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While much of the accounting literature that addresses gender issues has focused on womens' desires for more familial benefits such as flexible working hours and child care, this study documents results illustrating fundamental differences between women and men on issues of value. In it, female and male auditors were asked to respond to their perceptions of the practice of lowballing. Women felt that the practice was less acceptable than men did and also agreed significantly more often that lowballing is a violation of the independence in appearance clause of the Code of Professional Conduct.

This paper aims to investigate the effect of auditor switching and lowballing on conditional conservatism, particularly how different types of auditor switching, namely, upward, downward and lateral switching to/from Big 4 and industry specialists, affect earnings quality in the following selected Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand.

Using conditional conservatism as a proxy for earnings quality, this study hypothesises that upward switching from non-Big 4 to Big 4 auditors, or from non-specialist to specialist auditors, would result in high conditional conservatism, while downward switching would lead to low conditional conservatism. The study further tests whether lowballing provides a viable explanation for reduced earnings conservatism in firms that switch from Big 4 to non-Big 4 auditors, or from specialist to non-specialist auditors.

The analysis, on a sample of 28,073 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2016, shows that the decision to downgrade auditors leads to lower conditional conservatism in the year of switching, compared with other firms and the pre-switching year. The evidence further shows that, when firms downgrade their auditors, lowballing contributes to a decrease in conditional conservatism in the first year of audit switching. Further, this research finds that switching to specialist auditors will result in increased conditional conservatism, while switching from specialist auditors to non-specialist auditors will result in reduced conditional conservatism.

The findings of this study are useful to investors who are looking to diversify their investment portfolio in developing markets, as evidence about auditor switching and quality of financial reporting may be an important factor in their investment decisions. Downward auditor switches and lowballing could act as red flags to investors in the sense that these events could signal a decrease in conditional conservatism and, hence, quality of earnings.

This research offers new evidence to support the view that management decisions to switch to lower-quality auditors will force newly appointed auditors to acquiesce to clients’ demands for reporting low-quality earnings.

The purpose of this study is to test whether the realization rate on audit engagements increases with auditor tenure in competitive markets, suggesting the presence of initial audit lowballing.

Using regression analysis, we test this hypothesis with fee- and cost-related data from a sample of local governments audited by a single audit firm. Based on representations of the firm, we classify the audit market for the 127 cities, counties and school districts in our sample as competitive and the audit market for the 93 special district audits as non-competitive.

As hypothesized, we find that in the competitive market, the realization rate on audit engagements increases with auditor tenure but does not do so in the non-competitive audit market.

We cannot identify the specific engagements which were subject to a competitive bidding process, so we rely on the auditor’s representation of competitiveness by entity type.

To our knowledge, the central prediction of audit pricing models that the auditor’s realization rate increases with auditor tenure has not been tested in real audit markets because proprietary cost data are rarely available. Testing this prediction is the primary contribution of this paper.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether fees discounting exists in Malaysia and whether such a practice impairs auditor independence.

The paper employs a panel least regression of 3,003 firm‐year observations of firms listed on Bursa Malaysia for the period between 1996 and 2006. The paper collects the audit fees, auditor's identity and other firms' characteristics data from Compustat Global, Stock Performance Guide Handbook and annual reports. The annual reports are obtained from the Bursa Malaysia's web site and Mergent Online database. The paper removes initial public offering (IPO) firms, firms involved with PriceWaterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand merger and firms forced to switch auditor during the Arthur Andersen implosion in 2002.

The analysis shows that price cutting occurs on initial audit engagements even when audit fees are publicly disclosed. Further tests suggest that the auditor recovers the “sunk cost” invested during the initial engagement only during the fourth year of their audit engagement. Further, the paper finds price recovery is not significantly different from normal audit fees charged for the continuing audit engagement during the first three year period of engagement, as the audit firms will only recover the cost on the fourth year of engagement. Overall, this finding has an important implication for regulators, as it suggests that price recovery due to “lowballing” does not impair auditor independence.

Due to data unavailability, this study does not consider other unique factors that determine audit fees in Malaysia. Among them are political connections, institutional investors and ethnicity.

This is the first study that examines audit pricing during an initial engagement in Malaysia.

Press reports have indicated that firms frequently underprice restricted stock and employee stock options. I test for underpricing of stock and options.

I examined a sample of 5,333 private firm stock and option issuances between 1985 and 2017. I tested for underpricing using two approaches: assuming investors have no special market-timing ability and assuming instead they have perfect market-timing ability.

I find evidence of widespread stock and option underpricing by private firms before they go public reflecting large discounts that exceed reasonable compensation for lack of marketability. Unreported underpricing is more frequent in the last pre-IPO private equity transactions that offer the last opportunity to give such discounts before the stock is publicly traded, but the discounts are greater in the earlier pre-IPO transactions where unreported discounts are presumably tougher for the SEC to detect. Underpricing is still detected even when the actual DLOMs are tested against a benchmark that assumes investors have perfect market-timing ability.

Firms frequently underprice restricted stock and employee stock options. Firms tend to underprice stock options more frequently than restricted stock, but restricted stock tends to be priced at deeper discounts when recipients are assumed not to have any special market-timing ability.

Private firms issue restricted stock and options as incentive compensation. Lowballing the valuation transfers wealth from outside stockholders to employees/insiders. Wealth transfers take place through the issuance of equity claims to employees/insiders before firms go public. I found that more than a quarter of the DLOMs exceed the theoretical maximum by, on average, between 16% (median) and 20% (mean). This finding raises two questions worthy of investigation. First, to what extent do the frequency and magnitude of DLOMs above the theoretical maximum depend on whether a board of directors obtains an independent appraisal of a stock’s fair market value? Second, if DLOMs above the theoretical maximum are observed even when the stock is independently appraised, how do appraisers justify such large DLOMs?

The wealth transfers that take place through the issuance of equity claims to employees/insiders before firms go public benefit employees/insiders at the expense of outside shareholders.

My paper is the first to furnish evidence of widespread stock and option underpricing by private firms before they go public; demonstrate that the unreported underpricing is more frequent in the last pre-IPO private equity transactions that offer the last opportunity to give such discounts before the stock is publicly traded and show that the discounts are greater in the earlier pre-IPO transactions where unreported discounts are presumably tougher for the SEC to detect.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the audit price reactions of local accounting firms to the entry of the Big Four accounting firms into the Indian audit market, providing unique insight into emerging market dynamics.

Using financial data from Indian audit clients for a ten-year period from 1996 to 2005, the authors conduct a multivariate regression analysis based on extant audit fee literature.

This study finds evidence of a price-cutting strategy on behalf of the local incumbent accounting firms in response to the entry of the Big Four firms. It also shows small-sized incumbent firms to cut prices more drastically relative to medium-sized incumbent firms.

This study provides empirical insight into the pricing dynamics of professional services in an emerging market setting. Such insight is increasingly important in our evermore globalized economy where emerging markets are frequently the targets of expansion.

Competitive pressures in the audit market have led to aggressive fee renegotiation and tendering by companies. This paper reviews microeconomic tender theory and finds it to be of limited value in the audit context. Content analysis of semi‐structured interviews conducted with the finance directors of 12 UK listed companies which had recently tendered and/or changed auditor are used to investigate the tender/change process. Contrary to popular belief, fee levels do not necessarily dominate the decision to change auditors, rather changes within the client company, audit staffing, and auditor’s professionalism and competency issues dominate. Nor is the selection of a tender “winner” generally based solely on price, as predicted by tender theory and as would be expected when the consequences of audit failure do not fall on the directors. However, consistent with economic theory, the winning bid appears frequently to be too low, resulting in attempts by auditors to subsequently increase fees and resentment by the finance director. Directors generally appear to view the audit tender as relating to not only the attest function per se, but to a larger package of services concerning the financial reporting function. The relative importance of price versus non‐price competition in auditor choice is found to vary across companies. Auditor choice is influenced strongly by both economic and behavioural factors, in particular, by directors’ assessment of the quality of non‐attest services and the expected quality of working relationships, in addition to price and audit quality.

The results of recent research suggest that certain provisions of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) may have been less successful than intended (e.g., Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2009). Based on two different descriptions of economic bonding between auditors and their clients, we propose an explanation of why this might be so by showing that the effect of SOX mandates, and regulation in general, aimed at enhancing auditor independence is dependent on whether shareholders or managers monitor the auditor. The results of prior empirical studies are examined in context of the framework we describe, and suggestions for future research on this important topic are outlined.

The historical development and size of China’s audit market provides an opportunity to investigate important questions regarding the functioning of the market for audit services that are difficult, if not impossible, to test in other globally established markets. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the market entry of the Big Four accounting firms into China on the audit fees charged by its local accounting firms.

In this paper the authors rely primarily on the incumbent pricing literature (Simon, 2005; Geroski, 1995) to assist them in developing the specific hypotheses and empirical tests. This paper is an empirical study, which examines whether local incumbent accounting firms cut prices in response to the Big Four’s entry by using data from annual reports and audit reports for China’s listed companies from the 1994 to 2008 period.

This study shows that local incumbent firms cut prices post-entry. This study also finds that it was local large-sized accounting firms as well as accounting firms located in regions with highly developed- and competitive markets that cut prices in response to the Big Four’s entry.

This study has important implications for the Big Four accounting firms as it provides useful information about pricing strategies that would likely be used by local accounting firms in a new market. Local accounting firms in emerging markets can also gain useful insights about the pricing strategies adopted by the Big Four accounting firms when they enter a market.

Audit market research has little to offer on how local accounting firms respond in their pricing to the entry of Big Four accounting firms into their market, mainly because in western countries such as Canada, England, and the USA, the Big Four accounting firms are the oldest firms operating in those markets. This paper is the first study that examines the effect of the market entry of the Big Four accounting firms into China.