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This study aims to explore the role of rebel group legitimacy and ideology in durable peace (DP) following peace agreements to end civil wars. It builds on earlier research showing that justice and civil society involvement are critical in achieving DP. This study adds the impacts of rebel group activities and support on DP. Activities include service delivery and mobilization. Support is gauged with outcomes of presidential and parliamentary elections held following peace agreements.

Five data sets were used to measure the key variables: DP, inclusive commissions (IC), legitimacy symmetry (electoral outcomes), service delivery and ideological mobilization. A measure of rebel group integration in the political system was also constructed. Impacts of the integration, legitimacy and ideology variables were assessed with a hierarchical regression model (HRM). This study begins with a base model drawn from earlier research showing the key predictors were procedural justice (PJ) and IC. The authors ask about the extent to which the rebel group variables contribute additional variance to the prediction of DP.

The main contributors to the prediction of DP were PJ, IC and integration in the political system. None of the legitimacy or mobilization variables added significant variance to the prediction. Only one of the mobilization variables, forced recruitment, was significant. The decision to integrate into the political system following the agreement did not mediate the relationship between PJ in the negotiation process and DP. Results of a factor analysis showed that DP, PJ, IC and integration formed a cluster with strong loadings on the first factor.

The negative results for the legitimacy and mobilization variables may not be the last word on rebel group influences. Lack of support for the key hypotheses spurs attempts to discover other sources that contribute to the survival of rebel group actors in the political system and, in turn, to DP.

The issues raised by this study contribute to debates about ways to attain peaceful relations among competing groups following a civil war. It appears that attention to factors inside and around the negotiation process (PJ, ICs and conversion) may be more important than rebel group activities outside of these processes. The results call attention, in particular, to the important role played by political integration. From a policy perspective, it would be useful to develop levers for encouraging rebel groups to emerge as political actors in the post-agreement environment.

Developing measures of the symmetry of rebel group legitimacy and integration in the context of a comparative case study are the primary original contributions of this study. Furthermore, the mode of analysis (HRM) is novel in this literature. This approach builds on and extends the earlier research on factors influencing DP.

Years after the 2011 uprising Egypt, it seems that the country’s non-Islamist parties are still included in the political game. After significant alterations in their political sphere by mid-2013 at the advent of the Muslim Brother exclusion and the subsequent discrediting of Salafi al-Nour party, non-Islamist parties took clear part in the mobilization for presidential elections (2014, 2018) and competed for legislative seats in 2015. Nonetheless, it is difficult to expect them to turn into long-term key political players with clear-cut ideological postures, unique platforms and strong grass root mobilization. With the exception of the electoral gains scored by numbered parties like Free Egyptians’ party and Nation’s Future in 2015 legislative elections, these parties seem to be lagging behind esp. in terms of their popular base; who became winners at the advent of the radical exclusion of the MB from July 2013 onwards.

This paper is based on archival research and guided by basic assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, mainly game-theoretic versions of the approach. It is divided into four sections, three of them are chronological and the last one is thematic.

Egypt’s non-Islamists engaged in the post-2011 political sphere, with strong Islamist rivals crippling their political chances in the first two years following the 2011 uprising. They surely capitalized on the exclusion and discrediting of the latter, but they suffered lack of ideological clarity and fragmentation from 2011 onwards with no enough evidence these weaknesses were surpassed after Islamists were “out of their way”. The only strand of non-Islamist parties which came out as “game winners” were those possessing the resources and enjoying overt “friendly” relations with al-Sisi regime. Nonetheless, internal conflicts inside key secularist parties shed light on their capacity to turn into long-term players in Egypt’s political sphere.

Very few papers were published on Egypt’s secularists parties after the 2011 uprising from the perspective of the alteration that occurred in their political environment affecting their political weight and gains. More generally, literature on non-ruling parties in authoritarian contexts mostly reduce these parties to secondary roles allocated by ruling regimes. The paper seeks to overcome both shortages.

By drawing on the research paradigm of collective action that occurs in physical space, the present study aims to explore the antecedent predictors of network social mobilization – feeling of injustice – and discuss the emotional mechanism of this prediction: mediating effect of anger and resentment.

Micro-blog postings about network social mobilization were collected to develop the dictionary of codes of fairness, anger and resentment. Then, according to the dictionary, postings on Sina Weibo were coded and analyzed.

The feeling of injustice predicted network social mobilization directly. The predictive value was 27% and 33%, respectively during two analyses. The feeling of injustice also predicted social mobilization indirectly via anger and resentment. In other words, anger and resentment account for the active mechanism in which the feeling of injustice predicts network social mobilization. Mediating effect value was 29.63% and 33.33% respectively.

This study is our first exploration to use python language to collect data from human natural language pointing on micro-blog, a large number of comments of netizen about certain topic were crawled, but a small portion of the comments could be coded into analyzable data, which results in a doubt of the reliability of the study. Therefore, we should put the established model under further testing.

In the cyberspace, this study confirms the mechanism of network social mobilization, expands and enriches the research on social mobilization and deepens the understanding of social mobilization.

This study provides an empirical evidence to understand the network social mobilization, and it gives us the clue to control the process of network social mobilization.

This study uses the Python language to write Web crawlers to obtain microblog data and analyze the microblog content for word segmentation and matching thesaurus. It has certain innovation.

Critiques of elites define populism, which conceives of power relations as a unified, conspiring elite exploiting the good people. Yet, populism itself is inherently elitist, calling for a strong leader to take power and channel the will of the people. Elite theory, surprisingly overlooked in scholarship on populism, can clarify this apparent paradox and elucidate the dimensions of populism and its risk of authoritarianism in new ways. In contrast to populist ideological conceptions of power relations in society, elite theory points to the possibility that several elites with diverging voices and interests exist. Furthermore, elite theorists argue that such elite pluralism is a necessary component of a well-functioning democracy. Much scholarship on populism, often aiming to understand its causes and focussing on Western Europe and North America, points to the similarities of populist movements. The focus on similarities strengthens the understanding of populism as a uniform phenomenon and populist elite critiques as homogeneous. However, broader comparative studies show that different populist movements target a range of various elite groups. Indeed, the empirical reality of populist elite critiques targeting diverse elite groups is more in line with elite theory than populist ideological conceptions of power relations in society. A key to grasping the democratic challenges posed by the power relations between elites and masses in both populist critiques and populist solutions is an understanding of the institutional conditions for elite integration versus elite pluralism. This central discussion in both classical and modern elite theory is applied to analyse populism in this contribution.

The purpose of the paper “Commerce, jobs and politics: the impact of the USA–China trade on USA domestic politics” is to examine the impact of Chinese trade with the USA to determine the consequences of the trade on manufacturing employment. The geographic and sectoral impacts of this trade are assessed. The conclusion is that the USA–China trade has affected political polarization in such a way as to affect electoral outcomes. Implications for policy are discussed in the paper.

The overall design is a focused case study in terms of its focus on the USA–China trade relations. There is also a statistical component due to the breakdown of the USA in economic commuting zones.

The major finding is that Chinese import penetration created substantial political polarization in the USA and that polarization affected electoral outcomes. Chinese import penetration also resulted in a shift of jobs from the eastern heartland to the coasts. Much of the transition was aided by the restructuring of jobs within firms from manufacturing to high-end services.

Perhaps, the biggest limitation concerns how general and durable the findings are. The authors establish that the first decade after Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) (2001) was characterized by economic disruption in the USA labor market. Whether the economic effects will have a longer duration is not known.

One practical limitation is that it is difficult to know what policy actions to take on the basis of the research: trade policy, human capital (education) policy or place-based policies which aid particular regions.

The social implications in this paper are jobs and employment policy.

The author thinks this is very original work, though based on the work of several economists. But outside of a few articles, the author does not think much has appeared in political science journals.

Reflecting on recent empirical developments as well as insights from regulatory state theory, the paper considers directions in which the regulatory state could develop in the post-COVID-19 era.

This is a de-contextualised analysis of regulatory developments drawing on the prior regulatory state literature and literature on post-crisis responses. Taking into account recent empirical developments related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the paper sets out, in a comparative context, scenarios for the future development of the regulatory state.

Predicting the direction in which the regulatory state will develop is challenging, particularly at this early stage. Yet, we provide a conceptual framework for thinking about possible futures of the regulatory state and how domestic and international factors might mediate these futures.

The paper provides a structured approach to the analysis of the regulatory state bringing together insights from the literature on the regulatory state, public management reform, and global regulatory shifts.

This paper aims to contend that populism is damaging to both domestic and international politics; not only does it erode liberal democracy in established democracies but also fuels authoritarianism in despotic regimes and aggravates conflicts and crises in international system.

The research is divided into two main sections. First, it examines how populist mobilization affects liberal democracy, and refutes the claims that populism is beneficial and reinforcing to democracy. Second, it attempts to demonstrate how populism is damaging to domestic politics (by undermining liberal democracy and supporting authoritarianism) as well as international relations (by making interstate conflicts more likely to materialize). Theoretically, populism is assumed to be a strategy used by politicians to maximize their interest. Hence, populism is a strategy used by politicians to mobilize constituents using the main features of populist discourse.

The research argues that populism has detrimental consequences on both domestic and international politics; it undermines liberal democracy in democratic countries, upsurges authoritarianism in autocratic regimes and heightens the level of conflict and crises in international politics. Populism can lead to authoritarianism. There is one major undemocratic trait shared by all populist waves around the world, particularly democracies; that is anti-pluralism/anti-institutions. Populist leaders perceive foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics, because they consider themselves as the only true representatives of the people. Therefore, populist actors abandon any political opposition as necessarily illegitimate, with repercussions on foreign policy.

Some scholars argue that populism reinforces democracy by underpinning its ability to include marginalized sectors of the society and to decrease voter apathy, the research refuted these arguments. Populism is destructive to world democracy; populists are reluctant to embrace the idea of full integration with other nations. Populists reject the idea of open borders, and reckon it an apparent threat to their national security. The research concludes that populists consider maximizing their national interests on the international level by following confrontational policies instead of cooperative ones.

This paper aims to address two fundamental questions: (1) How has Bahrain's industrial policy evolved during the 21st century? and (2) what factors contribute to this evolution?

Utilizing secondary data, this paper identifies key decision-makers responsible for economic policy in Bahrain and delineates the evolution of Bahrain's industrial policy throughout the 21st century. Subsequently, it employs a series of interviews with elite civil servants engaged in the formulation and implementation of Bahrain's economic policies to understand the reasons behind the observed changes.

Since assuming the role of Crown Prince in 1999, Sh. Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa has been the key economic decision-maker in Bahrain. During the 21st century, Bahrain has shifted away from decisions closely aligned with the Washington Consensus towards those more in line with classical industrial policy. Interviews reveal that the private sector's underperformance in job creation, coupled with fiscal pressures, has driven this departure from the Washington Consensus. Moreover, the early successes of the interventionist Saudi Vision 2030 and Bahrain's own success in technocratically managing the COVID-19 pandemic have accelerated this transition.

Insights into the determinants of Bahrain's industrial policy can guide policymakers in refining future strategies. Recognizing the positive role of intellectual developments in academic economics literature becomes crucial for informed decision-making.

This paper fills a gap in the existing literature by providing answers to its research questions, particularly considering the significant changes witnessed in Bahrain's industrial policy post-pandemic.

The Italian government addressed the first wave of its COVID-19 outbreak with a series of social restrictions and calculative practices, all branded with the slogan #istayathome. The hashtag quickly went viral, becoming both a mandate and a mantra and, as the crisis played out, we witnessed the rise of the Italian social movement #istayathome. This study examines how the government's calculative practices led to #istayathome and the constituents that shaped this social movement.

The authors embrace social movement theory and the collective identity perspective to examine #istayathome as a collective action and social movement. Using passive netnography, text mining and interpretative text analysis enhanced by machine learning, the authors analysed just over 350,000 tweets made during the period March to May 2020, each brandishing the hashtag #istayathome.

The #istayathome movement gained traction as a response to the Italian government's call for collective action. Thus, people became an active part of mobilising collective responsibility, enhancing the government's plans. A collective identity on the part of the Italian people sustained the mass mobilisation, driven by cohesion, solidarity and a deep cultural trauma from COVID-19's dramatic effects. Popular culture and Italy's long traditions also helped to form the collective identity of #istayathome. This study found that calculative practices acted as a persuasive technology in forming this collective identity and mobilising people's collective action. Numbers stimulated the cognitive, moral and emotional connections of the social ties shaping collective identity and responsibility. Thus, through collective identity, calculative practices indirectly influenced mass social behaviors and the social movement.

This study offers a novel theoretical perspective and empirical knowledge to explain how government power affects people's culture and everyday life. It unveils the sociological drivers that mobilise collective behaviors and enriches the accounting literature on the effects of calculative practices in managing emergencies. The study contributes to theory by providing an understanding of how calculative practices can influence collective behaviors and can be used to construct informal networks that go beyond the government's traditional formalities.

Local cultures under the nation-states have evolved and produced new concepts. Migrations and cultural interactions have also influenced the language. Thus, different conceptualisations of migration have developed in the “Malay World.” Language is not only a product of ecological and geographical environment, but it is also a result of human mobilisations and cultural intercourses. The differences caused by various Malay World conceptualisations are also related to different interactions, histories and social realities. In the “Malay World,” Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa Indonesia are threatened by English hegemony. At this juncture, demonstrating these interrelationships helps one to understand local cultural intercourses between culture and social reality.

This paper implements the critical discourse analysis, notably, the dialectical–relational approach to different conceptualisations in the “Malay World.” Thus, it aims to discuss the reasons behind the usage of migration-related terms in Indonesia and Malaysia. How migration terms mainly shape social forms, process and circulate in the social world is argued in this paper. The authors target to investigate the local meaning sets for migration concepts and explore self-reflectivity in and critique of the usage of established images between Bahasa Indonesia and Malay concepts, using a Critical Discourse Analysis framework. The discussion section attempts to analyse and explain dialectical relations between social norms and social elements.

Trade diasporas, culture and identities of immigrants, cultural richness and multi-ethnicity have continuously diversified the conceptualisations. These concepts also indicate cultural dominations and exclusions. Thus, the migration dynamics in Southeast Asia might be understood by scrutinising these boundaries and patterns. This study showed that migration conceptualisations in the Malay world are substantially locally determined. Local wisdom and cultural codifications prevail in the migration context. A deeper understanding of the local context is essential in evaluating the international refugee protection mechanisms in these countries as neither Indonesia nor Malaysia are parties to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

Definitions of various types of migration are referred to in multiple terminologies throughout the Nusantara. While in Bahasa Melayu, migrant refers to pendatang, nomadic refers to nomad; refugee refers to pelarian, to migrate refers to berhijrah; in Bahasa Indonesia, migrant refers to migran, nomadic or nomad refers pengembara, refugee refers to pengungsi and migrate, or migration refers migrasi. At the same time, in the Nusantara, many communities define themselves according to their geographical features, such as Orang Sungai, Orang Laut or Orang Kuala. In this context, defining leads to a significant impact on shaping the discourses and approaches.

Definitions determine the borders, flexibilities, plausibility and flows of terms. Critical Discourse Analysis especially placed emphasis on languages and their impacts on social reality. According to Critical Discourse Analysis, terms and their genealogies, transformations and limits are vital in order to comprehend social facts and truth. To understand the change and continuity of migration flow in Southeast Asia, scrutinising the migration-related terms is crucial. This study aims to examine those main terms, their connection with other words, and their transformation in the Malay world sociologically. This as such will shed more light on the social changes regarding genealogical relationships and their usage in daily life within the Critical Discourse Analysis.

This study aims to fulfil the gap between authentic concepts of migration literature in Nusantara. Although Bahasa Melayu and Bahasa Indonesia have a strong connection and interaction, migration definitions in these languages are separated from each other. Cultural and social elements greatly influence migration-connected terms in Bahasa Melayu and Bahasa Indonesia. Without this understanding and the absence of local context, any assessment of their refugee protection systems may be incomplete. This study deals with different cultural nuances and refinements and their migration conceptualisations and histories are based on the ground of their social realities.