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This paper aims to investigate the impact of ownership concentration of the largest shareholder and foreign ownership on the demand for an external audit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in six Latin American countries. In particular, the authors test whether foreign-owned firms (compared with domestic private-owned firms) and domestic firms with minority foreign shareholders are more likely engaged in audit assurance.

The authors applied the logit model to estimate the impact of ownership concentration and owner/shareholder type on audit demand, using a sample of 4,609 SMEs. The probabilities of being audited for firms in these countries are then calculated from the estimation results.

The empirical results suggest an inverse relationship between ownership concentration and audit demand only for Uruguay and Peru. However, foreign-owned firms and domestic private-owned firms with minority foreign ownership have a high probability of being audited for all sample countries.

Policymakers in developing countries may promote foreign investments in domestic private-owned firms to improve their corporate transparency and governance.

This study contributes to the growing literature on the impact of ownership on audit demand by particularly focusing on foreign owners and foreign minority shareholders. The findings indicate that foreign ownership (either majority or minority) contributes to corporate transparency and business environments in emerging countries.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of higher-quality auditors on corporate risk-taking.

Agency theory suggests that managers have incentives to avoid risk in the interests of perquisite consumption and self-preservation, while investors prefer that managers invest in all projects with a positive net present value, i.e. projects that generally increase corporate risk. Empirical literature finds that managerial risk-aversion is mitigated (and firm value enhanced) when investor protection is higher. The authors examine whether higher-quality auditing is one such mechanism to encourage shareholder-focused corporate risk-taking. They model measures of corporate risk as a function of whether a firm is audited by an industry specialist or not, controlling specifically for accounting quality. They then examine the incremental effect of higher-quality audits on other forms of external monitoring (analyst coverage and institutional holdings) for corporate risk.

Using a sample from 2003 to 2007, the authors document a positive relationship between local-level audit industry specialization and both the standard deviation of annual stock returns and research and development expenditures (their measures of corporate risk-taking). They then find the effect is mitigated when firms have alternative external monitoring, in the form of either higher analyst coverage or greater institutional holdings.

Given the nature of the question the authors ask, particularly in the context of the auditor–client relationship, a potential limitation is the difficulty in assigning causation. Nonetheless, this study underscores the importance of auditors as an effective mechanism for monitoring corporate managers.

This study provides novel evidence that auditors affect managerial decision making beyond a simple effect on financial statements, and should be of interest to boards of directors, regulators and investors.

This study aims to investigate the association between executives with foreign backgrounds and the audit fees paid by the Chinese-listed firms over the period from 2010 to 2020.

To examine the association between executives’ foreign experience and audit fees, this study constructs the following empirical model: Lnfee_i,t = β₀ + β₁Foreign background_i,t + ∑β_j Control_i,t + YearFE + IndFE + ε_i,t (1).

This study finds that auditors charge higher fees for firms hiring more executives with foreign backgrounds. The results are robust to a battery of robustness checks, including fixed effects, alternative measures of independent variable, controlling for other characteristics of executives and auditors and entropy balancing method.

This study sheds light on how executives’ foreign backgrounds affect audit fees, enriching the literature on executive heterogeneity and audit fees and providing important implications for audit practitioners.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on internal auditing as the pandemic forced individual internal auditors and audit teams to conduct the work remotely.

Five in-depth semi-structured interviews of internal audit experts that work in German retail and manufacturing industry were conducted between February and April 2021.

The authors find that the importance of audit technologies did not change significantly due to the pandemic, as audit technologies were already an integral part of internal audits. Interestingly, the transition to remote audits occurred with remarkable speed and efficiency. The presence of well-functioning information and communication technologies emerges as a critical facilitator for effective remote communication, collaboration and data exchange. However, audit technologies can only partially replace physical on-site examinations and human interaction. The main challenges of remote audits are related to the auditing of non-digitalized processes and the inherent limitations of auditee interviews and interactions.

The authors' interview approach does not allow to cover variations between industries and between countries. While internal audit experts provided notably consistent responses during the interviews, acknowledging that the sample size is very small is important.

The COVID-19 pandemic serves as a catalyst for increased digitalization and technology adoption within the realm of internal auditing. A hybrid approach combining the benefits of on-site and remote audits is expected to prevail in the future.

The paper is among the first to document the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the work of internal auditing using field-based research methods.

This research aims to revisit Gul and Goodwin (2010), which focuses on exploring the relationship between debt maturity structure, credit ratings and audit fees. Furthermore, the authors investigate whether this association varies based on firm size, firm life cycle and financial reporting quality.

To investigate the research question, the authors use an extended sample period, 2004–2017, in comparison to the sample period, 2003–2006, used in Gul and Goodwin (2010). The authors use ordinary least squares regression as a baseline methodology along with two-stage least-squares regression and change analysis to control for endogeneity concerns.

According to Gul and Goodwin (2010), auditors charge lower audit fees for firms with higher short-maturity debt and better credit ratings, indicating a lower likelihood of financial misreporting. Further, Gul and Goodwin (2010) find that lower credit rated firms benefit more from short-term debt. Primarily, the findings are consistent with Gul and Goodwin (2010) and provide further evidence that the beneficial effects of short-maturity debt for firms with poor ratings are evident for small firms, firms in the growth stage of their life cycle and firms with poor earnings quality.

The findings imply that practitioners in the audit profession and investors should take a more nuanced and comprehensive approach to varied firm and financial factors, taking into consideration the intricate relationships between many elements impacting a firm’s financial health. As a result, audit professionals may give more accurate appraisals of a firm’s financial condition, and investors can make better investment decisions.

The authors reconfirm the findings of Gul and Goodwin (2010) using an extended sample. The findings are novel, which evidence that the lower audit fees for rated firms with short-maturity debt are moderated by firm size, life cycle and financial reporting quality.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether and how auditors’ pricing decisions are affected by their clients’ offshore trading activities, which are comprehensively measured through a textual analysis technique.

The authors identified a sample of 32,264 firm-year observations from publicly listed firms in the US during 2004 to 2015. The authors then used multivariate regressions to examine the effect of offshore trading activities on audit fees. In the regression models, the authors also control for a series of factors that are documented to influence audit pricing.

The authors find that offshore trading activities are positively associated with audit fees, suggesting that offshore activities are likely to increase a client firm’s business risk and/or the extent of client complexity. The authors also find that auditors charge higher audit fees only to firms purchasing inputs produced by their own assets overseas but not to firms buying inputs produced by local firms overseas. Moreover, the association between offshore trading activities and audit fees is more pronounced for offshore activities that are in countries with high trading centrality, for Big 4 auditors, or for auditors with industry expertise.

This paper extends the literature on the consequences of offshore activities by providing evidence on how auditors react to offshore activities. Moreover, it contributes to the audit fee literature. Prior studies largely focus on client-level determinants, while this study complements this line of literature by identifying firm’s offshore activities as an important risk indicator, which is perceived by auditors in their pricing decisions. A firm’s offshore activity is unique because the risk implication of the offshore activities depends not only on factors within the firm, but also on factors outside the firm in foreign nations.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of audit client importance on future bank risk and systemic risk in US-listed commercial banks.

The authors use archival research method.

The authors mainly find that client importance is negatively related with future bank-specific crash risk and distress risk, and also with sector-wide systemic crash risk and systemic distress risk in the future. The authors also report some evidence that these relations become more pronounced during the crisis period than during the non-crisis period. Moreover, the effect of client importance on systemic risk is found to strengthen in banks audited by Big-N auditors, by auditors without clients who restate earnings, and by auditors with more industry expertise.

These findings contribute to the auditing and systemic risk literature.

This study has implications for regulating the banking industry.

This study provides original evidence on how client importance affects bank-specific risk and systemic risk of the banking industry.

Chief executive officer (CEO) ability may have an effect on various corporate reporting decisions, and consequently, the CEO ability is subject to scrutiny by regulatory reviewers. However, theoretical literature provides mixed evidence on how the CEO ability affects the regulatory review risk. Thus, this study aims to empirically examine the effect of CEO ability on regulatory review risk.

To measure CEO ability, this study uses the CEO ability-score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012). Further, to measure regulatory review risk, the study uses the probability of receiving a comment letter from the Securities and Exchange Organization of Iran.

This study finds that the relationship between CEO ability and regulatory review risk is generally negative and statistically significant but not economically significant, i.e. the relationship is very small. In this regard, the study shows that the relationship is negative and also statistically and economically significant for firms with low levels of agency conflicts and high levels of corporate governance quality; and is positive and also statistically and economically significant for firms with high levels of agency conflicts and low levels of corporate governance quality. In addition, while the study finds no evidence that the regulatory reviewers’ workload compression influences the general relationship between CEO ability and regulatory review risk, it documents that low (high) regulatory reviewers’ workload compression weakens (strengthens) both the relationships stated above.

Collectively, the results suggest that the agency conflicts/corporate governance quality and regulatory reviewers’ workload compression are important factors in the analysis of the relationship between the CEO ability and regulatory review risk. The results offer insights into the opposing theoretical viewpoints about the relationship between CEO ability and regulatory review risk. Thus, the results will be of interest to boards of directors and other stakeholders involved in the regulatory review process.

The Public Sector is usually assumed to have a risk avoidance culture, with a reactive rather than proactive approach towards the management. However, an improved holistic approach seems to be required, especially when considering the complexity and size of the Public Sector, and the challenges it faces to connect the services, clients and the different levels of governance.

Within this chapter, the authors lay out a maturity level evaluation of Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC) within the Maltese Public Sector. Through documentation analysis of the available literature on the subject, the authors determine the principal themes required to develop an effective GRC practice across the Public Sector. The authors then design statements based on the identified GRC themes and administer it using an online survey tool to Public employees across different Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Entities, in order to obtain their perception. This is in order to determine gaps, weaknesses or limiting factors towards the implementation of an effective GRC.

The results show that, although, there is a substantial percentage of scepticism and few disagreements towards some of the statements, especially those which related to Risk Management (RM) and Internal Auditing (IA), the majority of Public Sector bodies do in fact show high standards of GRC practices integrated and present in their day-to-day operations and internal environment, showing that there is a well-developed Governance, Compliance and Control structure and Internal Audit function across the Sector.

However, the perception of participants is that the RM function is the least developed area. IA needs some improvement especially where trust on advice is involved.

Audit rotation (AR) is a key policy initiative implemented in global jurisdictions to deal with concerns about audit quality. Auditing financial reports involves communicating attested value-relevant company information to investors, and hence audit quality plays a role in the quality of financial reporting information. This paper aims to investigate whether AR affects the degree of information asymmetry (IS) between investors. It further aims to examine whether voluntary AR results in less asymmetric information compared to mandatory AR. Additionally, it examines whether political connections moderate the association between AR and IS.

The authors use data from publicly traded banks across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for the period 2010–2018. The authors include several variables to control for corporate governance and other firm-specific characteristics by using country-year fixed-effects regression model.

The authors find higher IS for banks that periodically rotate auditor, while banks voluntarily choose to rotate auditors obtain high-quality audits, which results in higher trading volume and lower stock return volatility, hence lower IS. The results suggest that when banks voluntarily choose to rotate auditors, investors perceive these banks as more committed to obtaining high-quality audits relative to mandatory AR. Providing higher quality audits enhances the credibility of reported information and thus reduce the level of IS. Moreover, IS following AR is higher for politically connected banks than for similar but politically unconnected banks. Finally, investors perceive voluntary AR as a disciplining tool, which mitigates IS. This mitigating role is not affected by bank political connectedness.

This study has limitations as the definition of AR could be interpreted as binary or too narrow, and hence it may not be appropriate to generalize findings to different contexts. Nonetheless, this study casts light on a new perspective to reconcile the existing mixed evidence on the influence of AR on IS and the moderating role of political connections. A further limitation is that because of data unavailability, the authors were unable to use other proxies (e.g. bid-ask spreads and analyst forecast dispersion) of IS.

The present findings provide insight to regulators, policymakers and standard setters on the potential adverse effect of political connections on the role of AR in mitigating IS. The results underscore the importance of voluntary AR, and suggest that regulators, policymakers and standard setters encourage firms to rotate their auditors periodically.

This study provides evidence in a setting that is unique at the economic, social and regulatory levels. Prior literature is lacking and has been centered on developed countries or focusing on single-country specifications. The data set of this study is unique and allows us to examine the interplay between political influence that arises through ownership and management roles of influential members of state.