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Deregulation and other factors permit and encourage financial institutions to become more integrated, both within their own (financial) industries, such as banking and insurance, and across these industries. Financial regulators have responded with like integration. As financial institutions increasingly compete with firms from other industries and areas, financial regulators similarly compete more across borders. The resulting competition in financial regulation enhances innovation, choice, and efficiency. The advent of home-run regulation, which in general allows financial institutions to adhere only to the financial regulations of their home area and is spreading across the US and Europe, may allow numerous regulatory regimes within a given market.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between regulation of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and their performance in Ghana.

The analysis is performed using data derived from the Bank of Ghana Database during a five-year period, 2006-2010. Correlated panels corrected standard errors model is used to estimate the regression equation. Capital adequacy requirements and the restrictions on the ability of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) to take deposits are used as proxies for regulatory pressure. The study also used the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as measures of NBFI performance.

Results of the study emerged with the evidence that there exists a positive relationship between minimum capital adequacy requirement of 10 per cent and profitability. This indicates that asking NBFIs to keep higher minimum capital adequacy ratio has resulted in improving their profitability. This suggests that capital regulation is an effective tool in enhancing the stability and the profitability of the financial services sector. In addition, the paper finds a positive relationship between regulatory pressure in terms of restrictions on deposits and NBFI profitability. This means that non-deposit-taking NBFIs have improved performance. This indicates that restricting NBFIs in terms of deposit-taking rather goes to increase profitability.

The value of this study is in respect of its contribution to the extant literature on financial regulation and performance of NBFIs.

To describe and to discuss the implications of the US Department of the Treasury's PATRIOT Act regulations requiring “covered financial institutions” (including broker‐dealers, banks, and mutual funds) to maintain risk‐based procedures to ensure that: correspondent accounts held on behalf of specified non‐US financial institutions; and private banking accounts, are subject to due diligence procedures to ensure that those accounts, and the financial institutions holding those accounts, are not being used for money laundering purposes.

Summarizes and analyzes the adopted rules.

Since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, regulation relating to anti‐money laundering has been among the highest profile – and highest priority – activity of securities and financial institution regulation. Consequently, anti‐money laundering rules and regulations have become a major aspect of compliance programs at financial institutions such as banks and broker‐dealers. The rules that are the subject of this article are noteworthy in part because they continue the trend of widening the universe of “financial institutions” that are now subject to substantial anti‐money laundering regulation. The rules described in this article add substantially to the complexity of anti‐money laundering regulation at financial institutions for a number of reasons, including: firstly, placing new, broad‐based requirements on financial institutions; secondly, requiring those financial institutions to make judgments regarding both the level of risk posed by certain accounts and the appropriate diligence that may be necessary for each such account; and thirdly, interpretive and implementation challenges.

A summary and analysis of new anti‐money laundering regulation, which comes at a time when US regulators are placing substantial emphasis on anti‐money laundering.

This study explores the interrelationship between regulatory risks and strategic controls within the financial supervision architecture of an emergent global financial centre of China that embraces innovation as part of its strategic objectives.

This paper employs a longitudinal case study approach to examine the institutional dynamics of the key financial regulators in connection with the regulated financial institutions in Hong Kong before and after the financial tsunami of 2008.

First, this study reveals an organic development of a specialised financial regulatory architecture that resists transforming itself structurally despite the significant impact of externalities. Second, in this post-financial crisis analysis, regulated financial institutions swiftly respond by strengthening their risk controls through compliance with the guidelines imposed by the regulator. Institutional dynamics in influencing the implementation of risk controls through a top-down interactive mechanism are observed. Such dynamic and pertinent rapid responses induce the pursuit of optimal risk management within a regulatory framework.

This paper provides a longitudinal case study to reveal regulatory risks and strategic controls of the global financial centre of China. It unveils mitigating risk control measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The study demonstrates how regulatory institutions strive to take precautionary, coercive measures such that the regulated institutions mimic and implement prudent mechanisms.

The area of law where the principle of transparency is applicable is expanding fast. Also many financial markets have recently become subject to new regulations requiring transparency, such as EU directives MIFID II or Solvency II. Here, what is expanding is not just the applicability of the principle as such, but also the scope of issues which are affected by transparency, that is, remuneration or conflict of interests. In the light of these regulations, it may seem that transparency has simply become a sole legislative measure assuring values such as consumer protection, market stability or – most of all – high-quality governance. Indeed, transparency is thought to contribute to the quality of governance in several different ways, although its implementation must meet certain standards if it is to produce the desired results, especially when it comes to financial institutions. Financial institutions are commonly required to be particularly transparent due to the fact they often act as public trust entities. As the activity of financial institutions is of such importance, the issue of transparency efficiency is worth discussing. Although it is said that the emergence of the principle of transparency in the EU law is a fairly new phenomenon, the existence of transparency obligation is not. Therefore, some doubts may arise as to the question whether the principle of transparency actually adds much to existing rules and principles. In this chapter the author explored and discussed how mandatory transparency affects financial institutions’ activity, and whether it performs its function efficiently.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between regulation of non‐bank financial institutions and their risk‐taking behaviours in Ghana.

The analysis is performed using data derived from the Bank of Ghana Database during a five‐year period, 2006‐2010. Correlated Panels Corrected Standard Errors model is used to estimate the regression equation. Capital adequacy requirements and the restrictions on non‐bank financial institutions' (NBFIs') ability to take deposits are used as proxies for regulatory pressure. The study also used the ratio of risks weighted assets‐to‐total assets, the ratio of non‐performing loans‐to‐net loans and the Z‐scores of NBFIs as measures of risk.

The results of the study show a negative relationship between minimum capital adequacy requirement and the risks weighted assets of NBFIs. This indicates that, asking NBFIs to keep higher minimum capital adequacy ratio results in reducing their risk‐taking. The results also indicate a positive relationship between regulatory pressure and risk weighted assets of NBFIs. The paper however found a negative relationship between restrictions on deposits and the risk of insolvency. The findings suggest that, non‐deposit‐taking NBFIs have higher risk weighted assets and are more prone to the risk of insolvency than deposit‐taking NBFIs.

The value of this study is in respect of its contribution to the extant literature on financial regulation and risk‐taking of NBFIs.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of financial institutions in the escalation of the global economic melt‐down (GEM) in America and how policy‐makers in Nigeria can learn from South Africa to safe‐guard the nation's financial institutions from economic shocks that could be propelled by banks' financial recklessness and poor corporate governance ethics.

The paper combines qualitative and quantitative data to establish that Nigeria has a lot to learn from America and South Africa. America is the heartland of the global financial system, and whatever happens to its economy and currency, often cause ripple effects on the rest of the world, except for a nation like South Africa that had an in‐built mechanism to forestall shock. The paper has six sections. First section presents a brief introduction on GEM and its ripple effects. Second section outlines the retrospective causes of GEM. Third section provides justification for regulation of the economy in the economic literature. Fourth section focuses on the thrust of bank regulation and control with reference to South Africa. Fifth section explores the financial institutions, regulation and supervision in Nigeria. Sixth section concludes with policy recommendations.

The findings in this paper are the potency of financial regulation and supervision to forestall economic melt‐down; the potency of financial regulation and supervision to safe‐guard a nation's financial institutions from financial recklessness and promote good corporate governance.

The major practical implication of this paper is that the problems of major banks in Nigeria are traceable to liquidity constraints, poor corporate governance compliance, poor credit risk management policy and ineffective allocation of capital to businesses.

This paper supports the Keynesian argument for effective regulation, supervision and control of the economy in general and financial institutions specifically (as opposed to the blind adoption of mainstream neo‐liberal economics).

The purpose of this paper is to analyse regulatory reform in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007‐2008.

The paper proposes a framework for regulatory reform that begins with the observation that financial manias and panics cannot be legislated away, and may be an unavoidable aspect of modern capitalism.

Financial crises are unavoidable when hardwired human behavior – fear and greed, or “animal spirits” – is combined with free enterprise, and cannot be legislated or regulated away. Like hurricanes and other forces of nature, market bubbles, and crashes cannot be entirely eliminated, but their most destructive consequences can be greatly mitigated with proper preparation. In fact, the most damaging effects of financial crisis come not from loss of wealth, but rather from those who are unprepared for such losses and panic in response. This perspective has several implications for the types of regulatory reform needed in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007‐2008, all centered around the need for greater transparency, improved measures of systemic risk, more adaptive regulations, including counter‐cyclical leverage constraints, and more emphasis on financial literacy starting in high school, including certifications for expertise in financial engineering for the senior management and directors of all financial institutions.

The paper stresses how we must resist the temptation to react too hastily to market events, and deliberate thoughtfully and broadly, instead, craft new regulations for the financial system of the twenty‐first century. Financial markets do not need more regulation; they need smarter and more effective regulation.

This paper aims to understand Japan’s financial regulatory responses after the global financial crisis and recession. Japan’s post-crisis reactions show two seemingly opposing trends: collaboration with international organizations to strengthen the regulation to maintain financial stability, and regulatory forbearance for the banks with troubled small and medium enterprise [SME] borrowers. The paper evaluates the responses by the Japanese financial regulators in five areas (Basel III, stress tests, over-the-counter [OTC] derivatives regulation, recovery and resolution planning and banking policy for SME lending) and concludes that the effectiveness of the new regulations for financial stability critically depends on the willingness of the regulators to use the new tools.

This report evaluates the post-crisis responses by the Japanese financial authorities in five dimensions (Basel III, stress tests, OTC derivatives regulations, recovery and resolution planning and bank supervision).

The effectiveness of the new regulations for financial stability critically depends on the willingness of the regulators to use the new tools.

The paper is the first attempt to evaluate the financial regulatory trends in Japan after the global financial crisis.

The purpose of this paper, which is a part of a PhD thesis, is to detect problems associated with the risk‐based approach to anti‐money laundering (AML), as well as present ways to improve the risk‐based approach.

The method is law and economics. The PhD thesis itself is also based on a comparative analysis of the Danish and British AML regimes.

The main findings are: failure to develop adequate risk‐based AML systems, taking into account varying levels of money laundering risk, is not only to be considered in the context of legal risk but also and more importantly in the context of integrity risk; anti‐money laundering (AML) has to be made part of financial and non‐financial institutions' corporate social responsibility policies; the Risk Analysis Manual provided by the Central Bank of The Netherlands lists very specific and comprehensive assessment criteria for a broad range of risks facing financial institutions. This manual could be considered by international bodies and individual financial institutions in informing their risk control; due to their intelligence access, cross‐national agreements of cooperation and exchange of information and contacts to multiple stakeholders, financial intelligence units are better placed in educating financial institutions on AML matters by means of regular typology publications and other guidance based on SARs and other intelligence; and AML considerations should be incorporated in other areas of law, such as immigration law concerning wealthy individuals, if the AML regime is to achieve its intended impact.

The paper highlights how the AML regime in general and the risk‐based approach in particular could be improved so as to meet concerns of both regulatory authorities and regulated entities.