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This paper aims to assess the effectiveness of the Bribery Act 2010 in curbing corporate bribery.

The paper takes a doctrinal focus in assessing UK bribery law using both primary and secondary sources.

This paper finds that the effectiveness of the Bribery Act 2010 in curbing bribery lies in its approach of changing the basis for corporate criminal liability from focusing on the guilt of personnel within the company to focusing on the quality of the system governing the activities of the company. Companies have to address the risks of bribery or risk facing liability for failure to prevent bribery. With its regulatory approach to corporate liability, coupled with its extraterritorial reach, the Bribery Act is likely to change business cultures that facilitate bribery, thereby proving an effective law to corporate bribes.

This paper highlights the deficiency of earlier laws in tackling corporate bribery, examines the crime of bribery from a company law perspective and argues that the regulatory strategy in the Bribery Act is likely to be an effective tool against bribery.

This study aims to critically analyse corporate criminal liability for bribery in Kuwait, by focusing on laws and regulations as key problem-solving mechanisms. To that end, it identifies and assesses the existing anti-bribery laws in Kuwait, including a legal evaluation based on international standards. This study raises several issues concerning the lack of regulations of private bribery, facilitating payments and kickbacks in government contracts, and gifts and hospitalities in private sector, using UK Bribery Act 2010 (UK BA 2010) as a reference. This study showcases how these legal shortcomings are inconsistent with international treaties, and undermine efforts to tackle corruption. Emphasis has been put on criminalising private bribery, regulating the acceptance of hospitalities and gifts and abolishing the commission payment regime in public contracts in Kuwait.

Adopting a doctrinal focus, this paper examines case studies on curbing corporate bribery using both primary and secondary sources. Given the increasingly transitional and organised nature of business corruption, extravagant gifts and facilitating payments in public procurements globally, a comparison is drawn with the UK BA 2010.

Kuwait’s legal system does not criminalise bribery in private sector. Its anti-bribery laws are not at par with international standards. Therefore, the laws on disclosing commissions in public contracts must be abolished, and facilitating payments and hospitality payments in private sector must be regulated.

This study explores corporate criminal liability for bribery in Kuwait by investigating the weaknesses and legal shortcomings of the existing anti-bribery laws, and proposing reforms to counter these using UK BA 2010 as a guide.

This study aims to investigate whether United Kingdom (UK)-based companies have changed their voluntary disclosures on curbing the bribery of foreign officials in response to the UK Bribery Act 2010, and if so whether and how such disclosure changes substantively reflected allegations of bribery of foreign officials by news media.

By using the notions of institutional pressure and decoupling and applying content and thematic analysis, the authors examined, in particular, disclosures on curbing bribery by the largest 100 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange in periods before and after the Bribery Act (2007–2012). News media reports covering incidents of bribery of foreign officials and related corporate disclosures before and after the Act were thoroughly examined to problematise corporate anti-bribery disclosure practices.

The study finds a significant change in disclosure on curbing bribery before and after the enactment of the UK Bribery Act, consistent with the notion of institutional coercive pressure. However, decoupling is also found: organisations' disclosures did not substantively reflect incidents of bribing foreign public officials, mostly from underprivileged developing nations.

This study acknowledges a limitation stemming from using media reports that focus on bribery incidents in identifying actual cases or incidents of bribery. As some of the incidents identified from news media reports appeared to be allegations, not convictions for bribery, companies could have defensible reasons for not disclosing some aspects of them.

Regulators should think why new or more regulations without substantive requirement are not helpful to curb corporate decoupling and injustice. The regulators should address the crisis that multinational companies (MNCs) being suppliers of bribery are much more harmful for the underprivileged communities in developing nations. Accordingly, this paper provides practical insights into how stakeholders ought to critically interpret MNCs' accounts of their involvement in bribery.

This study contributes to the accounting literature by problematising MNCs' operations in underprivileged countries. The findings suggest that not only public officials in developing countries as creators of bribery but also Western-based MNCs as the suppliers of bribery contribute to perpetuating unethical practices and injustices to the underprivileged communities in developing countries. This research is imperative as this is one of the first known studies that provides evidence of the actions including disclosure-related actions companies have taken in response to the UK Bribery Act.

The purpose of this paper is to identify mechanisms by which an international obligation to prevent or punish corporate bribery can be enforced by a national law through trade relations.

The UK Bribery Act 2010 is an example of national law which enforces OECD anti‐bribery norms, with a view to effecting an institutional change in the law and morality of other countries. Taiwan is used as a case study to look at how the UK Act may achieve its intended purposes.

The paper identifies three modes of governance in the enforcement of the Act: legal exclusivism, legal inclusivism, and legal pluralism. In the mode of legal exclusivism, the Act disregards the morality of Taiwan so as to enforce the principle of transparency in trade. In the mode of legal inclusivism, the Act allows UK multinational companies to make their own “laws” so that anti‐bribery norms can be more efficiently and effectively diffused. But in the mode of legal pluralism, the Act is forced to acknowledge the law and morality of other countries (e.g. Taiwan), especially when mutual legal assistance is crucial for cross‐border investigation and prosecution.

Although this paper is based on an analysis of how the Act will interact with the law and morality of Taiwan, the model developed provides a lens through which one can show how an international norm enforced by a national law can function in a way that brings about institutional change in other countries.

The paper provides a new insight into how legal norms can be diffused through trade.

This paper aims to critically analyse the Criminal Code Amendment (Bribery of Foreign Public Officials) Act 1999 and Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combating Corporate Crime) Bill 2017 with special focus on the facilitation payment (FP) defence by referring to the UK Bribery Act 2010. The study will showcase how FP promotes disrespect for a good corporate culture inevitable for responsible and sustained business and as to why FP must be abolished to make the Australian regulation consistent with the international standards.

This research is based on primary and secondary sources including the Senate Committee Reports and recent legislative developments in Australia, and the relevant law of the UK.

Australia is lagging far behind comparative jurisdictions including the UK, and the FP defence must be abolished to make the Australian regulation consistent with the international standards and to foster international business backed up by globalisation, competition and interconnectedness of national economies.

This paper is the original work of the author and has not been submitted elsewhere for publication.

This article aims to report on the development and validation of a bribery measurement index for the business sector, which, based on institutional theory, seeks to overcome the limitations of traditional measurements, recognizing the dynamics that originate the phenomenon and identifying process components.

To construct the index, correlational and principal component analysis techniques were used, as well as rigorous statistical tests, validating the instrument in a sample of 2,963 companies in Latin America, including Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru.

The result was an instrument composed of two dimensions: (1) anti-bribery game rules, composed of regulations knowledge and anti-bribery efforts, and (2) bribery as a perceived habit, allowing an objective representation of reality due to its internal consistency, concurrent and discriminant validity.

This instrument is one of the few that focuses on measuring bribery in the business sector in terms of corrupt practices, applicable for both public and private institutions to promote game rules against bribery. Additionally, the proposed theoretical model can be used to measure other phenomena with similar characteristics.

This article empirically highlights different variables that make bribery possible. The results can be helpful in the design of strategies to prevent this type of behavior. It also highlights the importance of designing mechanisms to record information related to bribery and the different expressions of corruption in order to explain its different nuances.

Este artículo informa sobre el desarrollo y validación de un índice de medición de soborno para el sector empresarial, que, basado en la teoría institucional, busca superar las limitaciones de las mediciones tradicionales, reconociendo las dinámicas que originan el fenómeno e identificando los componentes del proceso.

Para la construcción del índice se utilizaron técnicas de análisis correlacional y de componentes principales, así como rigurosas pruebas estadísticas, validando el instrumento en una muestra de 2.963 empresas de América Latina, entre ellas Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, México y Perú.

El resultado fue un instrumento compuesto por dos dimensiones: (1) reglas de juego antisoborno, compuestas por conocimiento normativo y esfuerzo antisoborno (2) soborno como hábito percibido, permitiendo una representación objetiva de la realidad debido a su consistencia interna, validez concurrente y discriminante.

Este artículo pone en evidencia empírica diferentes variables que hacen posible el soborno. Los resultados pueden ser útiles en el diseño de estrategias para prevenir este tipo comportamiento, también destaca la importancia de diseñar mecanismos para registrar la información relacionada con la lucha contra el soborno.

Este instrumento es uno de los pocos que se enfoca en medir el soborno en el sector empresarial en términos de prácticas de corrupción, útil para instituciones tanto públicas como privadas para promover mejores reglas de juego en contra del soborno. Adicionalmente el modelo teórico propuesto puede ser utilizado para medir otros fenómenos con características similares.

In 2006 the German-based electronics company Siemens faced widespread corruption and bribery allegations. Investigations of the German state attorney’s office disclosed an amount of more than 2.3 billion of suspicious payments to foreign governments (Schubert & Miller, 2008). It turned out that Siemens had bribed governmental officials in order to secure contracts and to obtain favorable conditions over more than three decades (Schmidt, 2009). Though Siemens had a clearly stated anticorruption policy this did not prevent the company from getting involved in one of the largest corporate scandals in German business history.

A deeper analysis of the scandal reveals at least four fundamental shortcomings which enabled the corrupt practices on all organizational levels. First, most of the managers saw no alternatives to secure their foreign business, especially in countries where bribery payment has been a widespread practice. Second, the managers had created misguided bonds of loyalty believing that personal engagement in the corruption scheme was part of their dedication to the company. Third, due to corporate routines and commonly accepted practices, most managers lacked a clear sense of reality seeing corruption as part of the regular business at Siemens. Fourth, poor governance structures and a lack of clear regulations for doing business in a corrupt environment made it easier for managers to bypass official regulations.

The Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 (MACC Act) has introduced Section 17 A, which holds companies and their management accountable for bribery committed by their Associated Persons in the interest of the company. This study aims to explore the evolving concept of Associated Persons and corporate liability within this legal framework. It delves into three primary legal models of Associated Persons, particularly focusing on corrupt cases falling under Sections 17 A (1), 17 A (6) and 17 A (7) of the MACC Act. The study also investigates the extent of Associated Persons’ involvement in these cases that eventually led to company liability.

The study deployed thematic and comparative analyses to assess the legal framework and highlight the significance of Section 17 A of the MACC Act.

The study disclosed that, despite having corruption policies, there is still a possibility for Associated Persons to engage in corrupt activities. To ensure long-term business sustainability, it is crucial to implement effective mechanisms and a strong compliance culture.

This study suggests implementing a due diligence checklist and conducting risk assessments for companies as measures against corruption caused by Associated Persons. Corporate entities and legal professionals may benefit from the reported findings to better comprehend the corruption offences outlined in Section 17 A of the MACC Act.

The financial crisis has been something of a turning point in the regulatory response to financial crime around the world. The failure of light‐handed regulation and risk assessment by both industry and regulators made the operation of financial regulatory agencies almost untenable, often leading to calls for their replacement by more effective agencies. The purpose of this paper is to assess the nature of this regulatory challenge.

The paper discusses some of the case studies that have emerged from the dark side of regulatory and enforcement policies in recent times.

A culture of minimal regulation of financial markets meant that many undesirable practices (such as insider trading, foreign corrupt practices, tax avoidance, money laundering and other frauds) were able to avoid detection until public outrage led to regulatory and prosecutorial agencies being prompted into action following the collapse of financial markets.

More detailed studies of particular institutions will be necessary; this will become possible as the current financial crisis subsides.

This paper explores some of the factors behind this state of affairs and makes policy recommendation in regard to the need for more effective internal controls and monitoring measures within the modern financial corporation.

This paper aims to examine the effect of family control on corporate anticorruption disclosures of UK publicly listed firms and whether female board directors moderate the latter relationship.

This paper uses Poisson regression analysis for a sample of 1,546 FTSE 350 firm-year observations. Weighted least squares and propensity score matching are then used to assess the robustness of the findings.

The results show that family ownership and involvement are negatively associated with anticorruption disclosures. The tests of moderation indicate that female directors decrease the negative effect of family control on anticorruption disclosures.

To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the impact of family control on anticorruption disclosures while taking into consideration the moderating effect of female directors.