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This paper aims to question the disappearance of sector‐specific regulation in European electronic communications markets.

To show that sector‐specific regulation will remain, five arguments are developed based on different disciplines: law, economics, political science and sociology.

It is found that sector‐specific regulation has already been in place for 15 years and there is no concrete indication that it will end soon. Competition law has intrinsic limitations, which, arguably, do not make it possible for authorities to resort only to that body of the law to ensure a smooth functioning of the electronic communications markets. The balance of power in the EU leads to sector‐specific regulation being maintained in the years ahead as the ideal way for European institutions to intervene in electronic communications markets. The electronic communications market requires regulation going beyond competition law in order to ensure the realization of non‐economic purposes. The implementation of sector‐specific regulation might contribute to concentrating the electronic communications markets.

Contrary to the claims of the European institutions that sector‐specific regulation in the electronic communication markets will lose its relevance, this paper argues that it is likely to remain for the foreseeable future.

The paper shows that deregulating a sector is not an easy task and that ex ante regulation is a key legal instrument for the proper functioning of a market.

European air transport policy, emerged through the confluence of case law and legislation, in four broad areas: liberalization, safety and security, greening, and the external policy. Following the implementation of the single market for air transport, policy shifted to liberalizing and regulating associated services and in recent years to greening, the external aviation policy, and safety and security. Inclusion of air transport in the Environmental Trading Scheme of the European Union exemplifies the European Commission’s proactive stand on bringing the industry in line with emission reduction trajectories of other industries. However, the bid to include flights to third countries in the trading scheme pushed the EU into a controversial position, causing the Commission to halt implementation and to give ICAO time to seek a global multilateral agreement. The chapter also discusses how the nationality clauses in air services agreements breached the Treaty of Rome, and a court ruling to that effect enabled the EC to extend EU liberalization policies beyond the European Union, resulting in the Common Aviation Area with EU fringe countries and the Open Aviation Area with the USA. Another important area of progress was aviation safety, where the EU region is unsurpassed in the world, yet the Commission has pushed the boundary even further, by establishing the European Safety Agency to oversee the European Aviation Safety Management System. Another important area of regulatory development was aviation security, a major focus after the woeful events in 2001, but increasingly under industry scrutiny on costs and effectiveness. The chapter concludes by arguing that in the coming decade, the EU will strive to strengthen its position as a global countervailing power, symbolized in air transport by a leadership position in environmental policy and international market liberalization, exemplified in the EU’s external aviation policy.

The regulation of electronic communications has been recently reformed in Europe. One striking feature of the review was to base most of the economic regulation – the so‐called significant market power regime – on antitrust principles. In particular, the regulated markets have to be defined according to competition law methodologies. This paper describes this approach and studies in detail the recently adopted Commission recommendation “on relevant markets susceptible to ex‐ante regulation”. The paper concludes with three policy recommendations. First, as regulation is more flexible and more complex, national regulators should co‐operate among themselves and national courts should only reform regulatory decisions in case of manifest error. Second, as regulation is not any more justified by the “original sin” of the previous monopolists, but by the inefficiency of antitrust to control market power, NRA should be cautious not to overly expand their intervention. Third, as ex ante market definitions are aligned on antirust principles, authorities should make sure that market definition is not a goal in itself but only a means to achieve the policy objectives of the sector‐specific regulation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the viewpoints of key stakeholders on the European Commission’s proposal for a regulation for a mechanism to resolve legal and administrative obstacles in cross-border regions. The mechanism known as ECBM, or European Cross-border mechanism, was presented as part of the legislative package for EU Cohesion Policy 2021-2027. The regulation will allow one Member State to apply their legal provision in another Member State for a concretely defined case. This proposal is particularly interesting as it does not give further competence to the European level, but changes how Member States may interact with one another, yet, it raises critiques as regards to its compliance with constitutional, international and European law.

This paper outlines the main elements of contention, which are legal justification, state sovereignty, compliance with the subsidiarity and proportionality principle, thematic and territorial scope, voluntariness and the administrative burden.

The author concludes that the assessment of the voluntariness of the regulation will be crucial in examining the regulations compliance with EU principles and suggests that a more nuanced reading as to which parts of the regulation are voluntary is needed. The author further expects the legal text to change substantial during the legislative procedure, in particular in regard to the thematical scope and the bindingness.

This piece summarises the debate currently held in the European Council and the European Parliament in a structured way to an interested readership. Examining the proposed regulation and the arguments for and against it offers the opportunity to review the main arguments that will be raised in any future debate on legal proposals on territorial development initiatives.

This article starts from the assumption that economic sociology, including Karl Polanyi’s work, can contribute fresh perspectives to regulation debates because it opens up new understandings of the nature of economic activity, a key target of legal regulation. In particular this article examines Polanyi’s idea that society drives regulation. For Polanyi the “regulatory counter-movement” is society’s response to the disembedding – in particular through the proliferation of markets – of economic out of social relationships. Section One of the article identifies three key challenges that arise from this Polanyian take on regulation for contemporary regulation researchers. First, Polanyi focuses on social norms restraining business behavior, but neglects social norms embedded in law as also shaping regulation. Second, he seems to imply a clear-cut conceptual distinction between “economy” and “society.” Third, his analysis sidelines the role of interest politics in the development of regulation.

Addressing the first of these three key challenges, Section Two of this article therefore argues that a Polanyian vision of “socialized” legal regulation should build on contemporary accounts of responsive law and regulation, which focus attention on social norms informing legal regulation. Section Three of this article tackles the second key challenge raised by Polanyi’s work for contemporary regulation researchers, that is, how to transcend a modernist perspective of “economy” and “society” as clearly demarcated, distinct fields of social action. It argues that discourse theory is an important alternative theoretical resource. Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe, the article suggests that understanding “economy” and “society” as performed by open and relationally constructed discourses helps to capture interconnections between “economy” and “society” that become particularly visible when we analyze how specific regulatory regimes work at a medium- and small-scale level. These points are further brought to life in Section Four through a discussion of the European Union (EU) regulatory regime for trade in risky, transgenic agricultural products, and in particular the current reform debates about the consideration of the “socioeconomic impacts” of such products.

Product intervention power is introduced under the markets in financial instruments regulation (MiFIR) and packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) Regulation for all EU Member States and gives National Competent Authorities (NCAs), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European Banking Authority (EBA) powers to monitor financial products (and services) under their supervision and to “temporarily” prohibit or restrict the marketing, distribution, or sale of certain financial instruments, or to intervene in relation to certain financial activities or practice. This extends the supervisory measures defined in MiFID II to any PRIIPs (including insurance-based investment products “IBI products”) that would not otherwise fall under the scope of MiFID II. Product intervention power is given to the NCAs, and in order to use power, it requires to take the specifics of the individual case into account and a series of conditions, criteria, and factors to fulfill. Moreover, ESMA and the EBA have a type of control function and ability to override national regulators on product. The aim of product intervention powers is to ensure strengthening of investor protection, but given the potential significant impact of this power, calls into question of possibility to delay innovation and slow down product developments on the capital market.

This paper provided an overview of supervisory measures on product intervention, that is, scope of the product intervention power, criteria, factors, and risks which have to be taken into consideration when using this regulator’s tool.

The applicable jurisdiction for insolvency proceedings, as provided by the Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, is the court of the Member State where the debtor's center of main interest (COMI) is located (Article 3(1)). The Regulation, however, does not provide a comprehensive definition of the COMI. This paper seeks to explore the meaning and developments behind the meaning of COMI as influenced by judicial reasoning and conflicts across Member States.

The study centres around the emerging jurisprudence and analyses case law across Member States in order to draw conclusions on the meaning of COMI and the emerging concepts. Extensive consideration of statutory interpretation, case reports and judicial comment is present in order to inform and develop conclusions.

In the absence of a definition it appears that the only relevant European guidance emerges from recital 13 and Article 3 (1). With little guidance in the Regulation, it has therefore been left to national courts to decide how the notion of COMI should be interpreted. Determining the COMI has emerged as one of the most controversial aspect and the principle point of legal conflict, with some highly debated cases within member states’ courts. On the basis of the case law, it is suggested that the interpretation of COMI is more flexible in UK and Italian courts. The approach adopted in continental Europe is referred to as the “centre of operations approach”, i.e. the debtor's COMI has to be determined by the place where he is “ascertainable by third parties”. The Anglo Saxon approach, on the other hand, is known as the “mind of management approach”, i.e. the debtor's COMI must be situated where decisions are actually made. The latter seems to enjoy a more practical and accessible approach.

Not only will the findings assist those seeking to understand the process and COMI requirements across member states but it will also assist those researchers seeking to understanding the comparative and conflict of law barriers to pan‐European insolvency proceedings.

After more than three decades of research and legal cases pursued by the European Commission (EC) and national regulators, interchange fees for four-party consumer card transactions are capped on December 9, 2015 across the European Union (EU). Since then, the development of card scheme fees has been a raising concern for merchants. Due to their nature, these fees have not been dealt with in research or covered by the Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR). This chapter aims to assess the recent development of card scheme fees within four-party card payment networks by relying on survey data obtained from 104 merchants across the EU. Findings show that for half of the merchant population card scheme fees have increased since the regulation. Further concerns related to transparency of fees, pass-through of savings to retailers and subsequently consumers, and the development of commercial cards are discussed. In light of the EC's scheduled review of the impacts of the policy intervention in 2019 (Article 17 of the IFR), this chapter evaluates alternative arrangements for the setting of card scheme fees with a focus on the legal basis for a potential regulation. Findings shall provide a ground for further interaction between academics, practitioners, and policymakers.

Seeks to answer the question “whose interests are being served by the laws of purporting to regulate genetically modified organisms?“ Considers the interests of the seed/chemical multinational companies, trade and investment for the countries in which these companies operate and the innovation of science and technology. Covers the European interests with regards to the single internal market and the conflict this can cause between economic and environmental/health interests. Looks at the issues from the US perspective and world trade. Continues by covering nature and the environment followed by health and safety and the rights of consumers. Assesses the regulations of the European community in order to find what protection is available.