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This study investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on performance related turnover. Our results indicate that smaller boards and institutional block holders are positively related to the likelihood of performance related turnover. CEOs that also hold the position of the chairman of the board or belong to a founding family face lower likelihood of turnover. CEO stock ownership is negatively related to turnover and CEOs who own 3 percent or more of their company stock face a significantly lower likelihood of performance related turnover. Moreover, protection from external control market has no effect either on the likelihood of turnover.

The purpose of this paper is to outline and discuss the main elements of the chief executive officer (CEO) that affect financial and non-financial aspects of companies. CEO reputation and corporate reputation and performance are intertwined concepts. It presents a conceptual framework, the “4Ps of the CEO branding mix”, and shows how they individually and collectively influence company reputation and performance.

An extensive inter-disciplinary research was conducted. Four primary elements of the CEO (performance, personality, prestige and persona) were identified that positively or negatively impact companies.

CEO reputation (prestige) can not only positively but also negatively impact companies and celerity CEO’s are no different. There are certain personality traits, such as honesty and humility, which are mostly associated with positive company outcomes, while other personality traits, such as machiavellianism and narcissism, seems to negatively impact companies. Certain aspects related to the CEO as a persona, such as CEO tenure (experience) and education, and also CEO’s physical appearance and facial expressions impact CEO’s image and, subsequently, company reputation and performance. Finally, this paper shows that CEO performance is more than company financial and market performance and includes aspects such as strategy execution or CEO succession planning.

The four ′P’s of the CEO branding mix provide a useful framework for CEO’s and the corporate communications department to developing a consistent and comprehensive CEO and corporate communication and branding strategy.

This paper contributes as it outlines the various aspects and elements which impact CEOs image and reputation. The four P’s serve as a useful framework for CEO’s as well as corporate communication departments to systematically measure and manage the CEO’s image and reputation and, consequently, company reputation and performance. It forms the basis for developing a consistent and comprehensive CEO and company communication and branding strategy.

This study seeks to examine whether CEO duality further exacerbates CEOs' motivation of self‐interest to engage in mergers and acquisitions to increase their compensation.

Regression tests using CEO compensation as the dependent variable, and CEO duality, firm size and firm performance as independent test and control variables. The regression tests are used for various sub‐samples of the firms, those that merge and those that have CEO duality.

The results indicate that for merging firms CEO compensation is positively associated with firm size. However, this association is unaffected by CEO duality. For non‐merging firms, the results indicate that CEO compensation is positively associated with firm size and firm performance. CEO duality moderates the positive association between CEO compensation and firm performance.

This study is limited to the extent that it does not observe the deliberations of compensation committees in their setting of CEO compensation, but only examines the outcomes of those deliberations. A future area of research is to examine compensation schemes of merger/acquisition CEOs in the context of other government structures, such as board independence and composition.

Shareholders who desire to keep CEO compensation levels positively associated with firm performance may consider supporting the separation of the positions of CEO and Chairperson of the Board.

This study contributes to the literature by concluding that governance structure influences CEO compensation schemes and CEOs of merging firms command higher compensation in spite of governance structure and firm performance.

This study aims to draw on the resource dependence theory to synthesize the conflicting arguments as well as commonalities of the agency and stewardship perspectives on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.

Multiple regression analysis is used to analyze the data collected from a sample of 212 large-scale publicly listed companies representing 20 sectors in the Colombo Stock Exchange in Sri Lanka.

The research results based on all of 212 publicly listed companies in Sri Lanka show, in support of the agency theory, that CEO duality exerts a negative effect on firm performance when the CEO is equipped with additional informal power. Conversely, CEO duality exhibits a positive effect on firm performance when board involvements are high, a finding that supports the commonalities of the agency and stewardship theoretical perspectives.

By examining the governance practices and concepts in an Asian developing economy, this study provides insight into the power dynamics between the CEO and the board of directors in managerial contexts that are largely different from those in western countries.

This study expands the theoretical underpinning of corporate governance research by identifying the performance implications of CEO duality within the broad context of the resource provision of the board of directors and the informal power of CEOs.

This paper aims to explore some of the practical challenges boards face in setting chief executive officer (CEO) pay to show why the failure to see considerable overlap between pay and performance may not be due to poor governance.

This paper critically explores the different types of pay reported in public sources (actual vs realized) and the types of performance measures used in CEO pay research. This paper then conceptually reviews the broader governance responsibility of boards, particularly the hiring and firing of CEOs and the impact these decisions have on CEO pay.

The authors suggest that much of the lack of overlap between pay and performance may be because of misaligned timing of the pay and performance measures, differences between internally promoted and externally hired CEOs and severance packages of fired CEOs. They conclude that the lack of overlap may not signal failure on the part of boards, but rather may reflect the risk and uncertainty those boards face in hiring and firing of CEOs.

The analysis shows how using publicly available sources of pay and performance data ignores the practical challenges that boards face in setting pay, and suggests greater care be given to future research purporting to show that boards are failing in their governance responsibilities.

CEO pay may not be as misaligned with performance as many researchers conclude, but may be due to the risks and uncertainty inherent in governance.

The distributive justice critique of CEO pay may not be valid.

As opposed to simply mining public databases, this paper more accurately describes some of the variables that impact how boards set CEO pay.

Objetivo – Este artículo explora alguno de los retos prácticos a los que se enfrentan los consejos de administración a la hora de fijar la retribución del CEO para mostrar que la falta de solapamiento entre retribución y resultados puede no deberse a un mal gobierno corporativo.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – El artículo explora de forma crítica los diferentes tipos de retribución disponibles en fuentes públicas (actual vs realizado) y el tipo de medidas de resultados empleados en la investigación en retribución de CEOs. A continuación el artículo revisa conceptualmente las funciones del consejo de administración, en particular la de contratar y despedir al CEO y el impacto que estas decisiones tienen en la retribución del CEO.

Resultados – Proponemos que mucha de la falta de solapamiento entre retribución y resultados puede deberse a una falta de sincronía temporal entre las medidas de retribución y resultados, a diferencias los CEOs promocionados desde dentro y los contratados fuera, y los paquetes de indemnización de los CEOs despedidos. Concluimos que la falta de solapamiento puede no estar indicando fallos en la acción del consejo de administración, sino el riesgo y la incertidumbre al que se enfrentan estos consejos a la hora de contratar y despedir CEOs.

Limitaciones/implicaciones – Nuestro análisis muestra como usar fuentes públicas sobre retribución y resultados lleva a ignorar los retos prácticos a los que se enfrentan los consejos a la hora de definir la retribución, y sugiere que la investigación futura debe ser más cuidadosa cuando afirme que los consejos de administración no están realizando sus funciones correctamente.

Implicaciones prácticas – La retribución del CEO puede no estar tan mal alineada con los resultados tal y como muchos investigadores concluyen, sino que esto es un reflejo de los riesgos e incertidumbres inherentes al gobierno corporativo.

Implicaciones sociales – La crítica a la justicia distributiva de la retribución del CEO puede no ser válida.

Originalidad/valor – En oposición a simplemente explotar bases de datos públicas, este artículo describe con mayor precisión algunas de las variables que influyen en como los consejos definen la retribución del CEO.

Objetivo – Esse artigo explora alguns dos desafios práticos enfrentados pelos conselhos administrativos ao estabelecer a remuneração do CEO, a fim de mostrar porque a incapacidade de ver a correlação entre o pagamento e a performance pode não ser atribuída à má governança.

Design/método/abordagem – O artigo explora de forma crítica os diferentes tipos de remuneração relatados em fontes públicas (real vs já realizado), e os diferentes tipos de medidas de performance utilizadas em estudos sobre remuneração de CEO. O artigo também revisa conceitualmente as funções do conselho administrativo, especificamente a de contratar e demitir CEOs, e o impacto que essas decisões têm na remuneração do CEO.

Resultados – Nós sugerimos que grande parte da falta de correlação entre pagamento e performance ocorre devido ao desalinhamento entre as medidas de performance e o momento do pagamento, às diferenças entre CEOs promovidos internamente e contratados externamente, e a pacotes de indenização de demissão de CEOs. Nós concluímos que a falta de correlação pode não significar uma falha por parte do conselho administrativo, e sim um reflexo do risco e da incerteza que esses conselhos enfrentam ao contratar e demitir CEOs.

Limitações/implicações – Nossa análise mostra como o uso de base de dados de pagamento e de desempenho publicamente disponíveis ignora os desafios práticos que os conselhos administrativos enfrentam ao estabelecer a remuneração do CEO, e sugere que pesquisas futuras devem ser mais cuidadosas ao afirmarem que os conselhos administrativos estão falhando em suas responsabilidades de governança.

Implicações práticas – A remuneração do CEO pode não estar tão desalinhada com os resultados como concluem muitos pesquisadores, pois pode ser um reflexo dos riscos e incertezas inerentes à governança.

Implicações sociais – A crítica à justiça de distribuição do pagamento do CEO pode não ser válida.

Originalidade/valor – Em oposição a simplesmente explorar base de dados públicos, este artigo descreve de forma mais acurada algumas variáveis que impactam como o conselho administrativo estabelecem a remuneração do CEO.

The optimal contracting view assumes that compensation arrangements should not reward performance upward that is beyond the management's control. Critics to this view assert, however that unearned compensation boom may be suggestive of pay for luck. Hence, the authors ask if CEOs' incentive pay is sensitive to lucky as to purely corporate performance. If such, one could question: Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Do institutional features matter for CEOs pay‐for‐luck? How does systematic incentive effect sensitive to luck's nature? Accepting the premises of both contacting and skimming agency's approaches, this paper aims to answer these questions.

General and separate ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) estimations have been run to estimate the general sensitivity of CEOs' pay, respectively, to performance and luck. These estimations are based on a sample of 300 publicly traded firms covering four countries from the Anglo‐American and Euro‐Continental corporate governance models for the period 2004 to 2008.

In support of the paper's theorizing, it was found that CEOs pay to be positively related to outside contingencies as well as to shareholders' interests. Positive pay sensitivity to exogenous shocks, which we label systematic incentive effect, shows that management take advantage of lucky external events. Further analyses show, moreover, two stylized facts. First, this effect is asymmetric as executives are rewarded more for good luck than penalized for bad luck. Second, it is less generous under stronger corporate governance, higher investor rights protection, and stricter law enforcement rules. The latter institutional factors seem to be overwhelmingly influential variables in explaining the differences in such effect across countries.

The paper contributes to the CEO compensation research by: showing that a simple contracting view can mislead shareholders about the effective CEOs' skills and efforts; and filling the lack of consensus within the empirical literature as to whether pay for luck depends on institutional features such as the law enforcement level, the degree of investors' right protection, and the corporate governance system's quality.

The paper's findings offer insights to shareholders, pay consultants, and regulators about the effects that unobservable macroeconomic shocks can have towards the design and the efficiency of a CEO pay contract. The findings help, however, academics understanding the international pay gap's causes.

This is a short commentary on Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment.”

Using insights from prior studies on executive compensation, the author’s commentary presents a critical evaluation of “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […].” In addition, the author offers potential avenues for further research.

The paper “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” is well executed and makes several significant contributions to the management and executive compensation literature. Particularly, noteworthy are the use of advanced quantitative methods, the use of power law distributions to explain chief executive officer (CEO) pay outcomes, the focus on pay-for-performance and the role of justice in CEO outcomes. The author’s commentary in the present paper discusses the measurement of CEO pay and performance, poses alternative estimation methods to explore the pay-for-performance link and offers thoughts on justice theory in the context of CEO pay.

The authors’ findings may be briefly stated as CEO pay is better described by a power law distribution than a normal distribution, CEO pay is not linked to firm performance and the patterns of CEO pay does not conform to patterns of distributive justice. Overall, the authors provide an important way to evaluate CEO pay outcomes. Thy set the stage for new avenues of research.

CEO pay is a highly controversial subject in the domain of corporate governance. This paper offers boards of directors and policymakers a method to better understand the success or failure of boardroom pay policies.

CEO pay is an important social measure.

The authors’ paper is original by offering a method for determining over and underpayment of CEOs. The author in the present paper makes suggestions on how one might extend the research.

Objetivo – Este es un comentario sobre el trabajo de Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle y Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment”.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – Utilizando las ideas de la literatura previa sobre retribución de ejecutivos, mi comentario presenta una evaluación crítica del artículo “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […]”. Además, esbozo algunas ideas para la investigación futura.

Resultados – El artículo “Dos lados de la injusticia de la retribución de los CEO” está bien desarrollado y realiza varias contribuciones significativas a las literaturas de gestión y retribución de ejecutivos. En particular, son de señalar: a) el uso de métodos cuantitativos avanzados, b) el uso de la distribución de ley de poder para explicar los resultados de la retribución de los CEO, c) el foco en el pago por resultados, d) el papel de la justicia en el rendimiento del CEO. Mi comentario a) discute las medidas de retribución y rendimiento del CEO, b) propone métodos de estimación alternativos para la relación entre retribución y rendimiento y c) ofrece ideas en torno a la teoría de la justicia en el contexto de la retribución del CEO.

Implicaciones – Los resultados de los autores pueden resumirse así: a) La retribución de los CEO se describe mejor como una distribución de ley de poder que como una distribución normal, b) la retribución del CEO y el rendimiento empresarial no están conectados, c) los patrones de retribución del CEO no concuerdan con los patrones de justicia distributiva. En general, los autores proporcionan un importante método para evaluar los resultados de la retribución de los CEO y fomentar la investigación futura.

Implicaciones prácticas – La retribución del CEO es un tema muy controvertido en el ámbito del gobierno corporativo. Este artículo proporciona a los consejos de administración y a los decisores públicos un método para entender mejor el éxito o fracaso de las prácticas retributivas en los consejos de administración.

Originalidad/valor – El trabajo de los autores es original al ofrecer un método para determinar la sobre o la infra retribución de los CEO. Yo apunto algunas sugerencias sobre cómo puede extenderse esta investigación.

Objetivo – Este é um breve comentário a Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment”.

Metodologia – Usando conhecimentos de estudos anteriores em compensação executiva, o meu comentário apresenta uma avaliação crítica de “Two sides of CEO pay injustice:….”. Adicionalmente, ofereço potenciais avenidas para investigação futura.

Resultados – O artigo “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” está bem feito e apresenta diversas contribuições importantes à literature sobre compensação executiva e de gestores. Em particular, são de salientar: a) o uso de métodos quantitativos avançados b) o uso de distribuições da lei de potência para explicar os resultados do pagamento a CEOs c) O enfoque no pagamento pela performance d) o papel da justiça nos resultados para o CEO. O meu comentário a) discute a medida de pagamento ao CEO e do desempenho b) Propõe métodos alternativos de estimação para explorar a ligação pagamento ao desempenho e c) Apresenta argumentos da teoria da justiça no contexto da compensação do CEO.

Implicações – Os resultados dos autores podem resumir-se como: a) Compensação do CEO é mais bem descrita por uma distribuição da lei de potência que por uma distribuição normal b) Compensação do CEO não está ligada à performance da empresa c) Os padrões da compensação do CEO não se conformam com justiça distributiva. Em geral, os autores fornecem uma forma importante de avaliar a compensação do CEO. Apresentam por isso novas vias para investigação futura.

Implicações práticas – Compensação do CEO é um tópico controverso do domínio da governança corporativa. Este artigo oferece aos Conselhos de Administração e decisores politicos um método para melhor perceber o sucesso ou insucesso das políticas de pagamento aos membros das Administrações.

Originalidade/valor – O artigo é original e oferece um método para determinar sobre ou sub compensação do CEO. Faço sugestões de como se pode estender a investigação.

This paper seeks to examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance and the moderating effects of ownership structure and board structure with respect to listed non‐financial companies in Thailand.

Logit model is employed to analyze the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance.

The paper finds that both ownership and board structure have effects on the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. The probability of CEO turnover is lower when the firm is controlled by family, the CEO is part of the controlling family, and board size is larger. Contrary to previous studies, sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is higher with the presence of CEO duality and lower degree of board independence. When a CEO continues to work beyond retirement age, the probability of turnover is not associated with firm performance.

This study provides evidence that CEO duality and low independent board is not necessarily bad corporate governance practice for Thai companies and would be of interest to regulatory bodies, practitioners, and academic researchers.

The authors comment on the paper by Aguinis et al. (2018). The authors believe that their hypotheses probably are true, but their methodology is flawed and their data do not support their conclusions.

The authors review and comment on the paper by Aguinis et al. (2018).

The data do not adequately demonstrate a power law distribution for chief executive officer’s (CEO) performance because the analysis confounded external conditions affecting performance, and the authors use inappropriate dependent variables. The analysis does not demonstrate a power law distribution for CEO pay because the analysis does not take into account changes in pay level and mix over time. The analysis does not show a lack of overlap between the two distributions because it does not take into account the way that the CEOs are paid for performance and because it uses CEO pay averaged over CEO tenure.

A more convincing analysis of the authors’ hypothesis would require the use of total shareholder return (TSR) as the dependent variable for organizational performance and would require a number of much more specific controls.

The authors call for greater use of power law thinking by practitioners in setting CEO pay. Their analysis indicates that practitioners already think in power law terms and allocate CEO pay accordingly. Moreover, power law theory and findings could be misused as an excuse for paying average CEOs much more than they are already paid.

The authors add another perspective on CEO pay.

The authors’ perspective is informed both by research and by consulting experience on CEO pay projects.

Comentamos el trabajo de Aguinis et al. (2018). Creemos que sus hipótesis son probablemente ciertas, pero su metodología presenta deficiencias y sus datos no apoyan sus conclusiones.

Revisamos y comentamos el trabajo de Aguinis y otros (en prensa).

Los datos no demuestran adecuadamente la existencia de una distribución ley de potencia (power-law) porque sus análisis no consideran las condiciones externas que afectan al resultado de la empresa y los autores hacen un uso inapropiado de las variables dependientes. Los análisis no demuestran que la retribución de los CEO sigua una distribución de ley de potencia porque no toman en consideración cambios en el nivel o composición de la retribución en el tiempo. Los análisis no muestran una falta de superposición entre las dos distribuciones porque no toman en cuenta la forma en la que los CEO son retribuidos por los resultados y porque utilizan la retribución media calculada sobre la antigüedad del CEO.

Un análisis más convincente de las hipótesis planteadas requiere el uso del rendimiento total de los accionistas como variable de resultados organizativos y un número mucho más específico de variables de control.

Los autores animan a los profesionales a pensar más en términos de una distribución de ley de potencia a la hora de fijar la retribución del CEO. Sus análisis indican que los profesionales ya piensan en términos de ésta distribución y asignan las retribuciones de manera acorde a ella. Es más, los resultados derivaos de la teoría de la ley de potencia pueden utilizarse erróneamente como una excusa para pagar menos al CEO medio.

Añadimos otra perspectiva sobre el pago a los CEO.

Nuestra perspectiva viene avalada por nuestra investigación y experiencia de consultoría en proyectos de retribución a CEOs.

Discutimos o trabalho de Aguinis et al. (2018). Acreditamos que as suas hipóteses são provavelmente verdadeiras, mas a sua metodologia apresenta deficiências e os dados apresentados não suportam as conclusões.

Analisamos e comentamos o trabalho de Aguinis et al. (2018).

Os dados não demonstram adequadamente a existência de uma distribuição de poder-lei porque suas análises não consideram as condições externas que afetam o resultado da empresa e os autores fazem uso impróprio das variáveis dependentes. As análises não mostram que as recompensas dos CEOs seguem uma distribuição da lei do poder porque não tomam em consideração as mudanças no nível ou na composição da remuneração sobre o tempo. As análises não mostram falta de sobreposição entre as duas distribuições, porque não têm em conta a forma como os CEOs são pagos pelos resultados e porque utilizam a retribuição média calculada sobre a antiguidade do CEO.

Uma análise mais convincente da hipótese proposta requer o uso do desempenho total dos acionistas como uma variável de resultados organizacionais e um número muito mais específico de variáveis de controle.

Os autores incentivam os profissionais a pensar mais em termos de uma distribuição da lei de potência quando se define o salário do CEO. Suas análises indicam que os profissionais já pensam em termos dessa distribuição e distribuem as recompensas de forma proporcional a ela. Além do mais, os resultados derivados da teoria da lei de poder podem ser erroneamente usados como uma desculpa para pagar menos para o CEO médio.

Agregamos uma outra perspectiva no pagamento ao CEO.

Nossa perspectiva é apoiada pelo nosso pesquisa e experiência de consultoria em projetos de remuneração para CEOs.

This paper contains a commentary on the paper by Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, O’Boyle and Joo published in this same issue. This paper aims to encourage the readers to examine this novel insight in future research but sadly, to disregard the results of this particular investigation.

Google Scholar tells us that, over a quarter of a million studies examine the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Aguinis et al. (2018) take much of that work to task. Observing that the distribution of CEO compensation is skewed, they question any work that assumes a normal distribution. Correcting the flaw, Aguinis et al. (2018) conduct their own investigation of this important relationship. Contrary to previous work, they find no consistent empirical relationship between pay and performance. The authors review and discuss their work with a clear eye on its implications for improving our understanding of these relationships.

The authors cannot accept the results of the Aguinis et al. (2018) investigation as it stands. Saying why, they close their commentary with some ideas that should help one understand whether accounting for a skewed CEO pay distribution really does revolutionize one’s understanding of corporate governance.

The statistical insight provided by Aguinis et al. (2018) yields provocative, if not profound, practical implications. While the authors’ review is critical, they aim to foster continued inquiry, not shut it down.

El objetivo del presente comentario del articulo de Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, O’Boyle and Joo (publicado en este mismo número) es el de motivar a sus lectores a examinar la nueva intuición que proporciona en el futuro pero, tristemente, desestimar los resultados de este trabajo en concreto.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – Google Scholar indica que hay más de un cuarto de millón de estudios que analizan la relación entre la retribución del CEO y los resultados empresariales. Aguinis et al., (2018) analizan gran parte de este trabajo. Tras observar que la distribución de la retribución del CEO es asimétrica, cuestionan cualquier trabajo que asuma una distribución normal. Corriendo este aspectos Aguinis et al. (2018) llevan a cabo su propio análisis en este importante tema. Contrariamente a otros trabajos previos estos autores no encuentran una relación consistente entre la retribución y los resultados. Revisamos y discutimos su trabajo con un ojo en las implicaciones para la comprensión de esta relación.

Resultados – No podemos aceptar los resultados de Aguinis et al. (2018) en su forma actual. Señalando porqué, cerramos nuestro comentario con algunas ideas que deben ayudarnos a entender si tomando en cuenta la asimetría de la distribución de la retribución del CEO realmente es una revolución para nuestra comprensión del gobierno corporativo de las empresas.

Implicaciones – La evidencia aportada por Aguinis et al. (2018) genera provocadoras, si no profundas, implicaciones prácticas. Si bien nuestro comentario es crítico, es nuestro deseo abrir – y no cerrar – el debate para considerar este importante tema.

Originalidad/valor – El comentario revisa de manera crítica las conclusiones del artículo publicado por Aguinis y colegas en este mismo número.

O objetivo do presente comentário do artigo de Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, O’Boyle e Joo (publicado neste mesmo número) é motivar aos seus leitores a examinar a nova intuição que proporciona no futuro mas, infelizmente, desestimar os resultados deste trabalho em concreto.

Metodologia – O Google Scholar diz-nos que mais de duzentos e cinquenta mil estudos examinam a relação entre compensação do CEO e performance da empresa. Aguinis et al. (2018) examinam uma boa parte desses estudos. Observando que a distribuição da compensação do CEO é enviesada, eles questionam os trabalhos que assumem uma distribuição normal. Corrigindo a falha, Aguinis et al. (2018) conduzem a sua própria investigação desta relação. Contrariamente a trabalho anterior, eles não encontram uma relação empírica consistente entre pagamento e performance. Revemos e discutimos o seu trabalho com enfoque especial nas suas implicações para a compreensão destas relações.

Resultados – Não podemos aceitar os resultados da investigação de Aguinis et al. (2018) tal como está. Dizendo porquê, terminamos o nosso comentário com algumas ideias que nos ajudam a perceber se dar conta duma distribuição enviesada de compensação do CEO realmente revoluciona a nossa compreensão da governança corporativa.

Implicações – A evidência estatística de Aguinis et al. (2018) levanta implicações práticas provocadoras, se não mesmo profundas. Sendo a nossa revisão crítica, pretendemos abrir – e não fechar – a continuação da consideração destes assuntos.

Originalidade/valor – O comentário faz uma revisão crítica das conclusões do artigo de Aguinis e colegas, neste número.