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A hedge-fund strategist had two decisions to make. First, what was the path of core euro zone long-term interest rates likely to be over the next year? Was the dramatic decline in German long rates over the past few years an aberration that would soon be reversed, or was it part of the “new normal” that would persist for some time? Second, how would periphery long rates evolve relative to core rates? That is—the spread between long rates in the likes of Greece, Spain, and Ireland and those in Germany—how would they evolve over the next year? Was the dramatic divergence in euro zone long rates likely to persist, or would the coming year see a continuation of the modest reconvergence that has occurred since mid–2012? He knew many factors influenced long-term interest rates; he would have to use his entire toolkit to address this issue. The evidence was in no way clear-cut. Some factors pointed toward lower German rates, some toward higher, some toward a widening of euro zone spreads (even a dissolution of the euro zone as we know it?), and some toward reconvergence.

In January 2011, during the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Jason Sterling, a hedge fund manager, was conducting online research to see if he could trade on any newsworthy information emerging from the summit. Sterling's fund traded primarily in sovereign debt, and he needed to figure out if European leaders would be able to come up with a viable solution to the crisis or whether the debt crisis would lead to the default of several European nations. He knew that if a solution was not found in the coming weeks, the sovereign debt markets could be thrown into turmoil.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate credit rationing across firms in euro zone countries, as it relates to its own sovereign credit ratings.

The authors utilize firm-level data from the Survey on Access to Finance of Enterprises for the period 2009-2013 conducted by the European Central Bank.

A negative association between the rating of sovereign creditworthiness and credit rationing is identified, while credit rationing varies substantially even among countries with the highest quality of sovereign bonds. Credit rationing is lower in sovereigns with high-quality ratings and higher in sovereigns near default. These results remain intact when fundamental firm characteristics (e.g. firm’s age and size, sector of economic activity, financial situation, etc.) are taken into consideration. This indicates that the interconnection of sovereign debt risk with domestic credit market outcomes is robust.

The present study contributes to the relevant literature by performing a detailed analysis of credit rationing for euro zone SMEs and by exploring the link between sovereign credit rating and credit rationing during the sovereign debt crisis period.

Recently the world economy was confronted to the worst financial crisis since the great depression. This unprecedented crisis started in mid-2007 had a huge impact on the European government bond market. But what are the main drivers of this “perfect storm” that since 2009 affects EU government bond market as well? To answer this question, we propose an empirical study of the determinants of the sovereign bond spreads of EU countries with respect to Germany during the period 2003–2010. Technically, we address two main questions. First, we ask what share of the change in sovereign bond spreads is explained by changes in the fundamentals, liquidity, and market risks. Second, we distinguish between EU member states within and outside the Euro area and question whether long-term determinants of spreads affect EU members uniformly. To these ends, we employ panel data techniques in a regression model where spreads to Germany (with virtually no default risk) are explained by set of traditional variables and a number of policy variables. Results reveal that large fiscal deficits and public debt as well as political risks and to a lesser extent the liquidity are likely to put substantial upward pressures on sovereign bond yields in many advanced European economies.

A major lesson of the European Monetary Union (EMU) crisis is that serious disequilibria result from regional monetary arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks. The purpose of this paper is to assess these disequilibria within the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and Financial Community of Africa (CFA) zones.

In the assessments, monetary policy targets inflation and financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size while real sector policy targets economic performance in terms of GDP growth. The author also provides the speed of convergence and time required to achieve a 100 percent convergence.

But for financial intermediary size within the CFA zone, findings, for the most part, support only unconditional convergence. There is no form of convergence within the CEMAC zone.

The broad insignificance of conditional convergence results has substantial policy implications. Monetary and real policies, which are often homogenous for member states, are thwarted by heterogeneous structural and institutional characteristics, which give rise to different levels and patterns of financial intermediary development. Therefore, member states should work towards harmonizing cross‐country differences in structural and institutional characteristics that hamper the effectiveness of monetary policies.

The paper provides warning signs to the CFA zone in the heat of the Euro zone crises.

After experiencing long, multiyear surges and slides in past decades, by summer 2013, the dollar had been range-bound against the euro. In this case, by assessing potential capital flows, students consider whether global currency market trends would propel the dollar higher, or if the past few years were just a pause in a much longer dollar depreciation episode. Suitable for both core and elective MBA courses in global financial markets and international finance, this case explores factors pointing to further euro appreciation and to others favoring the dollar. Sorting through mounds of evidence is necessary before forecasting the exchange rate's likely path. Filtering that evidence requires thinking about FX markets, prospective monetary policies, and past and prospective international capital flows.

In the domestic credit market creditor and debtor rights are clearly defined. In contrast, sovereign debt repayment is largely contingent on the debtor government’s willingness to repay as enforcement of contracts at the international level is limited. In this chapter we explore different sources of sovereign debt crises as opportunistic and myopic behavior by debtor nations, over-consumption of imported goods, credit temptation by lenders eager to allocate savings surpluses, and unexpected consequences of initially seen appropriate policies. We explore how these factors have played out in the Euro-debt crisis and outline a framework for creditor responsibility to complement debtor self-restraint.

India's balance of payments (BoP) has gone though several merits and oddities over its long journey since her liberalization era. On its way forward it has faced three of the world's worst challenges from the global turmoil. Of them, the impact of first crisis on India was minimal. But the other two crises had a tremendous impact on its external sector. In effect, the current and capital account of India's BoP have undergone significant structural changes during these two and a half a decades (1990–1991 to 2014–2015). It is in this context this chapter evaluates the evolution of two and a half decades of India's BoP in the context of global changes and exchange rate fluctuations and instability.

For close to two decades, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) has been preparing to launch a second monetary union within the ECOWAS region. This study aims to determine the impact such a unionised monetary regime will have on financial stability as represented by the nonperforming loan ratios of Ghana in a counterfactual framework.

This study models nonperforming loan ratios as dependent on the monetary policy rate and the business cycle. The study then used historical data to estimate the parameters of the nonperforming loan ratio response function using an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach. The estimated parameters are further used to estimate the impact of several counterfactual unionised monetary policy rates on the nonperforming loan ratios and its volatility of Ghana. As robustness check, the Least Absolute Shrinkage Selection Operator (LASSO) regression is also used to estimate the nonperforming loan ratios response function and to predict nonperforming loans under the counterfactual unionised monetary policy rates.

The results of the counterfactual study reveals that the apparent cost of monetary unification is much less than supposed with a monetary union likely to dampen volatility in non-performing loans in Ghana. As such, the WAMZ members should increase the pace towards monetary unification.

The paper contributes to the existing literature by explicitly modelling nonperforming loan ratios as dependent on monetary policy and the business cycle. The study also settles the debate on the financial stability cost of a monetary union due to the nonalignment of business cycles and economic structures.