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To explain a series of no-action letters recently released by the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance that help to clarify the circumstances in which a company may exclude shareholder proposals involving proxy access bylaw provisions from the company’s proxy statement.

Explains the background of competing proxy access bylaw provisions adopted or proposed by companies and proposed by shareholders, the “directly conflicts” test explained in SEC Staff Legal Bulletin 14H, and the “substantially implemented” guidelines implied in a series of no-action letters in February and March 2016. Explains the status of shareholder proxy access proposals as of Spring 2016.

Taken together with an earlier series of no-action letters released in February 2016 and Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H, published in October 2015, companies considering the adoption of a proxy access bylaw provision now have a clearer understanding of when the Staff of the Division of Corporation Finance is likely to conclude that a company may appropriately exclude a proxy access shareholder proposal in favor of a proxy access provision adopted or proposed by a company.

To explain the US Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) staff’s (the “Staff”) participating affiliate exemption from investment adviser registration for foreign advisers set forth in a line of Staff no-action letters issued between 1992 and 2005 (the “Participating Affiliate Letters”) and to discuss recent guidance issued by the Staff in an information update published in March 2017 (the “Information Update”) with respect to complying with requirements of the Participating Affiliate Letters.

Reviews the development of the Staff’s approach regarding the non-registration of foreign advisers that rely on the Participating Affiliate Letters from prior to the issuance of those letters through the Information Update and sets forth recommendations for registered investment advisers and their participating affiliates.

While there are arguments that the Information Update goes beyond restating established standards and does not clearly explain whether submission of all listed documentation is required, the Information Update will likely standardize the information submitted to the SEC.

Practical guidance for advisers relying on the Participating Affiliate Letters from experienced securities and financial services lawyers.

To review the M&A Brokers “no-action” letter issued in February 2014 by the staff of the USA Securities and Exchange Commission that clarifies the circumstances in which intermediaries (M&A brokers) may receive transaction-based compensation for services provided in connection with sales of private companies without having to register and be regulated by the SEC as broker-dealers under the USA Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Examines the new SEC staff interpretative guidance on activities of M&A brokers in light of USA federal securities laws and previous staff no-action letters that address the application of broker-dealer registration requirements to such intermediaries when they render services in connection with purchases and sales of privately-held companies. Summarizes the manner in which the SEC staff’s new position expands the types of private M&A transactions on which intermediaries may advise and broadens the scope of services they may provide without subjecting themselves to Exchange Act registration.

The M&A Brokers letter dispels much of the uncertainty existing under earlier SEC staff no-action letters about the scope of permissible activities in which unregistered intermediaries may engage in private M&A transactions. By broadening the scope of those activities under the federal statutory regime governing broker-dealers, the new staff guidance should facilitate the expansion of services provided by M&A brokers without registration and permit greater flexibility for M&A brokers and their clients to structure compensation arrangements. The paper cautions that, absent reform of more restrictive regulation under the securities laws of some states, the prospects for expanded involvement by unregistered intermediaries in private M&A transactions may not be fully realized.

Expert guidance from experienced securities lawyers.

The purpose of this paper is to summarize and discuss the implications of three related U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) no-action letters dated October 26, 2017 that seek to address the provisions of MiFID II related to “inducements”.

Provides background information regarding MiFID II and summarizes each of the three SEC Staff no-action letters: the SIFMA letter, the ICI letter and the AMG letter.

The no-action letters provide market participants with increased clarity as to how certain aspects of their business activities, in particular the “bundling” or “unbundling” of payments for research and execution, can comply with potentially competing systems of regulations.

Practical guidance from experienced financial industry and investment management lawyers.

Part I of this series appeared in the Summer 2002 issue of The Journal of Investment Compliance. It addressed the regulation of wrap fee programs under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”) and the requirements of Rule 3a‐4 thereunder, which must be met so that a wrap fee program is not deemed to be an investment company. Part I also discussed certain issues arising under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), including how program sponsors and any third‐party portfolio managers generally are viewed as investment advisers and are subject to the Advisers Act. Part II discusses additional Advisers Act issues such as suitability, fees, and advertising. It also briefly reviews issues arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). The information provided in Part II assumes that readers have some basic familiarity with Part I.

To analyze and draw conclusions from the “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets” (the “Framework”), released by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on April 3, 2019, and the SEC’s corresponding no-action letter to TurnKey Jet, Inc. (“TKJ”), which is the SEC’s first no-action letter publicly agreeing with the view that the digital asset described therein is not a security.

Explains how the Framework assists market participants in analyzing whether a digital asset is a security, by applying the Howey factors for identifying an investment contract. Discusses the SEC’s TKJ Letter, highlighting the factors the SEC emphasized in its analysis of the Framework.

While largely reiterating prior guidance, the Framework provides a helpful overview of the SEC’s views on when a digital asset is a security and how to properly analyze the prongs of Howey with respect to digital assets. The Framework also leaves certain important questions unanswered, including, for example, whether digital assets distributed by means of a so-called “Airdrop” are securities under the Framework, and the extent to which the Framework is meant to interact with digital assets that were issued or otherwise operate on platforms that are primarily overseas.

Expert guidance from lawyers with broad experience in financial services, securities, investment funds, derivatives, and digital assets regulation and compliance.

A pooled income fund (PIF) is one of the methods created under the 1969 Tax Reform Act whereby a taxpayer may make a tax‐deductible remainder gift to a charitable organization. The fund, established by a charitable organization to receive irrevocable gifts from at least two donors, pays current income to the individual beneficiaries for life, but at the termination of each income interest, the allocable principal must revert permanently to the charitable organization. In recent years, a number of PIFs have been offered to the public by charitable organizations through broker‐dealers or related entities. There are numerous securities‐law issues implicated by the sales of these PIFs, including: (i) whether broker‐dealers may solicit donations to such funds and receive compensation for their solicitations; (ii) the effect of the broker‐dealers’ solicitation and receipt of compensation have on securities registration for the PIF or units offered therein under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or the Investment Company Act of 1940; (iii) whether staff and persons affiliated with the sponsoring charity, including parties assisting them in the marketing of such pooled income funds, also should be permitted to solicit donations; (iv) whether such charities or persons, or parties assisting them in the marketing of such pooled income funds, then should be required to register as broker‐dealers; (v) what securities licenses may be required of the aforementioned parties; and (vi) whether there are ways to design the manner in which third parties other than broker dealers are compensated to resolve any potential issues arising from answers to the previous questions. This article first sets forth the applicable law involved in the analysis and then attempts to answer each of the issues presented above.

This article takes a close look at the requirements of the 1940 Investment Advisors Act for both registered and unregistered investment advisors — such as hedge funds and private equity funds. It highlights the significant issues that arise from the regulation for unregistered funds that are considering the consequences of SEC registration. It also reviews briefly the requirements of the Act that are already applicable to unregistered investment advisors.

To advise companies of a recent SEC no-action letter relating to tender and exchange offers for certain debt securities.

Reviews various conditions allowing an issuer to use a shortened timeframe in which certain debt tender/exchange offers need be kept open for as few as five business days.

The abbreviated debt tender/exchange offer structure contemplated by the no-action letter provides a more efficient mechanism for conducting debt tender/exchange offers in certain circumstances.

Issuers conducting a debt tender/exchange offer should consider whether the new abbreviated structure is more effective in achieving their objectives than the more traditional structures.

Practical guidance from experienced securities regulatory lawyers that gives an overview of important developments in debt tender/exchange offer practice.