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Product intervention power is introduced under the markets in financial instruments regulation (MiFIR) and packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) Regulation for all EU Member States and gives National Competent Authorities (NCAs), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European Banking Authority (EBA) powers to monitor financial products (and services) under their supervision and to “temporarily” prohibit or restrict the marketing, distribution, or sale of certain financial instruments, or to intervene in relation to certain financial activities or practice. This extends the supervisory measures defined in MiFID II to any PRIIPs (including insurance-based investment products “IBI products”) that would not otherwise fall under the scope of MiFID II. Product intervention power is given to the NCAs, and in order to use power, it requires to take the specifics of the individual case into account and a series of conditions, criteria, and factors to fulfill. Moreover, ESMA and the EBA have a type of control function and ability to override national regulators on product. The aim of product intervention powers is to ensure strengthening of investor protection, but given the potential significant impact of this power, calls into question of possibility to delay innovation and slow down product developments on the capital market.

This paper provided an overview of supervisory measures on product intervention, that is, scope of the product intervention power, criteria, factors, and risks which have to be taken into consideration when using this regulator’s tool.

This chapter aims the research whether the application of European Directive, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), had any significant effects on the European Capital Markets and the progress of the European Integration. This new regulation specifies the tasks and responsibilities of the supervisory authorities of the Member State of origin and the host Member State, in order to enhance the certainty of effectiveness of cross-border transactions supervision and to reduce the risk of imposing unnecessary legal reforms from the host Member State on investment firms which perform cross-border transactions. It has been concluded, among others, that the aligning of the national regulatory approaches to a common European regulatory system is quite necessary. It is finally concluded that MiFID will contribute to reduce problems at country level as the previous experience of the Investment Services Directive, where the European investments and economies of Member States were based mainly on the level of ‘country’ and not of the ‘sector’. An effective capital entrepreneurship market is a strategically important element in the development of new and innovative businesses, encouraging entrepreneurship, increasing the productivity and maintaining high economic growth rates in Europe. Currently, European venture capital market is much less effective than that of the US market, for example. Therefore, in this area, should be specified the priorities that will lead to new initiatives.

With the introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), financial institutions are faced with many investor protection provisions; this has a major impact on the day-to-day operations of private banks, which provide investment services to predominately retail or non-professional investors. The purpose of this paper is to determine how MiFID provisions regarding investor protection with respect to suitability are complied with in practice by private banks.

Based on interviews with 25 representatives of private banks from 10 different European Union (EU) member states, the researchers have determined how these provisions are fulfilled and associated risks mitigated. Mapping out the suitability requirements of MiFID and comparing them with how these have been operationalised, we arrive at the question of whether this leads to a level playing field and investor protection by different private banks.

Although MiFID is trying to achieve a level playing field between the EU member states, this study shows that this has not been achieved in all areas. Investor protection requirements from MiFID are interpreted and operationalised differently. Although these differences are sometimes small, sometimes they are larger and affect the way the investor is served and suitability determined.

This research provides a unique insight into the way private banks in Europe have implemented the MiFID II requirements and gives insight into best practices. For the future, this research can serve as a prelude to in-depth follow-up research on the implementation of EU provisions.

This paper aims to discuss the impact of nascent Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) initiatives and, thus, to deliver practical insights into MiFID II implementation, compliance and cost reduction MiFID II constitutes the backbone for the upcoming financial market reforms. With the first proposal of MiFID drafted in October 2011, this regulatory framework has undergone over 2,000 amendments. As MiFID II currently stands, this Directive attempts to address issues exposed by the global financial crisis.

This study, based on secondary research and an in-depth analysis of the MiFID II framework, investigates structural and technological challenges entailed by this Directive. The analysis is broken down into the following sections: technological and structural challenges; costs of implementation; MiFID II teams; facilitating near real-time regulatory reporting; increased transparency requirements; and information technology (IT) initiatives for MiFID II compliance.

MiFID II commands significant changes in business and operating models. With this in mind, the study indicates current technological and structural challenges faced by financial institutions and advises on ways of mitigating MiFID II risks. Although it is too early to assess the costs of implementing MiFID II, this paper suggests ways of reducing MiFID II-related costs. The study also advises on organising dedicated teams to deal with MiFID II. Furthermore, this paper argues that early investments in IT systems and processes would allow financial services firms to gain a competitive advantage and, hence, scoop up market share or launch new, lucrative services – especially in the area of collateralisation and market data processing.

This paper shows that the current version of MiFID II still requires a great deal of attention from the regulators that need to readdress contentious issues revolving around the links between MiFID II and other regulatory frameworks such as European Market Infrastructure Regulation and Dodd–Frank. This study addresses the MiFID II compliance issues by adopting European Union and non-European Union banks’ and asset managers’ perspectives and, hence, delivers practical implications for risk managers and compliance officers of various financial institutions.

This paper aims to discuss key concerns surrounding the recent implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID II). It focuses on the UK regime. The insights derived are envisaged to be helpful guides for participants and regulators in financial markets.

This paper used the legal-economics perspective. It relied on primary data from statutes and regulations and secondary data from the public domain to analyze the phenomenon. The analytical framework comprised the following sections: Introduction, MiFID I review, MiFID II scope, MiFID II key concerns and concluding remarks.

Only half of the EU Member States including the UK managed to transpose MiFID II within the 3rd January 2018 effective date. At this early stage of implementation, various teething problems were encountered. These pertained to costs and charges reporting, firm governance, product governance, transaction reporting, best execution and research. Owing to the sheer scale and complexity of MIFID II, most entities barely coped with their reporting obligations. Noting the situation, the Financial Conduct Authority assured firms taking all sufficient steps that they would be treated fairly.

The paper was not sufficiently empirical. However, the study benefited reasonably from triangulation of data and perspectives to provide good insights on the implementation effects of the complex and voluminous EU rules for governing financial markets with global implications.

Investors could gain from the enhanced transparency and best execution rules. Investment banks could gain from the emerging resilient, integrated and efficient financial markets. Regulators with better access to more and higher quality reporting could intervene more effectively when required.

This paper assembled and critically analyzed currently available research insights in these areas so as to provide useful guidance to those needing to work and comply with MiFID II rules and academics teaching financial services law.

The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) II directive was enforced in the EU in January 2018. While EU-member states implemented this directive in their national legislation, investment firms are still enforcing compliance. With the purpose of “investor protection”, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of transparency, suitability, warning and information requirements. How do investment advisers view and embrace these MiFID II requirements? Are differences evident within this group of professionals?

In total, 267 Dutch investment advisors serving non-professional investors daily completed structured surveys on their opinion of the acceptance and effectiveness of the MiFID II requirements. The findings are compared with existing literature to examine similarities with other legislation.

The results demonstrated differences depending on the investment firms’ size and investment advisors’ seniority and gender. Professionals should be critical of new legislation and regulations, as it limits their autonomy. However, female investment advisors and those with up to ten years’ experience are less critical of the effectiveness of the MiFID II requirements, embracing them without discussion. Investment advisors in large investment firms believe that MiFID II contributes to investors’ interests, whereas those in small and medium-sized investment firms often do not share this opinion. For example, respondents considered cost transparency an effective requirement to achieve better investment services and protect investors’ interests.

The effectiveness and applicability of legislation are often viewed from a legal perspective, and enforcement is essential. However, this study explores legislation from the perspective of professionals under supervision.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the markets in financial instruments directive II (MiFID II) on investment services in the Baltic states.

The authors take an exploratory, qualitative approach, based on data conducted from interviews with nine investment industry professionals using the laddering technique. The pool of experts was selected using the purposeful sampling method, and experts must have had a minimum of five years investment experience in the Baltics, working familiarity with MiFID II, and a university education in the fields of finance or economics.

The strict requirements of MiFID II reduce the range of available investment products and services for customers in the Baltics. Also, the profitability of Baltic investment companies decreased due to high compliance costs and bans on inducements. The results indicate that this may lead to increased barriers to entry and mergers and acquisitions for small investment companies.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first attempt to research the implications of MiFID II implementation in the Baltic states. The qualitative approach chosen offers a unique opportunity to highlight the critical effects of MiFID II on financial intermediates in smaller geographical markets.

The area of law where the principle of transparency is applicable is expanding fast. Also many financial markets have recently become subject to new regulations requiring transparency, such as EU directives MIFID II or Solvency II. Here, what is expanding is not just the applicability of the principle as such, but also the scope of issues which are affected by transparency, that is, remuneration or conflict of interests. In the light of these regulations, it may seem that transparency has simply become a sole legislative measure assuring values such as consumer protection, market stability or – most of all – high-quality governance. Indeed, transparency is thought to contribute to the quality of governance in several different ways, although its implementation must meet certain standards if it is to produce the desired results, especially when it comes to financial institutions. Financial institutions are commonly required to be particularly transparent due to the fact they often act as public trust entities. As the activity of financial institutions is of such importance, the issue of transparency efficiency is worth discussing. Although it is said that the emergence of the principle of transparency in the EU law is a fairly new phenomenon, the existence of transparency obligation is not. Therefore, some doubts may arise as to the question whether the principle of transparency actually adds much to existing rules and principles. In this chapter the author explored and discussed how mandatory transparency affects financial institutions’ activity, and whether it performs its function efficiently.

In the context of increasing private provision of social security and welfare, alongside what is argued to be the ‘financialisation’ of daily lives, individuals in many countries face an array of potentially difficult financial choices and decisions. Limitations in levels of knowledge and expertise may lead them to consider seeking financial advice. Yet, in the wake of the great financial crisis, trust in the financial services industry is low.

At the same time, in a number of countries the financial advice sector is facing its own challenges. These include regulatory issues concerning the definition, suitability and delivery of advice; the affordability of advice; and the challenges and opportunities facing the advice sector as a result of the increasing use of technology in the financial services sector.

This chapter examines the implications of these developments for the regulation and governance of financial advice in the context of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II. In particular, it considers the example of the UK and issues this raises for the implementation of recent European regulatory reforms.

The purpose of this paper is to summarize and discuss the implications of three related U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) no-action letters dated October 26, 2017 that seek to address the provisions of MiFID II related to “inducements”.

Provides background information regarding MiFID II and summarizes each of the three SEC Staff no-action letters: the SIFMA letter, the ICI letter and the AMG letter.

The no-action letters provide market participants with increased clarity as to how certain aspects of their business activities, in particular the “bundling” or “unbundling” of payments for research and execution, can comply with potentially competing systems of regulations.

Practical guidance from experienced financial industry and investment management lawyers.