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Although the trigger for the European economic and financial crisis was the subprime and subsequently banking crisis in the USA, the true roots of theEuropean malaise are to be found in the structural weaknesses of the European growth and Euro area development model based on debt financing of public and private expenditure and investment. These drivers were amplified by the lack of effective economic policy mechanisms from both the monetary and fiscal sides of macro-economic management. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 did not cause the underlying imbalances that are currently acting to tear apart the Euro area monetary and fiscal systems. Instead, it crystallised markets and public attention on the underlying core cause of the overall Euro crisis – the insolvency of the public financing system of the European Union (EU) member states.

This chapter investigates the impact of the euro crisis on Asia’s short-term economic outlook. This chapter tries to answer this question by examining both the trade and financial channels of crisis transmission. More specifically, it looks at the effect of euro crisis on Asian exports and growth, contagion from EU financial markets to Asian financial markets, and influence of EU bank lending on credit growth in Asia. The chapter also touches upon Asia’s policy space to assess how well the region is positioned to weather another major external shock. This chapter finds that the impact of euro crisis on developing Asia points to a sizable but manageable short-term impact. Furthermore, our analysis points to a significant effect on the region’s financial systems, especially its banking sector. This chapter informs policymakers of the impact of the euro crisis and advice to continue to keep a close eye on eurozone developments and their ramifications for their economies.

This paper investigates the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policies. It identifies an anti-growth bias in the ECB’s monetary policy approach: the ECB is quick to hike, but slow to ease. Similarly, while other players and institutional deficiencies share responsibility for the euro’s failure, the bank has generally done “too little, too late” with regard to managing the euro crisis, preventing protracted stagnation, and containing deflation threats. The bank remains attached to the euro area’s official competitive wage repression strategy which is in conflict with the ECB’s price stability mandate and undermines the bank’s more recent unconventional monetary policy initiatives designed to restore price stability. The ECB needs a “Euro Treasury” partner to overcome the euro regime’s most serious flaw: the divorce between central bank and treasury institutions.

This chapter proposes a comparative analysis of the monetary policies undertaken by the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank after the 2008 subprime crisis. We point out the twin nature of the financial crises in Europe in comparison with the US crises: in addition to the role of bank funding, the euro area countries have also experienced a structural problem of balance of payment disequilibria. This explains why in the early stages of the subprime crisis, the Fed has succeeded in tackling the illiquidity problems facing the banking sector, while the ECB did not. The Fed could then focus on tackling the recession in the real sector by adopting quantitative easing policies to exert downward pressure on the long-term interest-rate. In the euro area quantitative easing policies came later, in 2013. Even the forward guidance policies have been different between the two central banks. Unlike the ECB, the Fed has gone through diverse forward guidance policies: qualitative, calendar-based, and state-contingent. The chapter proposes a new survey of the monetary policies after the subprime crisis by comparing two strategies in different contexts: the United States and the euro area.

In the euro’s initial years, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain observed capital flow bonanzas and credit-booms, two cycles known to precede banking crises. Domestic banks fuelled those cycles via funding obtained from foreign financial institutions. Yet, these countries’ banking and financial crises have unfolded in different modes. In Ireland and Spain, credit-booms propelled real-estate bubbles, which dragged banks into crises, with governments’ accounts later being affected when rescuing banks (Spanish regional banks, and all Irish major banks). In Greece and Italy, extra monetary means perpetuated government imbalances (e.g. debt levels above 100% of GDP, large yearly deficits). More severely in Greece, banks were brought into crises by sovereign crises. In Portugal, a mixture of private and public sector–led crises have occurred. Our comparative study finds that these crises: (1) are connected to shocks and imbalances caused by dangerous banking sector cycles during the monetary integration process; (2) were not mere expansions of the US subprime crisis; (3) were not only caused by country-specific features and institutions; and (4) followed distinct paths, therefore, a uniform model encompassing all post-euro crises cannot exist.

In the domestic credit market creditor and debtor rights are clearly defined. In contrast, sovereign debt repayment is largely contingent on the debtor government’s willingness to repay as enforcement of contracts at the international level is limited. In this chapter we explore different sources of sovereign debt crises as opportunistic and myopic behavior by debtor nations, over-consumption of imported goods, credit temptation by lenders eager to allocate savings surpluses, and unexpected consequences of initially seen appropriate policies. We explore how these factors have played out in the Euro-debt crisis and outline a framework for creditor responsibility to complement debtor self-restraint.

The purpose of this paper by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) is to provide an account of the financial crisis in Europe during the period 2010-2013 and an analysis of how the relevant authorities reacted to the crisis.

These actions included measures taken by central banks, governments or fiscal authorities, and by regulatory or supervisory bodies. In a previous study covering the regulatory developments during the financial crisis up until 2009, issues such as the implementation of Basel III rules in Europe and the (mostly ad hoc and unilateral) resolution mechanisms set in most European countries to fight the crisis were covered. This study focuses on developments since 2010 with a focus on the concerns and actions that emerged with the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. In particular, the transition from the European Financial Stability Facility to the European Stability Mechanism is assessed. The focus after 2012 has progressively turned to the challenges of the European banking union.

These issues are jointly covered, along with some updates on the views of the ESFRC on recent advances in other areas, such as solvency regulation. All in all, the authors find that the weaknesses of the global financial system remain to be addressed, and they believe that the banking union is one of the main tools and opportunities for an improved and efficient crisis management in Europe.

The paper aims at contributing to the study of financial regulation after the banking crisis. The experience of the euro zone in this context is assessed in this article from a wide range of perspectives.

In January 2011, during the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Jason Sterling, a hedge fund manager, was conducting online research to see if he could trade on any newsworthy information emerging from the summit. Sterling's fund traded primarily in sovereign debt, and he needed to figure out if European leaders would be able to come up with a viable solution to the crisis or whether the debt crisis would lead to the default of several European nations. He knew that if a solution was not found in the coming weeks, the sovereign debt markets could be thrown into turmoil.

This chapter analyzes the rules and institutions that have characterized the European Monetary Union (EMU) during its prolonged crisis, stressing the limits of the strategy pursued by the European authorities. It also examines the issues of current account imbalances, economic growth and the problem of debt, and their interconnections. The main purpose of this chapter is to indicate feasible economic solutions and political arrangements in order to complete the institutional system of the EMU. This requires appropriate reforms of its institutional architecture. But such reforms demand changes in the treaties in order to make the Eurosystem more consistent and endowed of democratic legitimacy, so to have appropriate tools, resources and policies that can contribute to the stability, cohesion and development of the Eurozone.