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Conventional wisdom is that decentralized bargaining, performance pay and individualized remuneration schemes enable managers to utilize human resources more effectively. Examines employers’ recent experiences of such arrangements by drawing on data on company pay policies. Argues that moves to fragment bargaining and individualize reward systems have created new difficulties and problems in the management of pay, and that such initiatives can have costly consequences for employers.

The chapter presents a historical and economic analysis of Nordic wage formation, with a special focus on how collective agreements really work. A stereotypical interpretation of the evolution of Nordic wage bargaining systems is that a centralised setting of wages has gradually been substituted with more decentralised pay bargaining. This overlooks the fact that central organisations could never really control wage levels, even in the golden age of centralised bargaining. Instead, central pay bargains defined minimum wage changes that ensured that local conflicts would be ruled out. Moreover, the central stipulations could often be overruled or adjusted at the local level. Following insights of Teulings and Hartog, we argue that the main function of Nordic collective agreements has always been to rule out local conflicts that would otherwise be initiated to seek local rents. Thus, collective agreements combine macroeconomic flexibility with adequate investment incentives at the local level. In this crucial sense, Nordic collective agreements are a completely stable institution. The most important transformation that has taken place is that formal peak bargaining on mean pay increases has been substituted with pattern bargaining where the manufacturing industry acts as a wage leader. Economic theory suggests that this almost amounts to centralised pay setting.

The purpose of this paper is to explore what has happened to the notion and reality of equal pay over the past 50 years, a period in which women have become the majority of trade union members in the UK. It does so in the context of record employment levels based upon women’s increased labour market participation albeit reflecting their continued over-representation in part-time employment, locating the narrowed but persistent overall gender pay gap in the broader picture of pay inequality in the UK.

The paper considers voluntary and legal responses to inequality and the move away from voluntary solutions in the changed environment for unions. Following others it discusses the potential for collective bargaining to be harnessed to equality in work, a potential only partially realised by unions in a period in which their capacity to sustain collective bargaining was weakened. It looks at the introduction of a statutory route to collective bargaining in 2000, the National Minimum Wage from 1999 and at the Equality Act 2010 as legislative solutions to inequality and in terms of radical and liberal models of equality.

The paper suggests that fuller employment based upon women’s increased labour market activity have not delivered an upward pressure on wages and has underpinned rather than closed pay gaps and social divisions. Legal measures have been limited in the extent to which they have secured equal pay and wider social equality, whilst state support for collective solutions to equality has waned. Its replacement by a statutory minimum wage initially closed pay gaps, but appears to have run out of steam as employers accommodate minimum hourly rates through the reorganisation of working time.

The paper suggests that statutory minima or even voluntary campaigns to lift hourly wage rates may cut across and even supersede wider existing collective bargaining agreements and as such they can reinforce the attack on collective bargaining structures, supporting arguments that this can reduce representation over pay, but also over a range of other issues at work (Ewing and Hendy, 2013), including equality.

There are then limitations on a liberal model which is confined to promoting equality at an organisational level in a public sector subject to wider market forces. The fragmentation of bargaining and representation that has resulted will continue if the proposed dismantling of public services goes ahead and its impact upon equality is already suggested in the widening of the gender pay gap in the public sector in 2015.

I. INTRODUCTION In this monograph we point out and analyse various dimensions of bargaining structure, which we define broadly as the institutional configuration within which bargaining takes place, and attempt to provide some guidelines for management action. We look at the development, theory, and present framework of bargaining structure in Britain and then examine it in terms of choices: multi‐employer versus single employer, company versus plant level bargaining, and the various public policy issues involved.

Existing research concerning the impact of unions on relative wages provides evidence for the existence of significant union/non‐union wage differentials. However, union practices are deemed to have a more pervasive effect on the overall distribution of wages, reducing wage differentials across and within establishments. Attempts to explore union effects on wage dispersion in the context of the Italian labour market. Several indicators of wage dispersion are computed, using both industry and establishment level data, in the attempt to ascertain the different routes through which union presence affects the structure of wages. The empirical evidence shows that Italian trade unions have pursued “egalitarian” objectives and have succeeded in shaping pay policies which, through central and local negotiations, raise low wages and reduce wage differentials both among skill categories and across establishments.

This paper examines the extent of bargaining concessions in recession through investigating the effects of union bargaining on pay, job security and workforce composition.

Drawing on an original survey (n = 400) of workplace level trade union bargaining units in England, the authors employed latent class analysis to establish three groups of bargaining units on the basis of pay outcomes achieved. Linear regression analysis with moderation effects investigated whether pay rises at or above inflation in conjunction with shifts in bargaining priorities was associated with decreases in perceived job security and changes in the composition of the workforce.

Around a quarter of sampled units, concentrated mostly in decentralised bargaining units in the private sector, achieved pay rises at or above the inflation rate during an economic downturn. Pay rises at or above inflation in workplaces severely affected by recession triggered changes in bargaining priorities requiring some concessions, notably in terms of employees' job security. That said, across the sample, achieving pay rises was associated with improved perception of job security and lesser use of contingent labour.

The findings uncover a subset of bargaining units able to secure positive outcomes for workers against a hostile economic tide, whilst demonstrating that concession bargaining is not inevitable but rather contingent on the micro-environments in which union bargaining takes place.

EU social policy is perhaps the most controversial aspect of European integration yet, despite all the political clashes on the matter, concepts like “social Europe” or “social dimension” remain ill‐defined and imprecise terms. Intends to outline and clarify in detail the debate about whether or not the European Union should have competence with regard to labour market affairs. A key message is that social policy has been controversial because it has become embroiled in the debate about the future political direction of the EU. In particular, three contrasting political models –symbiotic integration, integrative federalism and neo‐liberalism – have been put forward as organizing principles for the EU and each has a coherent view of what form social policy should take at the European level. It is the clash between these three models that has caused EU social policy to be so contestable and intractable.

Decentralisation of pay bargaining in the UK is well known. Other countries in Europe have not gone so far but a clear trend towards decentralisation is perceptible, although national or industry‐wide bargaining is still widely used. There is an accompanying increase in the devolvement of responsibility for pay issues from personnel specialists to line management. These trends have been accompanied by a steady rise in variable pay across Europe. Proportionate growth varies between the public and private sectors.

Decentralization of pay bargaining in the UK is well known. Other countries in Europe have not gone so far but a clear trend towards decentralization is perceptible, although national or industry‐wide bargaining is still widely used. There is an accompanying increase in the devolvement of responsibility for pay issues from personnel specialists to line management. These trends have been accompanied by a steady rise in variable pay across Europe. Proportionate growth varies between the public and private sectors.

The paper sets out to ask whether the existence of a statutory model of collective bargaining has influenced the scope and depth of bargaining following voluntary trade union recognition.

The paper is largely based on a telephone survey of 101 employer representatives, commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry (2000). The survey was based on a sample of 213 voluntary trade union recognition agreements concluded between 1998 and 2002. The paper also draws on a textual analysis of 213 voluntary recognition agreements and refers to nine in‐depth case studies.

In this paper the research found evidence of dynamic relationships following recognition and in the majority of cases there has been collective bargaining on the core issues of pay, hours and holiday. There was less likely to have been negotiation over the non‐core issues of pensions, equal opportunities and training. There are clear differences between employers' reports of the nature of discussions with the union and what was set out in the written recognition agreements. The fact that a proportion of voluntary agreements have been formally limited to the core issues suggests the influence of the law in shaping both the scope and depth of voluntary recognition (and subsequent practice).

The analysis in this paper is based on employer perceptions of the bargaining process; clearly bargaining also reflects union aspirations. Further case studies based on workplace bargaining would illustrate this dynamic process.

The paper offers the first analysis of bargaining following voluntary recognition and assessment of the impact of the Employment Relations Act 1999.