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Quality assurance is the process of providing confidence that the stated or implied requirements for quality are met. In financial investment services, “quality” is defined as the perception of the investor about achieving satisfactory returns under acceptable and generally accepted risks within a planned time. Investor’s confidence in achieving quality stems from the quality assurance efforts and processes of the investment service provider. In this paper, different types of investment services, from a simple provision of investment information, to a full‐service portfolio management are discussed. Principles of quality assurance in investment services are provided. A realistic portfolio management case indicates that a modern quality management system (ISO 9000) can enhance quality assurance and thus the quality of investment services.

Examines the marketing of investment banking services and reviews critically the theoretical frameworks provided by the literature in the marketing of services field. Based on research interviews with 12 London‐based investment banks, discusses current marketing practices and identifies the critical marketing management issues facing the industry. Suggests a theory of marketing of investment banking services to guide the analysis of marketing practice.

Innovation is the way of life and we see various innovative techniques and methods being introduced in our daily life. This study aims to focus on digital innovation in the wealth management domain. This study examines the effect of usage of robo-advisory services in investment decision-making and behavioural biases, i.e. overconfidence and loss aversion. Such studies are more pronounced in developed countries and little has been studied about investor behaviour in association with advisory services in developing countries such as India.

Overconfidence and loss-aversion biases, investment decision-making and advisory services questions are measured using a five-point Likert scale. The number of respondents was 172 investors. A purposive sampling is used for gathering responses from investors. Structural equation modeling model was run using AMOS 22 version software package.

The authors found that behavioural biases positively and significantly influence the irrationalities of investment decision-making. The findings of this study also provide empirical evidence that the usage of robo-advisory services, by individual investors, is still incapable of mitigating behavioural biases, such as overconfidence bias and loss-aversion bias.

The sample size of this study could be a limiting factor. This study is limited only to two biases, while other behavioural biases affect the investment decision-making of the investors, which can be considered for future research along with the impact of robo-advisory services in different socio-cultural backgrounds.

This study will assist fintech start-ups, banks, architecture of robo advisors, product owners and wealth management service providers improvise their products, platforms and offerings of these automated advisory services. This could help individual investors to mitigate their behavioural biases in investment decision-making.

This study is useful to society as the awareness of robo-advisory services is very less, at present, and there is a need to increase the usage of these services to extend the benefit of this to the lower stratum of society. These services would be useful to all investors who find it difficult to afford financial advisors and help them mitigate their behavioural biases for investment decision-making.

This study is the first of its type that establishes the linkage between behavioural biases, digital innovation in fintech, i.e. robo-advisory services and individual investor’s investment decision-making in individual investor of the Indian stock market.

As an alternative to hiring financial specialists or investment consultants, robo-advisors offer financially automated investment services. This study aims to investigate how robo-advisors' service attributes, risk attitude and financial self-efficacy influence customers' choice preferences of adopting robo-advisors.

Two hundred fifty-one online surveys were used to collect data, and choice-based conjoint analysis was conducted.

Results show that increasing annual fees negatively impact customers' choice preferences. Promotion, general investment education and additional human assistance have a positive impact. Furthermore, risk-seeking and risk-averse customers require more human assistance than risk-neutral customer and customers with high levels of financial self-efficacy prefer more general investment education and additional human assistance than those with lower levels. In addition, customers in the older age group prefer promotion, general investment education and additional human assistance, while wealthy customers prefer lower annual fees, higher general investment education and more additional human assistance compared to middle-class and low-income groups.

This study contributes to robo-advisor providers to provide appropriate service attributes for each customer group.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

Business Model Analysis is acquiring increasing visibility in the European banking regulatory framework, following the European Banking Authority guidelines on common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP), developed to assess business and strategic risks (EBA, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). Starting from a selected literature review, in the paper, the authors analyse business models set up by financial intermediaries, bank and non-banks, for the distribution of investment services, first by comparing European niche players with European banking global players, and second, comparing European niche players among themselves to understand the evolution of business models for the distribution of investment services at European level. The research is supported by the Baffi–Carefin Research Centre at the Bocconi University (Italy), in collaboration with ANASF, the Italian Association of Financial Advisors (Italy).

The authors consider a sample of European financial players from 2009 to 2014. The authors’ focus is on France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and the UK; overall the authors’ handmade data set is based on 162 annual reports. The authors follow two main questions: Do the niche players, as they are focused on the distribution of investment services, have an upper limit to profitability, compared to the global players, as risk-takers in many financial areas? How is the business model of niche players changing, facing increasing competition and regulatory pressures?

Answering the first research question, the highest net profitability is found in the niche players group; the global players, as risk-takers, achieve lower remuneration, in contrast with the risk premium theory. The results were assessed over a limited period, however, deemed in line with the company’s strategic planning horizon. Answering the second research question, the authors focus on the case of niche players, using a cluster analysis. The authors identify three different business models: most dynamic niche players, which combine investment services, insurance and welfare services, achieving the highest margins and stability; players mainly focused on asset management, whose key vulnerability is the degree of open architecture, especially in light of future MiFID 2 implementation; and players mainly focused on the creation of well-structured on-line platforms, which offer also brokerage services, thereby reducing their marginality and potentially increasing their business risk.

Despite the limited time series, the authors’ research gives some inputs for those interested in deepening the business model analysis focus on the distribution of investment services and the business and strategic risk assessment, both for the global banks and the niche players (banks and non-banks).

The authors’ results could be of some interest during the strategic assessment of global banks and niche players, both adopting an internal perspective or an external one, as regulator.

By giving some specific insights into the assessment and comparison of business and strategic risks among global and niche players, the authors’ research provides the basis for further research in the field of the distribution of investment services.

The originality mainly regards the business model risk perspective and the focus of the authors’ analysis: the distribution of investment services. This sector, unlike the asset management, does not have an easily recognisable group of comparables at European level, all the European countries analysed have very different business models. This research avails of an original database, that is unique to Europe.

Focussing on the UK’s institutional real estate universe, this paper analyses variations in the operational management of real estate investment portfolios. For the main categories of institutional investors, the key tasks in real estate operational management, and the ways in which these tasks are typically bundled and categorised by investment managers are reviewed. Three broad operational management models are outlined. Case studies of real estate operational management models in practice are discussed.

The research approach is primarily descriptive, drawing upon illustrative investor case studies.

A range of operating models are identified for managing real estate investment portfolios. Specialists real estate investors tend to have highly vertically integrated operating models viewing most operational management functions as core operational capabilities. Multi-asset owners tend to have a vertically disintegrated operating model outsourcing fund, asset, property and facilities management. Investing institutions such as fund houses and specialist real estate investment advisors seem to have converged upon a common hybrid operating model with high margin, analytical functions such as fund and asset management being insourced and low margin, routine functions such as property and facilities management being outsourced.

Despite the size of the global, institutional real estate investment universe (estimated by DTZ to be worth more than USD 13.6 trillion in 2015), the topic of how (and how effectively) these assets are managed by institutional investors has attracted very little attention from the real estate research community. This paper provides some initial analysis and insights into operational management models for real estate investment portfolios in the contemporary real estate investment management landscape.

Explains the US Department of Labor’s newly proposed “Conflicts of Interest” rule and provides a critical analysis of its impact should it be adopted as proposed.

Explains the DOL’s proposed Conflict of Interest rule and discusses how it changes the current fiduciary standards of care under ERISA. The article then probes more deeply into the practical matters involved in implementing the rule, and into the realities of how it would impact fiduciary standards generally, investors, the financial services industry and securities arbitrations. Reactions to the proposed rule are then explained against the backdrop of the practical implications thereof.

This article concludes that the DOL’s proposed Conflict of Interest rule, albeit well-intended, is not reasonably designed to achieve its stated goal and would instead likely harm those whom it purports to help. Ironically, it also potentially waters down the existing high standards of current fiduciaries. The article supports the DOL’s goal of greater responsibility for financial service professionals and proffers an alternative solution that could achieve the desired result more effectively.

This article offers valuable insight on the realities of the proposed law and practical guidance on its implications to the investing public, the financial services industry and securities attorneys.

The following is an introductory profile of the fastest growing firms over the three-year period of the study listed by corporate reputation ranking order. The business activities in which the firms are engaged are outlined to provide background information for the reader.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has defined “soft dollar” practices as arrangements under which products or services, other than execution of securities transactions, are obtained by an investment adviser from or through a broker‐dealer in exchange for the direction by the adviser of client brokerage transactions to the broker‐dealer. In the wake of the mutual fund scandals of 2003, soft dollar practices have come under increased scrutiny by the SEC, the U.S. Congress, and others. This article is based on testimony presented by the Investment Counsel Association of America (ICAA) to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs at a hearing on soft dollars held on March 31, 2004. The article outlines the following positions: (1) the SEC should ensure that there is adequate disclosure about soft dollar practices, combined with appropriate inspection and enforcement of regulations governing such practices; (2) the consequences of abolishing soft dollars ‐ an outcome that would require Congressional action ‐ most likely would affect smaller investment advisory firms adversely, create entry barriers for new investment advisory firms, and diminish the quality and availability of proprietary and third‐party research; (3) investment advisers should be required to keep appropriate records relating to soft dollar arrangements and to develop and implement internal controls and procedures designed to ensure that soft dollar arrangements are supervised, controlled, and monitored; and (4) eliminating the use of soft dollars for third‐party research would harm investors, diminish the availability of quality research, provide a regulatory‐driven advantage for full‐service brokerage firms, disadvantage third‐party research providers, and result in less transparency to investors, regulators, and market participants.