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The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 included depositor preference legislation intended to reduce Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) resolution costs. However, depositor preference might induce an offsetting reaction by general creditors and may affect resolution type.

We examine the empirical impact of state-level depositor preference laws on resolution type and costs with call-report data and FDIC data for all operating FDIC-BIF insured commercial banks that were closed or required FDIC financial assistance from January 1986 through December 1992. Our major findings are that depositor preference has: (1) tended to increase resolution costs; and (2) induced the FDIC to choose assisted mergers over liquidations.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the rationale for Bank Recovery and Resolution Funds (BRRFs) in the context of the present European Union's (EU) decentralized safety net.

The paper makes some reflections on the governance aspects of BRRFs that would require minimum harmonization in the EU, emphasizing that BRRFs are only one institutional component of financial institutions' effective and credible resolution regime. This paper focuses on depository institutions, but the rationale of BRRFs could be extended to other credit institutions.

BRRFs contribute to shifting the government's trade‐off between bailing out and restructuring in favour of restructuring, to the extent that there is also an effective bank resolution legal framework. In turn, banks' contributions to BRRFs aim at discouraging their excess systemic risk creation, particularly through financial system leverage.

The paper provides input in the current regulatory debate to develop new measures for the reform of the regulatory framework of financial services in the EU.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether and how “living wills” and public disclosure of such resolution plans contribute to market discipline and the effective resolution of too big and too complex to fail banks.

The disorderly collapse of Lehman Brothers is analyzed. Large, systemically important banks are now required to prepare resolution plans (living wills). In the USA, parts of the living wills must be disclosed to the public. The public component is analyzed with respect to contribution to market discipline and effective resolution of banks considered too big and complex to fail. In a statistical analysis of the publicly available section of living wills, this information is contrasted with legislative requirements.

The analysis of public disclosures of resolution plans shows that they are insufficient to facilitate market discipline and, in some instances, fail to enhance public understanding of the financial institution and its business. When coupled with the uncertainty over how an internationally active financial institution will be resolved, the paper concludes that these reforms will do little to reduce market expectations that some financial firms are simply too big or too complex to fail.

A very small data set and the necessity of cross-checking the authors' observations with all publicly available sources. The authors have also tried to infer a purpose for public disclosure of parts of resolution plans. The authorities are remarkably vague on the issue and so the authors have assumed they actually did have a specific intent that would strengthen the system.

The inference from the publicly available portion of living wills is that the authorities are a very long way from abolishing too-big-to-fail.

So far as the authors know, this is the first in-depth analysis of the information available in the public sections of living wills.

This paper analyzes the new EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to determine the level of guidance on instruments to wind-down bad asset portfolios of asset management vehicles. In the absence of such detailed guidance stipulated by the BRRD, the aim is to provide certain practical guidance to future resolution planning and execution.

This paper draws upon experience from portfolio reduction strategies applied at European bad banks in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. For illustration purposes, the paper use case study data from a bad bank located in the eurozone.

For the new European Commission, implementation and enforcement of the Banking Union within the eurozone is currently a key priority. Present efforts are mainly directed towards minimum technical standards. However, the fundamental question of how to orderly unwind a bad assets portfolio without the usage of public funds remains partly addressed only. While a uniform approach to any bad asset does not seem to be applicable, certain lessons learned from previous financial crises may contribute to a selection of reduction strategies.

This paper draws upon experience from portfolio reduction strategies applied at European bad banks in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. It includes case study data from the wind-down of a eurozone bad bank detailing the asset reduction strategies achieved so far. Such per asset class wind-down patterns have not been published and commented on in academia so far.

An effective bank resolution regime requires taking action while the bank still has positive net worth and shareholder claims still have economic value. Such actions raise a number of legal issues with respect to the rights of shareholders. This paper aims to consider how to strike a balance between the need to protect the legitimate rights of shareholders and the need for a prompt and rapid action and a failure resolution mechanism that minimizes disruptions to the financial system and preserves market discipline.

The paper examines the nature of the shareholders' rights and the legal protection afforded to them. In the European context, the relevant sources of law are the European Convention on Human Rights and the applicable community legislation. It considers different options for resolution within this framework ranging from a pre‐packaged resolution decided by the shareholders ex ante to the outright divestiture of the shareholders once certain regulatory thresholds are breached while the bank still has positive net worth.

The curtailment of shareholder rights should seek to generate appropriate incentives for shareholders and other stakeholder and achieve broad objectives of enhancing predictability and maintaining public goods, while at the same time providing for due process, proportionality and adequate compensation.

The paper presents options on how to reform existing frameworks in order to facilitate bank restructurings in a crisis.

The paper discusses key elements that policy makers need to consider in the design of a regulatory framework for early intervention and resolution.

This paper aims to explain the importance of the international cooperation and coordination among supervisory authorities of different countries in event of banking crises. It also suggests that the harmonious relationship has to be attained in the adoption of ex ante financial regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes. In other words, the paper highlights the linkage between ex ante preventive regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes, on the one hand, and cooperation among national regulatory and supervisory authorities in globalized financial markets. Although the paper is relevant to most developed and emerging financial markets, it chooses Hong Kong as a context to examine this proposal. In the current literature, there are no similar approach linking these two paradigms and examining them in an integrated context.

The paper adopts a conceptual framework after the 2008 global financial crisis and takes Hong Kong, an international financial centre in which numerous branches or subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions locate, as an example to examine how the coordination with foreign supervisory authorities are being conducted and to analyse whether the present regulatory framework in Hong Kong is effective and sufficient against banking crises. Through the review of the literature, the important link between ex ante regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes is found to be significant in adopting proper solutions.

Through analysing the Hong Kong financial regulators’ reports on the collapse of Lehman Brother, the paper finds out that even though there is some weakness in the cooperation and coordination between regulators after the 2008 financial crisis, Hong Kong is still in the progress of proposing bank special resolution regime. Although there has been some awareness on the issue of coordination between home and host states regulatory measures, there is still a lack of awareness of the connection between regulatory measures and compensation schemes.

Conflict of interests could hardly be prevented in the course of cooperation and coordination among home and host regulatory authorities, and the coordination of the important link between ex ante regulatory measures and ex post compensation scheme which involves legal and economic analyses is a challenging task.

The paper’s findings show that there are practical implications for the recent rapid development of special resolution regime for global systematically important financial institutions against future banking crises and for managing the balance between the adoption of financial supervisory laws and special resolution measures.

This paper suggests that the harmonious coordination between ex ante regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes has to be achieved through international context to avoid the absurd situations. This conceptual integrated framework presented in the current paper is not touched upon by the existing literature. This important concept is valuable for future research, and it is significant to financial regulators, legislators and the government in adjusting policy against banking crises in both developed and developing countries.

This paper aims to consider whether it is plausible to resolve troubled systemically important cross-border banks by dividing them so that the component national authorities can resolve the parts in their jurisdiction separately according to their own priorities.

The example of New Zealand is used. This country has chosen just such a route in its Open Bank Resolution (OBR) policy. The difficulties and advantages of this route to resolution are analyzed.

The paper concludes that the New Zealand route is plausible for systemic subsidiaries, providing there is deposit insurance. The minimum cost route is likely to be one where the home authority takes responsibility for the whole group and keeps all systemic operations running. It remains to be seen what the new EU-level proposals could achieve.

OBR is as yet fortunately untried although there are some examples from a smaller scheme in Denmark.

These findings have important implications for financial regulators round the world but especially in the EU as it seeks to find a similar approach in the Recovery and Resolution Directive.

This topic has not been covered by others and will add ideas of practical value to the debate. One of the major problems addressed by the Basel Committee in its approach to supervision and regulation of cross-border banks is to come up with arrangements that allow the network of national authorities to handle problems in a large cross-border bank quickly, efficiently and preferably pre-emptively without recourse simply to a major taxpayer bailout.

This paper aims to examine the prospects of a dispute resolution framework for the Islamic banking industry in Tanzania under the existing legal framework.

This paper is based on comparative study by drawing significant lessons from other jurisdictions, and argues that to avoid some of the initial drawbacks in the dispute resolution framework for Islamic banking transactions in more advanced jurisdictions like Malaysia and United Kingdom, it is important for Tanzania to get it right from the onset to effectively manage Islamic banking disputes.

The study finds that apart from the court system which provides the main avenue for Islamic finance litigation, other processes such as arbitration and mediation which are deemed to be more sustainable could also be developed for effective dispute management.

The study focuses on Tanzania banking system with comparison to other jurisdictions.

An increase of Sharī’ah-compliant products in Tanzania has led to the establishment of a number of Islamic banks. This study demonstrates the need for Tanzania to make use and/or make adjustment of its laws for effective dispute settlement of banking-related disputes.

This study appears to be the first paper to draw significant experiences from other jurisdictions to resolve Islamic banking disputes in Tanzania. It is expected to provide a good policy framework for the stakeholders in the Islamic banking industry in Tanzania.

Using a two bank, two-period game-theoretic model, this chapter shows that contingent purchase and assumption policy under which the choice of acquirer for a failed bank is contingent on the surviving banks’ risk-taking behavior is generally most effective in reducing moral hazard problems, particularly for countries with low levels of competition and high regulatory barriers. Moreover, we find that to minimize the probability of future bank failures, the choice of acquiring bank should be based not only on the short-term goal of resolving the insolvencies of financial institutions, but also on the long-term effects of ex ante risk-taking incentives.

The purpose of this paper is to present measures and policies followed during the Greek fiscal crisis to safeguard financial stability.

Greece since 2009 was subjected to the Excessive Deficit Procedure and a government debt crisis due to the arrival of the global economic crisis leading to a major economic and banking crisis. Two huge bailout loans and programs helped Greece avoid default. However the second bailout loan and participation of banks in the Private Sector Involvement caused losses to the banking system that amounted to €37.7 billion. To deal with the prospect of potential bank failure Bank of Greece the central bank in cooperation with national and international authorities developed many strategies to safeguard financial stability such as cash management and liquidity operations establishment and operation of Greek Financial Stability Fund (GFSF) institutional framework for recapitalization and resolution of credit institutions.

The first step was to support bank liquidity pressures. In the face of these pressures the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations provided lending to euro that ended 2010 and accounted to €97.6 billion. The second step was to establish a legal and regulatory framework for bank resolution and assess funds needed to recapitalize banks through stress tests and diagnostic assessments. Results showed that during 2012–2014 the Greek banking sector would require approximately €40.5 billion for strengthening its capital base of which €27.5 billion corresponded to the four “core banks”. Bank of Greece and GFSF managed to complete a €48.2 billion bank recapitalization in June 2013 of which the first €24.4 billion was injected into the four biggest Greek banks. In return Bank of Greece received a number of shares in those banks which it can now sell again during the upcoming years. The third step of policies was to implement resolution and restructuring measures. From October 2011 to March 2014 12 banks resolved through the new legal and regulatory framework under either a transfer order (order to transfer assets and liabilities to a transferee credit institution) or establishment of a bridge bank. All policies succeeded to safeguard Greek financial stability and restore bank losses that resulted from Greek public debt “haircut”.

To the best of the author’s knowledge this is the first paper examining this issue.