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Aims to analyse the labour market outcome when there are two unions in the industry, representing heterogeneous workers – imperfect substitutes in production.

Competition between union policies are viewed in terms of both employment and wage strategies. Results for substitutes and complements are inspected. Attention is given to the strategic behaviour of the unions, towards one another and/or the employer side. Cooperation is modelled using the Nash‐maximand approach.

Gathers some notes and enlargements to the standard collective bargaining problem in which unions maximise utility. Extends the framework to model union competition behaviour for jobs and/or employment that reproduces the standard market product analysis of imperfect competition. Focuses on heterogeneous labour.

The analysis concentrates on the case of union duopoly, but can easily be enlarged to the n‐union setting – which is left for further investigation.

A simple analytical example with Stone‐Geary union utility functions and a linear labour demand system is forwarded.

The purpose of this paper is to suggest possible extensions of the baseline Rubinstein sequential bargaining structure – applied to the negotiation of stationary infinitely termed contracts – that incorporate a direct reference to the “ideal” utilities of the players. This is a feature of the Kalai‐Smorodinsky cooperative solution – even if not of the generalized Nash maximand; it is usually not encountered in non‐cooperative equilibria.

First, it is argued that different bargaining protocols than conventionally staged are able to incorporate temporary all‐or (and)‐nothing splits of the pie. Scenarios are advanced where such episodes are interpreted either as – out of bargaining – war or unilateral appropriation events, or free experience contracts. Second, some modifications to the Rubinstein infinite horizon paradigm are experimented with, allowing for mixed strategies under alternate offers, and matching or synchronous decisions in a simultaneous (yet, discrete) bargaining environment. Solutions are derived where the reference to the winner‐takes‐it‐all outcome arises as a parallel – out‐of‐the‐protocol – outside option to the status quo point. In some cases, the limiting maximand for instantaneous bargaining was derived.

Rubinstein's optimal periodic division in a closed contract remained robust to most of the settings.

Presents possible extensions of the baseline Rubinstein sequential bargaining structure.

To analyse the implications of signs of reform modification, stoppage or reversal, such as price controls, that have emerged in many developing economies, it is necessary to understand their efficiency consequences. This paper aims to study the effect of price interventions in imperfectly competitive product markets, to investigate whether reforms reversals are necessarily harmful.

The model assumes firm set prices and face sunk costs of entry.

The paper shows that a minimum price can induce a Pareto improvement, by preventing price wars and encouraging entry. The result is supported by empirical evidence from some developed economies, holds when sunk cost vanishes, and is robust to some extensions. A fixed price may be optimal in the environment investigated.

The results may be of interest to theorists and policy-makers interested in imperfectly competitive markets.

This paper aims to investigate the problem of searching for the equilibrium in the housing market, the mortgage lending market and the insurance market in the process of selling the residential property. Three classes of markets are established in three modes, which reflect the interdependence of the firms’ interests in these markets through the parameters of their integration. The paper aims to determine the prices in these markets on the basis of the compromises among the conflicting interests of the related firms, and, in addition, to assess the rationality of integration for firms, which are participants in the process of selling the residential property.

On the basis of the revenue sharing contracts and the supply chain coordination methods, the optimization models of the housing realtor, the mortgage bank and the insurance company are developed. The models consider the interdependence of the firms’ interests, the monopolistic competition in these markets and the conditions of the firms’ individual rationality in the interaction process.

The results of the study are as follows. First, as a consequence of a decrease in the demand curves in monopolistic competition, the housing market, the mortgage market and the insurance market are interconnected, therefore, the optimization models of the firms in these markets are interdependent through the revenue sharing parameters. Second, in these markets the individual firms’ sales optimums are not identical, therefore, the interests of the firms are contradictory. Third, in the realtor-bank-insurer system, the equilibrium satisfies the condition of zero revenue sharing payments between the agents; additionally, the equilibrium prices in these markets are mutually independent. Fourth, in the disequilibrium, the prices in these markets are interrelated, i.e. the price in one market increases with the price in another market, if the payment is directed from the former to the latter, and vice versa.

The results of the study are applicable in practice, if the markets demonstrate the decreasing demand curves and if the needs of buyers in related markets are interconnected.

The interaction between the realtor and the mortgage bank enables the realtor to raise its sales and the bank to increase in the number of loans, i.e. it leads to growth of their profits. The interaction between the insurer and the mortgage bank enables the insurer to increase in the number of policies and the bank to reduce the risk of lending, i.e. it leads to an increase in their profits. The identification of the individual firms’ sales optimums enables agents to determine the terms of the contracts of these interactions, which are compromises from the positions of each transaction participants. In addition, the firms’ optimums indicate the predictions of the equilibrium market prices.

In comparison with the studies in the contract theory framework, first, the mathematical description of the complicated (three-agent) system of interactions is proposed; second, the optimal choice non-linear models are developed, which take into account the non-linear demand functions in the monopolistic competition markets; third, the equilibrium of the agents with contradictory interests is investigated. In the later item, the authors establish that the revenue sharing contracts in the complimentary demands functions systems do not require the payments between the participants. Fourth, the authors prove that, in the equilibrium of these markets, the housing prices, the mortgage interest rates and the insurance rates are mutually independent and equal to the prices in the isolated markets.

A standard model of equilibrium unemployment consists of static equations for real-wage ambitions (wage curve) and real-wage scope (price curve), which jointly determine the NAIRU. The heuristics of the model states that unless the rate of unemployment approaches the NAIRU from any given initial value, inflation will be increasing or decreasing over time. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The authors formalize this influential heuristic argument with the aid of a dynamic model of the wage-price spiral where the static theory’s equations are re-interpreted as attractor relationships.

The authors show that NAIRU unemployment dynamics are sufficient but not necessary for inflation stabilization, and that the dynamic wage-price spiral model generally has a dynamically stable solution for any predetermined rate of unemployment. The authors also discuss a restricted version of the model that conforms to the accelerationist view that inflation increases/falls if unemployment is not at its “natural rate”.

To investigate the relevance of heuristical dynamics of influential macro models, explicit modelling of such dynamics is a necessary step.

An important argument against social orders that represent an attempt to target unemployment at relatively low levels, is refuted by the analysis.

A high degree of employment is a main premise for a social order with equal income distribution and a drive for productivity growth.

It is important that economics give a balanced view of the possibility of attaining inflation stability at low or moderate levels of unemployment. This offering is contributions to establish such a balance.

This paper investigates how the channel leadership strategies develop a post-coronavirus disease (COVID-19) resilient agri-supply chain, which reduces supplier and retailer's price loss and enhances the logistics service quality level considering logistics outsourcing of agri-product especially for the rapidly changing market condition.

Based on the classical leadership theory, two channel leadership strategies, i.e. LPL and SL, are considered. The proposed framework first derives the equilibrium price and service quality level decision among the supplier, the logistics provider and the retailer. Then it compares both leadership strategies in terms of the equilibrium prices and service quality theoretically. This article also presents a case study of Arabian dates pricing and supply chain to test the theoretically derived propositions.

Selection of suitable leadership strategy is a critical factor for profit maximization of the supply chain drivers and proper optimization of equilibrium price and service quality. Here, the product's quality and the market's socio-economic condition play an important role in selecting a suitable leadership strategy. A random transformation of the physical market to an e-commerce portal creates a wide variation of the market's socio-economic parameters, affecting the equilibrium pricing and the logistics provider's service quality.

This study proposes a post-COVID-19 resilient agri-supply chain framework considering price and quality-dependent stochastic market demand, incorporating a wide range of socio-economic factors in the model to counteract the effect of rapid behavior change of agri-market due to COVID-19 norms. This research examines the effect of different channel leadership strategies to facilitate suitable decisions on prices and service quality and retrieve the profit of the supplier, retailer and logistics provider. The future models can incorporate competitiveness in logistics outsourcing, fourth-party logistics (4PL) and contract farming in the agri-supply chain. Each of the extensions can open avenues in different directions.

As the post-COVID-19 market and the customer behavior is randomly changing, and the traditional market is rapidly converting into supermarkets and e-commerce portals, this paper examines the model with a wide variety of e-commerce portals with multi-variation of product. It is conclusive that the product's quality and the market's socio-economic behavior significantly impact the equilibrium decision. The drivers of the supply chain must take them into account before choosing a particular channel leadership strategy.

This study considers a multi-product and multi-market (e-commerce) model by integrating a wide variety of products and the market's socio-economic parameters. The model is tested in a price and quality-dependent stochastic market condition, contributing to the literature by reconciling two different channel leadership strategies into the global logistics of fresh agri-product.

The reasons for writing the paper are flexibility of information under multi‐agent approach.

The main method used for the research is preferences in environment and matching of information.

The benefits of hierarchy flow from the fact that it attenuates opportunism and attenuates the problem stemming from bounded rationality. The preference of an agent over sets of possible future choices can be represented using subjective states. This is sufficient to give a representation in which the agent has a coherent subjective state space, and shows that the size of the subjective state space depends on the individual circumstances.

The original value of the paper is a measure of the agent's uncertainty about future contingents. Changes in the surplus yield valuable information about the comparative static of matching patterns across environments in equilibrium.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the labor market outcome when there are two unions in the industry, representing heterogeneous workers – substitutes or complements in production – and using wage strategies, in the presence of minimum wage regulation.

Three strategic environments are considered: symmetric Bertrand‐Nash duopoly, Stackelberg duopoly, and efficient cooperation between the two unions.

Usually, minimum wage legislation (floor) would decrease employment; it is shown that in Stackelberg environment, minimum wage legislation may induce an increase in total employment. Wage‐pushing strategies by a leader may also arise; and if workers are substitutes, entry deterrence strategies by the leader may be observed.

This paper analyses the impact of minimum wages in duopoly scenarios in an extensive way.

The purpose of this paper is to present a solution strategy for the analysis of cable networks which includes an extension to the force density method (FDM) in an attempt to support cable elements when they become slack. The ability to handle slack cable elements in the analysis is particularly important especially in cases where the original cable lengths are predefined, i.e. the cable structure has already been constructed, and there is a need for further analysis to account for additional loading such as wind. The solution strategy is implemented in a software application.

The development of the software required the implementation of the FDM for the analysis of cable networks and its extension to handle constraints. The implemented constraints included the ability to preserve the length in the stressed or the unstressed state of predefined cable elements. In addition, cable statics are incorporated with the development of the cable equation and its modification to be able to be handled by the FDM .

The implementation of the solution strategy is presented through examples using the software which has been developed for these purposes.

The results suggest that for cable networks spanning large distances or cable elements with considerable self-weight the neglect of the cable slackening effects is not always conservative.