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The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the impact of the single currency on the institutional design of the banking union, through evidence on the financial integration process.

Data analysis uses multiple sources of data on key drivers of financial fragmentation. The paper starts from a snapshot the status of financial integration and then identifies the main components of this trend.

Evidence shows that financial integration in the euro area between 2010 and 2014 retrenched at a quicker pace than outside the monetary union. Home bias persisted. Under market pressures, governments compete on funding costs by supporting “their” banks with massive state aids, which distorts the playing field and feed the risk-aversion loop. This situation intensifies frictions in credit markets, thus hampering the transmission of monetary policies and, potentially, economic growth. Taking stock of developments in the euro area, this paper discusses the theoretical framework of a banking union in a single currency area with decentralised fiscal policy sovereignty. It concludes that, when a crisis looms over, a common fiscal backstop can reduce pressures of financial fragmentation, driven by governments’ moral hazard and banks’ home bias.

Additional research is required to deepen the empirical analysis, with econometric modelling, on the links between governments’ implicit guarantees and banks’ home bias. This is an initial data analysis.

Under market pressure, governments in a single currency area tend to be overprotective (more than countries with full monetary sovereignty) towards their own banking system and so trigger financial fragmentation (enhancing banks’ home bias). To revert that, a common fiscal backstop is an essential element of the institutional design. The paper shows empirical evidence and theory, as well as it identifies underlying market failures. It links the single currency to the institutional design of a banking union. This important dimension is brought into a coherent framework.

This paper aims to assess the topography of financial regulation, supervisory styles and performance of banking systems across the world.

The author gains insights by comparing regulatory and supervisory practices and their impact on banking system performance before and after the global crisis. The study illustrates the differences in regulation/supervision among crisis, non-crisis and BRICS countries. Even as capital ratios increased, bank governance and supervision regimes were strengthened, the private sector incentives to monitor banks deteriorated.

The results show that the crisis-countries had weaker regulatory and supervisory frameworks than those in emerging countries during the crisis period. BRICS countries as a distinct block have demonstrated uniqueness in their regulatory/supervisory styles that are similar neither to those in the crisis-countries nor to those in the non-crisis countries.

The originality of this study lies in its unique approach to assessing the bank regulation and supervision styles around the world and their impact on banking system profitability, as it uses a robust database. Further, this study provides not only a general assessment but also a comparative analysis of the BRICS and emerging economies. Regulatory agencies around the world would greatly benefit from systematic evidence on the relationship between bank performance and regulatory/supervisory systems.

This study aims to demystify how the critical regulations affecting the bank competition have instituted, amended and fine-tuned over the years in India and its peers in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). The gaps in the regulatory practices influencing bank contestability and competition in BRICS nations are identified. Also, the regulatory convergence is tested by comparing the policies embraced in India vis-à-vis its peer nations.

A methodological framework by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2013) is adopted to construct various regulatory indices. The empirical analysis is based on information available in five rounds of the bank regulation and supervision survey conducted in 2000, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2017 by the World Bank.

The empirical findings elucidate that although bank entry regulations have been liberalized over time, the bank contestability seems to be low in the BRICS countries, especially in India. This might be due to the substantial government ownership and the presence of notional powers that are conferred to bank supervisors. On comparing the bank regulations in India vis-à-vis its peers, the author find a strong convergence in licensing requirements for entry into the banking business, foreign bank entry mode, restrictions on conglomerate formation and adoption of prompt corrective action framework.

The study suggests that future policy initiatives in India need to focus on redesigning the banking structure by reducing the share of state ownership, permitting joint ventures and liberally allowing the entry of new domestic and foreign banks in the industry. In the years to come, regulators in India will continuously face the challenge of fostering bank contestability without jeopardizing bank efficiency and overall stability.

This study is perhaps first of its kind, which analyzes the inter-temporal changes in regulatory indicators to examine the variations in the competitive environment of the banking markets of BRICS economies in general and India in particular.

Non-performing assets (NPAs) have been a cause of concern for the banking sector across the world and have invited a lot research interest, especially for emerging economies. In India, the NPAs grew many folds and reached alarming levels in 2013. The available mechanisms, such as Corporate Debt Restructuring Scheme, were not adequate to address this issue. The Central Reserve Bank of India with the Government of India introduced various guidelines, schemes and regulations like framework for revitalizing distressed assets to tackle NPAs during the period 2013-2017. Taking the case of India, the purpose of this paper is to examine policy initiatives and analyse the impact of regulatory shocks on the equity market returns and the systematic risk of individual banking stocks using an extended version of the market model.

In this study, the authors design the experiment to explore the reaction of banking stocks to the various regulatory measures and also measure the change in systematic risk for these stocks as a result of the regulatory changes. Following the approach suggested by Soraokina and Thornton (2015), the authors use the extended market model to test the reaction of banking company stocks to the regulatory measures.

The study finds that banking stocks did not earn significant abnormal returns on the announcement of these measures. However, the systematic risk of the banking index reduced significantly on the introduction of regulatory measures, and this risk reduction has been primarily in the stocks of private sector banks.

This paper provides insights on the equity market's short-term reaction to the reform initiatives introduced by the government. The scope of the paper is with respect to one emerging economy, India, which underwent a series of regulatory reforms to tackle the banking NPA problem.

The paper fills an important research gap where the impact of schemes and regulations is captured for an emerging economy like India. It tries to bring forth the importance of these reforms and how an investor perceives the same. This paper tests for changes in systematic risk as measured by market beta as well as measures cumulative abnormal returns associated with important events in the process of regulatory reforms happening in India from 2013 to 2017.