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Regulatory authority officials in Korea have been considerably strong enough to affect citizen’s intentions and alter their incentives to take new challenges. But, from…
Regulatory authority officials in Korea have been considerably strong enough to affect citizen’s intentions and alter their incentives to take new challenges. But, from the result of steady regulation reform, absurd bureaucratic interventions have been sharply reduced. Corruption in the process of rent seeking has decreased too. It is impossible to exercise regulatory authority that infringes on the essence of the freedom of the people because people who live in a democratic society would not accept these absurd practices.
This chapter introduces some key features of the regulatory management system in South Korea as well as the challenges that need to be overcome. In particular, the bureaucracy has worked hard to chip away at past regulations that produce rents for various private interest groups but provide little to society at large. Regulatory quality is tied closely to democracy as maintaining a fair and even playing field for entrepreneurs is a key freedom. Introducing checks and balances into the regulatory system can be an important way to facilitate this goal. The Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) facilitated to strengthen the logic of regulatory necessity and the logic of improving regulation which increased the level of its institutionalization.
The aim of this study is to analyse the transformation of the Ecuadorian financial system using the regulatory dialectic approach (Kane, 1977). This research examines the…
The aim of this study is to analyse the transformation of the Ecuadorian financial system using the regulatory dialectic approach (Kane, 1977). This research examines the initial conditions and motivating factors of the reform process, as well as the interplay between government and bankers during the period 2007-2012.
Kane’s regulatory dialectic suggests that regulation of financial institutions is a series of cyclical interactions between opposing political and economic forces. Three main stages are identified: thesis (measures and regulatory actions), antithesis (avoidance/lobby against those reforms) and synthesis (adaptive reregulation resulting from the interaction between interest groups).
Since 2007, the government focused on regulating interest rates, developing a liquidity fund for banking emergencies, increasing taxation and restricting international capital flows. These government initiatives took place against a background of conflicting interests. Private bankers opposed the majority regarding them as burdensome new rules, rather than enlightened reforms. Publicly, these reforms as intended by the government were seemingly supported. Finally through the political process, they were approved. To date, these reforms have strengthened the financial system, produced encouraging social policy results and placed the financial sector to serve the government’s development strategy.
Using Kane’s notion of regulatory dialectic, we explain the process of financial reform in Ecuador as part of a cyclical interaction between opposing forces. Drawing on this framework enabled insight into the nature of government intervention. Hence, we show how that intervention affected the growth, development and structure of the banking system.
This study aims to explore corporate earnings management practices in Australia and New Zealand before and after the regulatory changes and corporate governance reforms…
This study aims to explore corporate earnings management practices in Australia and New Zealand before and after the regulatory changes and corporate governance reforms. The study argues that the effectiveness of regulatory reforms has to be reflected in constraining earnings management in post-reform period as compared to pre-reform period.
Using a sample of 3,966 firm-year observations, including all ASX and NZX listed firms for the period 2001-2006, the study examines earnings management practices in both countries in pre- and post-reform periods with appropriate statistical methods.
The results indicate some interesting phenomenon: the magnitude of earnings management did not decline after the governance reform as a positive time trend is observed in the entire sample as well as in Australian and New Zealand sub-samples, suggesting that earnings management has been growing over time. Additional test indicates no structural change has occurred before and after the new regulations. The shifting from decreasing earnings management to increasing earnings management can be interpreted as an evidence that earnings become more ‘informative’ in a more transparent disclosure regime to capture short-run benefits from regulator reforms.
The shifting of earnings management behaviour from decreasing to increasing income can be interpreted as the outcome of more “informative”, rather than “deliberate”, earnings management in a more transparent disclosure regime to capture short-run benefits of regulatory reforms, which is worth further investigation. The findings of the study can lead regulatory authorities taking appropriate measures to promote earnings quality in corporate financial reporting from a long-run decision usefulness context. Any future reforms should be directed to protecting the interest of stakeholders as well as ensuring benefits outweighing costs for them.
The findings of the study can lead regulatory authorities in taking appropriate measures to promote earnings quality in corporate financial reporting from a long-run decision usefulness context.
The study adds value to the existing earnings management literature as well as effectiveness of regulations for the benefit of wider stakeholder groups.
Reform of government regulation of private business has been considered a cornerstone of good governance and a necessary condition for economic growth. Part of regulatory…
Reform of government regulation of private business has been considered a cornerstone of good governance and a necessary condition for economic growth. Part of regulatory reform is reducing and streamlining administrative or procedural regulations imposed on business by government bureaucracies. Such regulations impose burdens on firms in terms of the time and effort required to file forms, delays in processing documents and applications and in granting approvals, transactional costs if charges are levied, and obstacles resulting from arbitrary decisions by government officials during the process. The chapter will consider the burdens on business caused by regulatory procedures imposed by bureaucracy in the countries of Southeast Asia, and how the reform of such procedures has varied across region, with a particular focus on certain key business functions, viz. starting a business, importing and exporting, paying taxes, and constructing a commercial building. The chapter will posit explanations of why such variation exists and will discuss links between reform of regulatory procedures and the level of social and economic development of a country. In conclusion, the scope for reform of regulatory procedures in those countries where they remain especially burdensome, will be examined, with consideration given to what reforms are necessary and feasible.
Examines Spain’s problems in implementing regulatory reform and offers suggestions for addressing them. Hopes to be instructive to other countries embarking on regulatory…
Examines Spain’s problems in implementing regulatory reform and offers suggestions for addressing them. Hopes to be instructive to other countries embarking on regulatory reform. Concludes that other countries should concentrate on problems on implementation that they are likely to face and should be prepared for.
Purpose – To discuss, from the perspective of developing countries, recent proposals for reforming international standards for bank capital requirements.…
Purpose – To discuss, from the perspective of developing countries, recent proposals for reforming international standards for bank capital requirements.
Methodology/approach – After evaluating, from the viewpoint of developing countries, the effectiveness of capital requirements reforms and progress in implementing existing regulatory accords, the chapter discusses the procyclical effects of Basel regimes, and suggests a reform proposal.
Findings – Minimum bank capital requirements proposals in developing countries should be complemented by the adoption of an incremental, size-based leverage ratio.
Originality/value of chapter – This chapter contributes to enlarge the academic and policy debate related to bank capital regulation, with a particular focus on the situation of developing countries.
The informal economy has expanded across developing countries during the last decades. Focussing on the Turkish case, the purpose of this paper is to examine the role of…
The informal economy has expanded across developing countries during the last decades. Focussing on the Turkish case, the purpose of this paper is to examine the role of neoliberal reforms in this development. The author argues that neoliberal reforms produced a double-edged transformation in the regulatory environment of Turkey. On the one hand, the legal rules that constrain the operation of market forces decreased giving way to more entrepreneurial activity; while on the other hand, the state's effectiveness in “policing” the market declined. As the regulatory barriers to private entrepreneurship decreased, the regulatory barriers to informality also decreased. Private sector growth and informalization emerged as the concomitant outcomes of neoliberal reforms.
This paper examines how the state's changing regulatory relationship to the private sector under neoliberal reforms fostered informal economic activities through a close study of the Turkish case.
At the end of the 1980s, the Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto popularized the view that informalization resulted from government regulations imposing rigid constraints and costs on economic actors, and so would be restrained by decreasing or eliminating them. The economic developments of the past few decades challenge this view, however. The size of the informal economy has expanded in developing nations at a period when government regulations have been declining. How can we explain the increasing volume of informal economic activity in developing nations over the past few decades? And more, how can we explain that this has happened during a period when the private sector has grown, and regulatory rigidities have declined? This paper argues that the state's changing regulatory relationship to the private sector under neoliberal reforms was an important factor in the expansion of informal economic activities.
The implications of neoliberal reforms for economic processes have been widely studied in the social scientific literature. Only a handful of studies have explored their implications for the informal economy, however. These studies singled out factors such as the decline in public employment, weakening of labor unions, or capital's enhanced ability to exploit labor in contributing to informalization of developing country economies in the neoliberal era. By discussing how the changing regulatory contours of the state-economy relationship played a role in the growth of informally operating private enterprises, this paper adds to the existing knowledge of this relationship.
This study is a considered interpretation of the National Registration and Accreditation Scheme for the health professions, which commenced operations in Australia in…
This study is a considered interpretation of the National Registration and Accreditation Scheme for the health professions, which commenced operations in Australia in 2010. The development of the Scheme and its operational elements (namely the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency and 14 profession-specific national Boards) are positioned within the context of regulatory capitalism. Regulatory capitalism merges the experience of neoliberalism with an attentiveness to risk, particularly by the State. Nationally consistent legislation put in place a new set of arrangements that enabled the continuity of governments’ role in health workforce governance. The new arrangements resulted in an entity which is neither exclusively subservient to nor independent of the State, but rather “quasi-independent.” In exploring this arrangement, specific consideration is given to how the regulatory response matched the existing reality of a global (and national) health workforce market. This study considers this activity by the State as one of consolidation, as opposed to fracturing, against a backdrop of purposeful regulatory reform.
Many European-level networks and regulatory constellations in different sectors (e.g., energy, telecommunications) without clear anchorage into the European Union (EU…
Many European-level networks and regulatory constellations in different sectors (e.g., energy, telecommunications) without clear anchorage into the European Union (EU) institutional landscape have been subject to increasing efforts by the EU institutions to tie them closer to the EU. They are serving increasingly as platforms for preparing EU policy or for implementing EU decisions, which may result in closer institutional bonds with the EU. This chapter aims at examining the differences and similarities between the process towards more EU-integration in two different domains (i.e., telecommunications and patents) and regulatory constellations (i.e., supranational and intergovernmental).
The chapter analyzes the evolution in the European telecommunication sector and the European Patent System and juxtaposes this analysis with the literature on institutionalization, Europeanization of regulatory network-organizations, and multilevel governance (MLG). It focuses on the role of the European Commission and the interaction with the national regulatory agencies (NRAs) and networks within the institutional framework.
Irrespective of the particular regime (intergovernmental/supranational) in a certain domain or sector, a common trend of closer coordination and integration prompted by the Commission is taking place, which triggers a certain resistance by the national bodies regulating that domain. As long as a specific competence is considered instrumental in the creation of the single market, the Commission has strong incentives to strengthen its influence in this field, even if those competences have been regulated through an independent intergovernmental regime.
The dynamic described in this chapter allows us to reflect upon the MLG conception as developed by Marks and Hooghe (2004), which distinguish between two types of MLG. Type I MLG refers to different levels of governments, more specifically to the spread of power along different governmental levels and the interactions between them. Type II MLG refers to jurisdictions that are both task-specific and based on membership that can intersect with each other. They respond to particular problems in specific policy fields (Marks & Hooghe, 2004). Our analysis shows that the increase in coordination and integration are the outcome of both MLG Type II processes (coordination between two issue-specific bodies) and of MLG Type I processes (tensions between two governmental levels). Furthermore, the negotiation dynamics regarding this increased coordination and integration reveal that the tensions typical of MLG Type I took place as a consequence of the increased coordination between Type II bodies. Put differently, multi-level coordination and integration mechanisms in the EU can be seen as both Type I and Type II processes. They combine features of both categories and reveal that their Type I and Type II features are interdependent.
The analysis in this chapter shows a need for further strengthening the MLG Type I and II conceptual framework by balancing the analytical distinction between the two types with developments about how Type I and Type II are often entangled and intertwined with each other rather than separated realities.
The chapter describes and compares the dynamics in the European telecommunications sector and the European patent system with interesting observations for NRAs and the European Commission with respect to coordination and integration.
The original nature of the current chapter relates to the two selected areas and the addition to the literature on MLG.
First, with respect to the areas investigated the dynamics of the European telecommunications sector have been analyzed also by other authors, but the European patent system is an area which is relatively unexplored in terms of governance research. The combination of the two sectors with a detailed analysis of similarities and differences is highly original and generates interesting lessons with respect to coordination and integration in supranational and intergovernmental regimes.
Second, Marks and Hooghe (2004) distinguish between the two types of MLG as if they are two different constructs that are not related to each other. Our cases and argument cover both types of MLG and show the interconnection between the dynamics taking place in the two types of MLG.