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This paper aims to explore the implications of Aguinis and colleagues’ study, and in particular their claim that the inconsistency between chief executive officer (CEO) pay and CEO performance is reflective of a fundamental injustice. In doing so, the authors highlight issues regarding the meaning of fairness in the context of CEO pay, the extent to which CEOs can personally affect firm performance and the challenges in ascertaining whether CEOs are overpaid, underpaid or appropriately paid.

The authors use a conceptual approach, integrating research on executive compensation and managerial discretion to lend nuance to Aguinis and colleagues’ arguments and findings.

The main takeaway of the commentary is that CEO pay fairness is a complex and multifaceted matter that can be difficult to broadly characterize. The evidence offered by Aguinis and colleagues regarding power law distributions and the weak overlap between CEO pay and CEO performance is compelling, but questions about income inequality and pay fairness rarely lend themselves to straightforward answers. Some caution is thus warranted when evaluating Aguinis and colleagues’ conclusion that the US CEO labor market is pervasively unfair.

The authors urge scholars who build on the work of Aguinis and colleagues to pay heed to the challenges in reconciling the twin concepts of CEO pay and CEO performance.

Objetivo – Este comentario explora las implicaciones del estudio de Aguinis y colegas, y en particular su afirmación de que la inconsistencia entre la retribución del CEO y su rendimiento es el reflejo de una injusticia fundamental. Se señalan aspectos relativos al significado de justicia en el contexto de la retribución del CEO, a la influencia del CEO sobre el resultado empresarial, y a los retos de aseverar si la retribución de los CEOs es excesiva, insuficiente o justa.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – Los autores utilizan una aproximación conceptual, integrando investigación en retribución y discrecionalidad de ejecutivos para matizar los argumentos y resultados de Agunis y colegas.

Resultados – La principal conclusión del comentario es que el grado de justicia del pago a CEOs es un tema difícil de caracterizar de forma global. La evidencia ofrecida por Aguinis y colegas en relación a la distribución de ley de poder y la poca superposición entre la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO es fascinante, pero las cuestiones sobre inequidad y justicia de los ingresos y la retribución raramente generan respuestas sencillas. Por tanto es necesaria cierta cautela a la hora de evaluar la conclusión de Aguinis y colegas de que el mercado laboral de CEOs en Estados Unidos es fundamentalmente injusto.

Originalidad/valor – Los autores urgen a los académicos a avanzar sobre el trabajo de Aguinis y colegas y prestar atención al reto de reconciliar los conceptos de retribución del CEO y resultados del CEO.

Objetivo – Este comentário explora as implicações do estudo de Aguinis et al., e em particular a sua afirmação de que a inconsistência entre a remuneração do CEO e seu desempenho é a reflexão de uma injustiça fundamental. Aspectos relacionados com o significado da justiça são apontados no contexto da remuneração do CEO, a influência do CEO sobre o resultado do negócio, e os desafios de afirmar se a remuneração dos CEOs é excessiva, insuficiente ou justa.

Design/metodologia/aproximação – Os autores utilizam uma abordagem conceitual, integrando a pesquisa na remuneração e discrição dos executivos para clarificar os argumentos e os resultados de Agunis et al.

Resultados – A principal conclusão do comentário é que o grau de equidade do pagamento aos CEOs é um assunto difícil de caracterizar de forma global. A evidência oferecida por Aguinis et al. em relação à distribuição da lei de poder e a pequena sobreposição entre a remuneração e o desempenho do CEO é fascinante, mas as questões de desigualdade e justiça de renda e retribuição raramente geram respostas simples. Portanto, é necessária alguma cautela ao avaliar a conclusão de Aguinis et al. que o mercado de trabalho dos CEOs nos Estados Unidos é fundamentalmente injusto.

Originalidade/valor – Os autores instam aos investigadores a avançar sobre o trabalho de Aguinis et al. e prestar atenção ao desafio de conciliar os conceitos de remuneração do CEO e os seus respectivos resultados.

Despite widespread interest in “behavioral strategy,” it is not clear what this term, or its associated academic subfield, is all about. Unless a critical mass of scholars can agree on the meaning of behavioral strategy, and professionally identify with it, this embryonic community may face a marginal existence. We describe three alternative conceptions for the academic subfield of behavioral strategy, along with assessments of the pros and cons of each. The “small tent” version amounts to a direct transposition of the logic of behavioral economics to the field of strategic management, specifically in the style of behavioral decision research. The “midsize tent” view is that behavioral strategy is a commitment to understanding the psychology of strategists. And the “large tent’ view includes consideration of any and all psychological, sociological, and political factors that influence strategic outcomes. We conclude that the midsize tent represents the best path forward, not too narrow and not too broad, allowing rich scope but with coherence. The large tent conception of behavioral strategy, however, is not out of the question and warrants serious consideration.

Financial analysts act as crucial conduits of information between firms and stakeholders. However, comparatively little is known about how these information intermediaries evaluate the believability and importance of corporate disclosures. We argue that a firm’s level of managerial discretion, or latitude of executive action, acts as a cue for financial analysts, which helps them interpret and respond to voluntary management earnings forecasts. Our study provides strong, robust evidence that financial analysts find management forecasts significantly less believable in low-discretion than in high-discretion environments, and therefore tend to be much less responsive to these forecasts. We also show that managerial discretion is especially impactful on analysts’ responses in those circumstances where analysts are typically most uncertain about how to interpret management forecasts.

The purpose of the study is to set a research agenda so that future conceptual and empirical research can improve the understanding of why CEO pay and CEO performance are decoupled.

The paper compiles and adds to many of the explanations provided by this special issue’s nine commentaries regarding why CEO pay and CEO performance are decoupled. These explanations were grouped into two categories: economic (e.g. marginal productivity theory, agency theory and behavioral agency model) and social-institutional-psychological (e.g. CEO individual differences and characteristics and CEO-organization interactions). Moreover, new analyses based on additional data were conducted to examine measurement-related explanations for the observed pay-performance decoupling.

Results based on alternative measures of pay and performance confirmed, once again, the existence of pay-performance decoupling.

This paper will stimulate research pitting theoretical explanations against each other to understand their relative validity in different contexts.

The paper informs ongoing efforts to link CEO pay to performance.

The paper also revisits the decoupling of CEO pay and firm performance from a normative and value-based perspective (i.e. regarding whether pay and performance should be related).

The paper clarifies that the articles in this special issue largely concluded that CEO pay is decoupled from CEO performance.

Objetivo – El objetivo es proponer una ageda de investigación de forma que la futura investigación conceptual y empírica pueda mejorar la comprensión sobre por qué la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO no están conectados.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – El artículo compila y añade a la mayoría de las explicaciones proporcionados por los nueve comentarios publicados en este número especial acerca de porqué la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO están desconectados. Estas explicaciones se agrupan en dos categorías: económicas (e.g. teoría de la productividad marginal, teoría de agencia, modelo de agencia comportamental) y socio-institucional-psicológicas (e.g. diferencias y características individuales del CEO, interacción CEO-organización). Además, se llevan a cabo nuevos análisis sobre datos adicionales para examinar algunas explicaciones relativas a la medición para la falta de conexión entre retribución del CEO y su rendimiento.

Resultados – Los resultados basados en medidas alternativas de retribución y rendimiento confirman, una vez más, la existencia de una desconexión entre ambas magnitudes.

Limitaciones/implicaciones – Este artículo estimulará a investigación contraponiendo diferentes explicaciones teóricas para entender su validez relativa en diferentes contextos.

Implicaciones prácticas – El artículo informa sobre los esfuerzos actuals para relacionar la retribución del CEO y su rendimiento.

Implicaciones sociales – El artículo revisa la desconexión entre la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO desde una perspectiva normativa y de valor (i.e. sobre si la retribución y el rendimiento deben estar conectados).

Originalidad/valor – El artículo clarifica que los artículos en este número especial concluyen que la retribución del CEO está desconectada de su rendimiento.

O objetivo é estabelecer uma agenda de investigação para que futuros estudos conceptuais ou empíricos possam melhorar a compreensão do porquê de a compensação do CEO e o desempenho do CEO estarem dissociados.

Metodologia – O artigo compila e acrescenta às muitas explicações fornecidas pelos oito comentários deste número especial sobre as razões da dissociação da compensação e do desempenho do CEO. Estas explicações agrupam-se em duas categorias: económicas (eg., teoria da produtividade marginal, teoria da agência, modelo da agência comportamental) e Socio-institucional-psicológicas (eg., características e diferenças individuais do CEO, interações CEO-Organização). Além disso, conduziram-se novas análises baseadas em dados para examinar explicações baseadas em medições para a dissociação pagamento-desempenho.

Resultados – Resultados baseados em medidas alternativas de pagamento e desempenho confirmaram, uma vez mais, a existência da dissociação entre pagamento e performance.

Limitações/implicações – Este artigo estimula investigação que contraponha diferentes explicações teóricas, para perceber a sua validade relativa em diferentes contextos.

Implicações práticas – O artigo dá informação sobre esforços em curso para ligar a compensação do CEO ao desempenho.

Implicações sociais – O artigo revisita a dissociação do pagamento e desempenho da empresa Numa perspectiva normative e baseada em valores (ie, sobre se a compensação e a performance devem estar relacionadas).

Originalidade/valor – O paper clarifica que os artigos neste número especial basicamente concluiram que a compensação do CEO está dissociala do desempenho do CEO.

The products of some firms emerge neither from new technology developments nor from attempting to address articulated consumers’ needs, but from a company-internal design-driven approach. To explore this design-driven approach, we propose a construct, design orientation, as a firm’s ability to integrate functionality, aesthetics, and meaning in its new products. We hypothesize relationships between a firm’s design orientation, customer orientation, technological orientation, and willingness to cannibalize on its new product performance.

We use data from surveys of senior marketing executives entrusted with design in 252 US firms, we validate the construct of design orientation and establish its distinctiveness from related constructs of creativity, technological orientation, and customer orientation. Using a structural equation modeling approach, we test the hypotheses and find support for them.

Individually, design orientation, technological orientation, and customer orientation improve new product performance. In addition, customer orientation decreases the positive effect of design orientation while willingness to cannibalize increases the positive effect of design orientation on new product performance.

More than two-thirds of respondents (69%) perceive that their firm can improve its new product performance by increasing its design orientation, an overlooked organizational capability.

Although practitioners have acknowledged the importance of design as a strategic marketing issue, there is little in the literature on how firms can benefit from building capabilities in the design domain, the issue we focus on in this research.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how chief executive officers’ (CEOs) narcissism impacts firm performance and how this, in turn, affects a CEO’s positive rhetorical tone.

The narcissism score is measured by using an analytical composite score for each CEO based on eight factors. The paper uses textual analysis on a sample of 848 CEO letters of US firms over the period 2010–2019. WarpPLS software, version 7.0 was used to conduct structural equation modeling through the partial least squares because a non-linear algorithm exists between CEO narcissism, firm performance and positive tone, and the values of path coefficients moved from non-significant to significant.

The results suggest that performance partially mediates the relationship between CEO narcissism and positive tone. This indicates that not all the positivity expressed by narcissistic CEOs is opportunism; some of it is indeed driven by better performance. The reported findings indicate that firm performance explains one-quarter of a CEO’s positive words, whereas some three-quarters of the positivity is driven by a narcissistic CEO (i.e. opportunism). A comparison of letters signed by highly narcissistic and less narcissistic leaders reveals that among those letters signed by highly narcissistic leaders, firm performance plays a significant mediating role between narcissistic tendencies and positive tone. However, among those with less narcissistic score, there is no evidence that performance mediates the tone and narcissism. Interestingly, both highly narcissistic and less narcissistic CEOs use positive words and optimistic expressions even when their firms perform poorly or negatively.

The results help shareholders be aware that CEOs may opportunistically use their personal characteristics and language to manipulate them. Data limitations about women CEOs were one of the reasons behind the small proportion of women CEOs in this study, making it low in generalizability.

A comprehensive review showed that none of previous studies examined the more ambiguous relationship between a CEO’s narcissist tendency, the firm’s performance, and CEO rhetorical tone. As one set of studies focused on Narcissism → Performance, and the other one on Performance → Tone, this current study completes the picture with Narcissism → Performance → Tone.