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We examine how input- (vs. output-) based performance evaluation and incentive intensity impact employees’ autonomous motivation, thereby influence their proactive work behaviors.

We collected survey responses from 309 employees of different firms. Multi-group Structural Equation Modeling analyses were used to analyze the data.

Input-based evaluation had a positive effect on autonomous motivation and proactive work behaviors when task uncertainty was high, but a negative effect when it was low. Autonomous motivation had a positive effect on proactive work behaviors.

Our results on the moderating effect of task uncertainty provide insights into inconsistencies in earlier studies. Moreover, applying self-determination theory of motivation to incentive research can provide some insights into why sometimes, incentives can negatively affect performance.

The study of proactive work behaviors is important because despite their necessity in the fast-changing business environment, they are relatively unexplored in the incentive literature. Proactivity is especially important for tasks that are high in uncertainty because the exact tasks to achieve those goals are hard to specify.

We investigate the effect of performance management system on proactive work behaviors, mediated by autonomous motivation and moderated by task uncertainty.

Most research on worker participation treats it as an establishment-level phenomenon even though it is seldom used on an establishment-wide basis. This paper, however, examines how three forms of incentive compensation are used at the job level, and it assesses the potential ramifications for inequality. I find that the use of incentive compensation reflects the gender composition, unionization, and functional role of jobs. Jobs with many full-time women, for instance, are less likely to use group incentives and profit sharing because they are less likely to play central or managerial roles in establishments. This suggests that incentive compensation may increase inequality.

Purpose – Since risk management is crucial for achieving strategic objectives in a complex and uncertain environment and its effectiveness relies deeply on efforts to create a risk-conscious culture, this study aims at understanding whether risk management can be promoted and reinforced by the use of performance-based monetary incentives given to Board members and top managers.

Methodology/approach – This study is explorative in nature and investigates four case studies based on document analysis and semi-structured interviews with risk managers.

Findings – Results show that some companies have already adopted risk measures in incentive schemes. At the same time all interviewees agree with the usefulness of linking traditional performance-based monetary incentives to risk management objectives in order to improve the effectiveness of the latter and to create a risk-aware culture. However, the difficulty in identifying proper measures has been underlined.

Practical implications – The study confirms the feasibility of linking risk dimensions to reward systems and suggests that firms should move in this direction. The study also outlines and proposes some possible measures to reward managers.

Limitations – This study views risk as measurable and managerially actionable and focuses only on incentives while acknowledging the use of other mechanisms that can contribute to the creation of an informed risk culture. Furthermore, the integration of risk management with other management control systems and accounting instruments has not been analyzed.

Value of the paper – This study addresses firms and their stakeholders’ need to make top managers more accountable for risk in their decision-making.

Using data collected in 1999 from manufacturing units, this paper reports the results of an investigation into the interactive effect of benchmarking and incentives on manufacturing unit performance. Based on a mail questionnaire sent to a sample of manufacturing units within U.S. electronic industry, the results of this paper provide evidence of significant interaction effect of benchmarking and incentives resulting in product cost improvement and product quality performance.

The present research examines the effect of incentivizing both outcome and driver measures of SPMS on middle managers' proactivity in influencing the strategy formulation process. A case-based experiment was conducted among 74 full-time employees. The results suggest that when incentives are linked to both outcome and driver measures of SPMS, compared with when they are outcome-based and not linked to the SPMS, managers are more proactive in communicating strategy-related issues to top management. In addition, this effect of SPMS-based incentives on middle managers' proactivity is mediated by their autonomous extrinsic motivation to achieve strategic goals. The results are in general consistent with postulates of the self-determination theory of motivation. This chapter also has practical implication. Specifically, recent evidence suggests that most SPMS adopters fail to validate causal business models underlying their formulated strategies (Ittner, 2008; Ittner & Larcker, 2003, 2005). Middle managers' proactive strategic behavior may be one means to prompt top management to inspect formulated strategies and their underlying business models.

Incentives are effective at enhancing productivity, but research also suggests that performance incentives can have “unintended negative consequences” including increases in hazard/injuries, increases in errors, and reduction in cooperation, prosocial behaviors, and creativity. Relatively overlooked is whether, when, and how incentives can be designed to prevent such negative consequences. The authors review literature in several disciplines (construction, healthcare delivery, economics, psychology, and [some] management) on this issue. This chapter, in toto, sheds a generally positive light and suggests that, beyond productivity, incentives can be used to improve other outcomes such as safety, quality, prosocial behaviors, and creativity, particularly when the incentives are thoughtfully designed. The review concludes with several potential fruitful areas for future research such as investigations of incentive-effect duration.

Scientific knowledge has characteristics of a pure public good. It is non-rivalrous in the sense that once generated, it is neither depleted nor diminished by use. Knowledge is also non-excludable since, once it is made available, in the absence of clearly defined property rights, users cannot be excluded from using it. These aspects imply that private market mechanisms will not provide adequate incentives for knowledge creation. Legal property rights, such as patents, are one means of dealing with this problem. Patronage in the form of government support for research provides another solution, as does the priority system of awarding credit for scientific discoveries to the first to find them. In the last two decades, there has been a growth in the relative importance of the use of legal property rights in the university setting and with it a growing controversy as to whether the costs may be outweighing the benefits. In this chapter, we discuss issues and evidence with regard to the ownership and licensing of publicly funded research intellectual property rights (IPR). We begin with an overview of incentives created by the patent system and discuss the ways in which these incentives differ from traditional norms of science. We then draw on the legal and economic literatures which distinguish among the incentives to invent, disclose, and innovate, and argue that the rationale for providing IPR for university research stems from the last of these. Finally, we discuss the available evidence on the creation and diffusion of academic research under current IPR regimes.

Rather than organize as traditional firms, many of today’s companies organize as platforms that sit at the nexus of multiple exchange and production relationships. This chapter considers a most basic question of organization in platform contexts: the choice of boundaries. Herein, I investigate how classical economic theories of firm boundaries apply to platform-based organization and empirically study how executives made boundary choices in response to changing market and technical challenges in the early mobile computing industry (the predecessor to today’s smartphones). Rather than a strict or unavoidable tradeoff between “openness-versus-control,” most successful platform owners chose their boundaries in a way to simultaneously open-up to outside developers while maintaining coordination across the entire system.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of Mexico’s national teacher incentive program, Carrera Magisterial (CM), on educational quality and equity.Methodology – I conduct a descriptive analysis of data from two Mexican states, Aguascalientes and Sonora, to explore whether the distribution of teachers across schools and communities has changed since the implementation of CM.Findings – Although more qualified teachers tend to be disproportionately concentrated in wealthier municipalities and urban areas in both Aguascalientes and Sonora, I find some evidence that the distribution of qualified teachers has become more equitable over time in both states.Research limitations – These results suggest that CM’s design, which allows teachers to advance more rapidly through the system if they teach in low-development zones, may have increased equity in children’s access to qualified teachers. However, these trends could result from influences beyond CM, such as salary incentives to teach in less developed areas. We must also take care in extrapolating results from two Mexican states to other states with different populations and geographies.Practical implications – This research suggests that policymakers must apply a careful analysis to the design of CM, especially the allocation of points to teachers based on their students’ test scores. In particular, educators and policymakers must consider the potential movement of more qualified teachers to higher-scoring schools and classrooms.Value – Although substantial research has examined whether CM has improved educational quality in Mexico, this is one of few studies to explore the program’s impact on educational equity.