Search results
1 – 10 of over 14000This empirical study conceptualizes the institutional environment within which firms function in a transition economy as a number of dimensions, representing the externally set…
Abstract
This empirical study conceptualizes the institutional environment within which firms function in a transition economy as a number of dimensions, representing the externally set ‘rules of the game’ as perceived by senior managers. It then proposes a mediating model of the links between that environment and the commercial performance of enterprises in which incentive intensity is a key strategic choice, influenced by perceptions of the institutional setting and the influence of that choice is carried on to commercial performance by a set of managerial orientations. The model is tested using survey data from a sample of 959 Chinese enterprises.
Tian Wang, Yunan Duan and Yangyang Liang
The authors address a two-dimensional (both customer acquisition and retention) incentive in a decentralized service chain consisting of a risk-neutral brand and agent (or…
Abstract
Purpose
The authors address a two-dimensional (both customer acquisition and retention) incentive in a decentralized service chain consisting of a risk-neutral brand and agent (or averse).
Design/methodology/approach
The authors focus on the relationship between acquisition and retention, that is, retained customers (repeated purchases) are based on and come from the acquired (new) customers in the former period. The authors also design a two-period separate incentive on both dimensions.
Findings
The authors found that a targeted incentive strategy should be applied for achieving more revenue when the incentive intensities are relatively small. Otherwise, the brand needs to adjust the targeted incentive strategy into incentivizing the opposite dimension, particularly on acquisition. Under the optimal contract, the brand needs to be very careful with deciding the fixed part of the incentive salary and the incentive intensities on both dimensions. For example, the fixed salary initially decreases and then increases in the incentive intensities. For the optimal incentive policies, the brand should incentivize acquisition but outsource retention if the agent is risk-neutral. When the agent is becoming risk-averse, the brand should lower its incentive intensity as the risk degree and variances become larger. Interestingly, the brand may benefit from introducing risks.
Originality/value
The study contributes to the literature by considering the following points. First, the authors extend the principal-agent incentive model by considering two-period decisions of customer acquisition and retention. Second, based on the two-period principal-agent problem, the authors design separate incentive intensities on acquisition and retention, respectively. While, most of the literature focused on acquisition incentives. Third, different from other works focusing on either risk-neutral or risk-averse environments, the authors consider both and compare the cases of risk-neutral and risk-averse to analyze the impact of risk on the optimal decisions and the brand's expected profit.
Details
Keywords
Peter A. Bamberger and Racheli Levi
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of two key team‐based pay characteristics – namely reward allocation procedures (i.e. reward based on norms of equity, equality…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of two key team‐based pay characteristics – namely reward allocation procedures (i.e. reward based on norms of equity, equality or some combination of the two) and incentive intensity – on both the amount and type of help given to one another among members of outcome‐interdependent teams.
Design/methodology/approach
A total of 180 undergraduate students participate in a laboratory simulation with a 2 × 3 experimental design. Servicing virtual “clients,” participants receive pre‐scripted requests for assistance from anonymous teammates. ANOVA and hierarchical regression analyses are used to test the hypotheses.
Findings
Relative to equity‐oriented group‐based pay structures, equality‐oriented pay structures are found to be associated with both significantly more help giving in general and more of the type of help likely to enhance group‐level competencies (i.e. autonomous help). Incentive intensity strengthens the effects of reward allocation on the amount (but not the type) of help giving.
Research limitations/implications
While the short time frame of the simulation poses a significant threat to external validity, the findings suggest that team‐based compensation practices may provide organizational leaders with an important tool by which to shape critical, helping‐related team processes, with potentially important implications for both team learning and performance.
Practical implications
Managers interested in promoting capacity‐building and helping among team members should avoid allocating team rewards strictly on the basis of the individual contribution.
Originality/value
This paper provides the first empirical findings regarding how alternative modes of team‐based reward distribution may influence key group processes among members of outcome interdependent teams.
Details
Keywords
According to TCE, different forms of economic organization – markets, hierarchies, hybrid forms of various kinds, etc. – are characterized by different “syndromes of attributes,”…
Abstract
According to TCE, different forms of economic organization – markets, hierarchies, hybrid forms of various kinds, etc. – are characterized by different “syndromes of attributes,” or coherent sets of features (Williamson, 1991). Because each form of organization implements a distinctive set of governance features, each is efficient for a different type of transaction, implying trade-offs among the forms. The two key categories of features are the allocation of decision-making authority among and within firms and the intensity of the incentives facing firms and members of them. By concentrating decision-making authority, hierarchies have the benefit of facilitating “cooperative adaptation”; that is, coordinated change among two or more parties. Adaptation to new economic circumstances is, after all, the main function of an economic system (Hayek, 1945). Hierarchies are said to facilitate cooperative adaptation better than markets because unlike for markets, courts will not intervene in internal disputes and fiat is available as a last resort. This leaves more scope for the management hierarchy to use its authority to promote cooperative adaptation to unanticipated circumstances (Williamson, 1975, 1991). On the other hand, hierarchies feature weaker incentive intensity, that is, weaker links between individual or unit performance and individual or unit reward. This is because market-like levels of incentive intensity would inhibit cooperative adaptation by stimulating “autonomous adaptation” instead. Autonomous adaptation refers to adaptation by individual firms or organizational members that occurs without regard to its effects on other parties. Williamson (1985) also argues that market-like incentives lack credibility within hierarchies due to the ultimate availability of fiat. Thus, for TCE, the most fundamental trade-off between various forms of internal organization is between cooperative adaptation and incentive intensity.
The high uncertainty of technological innovation in megaprojects brings great challenges to the R&D institution and also acts as a trigger for moral hazard. The incentive and…
Abstract
Purpose
The high uncertainty of technological innovation in megaprojects brings great challenges to the R&D institution and also acts as a trigger for moral hazard. The incentive and supervision are effective means to improve the performance of innovation. The purpose of this paper is to propose appropriate incentive and supervision mechanisms to reduce information asymmetry and improve the efficiency of incentives. Suggestions on technological innovation are put forward to megaprojects management.
Design/methodology/approach
According to the principal-agent theory, the research develops incentive models under three states, i.e. information symmetry, information asymmetry and information asymmetry based on supervision mechanism. The Bayesian theory is employed to prove the effectiveness of the novel supervision method based on risk assessment.
Findings
The results indicate that under the information asymmetry, the incentive intensity is positively correlated with the social benefits coefficient, and negatively correlated with the patent benefits coefficient. The R&D effort and the owner's incentive intensity decline with the increase of information asymmetry. The supervision of risks can effectively reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and the higher the uncertainty of innovations, the more significant the effect of supervision is. As the supervision intensity increases, the incentive intensity, the R&D effort and the innovation output will increase. In addition, the R&D institutions with high innovation capability, low unit cost of R&D and low risk-aversion are more willing to make efforts to innovate.
Originality/value
This study fills the research gap on incentive and supervision of technological innovation in megaprojects. The externality of innovation benefits is considered in the model. The traditional incentive model is extended through the introduction of supervision. Furthermore, a novel supervision method based on risk assessment is proposed. The results validate the importance of risk management in technological innovation and provide a new insight for project management.
Details
Keywords
Xinzhou Qi and Zhong Ning
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the characteristics of the incubation industry, government funding, and the intensity of funding for different…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the characteristics of the incubation industry, government funding, and the intensity of funding for different services. Because the incubation industry has particular characteristics, government funding varies for different services, and its intensity varies with service.
Design/methodology/approach
Government funding is classified as incubation subsidy and incubation incentive. Besides, incubation services include property management, business mentoring as well as investment and financing. Based on this, this study examines the influence mechanism of different subsidy and incentive on incubation services by using the generalized propensity score matching method.
Findings
The empirical results show that subsidy and incentive have an inverse-U shape effect on property management service, but a linear effect on business guidance service. Furthermore, subsidy does not affect investment and financing service, but incentive that can have a significant impact.
Originality/value
The theme of government funding and incubator services plays an important role in helping entrepreneurs expand their businesses. Incubation subsidy and incentive can provide important support to help enterprises obtain more preferential loans, technical services and technical support in the incubator. Applying it to incubator services can provide better technology and entrepreneurship guidance. These services can help new entrepreneurs understand products and markets, and how to develop more successfully in the early stage. In short, incubators supported by government funds can provide important support to entrepreneurs to help them successfully realize their business plans.
Details
Keywords
– This paper aims to investigate the economic determinants and the effects on firm value of the Chief Marketing Officer’s (CMO’s) equity incentives.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to investigate the economic determinants and the effects on firm value of the Chief Marketing Officer’s (CMO’s) equity incentives.
Design/methodology/approach
The empirical analysis uses 586 firm-year observations corresponding to 227 unique firms collected from Execucomp dataset over the period 2000-2009.
Findings
The paper documents that when a firm’s marketing intensity increases, the CMO’s equity incentives significantly increase; CMO’s equity incentives are positively related to shareholder value, and this positive relationship is incremental to that between the Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO)’s equity incentives and firm value; the positive impact of the CMO’s equity incentives on the firm value is partially mediated by marketing investments.
Research limitations/implications
The paper helps understand under which circumstances firms provide the CMO with high-equity incentives and what the performance implications are of providing the CMO with long-term incentives.
Practical implications
Results indicate that companies should try to incent the CMO with equity-based incentives because the CMO can boost shareholder value on a way that is incremental to how the CEO does so. As a consequence, if the board of directors decides not to provide the CMO with sufficient equity incentives, it is likely that this decision will be suboptimal for shareholders.
Originality/value
This paper is the first to analyze the structure and effect on firm value of the CMO’s compensation in answer to calls for research on compensation of executives other than CEOs.
Details
Keywords
Hideo Owan, Tsuyoshi Tsuru and Katsuhito Uehara
Under a discontinuous and nonlinear compensation scheme, which is prevalent among car dealerships, the amount of a salesperson’s expected daily commission depends primarily on his…
Abstract
Purpose
Under a discontinuous and nonlinear compensation scheme, which is prevalent among car dealerships, the amount of a salesperson’s expected daily commission depends primarily on his position in the pay schedule on the day he makes a sale. Salespeople thus vary their efforts and adopt a different pricing strategy week by week, or even day by day. The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive effect of such a nonlinear scheme and provide the evidence that salespeople’s behavior is consistent with the theory.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors conduct regression analyses using the transaction data provided by two North American auto dealerships. The authors construct a daily measure of varying incentive intensity and evaluate its impact on the distribution of individual daily sales and the dealership’s gross profit rate.
Findings
The authors find that the daily measure of varying incentive intensity has a positive effect on the distribution of individual daily sales and a negative impact on the dealership’s gross profit rate. The results suggest that: salespeople adjust their effort levels in response to the intensity of incentives; and they game the system by lowering the prices when the marginal return to doing so is high.
Research limitations/implications
The study shows that there is a high cost associated with the discontinuous nonlinear pay scheme, raising the question of why many auto dealerships use it.
Originality/value
This paper sheds light on the undesirable aspects of discontinuous and nonlinear incentive schemes, varied performance and gaming, by quantifying the effects of the worker’s behavior.
Details
Keywords
Sinikka Moilanen and Seppo Ikäheimo
This paper aims to interpret and compare managerial intentions for and employee perceptions of group-based incentive systems.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to interpret and compare managerial intentions for and employee perceptions of group-based incentive systems.
Design/methodology/approach
The data comprise interviews with managers and employees in four Finnish firms with experience of company-wide incentive systems involving profit-sharing and team-based rewards. Benefitting from social exchange theory, managers’ intentions and employees’ perceptions are examined.
Findings
Managers’ and employees’ views resemble each other concerning profit-sharing as reflecting reciprocity rooted in perceived distributive fairness, whereas examination of the team-based rewards revealed impediments in reciprocity. While managerial intentions for team-based rewards refer to social exchange with economic intensity via selection of controllable performance measurements aimed at making individual-level effort count, the employees’ perceptions deem such metrics non-controllable, reflecting perceived distributive and procedural unfairness.
Practical implications
Profit-sharing seems to create fair social obligation and goal congruence between managers and employees, whereas team-based incentives easily suffer from unfairness, reducing their effectiveness.
Originality/value
Distinguishing between managerial intentions and employee perceptions pertaining to incentive systems facilitated in-depth exploration of the social exchange inherent in them, conceptualized in terms of economic intensity, fairness and controllability. With this lens, qualitative analysis revealed differences in interpretations of controllability and fairness between the managerial intentions and employee perceptions. The central contribution to scholarship takes the form of interpretations reflecting upon these key findings.
Details
Keywords
Mohammad Javad Asgari, Amir Zakery and Mir Saman Pishvaee
This paper aims to investigate the impact of the factors affecting open innovation (OI) intensity, in terms of three components of cooperative innovation, resource search and…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to investigate the impact of the factors affecting open innovation (OI) intensity, in terms of three components of cooperative innovation, resource search and external research and development (R&D), as well as the impact of OI intensity on commercialization performance in small and medium-sized enterprises.
Design/methodology/approach
The data obtained from the distributed questionnaire among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from Isfahan Science and Technology Town (ISTT) in Iran, was analyzed using inferential and parametric statistics to examine the research hypotheses. In this analysis, structural equation tests were used to confirm or reject the research hypotheses using Smart PLS software.
Findings
The results indicate that all three OI components influence commercialization in technology-based firms of ISTT, while the most important one is cooperative innovation. Among the factors affecting OI components, innovative incentives are the most effective one that increases both external R&D and cooperative innovation. Facilitators and limitations of open innovation are also affecting OI intensity, with lower priorities.
Practical implications
Science park managers and policymakers should lay the ground for enhancing the cooperation intensity among firms. Cooperation intensity is the most effective open innovation component to improve commercialization performance.
Originality/value
Open innovation antecedents and its consequence on commercialization performance have been investigated for the same time in SMEs of a science park.
Details