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The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of auditor switching on audit fee discounting in Iran. The increased competition in the Iranian audit market following audit market liberalization in 2001 has resulted in a rapid increase in auditor switching and reduces the relative bargaining power of auditors compared to the clients. It is expected that auditor switching results in fee discounting because the relative bargaining power of an auditor (client) is likely to be at the minimum (maximum) point during the initial period of engagement. Since the increased bargaining power of a client in initial year seems to be different in the case of different type of auditor switching (from a state auditor to a private and from a private auditor to another), the magnitude of fee discounting is expected to be different.

The objective is tested using a sample of 1,022 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2010. This study applies the multivariate regression model using the first difference specification of audit fee as a dependent variable.

Multivariate analysis reveals that auditor switching results in 14 percent of fee discounting. In addition, the results show that 18 and 13 percent of fees discounting during the initial year of engagement arise from cases of auditor switching involving a change from state auditors to private auditors, and a change from one private auditor to another, respectively. The findings support bargaining power view explanation in relation to audit fees discounting in initial year engagement.

This study is the first to examine the impact of auditor switching (and analyzed different types of auditor switching) on audit fee discounting using the bargaining power view.

This paper aims to investigate the effect of auditor switching and lowballing on conditional conservatism, particularly how different types of auditor switching, namely, upward, downward and lateral switching to/from Big 4 and industry specialists, affect earnings quality in the following selected Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand.

Using conditional conservatism as a proxy for earnings quality, this study hypothesises that upward switching from non-Big 4 to Big 4 auditors, or from non-specialist to specialist auditors, would result in high conditional conservatism, while downward switching would lead to low conditional conservatism. The study further tests whether lowballing provides a viable explanation for reduced earnings conservatism in firms that switch from Big 4 to non-Big 4 auditors, or from specialist to non-specialist auditors.

The analysis, on a sample of 28,073 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2016, shows that the decision to downgrade auditors leads to lower conditional conservatism in the year of switching, compared with other firms and the pre-switching year. The evidence further shows that, when firms downgrade their auditors, lowballing contributes to a decrease in conditional conservatism in the first year of audit switching. Further, this research finds that switching to specialist auditors will result in increased conditional conservatism, while switching from specialist auditors to non-specialist auditors will result in reduced conditional conservatism.

The findings of this study are useful to investors who are looking to diversify their investment portfolio in developing markets, as evidence about auditor switching and quality of financial reporting may be an important factor in their investment decisions. Downward auditor switches and lowballing could act as red flags to investors in the sense that these events could signal a decrease in conditional conservatism and, hence, quality of earnings.

This research offers new evidence to support the view that management decisions to switch to lower-quality auditors will force newly appointed auditors to acquiesce to clients’ demands for reporting low-quality earnings.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of simultaneous and partial auditor switching toward the abnormal return of manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2009 and 2012.

Auditor switching is divided into some types: lateral Big 4 to Big 4 (B4B4), lateral non Big 4 to non Big 4 (NB4NB4), cross-up (CU) and cross-down. The abnormal return is measured with a market-adjusted model. In this study, company size is used as the control variable and is measured using the natural logarithm of the total assets (LnTA) and return on equity. Multiple linear regression is used for analysis with significant value a= 5 percent. The hypotheses were tested using f-test and t-test.

The result shows that simultaneous auditor switchings affect the abnormal return. In partial auditor switching, only CU switch has effects on the abnormal return.

This study provides additional literature on the effect of auditor switching, especially on an abnormal return.

This paper investigates the impact of the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) merger in Australia on existing and potential clients of the new merged firm. From prior theory it is expected that some existing clients may have an incentive to switch away from a newly merged firm as the same larger firm now audits close competitors once audited by separate firms. Prior theory also suggests that another group of potential clients should be attracted to the newly merged firm where the merger enhances or creates industry specializations. The expectation is that in both of these instances there will be increased switching activity associated with the newly merged audit firm. Contrary to expectations, a significantly lower level of switching behaviour was observed for the newly merged firm compared with that of the other Big 5 firms, suggesting that an advantage of enhanced specialization may not be the attraction of new clients but the retention of existing clients. When comparing the nature of the switches, some support was found for the view that the switches to the new firm were likely to be in enhanced areas of specialization, but no evidence was found to suggest that close competitors would switch away from this firm. The greater rate of retention of clients compared with other Big 5 firms was not associated with a more competitive audit pricing policy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the costs to audit firms in terms of lost revenues of losing small clients due to auditor switching or client bankruptcy after issuing first-time going concern modified opinions.

A population of small Swedish companies receiving first-time going concern modified opinions in 2009 was examined to determine the effects two years later compared with a matched sample of financially stressed companies that had not received going concern modified opinions.

The results indicate that both auditor switching and client bankruptcy are positively related to receipt of going concern modified opinions. Furthermore, the authors find empirical evidence that auditors issuing first-time going concern modified opinions lose proportionately more fees through auditor switching and client bankruptcy than do auditors not issuing such opinions to financially stressed clients. Finally, the authors found that the going concern modified opinions issued by Big 4 firms are no more harmful to clients than are those issued by other audit firms.

The authors recognize a limitation of this study regarding the choice of control companies. Although the authors attempted to find similarly sized and similarly financially stressed companies from the same industries as those companies in the test group, the authors may have missed other variables relevant to auditor switching or client bankruptcy.

A practical implication for the audit profession is the increased awareness of the fact that the financial dependence issues reported in this study extend to auditors with small client companies.

This is the first study to examine fees lost due to auditor switching and client bankruptcy caused by going concern modified opinions in a population of small companies. It contributes to the mixed evidence presented in previous research as to the extent to which going concern modified audit opinions are self-fulfilling prophecies.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine one aspect of auditor‐client relationship, namely audit tenure and switching behaviour, and factors affecting it. Lengthy audit tenure with the same client has been cited as one of the threats to auditor independence. Given the importance of this issue, this research attempts to shed some light on the effect of audit tenure and switching behaviour on auditor independence in Malaysia.

This study evaluates the effects of various independent variables on switching behaviour and audit tenure using logistic regression analysis.

An examination of 297 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange over a period of 11 years reveals audit firm switching to be significantly associated with distressed large clients and that the length and direction of switch depend upon the type of audit firm.

A number of important variables such as corporate governance characteristics, audit and non‐audit fees and types of audit opinion that could enhance our understanding of audit tenure and auditor switching in Malaysia, were not incorporated into our regression models. Hence, future studies may consider such variables.

This study is the first conducted using Malaysian data where audit tenure and switching are used as dependent variables. The results have important implications on the auditing profession and regulators in Malaysia.

From 2000 to 2007, 14 Chinese accounting firms had their audit licenses terminated or suspended for different reasons, forcing clients of these accounting firms to select new auditors within a short period of time. The purpose of this paper is to examine the auditor switching patterns and audit partner following decision of these clients and the effect of both client and (terminated or suspended) auditor characteristics on the auditor change decisions.

By using 245 (191) clients of terminated or suspended audit firms, the authors apply logistic regressions to investigate clients’ switching decision (following decision).

The empirical results indicate that state-owned enterprises tend not to switch to Big 4 audit firms; clients with dual shares tend to choose from the Big 4 for their succeeding audit firms. Moreover, companies whose preceding auditors received severe regulatory sanctions are less likely to switch to auditors of higher quality; companies who hired local auditors are more likely to follow their preceding audit partners as a result of forced auditor change.

This study enriches forced auditor change literature by discussing both clients’ and preceding auditor’s attributes on clients’ switching and following decisions.

This paper aims to first investigate auditor change following mismatch by focusing on the number of times mismatch occurred prior to auditor change and on clients mismatched continuously with auditors for two or more years. Subsequently, it studies the relation of mismatch in the current year with auditor change for clients mismatched in the past year. These issues are important because of the call for regulatory intervention in auditor selection. If market forces achieve improvement in matching, then those forces should be relied upon in auditor selection.

This paper adapts the literature to estimate mismatch and uses logistic regressions on an auditor change model to study the timing of auditor change by mismatched clients and on a mismatch model to examine improvement in matching following auditor change.

This paper finds that the more frequent mismatches occurred in the past four years, the higher the likelihood of switching in the current year. Clients mismatched continuously for two or more years are more likely to change auditors. This paper also reports that mismatched clients who switch auditors are less likely to be mismatched again after the switch.

Because market forces reduce mismatch through auditor change, free choice by clients and auditors should be allowed, and regulatory intervention should be introduced cautiously. As investors and other users of financial statements have an interest in seeing that clients get the appropriate auditors for the audit, they will be assured that market forces could achieve the purpose. Thus, the results of this paper address public concern in the regulatory regime and support current audit market practices.

Prior studies assume a one-year time frame for auditor change to follow mismatch. This paper relaxes this assumption, to better reflect audit market practices, by showing that clients who are more often mismatched with auditors or those mismatched continuously for two or more years could also change auditors. Furthermore, prior studies find that mismatching motivates auditor change, but they do not show that matching improves after the change. This paper extends the literature by shedding new light to show that auditor change improves auditor–client matching.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the potential effect of busy season resource constraints on the selection of a new auditor, conditioned upon the status of the prior auditor.

The paper employs multivariate logistic regressions for a sample of firms that changed auditors between 1979 and 2005 to explore the empirical correlations between having a December fiscal year-end (FYE) and non-lateral switches.

The paper finds that non-BigN clients with December FYEs are less likely to switch to BigN auditors than those with non-December FYEs prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). This trend subsides after SOX. For firms with BigN predecessor auditors, fiscal year-end appears to have insignificant influence on auditor switching.

The findings suggest that upwardly mobile clients face greater audit supply constraints compared to clients already being audited by a BigN firm during the traditional busy season. However, the curbing influence on switching upwards erodes after SOX.

This study is to show the impact of supplier capacity constraints on audit production and structural changes within the auditing profession.

The findings can further the understanding of the determinants of auditor-client realignment, given that the paper identifies and explores the effects of having a December FYE on subsequent auditor appointments, conditioned upon the status of the prior auditor.

This paper aims to examine whether knowledge about companies switching auditors from Big 4 firms to regional firms affects commercial lending decisions.

The approach used is an experiment where bank loan officers make judgments about risk and probabilities of granting a line of credit.

Neither risk assessments nor probabilities of granting credit differed for companies that switch auditors from Big 4 firms to regional firms as compared to companies that did not switch auditors. For companies that did switch auditors, providing a reason for the switch did not influence lending decisions.

Lenders were given questionnaires that do not contain all of the information they may have used in actual loan decision settings. Also, the hypothetical nature of the decisions and incentives may not produce the responses that would be given in actual lending scenarios.

When applying for bank loans, companies need not be concerned about having switched auditors from Big 4 to regional firms. Also, companies that switch from Big 4 firms to regional firms need not worry about whether or not to provide a reason for the audit firm switch.

This study adds to the auditor switching literature by investigating the effects of switches from Big 4 firms to regional firms on commercial lending decisions.