auditor are used to investigate the tender/change process. Contrary to popular belief, fee levels do not necessarily dominate the decision to change auditors, rather changes within the client company, audit staffing, and auditor’s professionalism and competency issues dominate. Nor is the selection of a tender “winner” generally based solely on price, as predicted by tender theory and as would be expected when the consequences of audit failure do not fall on the directors. However, consistent with economic theory, the winning bid appears frequently to be too low, resulting in attempts by auditors to subsequently increase fees and resentment by the finance director. Directors generally appear to view the audit tender as relating to not only the attest function per se, but to a larger package of services concerning the financial reporting function. The relative importance of price versus non‐price competition in auditor choice is found to vary across companies. Auditor choice is influenced strongly by both economic and behavioural factors, in particular, by directors’ assessment of the quality of non‐attest services and the expected quality of working relationships, in addition to price and audit quality.

The purpose of this paper is to examine two factors which influence auditor change: audit and client firms’ characteristics, for Malaysian listed companies. Given the costs involved, it is important to understand the reasons why companies change their auditor and choose a particular level of audit assurance.

This study evaluates the effects of various independent variables on auditor change behaviour and the sensitivity of results to alternative period measurement by using logistic regression analysis.

An examination of 400 companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange‐KLSE) over a period of 18 years reveals auditor change to be significantly influenced by client firm's characteristics, notably changes in management, size of the client firm, complexity, and client's firm growth, lending support to the findings of previous survey studies.

In the cause of brevity, a number of potentially important variables, that might enhance an understanding of auditor change behaviour in Malaysia, were not incorporated in the regression models, and might be considered in future studies.

The results presented in the paper have important implications for both the auditing profession and regulators in Malaysia.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of Confucianism on auditor changes by highlighting the role of the cultural embeddedness mechanism in audit contracts from the perspective of credit governance.

Using a unique sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2008 to 2018, this study uses logit regression as the baseline methodology while controlling for macro-level factors and firm-level characteristics, as well as industry and year fixed effects. This study also conducts different mediation/channel analyses, endogeneity tests (using two-stage least squares and difference-in-differences techniques) and robustness checks.

The findings show that the embeddedness of Confucianism in a corporation reduces auditor changes. Furthermore, the channel analyses (using moral self-discipline, social trust, professional ethics and the quality of accounting information as four potential channels) reveal that Confucianism can improve moral credit and consolidate the cultural foundation of credit governance. Specifically, the stronger the embeddedness of Confucianism, the more stable the auditing contract. Finally, Confucianism in formal and informal systems can be mutually substituted.

There is limited research on how culture affects auditing contracts. This study offers new contributions and extends the literature on the connection between cultural embeddedness and contract stability. Confucianism has the potential to strengthen the efficiency of credit governance and maintain the stability of contracts. This study offers a thoughtful orientation toward duly using Confucianism vis-à-vis credit governance.

Prior studies include auditor‐initiated (AI) and client‐initiated (CI) auditor changes together and conduct research as though they were the same. This paper aims to hypothesize that AI and CI changes are driven by different interests and to examine factors that could explain and predict them.

Based on the prior literature, the authors classified factors into AI and CI categories a priori, and then developed hypotheses that aligned with the classification. The data source is AuditAnalytics.

The univariate and multivariate analyses support the hypothesis that CI and AI separations are driven by different interests. The empirically determined prediction model (a classification and regression trees (CART)‐generated six‐step process), which performed better than other multivariate models, classifies AI and CI auditor separations with an accuracy rate of 68 percent.

The findings suggest that future research should incorporate the differences between AI and CI separations into their studies. One intriguing issue is the lack of importance of the variable audit fees to total fees in the CART model. Though statistically significant in some of the multivariate analyses, the variable is not important in the CART model. This issue merits further investigation as it could provide important insight into dependency issues that are presumed by current audit regulation.

The paper has important implications for practice. It offers insight into factors that drive CI and AI auditor separations. The CART model may serve as a decision aid for both auditors and regulators as they contemplate and evaluate auditor change decisions.

The paper provides original insight into AI and CI auditor changes when considered as distinct issues that are driven by different interests.