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Variations of human-versus-structure and within-humans at the organizational and the project level are critical in shaping the internal arrangement for effectiveness of project-based organization’s (PBOs) governance. Recent discourse presents governmentality at the organizational level and leadership at the project level as human agency of governance, whereas governance structures to be their counterpart. However, project-level mechanisms of governmentality that can help to understand possible variations among these governance dimensions remained veiled. This study uses institutional theory to explore these internal arrangements accommodated by variations of PBOs governance dimensions at the project level.

The study followed Eisenhardt protocols of multiple case study design using an abductive research approach. Considering the heterogeneity of governance as a phenomenon in literature, boundary conditions were established before theorizing the model of the study to avoid ambiguities and define the research scope. Five PBOs were chosen using theoretical sampling, yielding 70 interviews. Data were analyzed by constant comparison with theory, using replication logic and cross-case analysis.

Findings revealed that project managers perform a buffer function for governmentality at the project level. Identified mechanisms of governmentality at the project level included two downward mechanisms, i.e. communication and informal interactions of governors, and two upward mechanisms of adaptation and reciprocity by project managers and project team members. Cross-analysis for variations among PBOs’ governance at the project level revealed seven arrangements showcasing synergies or contrasts.

The study adds to organizational project management literature by advancing the significance of congruence between humans and structures in project governance. Furthermore, the synchronization of the project manager’s leadership style with the governmentality approach and governance structure of PBOs is of crucial importance at the project level. Findings suggest the same by showcasing synergetic versus contrasting internal arrangements accommodated in varying PBOs governance dimensions. Implications highlight that synergies among PBOs governance dimensions and project manager’s styles can minimize conflicts and inconsistencies in governance implementation, whereas contrasts might trigger them.

Hospital governance accountability structures in Iran, similar to other countries, have undergone various reforms with different goals. The current study aimed to identify the rules and regulations of the hospital governance structure in Iran and how they pay attention to accountability.

This qualitative document content analysis study was conducted using hospital governance structure documents in Iran using the Ready materials, Extract data, Analyze data and Distil (READ) document analysis framework. 2,921 documents were extracted from the official government websites of Iran. After screening, seven documents related to the hospital governance structure were selected. A directed content analysis approach was used. The findings were finally future purification matched with the original documents.

The findings showed that documents had not addressed the inclusive governance structure of the hospital comprehensively. The medical staff organization structure is not considered in the documents, and its duties are assigned to a technical or a clinical director. Most documents addressed financial accountability. The documents did not require the hospital’s governance to have an inclusive accountability structure. However, they paid more attention to the administrative and financial autonomy of hospitals.

Accountability is one of the most essential components in the hospital's governance structure. It can increase the success of hospital efficiency, effectiveness, vision and mission fulfillment. The study result can help health services policymakers and managers formulate better organization structure rules and regulations for hospital governance accountability.

This study is the first qualitative analysis of accountable governance structure documents in Iranian hospitals. We used the READ method as a comprehensive approach for document analysis.

This study aims to examine the impact of corporate governance on the speed of adjustment (SOA) of capital structure in a developing market, Pakistan.

The study's sample includes 173 non-financial enterprises that were listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) between 2011 and 2020. The capital structure of the sample companies is determined by the ratio of total debt to total debt plus the market value of equity. Corporate governance is measured by board size, independence, CEO duality, management ownership, blockholders ownership and institutional ownership. A two-step difference GMM model was used to achieve the study's objectives.

Through applying the reduced form model approach, we discovered that corporate governance variables have a considerable negative impact on the speed of targeted leverage adjustment in sample firms. Additionally, to check the robustness of results, the two-stage technique used to examine this corporate governance-SOA relationship. Furthermore, we discovered that smaller enterprises modify their capital structure more than larger firms. Furthermore, corporations prioritize short-term debt adjustment above long-term debt adjustment.

The study's findings provide further information to company managers and investors on the relationship between corporate governance quality and the pace of adjustment towards targeted leverage across Pakistani enterprises. Furthermore, this study adds new information from growing countries such as Pakistan to the existing literature, which can help regulatory authorities and policymakers improve the quality of corporate governance. It is commonly known that improving the quality of corporate governance practices improves the firm's capital structure, which benefits all stakeholders.

In the context of developing economies, the academic literature lacks research that examine the impact of corporate governance on dynamic capital structure decisions. This study intends to fill this gap.

This paper contributes to the existing literature by extending the empirical work on the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure by analyzing the mediating role of cost of capital in the non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX).

The sample for this study includes non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (formerly Karachi Stock Exchange) for the period of 2004–2016. Based on 1800 firm-year observations, three approaches of panel data analysis are applied for the step-wise analysis of the underlying study. Firstly, Pooled OLS is applied. Secondly, fixed and random effect panel regression followed by the Hausman test to check the unobservable individual heterogeneity of the data. Hausman test indicates that the fixed-effects model is the most appropriate model for the sample panel data.

The study's findings are that board size, board composition, CEO/Chair duality, institutional ownership and managerial ownership have statistically significant direct effect on the firm's financing decisions. However, CEO/Chair duality, institutional ownership and managerial ownership have significant indirect effect on firm's capital structure decisions. The interesting finding of the paper is on the evidence of mediating role of cost of capital in the nexus of corporate governance and capital structure. Moreover, some conventional determinants of capital structure, including the firm's size, asset structure of the firm, profitability, business risk and growth, are found as determinants of capital structure decisions of the firms.

There are a few limitations to our study which could be addressed by upcoming research. We did not include all the four mechanisms of corporate governance including board structure, audit structure, compensation structure and ownership structure. However, we used only five important attributes including board size, board composition and CEO/Chair duality form board structure, managerial ownership and institutional ownership form ownership structure of corporate governance as our explanatory variables to examine their impact on the capital structure choices of the firms. Future studies may fill this research gap by involving some other attributes of corporate governance and analyzing their effectiveness and impact on value relevant capital structure decisions. Further, due to limited time and resources, we only tested the mediating role of cost of capital, hence, future researchers can analyze the mediating and moderating roles of different variables which may influence the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure choices of the firms.

The study has many valuable guidelines and practical implications for the financial managers of the corporations. Our results will facilitate the policymakers in setting their corporate governance policies and practices and making the value relevant capital structure decisions in compliance with the implications of corporate governance mechanism. In addition, our study provides the empirical evidence in accordance with the argument that good governance practices, particularly the voluntary disclosures by the firm may reduce the information asymmetry which, ultimately, reduces the agency cost and the cost of capital for the firm. However, while deciding the financial policy of the corporations, managers can use our findings in order to assess the effectiveness of corporate governance practices employed by the firm in achieving the optimal capital structure at which the weighted average cost of capital is at its minimum level.

This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the mediating role of the cost of capital in the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure decisions of the firms. This paper provides empirical evidence that corporate governance indirectly affects capital structure decisions through the mediating role of cost of capital.

The study aims to yield evidence on the relation between the quality of governance characteristics and the firms' financial credibility involved in financial violations.

The study uses annual data ranging from 2000 to 2018. The sample consists of 154 nonfinancial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange, comprising 77 fraudulent and 77 non-fraudulent companies. To examine the relationship between improvements in the governance structure and financial credibility of the firms, hypotheses are tested using the univariate analysis and multivariate regression model through the ordinary least square method.

The results affirm that fraud firms are possessed with poor governance structure compared to control firms in the pre-fraud year. The findings further imply that an improved governance structure brings foremost performance in stock price. The results of the study divulge that board of directors characteristic i.e. change in outside directors' percentage has a significant positive impact (β = 0.015, p = 0.05) on the financial credibility of the firms. The governance variables in terms of CEO-COB joint position has a significant negative (β = −0.824, p = 0.05) association with the financial credibility, which means that whenever CEO-COB joint position enhances, the financial credibility of the firms decreases. However, governance variables in the context of blockholders percentage has a significant positive (β = 0.13, p = 0.01) impact on financial credibility. The results of the study overall indicate that the governance structure has a significant influence on the financial performance of firms in the stock market.

The study provides an understanding of how fraudulent firms rehabilitate their governance structure and accrue economic benefits by the means of financial credibility after when the fraud is made public. It also adds to the literature in the area of corporate frauds specifically the role of governance structure in the financial performance of fraudulent firms in the stock market; this field is in its initial stage, even in developed countries, while, in developing countries, little work has been done.

This paper aims to explore the formal (i.e. contracts, standards, processes, and structure) and informal (i.e. social structure, norms, information sharing, and value system and culture) governance instruments used in supply networks and their influence on quality.

This research is qualitative-exploratory in nature, involving semi-structured interviews with 20 managers from three essential layers in the dairy industry's supply chain: companies that supply essential inputs to milk producers; milk producers; and milk cooperatives.

Analysis of the generated data show that formal governance instruments have a strong and/or weak influence on products' and operations' quality in the dairy industry context; informal instruments have a strong and/or weak influence on quality, as a counterpart to formal instruments; and the integration of verified governance instruments positively influences the quality of products and operations.

This paper offers several managerial and practical implications. The first is to encourage suppliers of primary inputs and milk producers to invest in the formal structure, primarily in formal contracts with each other. The second implication suggests the relevance of creating different training and qualification courses with members from all organizational levels. Third, there is a need for cooperatives, encompassing all industries, to consider several informal instruments, complementary to contracts and standards currently used for processes.

Governance instruments can lead to desired supply chain outcomes, including those related to quality. Although previous supply chain studies have investigated the relationship between governance instruments and the supply chain, and quality management and the supply chain, studies on governance instruments' influence on supply chain quality are limited.

We investigate the effect of the adoption of formal board structure and board processes on firm performance in Colombian family firms, in a context where firms can choose specific aspects of board structure and processes. We deploy insights from the behavioral governance perspective to develop arguments about how family businesses may choose board elements based on their degree of control over the firm (absolute control or less), and its effect on firm performance.

We use an unbalanced data panel of 404 firm-year observations. The data was obtained from the annual financial and corporate governance reports of 62 Colombian stock-issuing firms for the period 2008–2014 – due to change in regulation, data could not be added beyond 2014. Panel data technique with random effects was used.

The results show that board structure is positively associated with financial performance, however, this relationship is negative in businesses where family has absolute control. We also found that there is a negative association between board processes and performance, but positive association in family-controlled businesses.

Our research contributes to research streams on effects of family control in firm choices and on the interactive effect of governance choices and institutional context and more generally how actors interact (rather than react) with their institutional context.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss how the failed finance companies in Sri Lanka used fair value accounting practices as an opportunistic earnings management practice to launder money under weak corporate governance structures.

This paper uses a qualitative design under the philosophy of interpretivism. The case study research strategy is used inductively to investigate how fair value accounting had been used for money laundering.

The dishonest intention of major shareholders and board of directors had forced failed companies to misuse fair value accounting to manipulate performance and use them for personal benefits which were detrimental to the depositors and stability of the companies. The weak corporate governance structures which were developed because of regulatory forbearance were influential for manipulations. The concentrated ownership had reduced agency conflicts between shareholders and managers because major shareholders were the members of the board of directors. The appointed committees were not effective because of an inadequate number of independent directors with sufficient expertise. The reduced agency conflict between shareholders and managers has exaggerated the agency conflict with depositors. Therefore, it is recommended to dilute ownership concentration to establish good corporate governance structures and make stable institutions.

This study does not discuss the dishonest fair value accounting practices of all licensed finance companies because of the sensitivity of the matter for surviving companies.

This paper is an original work of the authors which discusses how fair value accounting practices had been used to launder money in failed finance companies in Sri Lanka as an emerging market context.

This paper aims to examine the nature of corporate governance systems in Ghanaian Family-owned Businesses (FOBs). Specifically, the study investigates the nature of boardroom decisions structures, sources of governance regulations and family roles in corporate governance.

Drawing on Bourdieusian perspectives of the field, capital, habitus and doxa, a case study design is used to gather detailed insights about the phenomena. Purposively, the study conducts 20 interviews with participants from 15 FOBs in Ghana. The interview data are complemented with secondary sources, such as FOB handbooks, website information, legal documents and scriptures. Subsequently, data gathered were thematically analysed.

The study finds that human actors blended traditionally tacit and legally expressed boardroom decisions structures in FOBs governance. Again, traditional values, social acceptance of religious sociology and regulatory frameworks of the field dictate corporate governance practices in FOBs. In multiple family ownerships, orthodoxy of doxa is challenged; hence, power struggles and family roles in governance depend on capital possessed by social actors.

To continue as a going concern, FOBs must be mindful of traditional, religious sociology of family and regulatory frameworks within the field in which they operate. This is because, without this, the going concern of FOBs becomes suspicious and highly unlikely, especially where there are multiple family ownership and generations.

The previous literature predominantly focussed on formal boardroom structures in addressing FOBs' corporate governance issues. Notwithstanding, family governance risk of domineering and distrust associated with traditional and relational governance mechanisms remain under-represented and inconclusive, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This study investigates the effects of elements of corporate governance along with firm specific variables on the financial leverage of listed Indian firms in the context of agency conflicts and new governance laws.

A series of panel ordinary least squares as well as fixed/random effects regression models of book and market value of financial leverage on variables of corporate governance (board size, board composition, board meeting, board attendance and board gender) along with a set of control variables (asset tangibility, firm size, growth, liquidity and profitability) were estimated by employing 113 listed Indian firms during 2010–2021. Dynamic panel generalized method of moments models were also estimated to check the robustness of empirical results. Further, the full sample of firms was divided into small and large board sized companies using the median approach to investigate differences between small and large board characteristics on financial leverage.

The evidence predominantly suggested that the governance variables have significant impact on leverage ratios of selected firms. Governance variables such as board size, composition, attendance and gender are significantly found to be reducing the financial leverage of firms indicating that in general these attributes in a way, through monitoring managers, put pressure on them to pursue lower financial leverage. Board meeting is found to be positive and significantly related with financial leverage suggesting that the frequency of meetings signals its monitoring ability that may influence lenders' risk assessment lowering borrowing cost. The results on small and large board sized companies indicate that firms with small boards relatively issue more debt compared to firms with large boards suggesting that small boards adopt high debt policy.

The main policy implication of the study is that elements of internal corporate governance is a significant governance tool that has the potential to reduce agency conflict between the managers and agents through monitoring and decision making that has tangible effects on critical corporate decisions such as capital structure choices.

This paper contributes to the existing literature by bringing new evidence relating to agency conflicts and capital structure decisions in an emerging market like India post adoption of new regulations related to corporate governance specified in Clause 49 of Securities and Exchange Board of India and Companies Act, 2013 as there is significant dearth of such empirical work.