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The wave of regulatory reforms in European telecoms and electricity industries has had an important impact on the structure of the state as well as of corporations. The purpose of this paper is to explore the establishment of these regulatory organizations at the state and corporate levels within a unified theoretical framework, that is grounded in the politics of regulation.

The case selection includes governance structures at the state and corporate levels in 16 European countries in both telecoms and electricity.

The data reveal that regulatory agencies exist in both telecoms and electricity sectors in all 16 countries under study, with the notable exception of Switzerland's electricity sector. At the same time, business corporate reforms were also evident, mainly via the creation of corporate regulatory offices at the headquarters of the firms. These departments, which redefine the patterns of responsibility within the corporation and have played the leading role in the negotiations with the external regulatory environment.

This paper strives to overcome the tendency in the scholarly literature to look only at one or the other aspect of the growth of regulatory development and therefore also to offer a narrow understanding of the growth of regulation. It asserts that the commonalities in the expansion of autonomous regulatory agencies and corporate regulatory departments suggest that the growth in the regulatory professionalization of the state and of business corporations reflects the changing nature of capitalist economy and society and the rise of a new global order of “regulatory capitalism”.

In the context of increasing private provision of social security and welfare, alongside what is argued to be the ‘financialisation’ of daily lives, individuals in many countries face an array of potentially difficult financial choices and decisions. Limitations in levels of knowledge and expertise may lead them to consider seeking financial advice. Yet, in the wake of the great financial crisis, trust in the financial services industry is low.

At the same time, in a number of countries the financial advice sector is facing its own challenges. These include regulatory issues concerning the definition, suitability and delivery of advice; the affordability of advice; and the challenges and opportunities facing the advice sector as a result of the increasing use of technology in the financial services sector.

This chapter examines the implications of these developments for the regulation and governance of financial advice in the context of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II. In particular, it considers the example of the UK and issues this raises for the implementation of recent European regulatory reforms.

This chapter aims the research whether the application of European Directive, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), had any significant effects on the European Capital Markets and the progress of the European Integration. This new regulation specifies the tasks and responsibilities of the supervisory authorities of the Member State of origin and the host Member State, in order to enhance the certainty of effectiveness of cross-border transactions supervision and to reduce the risk of imposing unnecessary legal reforms from the host Member State on investment firms which perform cross-border transactions. It has been concluded, among others, that the aligning of the national regulatory approaches to a common European regulatory system is quite necessary. It is finally concluded that MiFID will contribute to reduce problems at country level as the previous experience of the Investment Services Directive, where the European investments and economies of Member States were based mainly on the level of ‘country’ and not of the ‘sector’. An effective capital entrepreneurship market is a strategically important element in the development of new and innovative businesses, encouraging entrepreneurship, increasing the productivity and maintaining high economic growth rates in Europe. Currently, European venture capital market is much less effective than that of the US market, for example. Therefore, in this area, should be specified the priorities that will lead to new initiatives.

This paper aims to consider recent arguments that post-crisis regulatory reform has misunderstood the nature of banks’ activities. These arguments suggest that a bank’s role is not that of intermediation between savers and borrowers but the systemically riskier one of private money creation.

The paper assesses whether banks’ activities are best understood as private money creation rather than intermediation. It considers the argument that regulatory reform has not gone far enough to prevent a recurrence of future credit spirals ending in financial crises.

This paper analyses banks’ activities and finds that it is incorrect to consider that they engage in relatively unfettered money creation. While fractional reserve banking does create flows of money through the economy, these flows are tethered to banks’ funding requirements. Multiple use of that money, rather than representing an ill-understood risk, simply reflects the nature of maturity transformation. This has not been missed in designing the post-crisis regulatory framework. The revised framework contains many features that are not fully recognised by proponents of the money creation critique and goes significantly further than they allow. Once completed, it will address many of the concerns they raise. They are right to call for further consideration of whether the countercyclical features of the new framework are sufficiently developed.

The paper provides an early detailed response to recent criticism of the post-crisis regulatory reform programme coming from a money creation perspective of banks’ role in the economy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the probable structure of bilateral derivatives contracts following international regulatory reforms.

The theoretical context of the paper is private and meta‐regulation, which the author applies to a case study and current industry analysis.

While regulations are still being written, it is likely that elements of oversight for the bilateral derivatives market will involve enforced self‐regulation. When combined with more specific outcome‐oriented regulatory requirements, the industry is well‐suited to this type of coordinated regulatory regime.

In light of the uncertainty of derivatives regulation and the future size of the bilateral, over‐the‐counter (OTC) derivatives market, practitioners should consider a likely broader range of regulation structures.

The paper fills a gap in the literature about non‐traditional governance structures for the derivatives markets following the financial crisis. Rather than considering regulation on a light/heavy axis, the paper examines whether this segment of the market can sustain a process‐oriented regulatory arrangement.

In order to understand this new economic environment we need first to look at the context and some of the facts. Firstly society has lost a lot of faith with two important institutions, politics and business. There is a lack of trust in both. The UK political scene has been hit by several scandals involving poor ethical behaviour such as false and fraudulent expenses claims by members of the UK parliament. This has created distrust in politicians according to many surveys and polls such as for the BBC which found 80% of voters did not trust politicians to tell the truth (BBC News 24, 18 March 2010). This distrust arguably created political ambiguity and the country and contributed to the first ‘hung parliament’ in the United Kingdom for many years with no overall majority for one party in the 2010 general election. This subsequently resulted in the first coalition government since 1945 between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives (UK General Election, 6 May 2010). In the United States, Barak Obama in an attempt to differentiate himself from the cosy business-Bush presidential era developed a presidential campaign message about ‘restoring trust’. Arguably companies need to do the same as we enter the second decade of the second millennium. According to the 11th annual Edelman Trust Barometer (2010) we have seen trust figures plummet with two-thirds of the study's public trusting companies less than a year ago. Furthermore in the context of organisations' responsibility, just 38% trust business to do what is right, which is down 20% from just the previous year. Perhaps most disturbing of all for corporations only 17% trust the information coming from a company's CEO (chief executive officer). For companies that is a terrifying statistic. In previous eras rolling out the organisational head was a sure fire way of getting media coverage as well as influencing key stakeholders such as institutional investors and also in building and developing credibility. This was achieved because organisational stakeholders when listening to corporate messages heard it ‘from the horse's mouth’, the CEO. Now these individuals are tarnished with the labels of greed, excessive pay and the abuse of managerial power.

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature that measures the concept of firms' information environment (IE) with focus on the validity of proxies used to measure IE.

The paper reviews the IE literature using theoretically based categories and analyzes the contextual meaning and use of IE proxies. The review is based on a selection of 284 research articles from 51 journals between 2000 and 2018. A total of 37 different proxy measures of IE are found and analyzed with respect to causality based on categories and the use of IE variables as dependent, independent and control variables.

The study indicates that the IE measures are heterogeneous and there is a lack of consensus regarding their use. The different conditions used to study IE explain part, but far from all, of this heterogeneity. Furthermore, we find that the use of IE measures is only briefly discussed or motivated among the studies in the sample. These findings suggest a necessary discussion about causality in the use of IE as dependent, independent or control variables.

This study contains new and significant information on IE and IE proxy measures. It provides an extensive literature review and provides a novel typology to analyze IE.

Many European-level networks and regulatory constellations in different sectors (e.g., energy, telecommunications) without clear anchorage into the European Union (EU) institutional landscape have been subject to increasing efforts by the EU institutions to tie them closer to the EU. They are serving increasingly as platforms for preparing EU policy or for implementing EU decisions, which may result in closer institutional bonds with the EU. This chapter aims at examining the differences and similarities between the process towards more EU-integration in two different domains (i.e., telecommunications and patents) and regulatory constellations (i.e., supranational and intergovernmental).

The chapter analyzes the evolution in the European telecommunication sector and the European Patent System and juxtaposes this analysis with the literature on institutionalization, Europeanization of regulatory network-organizations, and multilevel governance (MLG). It focuses on the role of the European Commission and the interaction with the national regulatory agencies (NRAs) and networks within the institutional framework.

Irrespective of the particular regime (intergovernmental/supranational) in a certain domain or sector, a common trend of closer coordination and integration prompted by the Commission is taking place, which triggers a certain resistance by the national bodies regulating that domain. As long as a specific competence is considered instrumental in the creation of the single market, the Commission has strong incentives to strengthen its influence in this field, even if those competences have been regulated through an independent intergovernmental regime.

The dynamic described in this chapter allows us to reflect upon the MLG conception as developed by Marks and Hooghe (2004), which distinguish between two types of MLG. Type I MLG refers to different levels of governments, more specifically to the spread of power along different governmental levels and the interactions between them. Type II MLG refers to jurisdictions that are both task-specific and based on membership that can intersect with each other. They respond to particular problems in specific policy fields (Marks & Hooghe, 2004). Our analysis shows that the increase in coordination and integration are the outcome of both MLG Type II processes (coordination between two issue-specific bodies) and of MLG Type I processes (tensions between two governmental levels). Furthermore, the negotiation dynamics regarding this increased coordination and integration reveal that the tensions typical of MLG Type I took place as a consequence of the increased coordination between Type II bodies. Put differently, multi-level coordination and integration mechanisms in the EU can be seen as both Type I and Type II processes. They combine features of both categories and reveal that their Type I and Type II features are interdependent.

The analysis in this chapter shows a need for further strengthening the MLG Type I and II conceptual framework by balancing the analytical distinction between the two types with developments about how Type I and Type II are often entangled and intertwined with each other rather than separated realities.

The chapter describes and compares the dynamics in the European telecommunications sector and the European patent system with interesting observations for NRAs and the European Commission with respect to coordination and integration.

The original nature of the current chapter relates to the two selected areas and the addition to the literature on MLG.

First, with respect to the areas investigated the dynamics of the European telecommunications sector have been analyzed also by other authors, but the European patent system is an area which is relatively unexplored in terms of governance research. The combination of the two sectors with a detailed analysis of similarities and differences is highly original and generates interesting lessons with respect to coordination and integration in supranational and intergovernmental regimes.

Second, Marks and Hooghe (2004) distinguish between the two types of MLG as if they are two different constructs that are not related to each other. Our cases and argument cover both types of MLG and show the interconnection between the dynamics taking place in the two types of MLG.