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The purpose of this paper is to discuss how the failed finance companies in Sri Lanka used fair value accounting practices as an opportunistic earnings management practice to launder money under weak corporate governance structures.

This paper uses a qualitative design under the philosophy of interpretivism. The case study research strategy is used inductively to investigate how fair value accounting had been used for money laundering.

The dishonest intention of major shareholders and board of directors had forced failed companies to misuse fair value accounting to manipulate performance and use them for personal benefits which were detrimental to the depositors and stability of the companies. The weak corporate governance structures which were developed because of regulatory forbearance were influential for manipulations. The concentrated ownership had reduced agency conflicts between shareholders and managers because major shareholders were the members of the board of directors. The appointed committees were not effective because of an inadequate number of independent directors with sufficient expertise. The reduced agency conflict between shareholders and managers has exaggerated the agency conflict with depositors. Therefore, it is recommended to dilute ownership concentration to establish good corporate governance structures and make stable institutions.

This study does not discuss the dishonest fair value accounting practices of all licensed finance companies because of the sensitivity of the matter for surviving companies.

This paper is an original work of the authors which discusses how fair value accounting practices had been used to launder money in failed finance companies in Sri Lanka as an emerging market context.

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which companies in one of the Islamic culture countries, Egypt, are complying with the Islamic implementation of the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance and testing the impact, if any, of such compliance on mitigating of stock option fraud incentives.

A logistic regression model is used to examine the effects of board of directors, audit committee, ownership structure and other firm characteristics on the likelihood of stock option fraud. The analysis is based on the data for stock option grants obtained during the period from 2006 to 2009.

The results suggest that the rate of compliance with the Islamic implementation of the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance in Egyptian public‐held companies is low. Weak corporate governance allows executives to exercise greater influence over the board of directors and audit committee decisions. Furthermore, a low level of disclosure, duality of CEO, high percentage of insiders in board of directors, auditor turnover, and management ownership are among the factors that increase the likelihood of stock option fraud in the Egyptian setting.

The results are constrained by the proxies used to define stock option fraud. Additionally, the limited number of companies with stock option grants in Egypt might affect the results.

This paper provides insights into exposing stock option fraud by Egyptian public‐held companies and sheds light on the effective role of corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate this phenomenon. This would help policy setters to enhance compliance with the Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance and develop a comprehensive Shari'ah model of corporate governance that reduces stock option fraud.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between corporate governance structures and stakeholder and shareholder value maximization perspectives in 267 African banks from 2006 to 2011.

The authors used the Prais–Winsten ordinary least squares and random effect regression models to explore this relationship to ensure consistency and efficiency in results. The data for this study were collected from Bankscope.

The results of this study show that corporate governance structures such as CEO duality, nonexecutive members and extreme large board size lead to a reduction in both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. However, audit independence and board size also promote both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. Although gender diversity promotes profit maximization, it was not significant in any of the models estimated. The results further suggest that the same corporate governance structures promote and detract shareholder and stakeholder value maximization in Africa although the effect of corporate governance structures was weightier on shareholder value maximization confirming the agency theory.

From these findings, bank management must pursue the institution of good corporate governance structures and avoid weak corporate governance structures to promote shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. Also equity holders may have to pay particular attention to corporate governance structures because they benefit the most from the institution of good corporate governance structures.

This study explores and compares how corporate governance structures promote shareholder and stakeholder value maximization separately in African banks. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first of such studies.

Effective corporate governance is significant for firms in developing countries because it can lead to managerial excellence and help firms with a weak corporate governance structure to raise capital and attract foreign investors. The purpose of this paper is to examine the barriers, issues, and challenges hindering effective development and implementation of corporate governance in Nigeria.

A combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods was employed to collect information. Specifically, data were collected from 296 managers, company presidents, and board of directors in selected firms. Descriptive data and interview analyses are presented with respect to the barriers and issues hindering effective corporate governance development and implementation in Nigeria.

The study provides significant current information on corporate governance and barriers hindering its development and implementation in Nigeria. The findings reveal a number of constraints that hinder the implementation and promotion of corporate governance in Nigeria. These constraints include weak or non‐existent law enforcement mechanisms, abuse of shareholders' rights, lack of commitment on the part of boards of directors, lack of adherence to the regulatory framework, weak enforcement and monitoring systems, and lack of transparency and disclosure.

The study was limited to four cities in Nigeria. A broader geographic sampling would better reflect the national profile. Another limitation could stem from the procedure used in data collection (drop off and pick up). However, extreme measures were taken to protect the identities of the respondents.

The significance of this study stems from the fact that very few studies have explored the impact of human resource challenges and prospects in Nigeria. The results provide additional insights into corporate governance practices in Nigeria, a sub‐Saharan African country. This region has thus far been neglected by management researchers, and so the insights gained from this study will contribute to the future development of this line of research, particularly in a non‐Western country like Nigeria.

This paper builds on the “Law and Finance” theory and aims to examine the effect of the legal and institutional environment on the governance–performance relationship in the context of non-US firms. More precisely, it examines whether and how the country’s legal system and the level of investor protection interact with the firm-level corporate governance and affect firm performance.

The authors used the “G-Index” governance score developed by the Governance Metrics International rating for a sample of 12,728 firm-year observations from 23 countries over the 2009–2016 period.

The results show that the interaction between the country-level institutions and corporate governance system significantly affect the firm performance. In particular, the findings indicate that firms operating in common law countries tend to exhibit a positive valuation effect and higher performance than firms with a comparable corporate governance level operating in civil law countries. More precisely, the authors find that in common law countries, higher investor protection with enhanced corporate governance is associated with better firm performance. However, firms operating in civil law countries with weaker investor protection and a comparable corporate governance level tend to experience a negative valuation effect.

The findings suggest that the institutional and legal environment is crucial and important in determining the value-maximizing level of good governance practices. Managers and regulators should carefully analyze the cost of these initiatives and should coordinate it with the needs of the country’s legal system. The challenge for the company will be how to adjust its corporate governance strategy according to the needs and demands of the country’s legal system in which the company operates to improve its performance. The regulators should ensure a fit between the specifics of the national legal and institutional environment and corporate governance standards and practices.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of interactive effect of competition and corporate governance on productivity growth of firms in Nigeria. Studies that have considered this issue were mainly from developed countries possessing strong institutions as against those of developing countries like Nigeria. Moreover, studies from Nigeria have focused exclusively on corporate governance and firm performance. The interaction effect of competition on corporate governance is yet to be addressed in the context of Nigeria.

The study adopts the dynamic panel data analysis approach suggested by Arellano and Bond for productivity growth analysis. Data on 76 non-financial firms for 11 years beginning from 1997 were extracted from the financial statements of companies collected from the Nigerian Stock Exchange and subsequently analysed using General Methods of Moments (GMM).

The results show that competition had a positive impact on productivity growth, however, its interaction effect with corporate governance had a substitute but not significant impact on productivity growth. When competition was interacted with an alternative corporate governance mechanism – bank – a positive and significant impact was, however, observed which shows that competition and bank loans are complementary in stimulating productivity growth of firms in Nigeria.

The study could not be carried out beyond year 2007 owing to the exit of some firms after 2007 which could have reduced the sample size drastically. The findings emanating from this study suggests that government should focus much more on implementing competitive policies and bother less on writing corporate governance codes.

The results demonstrate that corporate governance had no significant impact on productivity growth even when it was interacted with competition. However, competition on its own had a significant impact on productivity which means that Nigeria should concentrate more on building a competitive private sector, and in this regard, government should try and pursue policies that will foster competition and eliminate monopolistic tendencies. Once, there is effective competition, the corporate governance may be strengthened. However, the interactive effect of competition and bank loans was found with a positive and significant impact which indicates that banks as alternate corporate governance mechanism can only be effective if competition is strong. This goes to show that the financial sector may not be able to effectively and positively impact the real sector in Nigeria if the prevailing level of competition is low. In such a situation finance may not be channelled to projects that have long-run implications on sustainable growth and development.

Socially, if the environment for competition is not fostered in Nigeria, the country may face an uphill task in combating the problem of poverty through a private sector-led solution. Hence, there is a need for government to begin to formulate comprehensive competition policies that will ensure that resources are optimally utilized in Nigeria.

In the context of Nigeria, this study is novel, the use of productivity growth as against firm financial performance is unique for Nigeria while the use of GMM method of analysis helps in reducing the effect of endogeneity inherent in corporate governance and performance of firms in Nigeria.

This study aims to provide a review of corporate governance and cash holdings because strong corporate governance is necessary for the efficient utilization of firm’s liquid resources such as cash, to minimize the agency cost of high cash holdings and to improve the value of cash.

The authors provide a literature review of corporate governance and cash holdings through a conceptual and theoretical argument rather than empirical research.

The authors review an empirical and theoretical work surrounding key corporate governance variables and identify avenues for future research. The authors find that corporate governance mechanisms and cash holdings have received much attention during the past two decades. However, the significant role of corporate governance (both country-level and the firm-level) in controlling the entrenched behaviour of the managers is discussed separately in the literature. The combined effect of both country-level and the firm-level governance is lacking in the cash holdings literature. Additionally, this study has found that much attention is paid to the developed markets, while only a few focused on the developing markets regarding cash holding literature, although the agency problems are high in developing markets.

The study contributes to the growing literature on corporate governance and cash holdings and provides a further understanding of the role of governance in minimizing the agency cost to increase value by assuring that firms’ assets are used efficiently and productively in the best interests of investors and other stakeholders. In addition, it provides a new idea to the policymaker and future researchers where they need to do more work.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of ownership structure on firm valuation and performance across different geographical regions within mainland China.

The authors classify China in six geographical regions and use cross-sectional data of companies with A-shares listed on domestic stock exchanges in China for the year-end 2015. Using data from CSMAR and Wind database, they use multivariate regression technique and analytically compare the consistency of relationship between operational variables of ownership structure with corporate performance and evaluation.

The authors find that institutional ownership and state ownership negatively affect market valuation throughout various geographical regions of China. Further, in East, Northwest, South Central and Southwestern parts of China, managerial ownership and concentration of shareholding among top ten shareholders positively influence return on equity (ROE). Interestingly, institutional shareholding negatively affects return on assets (ROA), while institutional ownership has a neutral effect on profitability margin in Northeast China. Although in northern part of China, this relationship is slightly positive. In East China region, state ownership and ownership concentration are directly proportional to profitability margin.

As some of the findings exhibit weak state of market efficiency in some regions, the study may also be useful in identifying arbitrage opportunities across different regions. Moreover, this study suggests that regions with the same business environment and conditions anywhere around the globe invite same or similar ownership structure for better firm performance and valuation.

The study provides unique understanding of relationship between ownership structure, market valuation and firm performance in various parts of China and will be an addition to the relevant literature. Given a change in company’s ownership structure and considering its region of incorporation, this study will help investment analysts in assessing performance and market valuation of the firm. It will also assist several classes of investors, financial institutions and international businesses in making their investment decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership structures on earnings quality in China both prior and subsequent to two important corporate reforms: the code of corporate governance (CCG) in 2002 and the split share structure reform (SSR) in 2005.

This study utilises informativeness of earnings (earnings response coefficient), conditional accounting conservatism and managerial discretionary accruals to assess earnings quality using 12,267 firm-year observations over 11 years from 2000 to 2010. Further, two dummy variables for measuring the changes of CCG and SSR are employed to estimate the effects of CCG and SSR reforms on earnings quality via OLS regression.

This study finds that the promulgation of the CCG in 2002 has had a positive impact, but the SSR reform in 2005 has had little effect on listed firms’ earnings quality in China. These results hold good after controlling for a number of ownership, governance and other variables and estimating models with multiple measures of earnings’ quality.

Future research could focus on how western style corporate governance mechanisms have been constrained by the old management systems and governmental dominated ownership structures in Chinese listed firms. The conclusion is that simply coping Western corporate governance model is not suitable for every country.

The results will assist Chinese regulators in improving reporting quality, ownership structure and governance mechanisms in China. The results will help international investors better understand quality of financial information in China.

This is the first to our knowledge that addresses the effects of major governance and ownership reforms together on accounting earnings quality and, thus, makes a significant contribution on understanding the effect of regulatory reforms on improving earnings quality. In doing so, it also indirectly assesses the effectiveness of western-style corporate governance mechanisms introduced in China.