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Structural models' inflation forecasts are often inferior to those of naïve devices. This chapter theoretically and empirically assesses this for UK annual and quarterly inflation, using the theoretical framework in Clements and Hendry (1998, 1999). Forecasts from equilibrium-correction mechanisms, built by automatic model selection, are compared to various robust devices. Forecast-error taxonomies for aggregated and time-disaggregated information reveal that the impacts of structural breaks are identical between these, helping to interpret the empirical findings. Forecast failures in structural models are driven by their deterministic terms, confirming location shifts as a pernicious cause thereof, and explaining the success of robust devices.

This article aims to report on the development and validation of a bribery measurement index for the business sector, which, based on institutional theory, seeks to overcome the limitations of traditional measurements, recognizing the dynamics that originate the phenomenon and identifying process components.

To construct the index, correlational and principal component analysis techniques were used, as well as rigorous statistical tests, validating the instrument in a sample of 2,963 companies in Latin America, including Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru.

The result was an instrument composed of two dimensions: (1) anti-bribery game rules, composed of regulations knowledge and anti-bribery efforts, and (2) bribery as a perceived habit, allowing an objective representation of reality due to its internal consistency, concurrent and discriminant validity.

This instrument is one of the few that focuses on measuring bribery in the business sector in terms of corrupt practices, applicable for both public and private institutions to promote game rules against bribery. Additionally, the proposed theoretical model can be used to measure other phenomena with similar characteristics.

This article empirically highlights different variables that make bribery possible. The results can be helpful in the design of strategies to prevent this type of behavior. It also highlights the importance of designing mechanisms to record information related to bribery and the different expressions of corruption in order to explain its different nuances.

Este artículo informa sobre el desarrollo y validación de un índice de medición de soborno para el sector empresarial, que, basado en la teoría institucional, busca superar las limitaciones de las mediciones tradicionales, reconociendo las dinámicas que originan el fenómeno e identificando los componentes del proceso.

Para la construcción del índice se utilizaron técnicas de análisis correlacional y de componentes principales, así como rigurosas pruebas estadísticas, validando el instrumento en una muestra de 2.963 empresas de América Latina, entre ellas Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, México y Perú.

El resultado fue un instrumento compuesto por dos dimensiones: (1) reglas de juego antisoborno, compuestas por conocimiento normativo y esfuerzo antisoborno (2) soborno como hábito percibido, permitiendo una representación objetiva de la realidad debido a su consistencia interna, validez concurrente y discriminante.

Este artículo pone en evidencia empírica diferentes variables que hacen posible el soborno. Los resultados pueden ser útiles en el diseño de estrategias para prevenir este tipo comportamiento, también destaca la importancia de diseñar mecanismos para registrar la información relacionada con la lucha contra el soborno.

Este instrumento es uno de los pocos que se enfoca en medir el soborno en el sector empresarial en términos de prácticas de corrupción, útil para instituciones tanto públicas como privadas para promover mejores reglas de juego en contra del soborno. Adicionalmente el modelo teórico propuesto puede ser utilizado para medir otros fenómenos con características similares.

There is a long-lasting debate on the relationship between democracy and economic growth, though it remained inconclusive. On the other hand, corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world that lessens the efficiency of a good government, distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and particularly hurts the poor. Moreover, the corruption–growth relationship has been shown to be contingent upon the political regime. This chapter has chosen a set of emerging market economies (EMEs), which consists of democratic as well as authoritarian countries, to throw light on democracy–growth relationship through the channel of corruption using a system generalized method of moments estimation of a panel of 27 countries for a period of 2006–2018. Results show that democracy is growth-enhancing but corruption dampens its positive impact to some extent. However, for authoritarian countries corruption can enhance growth.

This paper applies the logic of economic calculation to the actions of autocrats. We model autocrats as stationary bandits who use profit-and-loss calculations to select institutions that maximize their extraction rents. We find in many cases autocrats achieve rent maximization through creating and protecting private property rights. This in turn yields high levels of production, with expropriation kept low enough to incentivize continued high production. Importantly, while this leads to increasing quantities of available goods and services over time, it does not lead to true development; that is, the coordination of consumer demand with producer supply through directing resources to their highest-valued uses. We apply our model to the authoritarian governments of Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, showing how they function as quasi-corporate governance organizations in the business of maximizing appropriable rents.

Using original mass public surveys in nine East European, European Union (EU) member countries (2007), I develop a micro-level approach linking individuals’ perceptions of inequality and corruption. Merging an instrumental variables approach with an emerging body of comparative scholarship, I demonstrate that individuals’ perceptions of inequality can be seen to contribute to their perceptions of corruption based on individuals’ normative concerns of the failure of democratic institutions to address issues related to inequality. Thus, for these countries, this region, the EU, as well as other new democracies, we can better understand these potential threats to the development of stable, sustainable democracy.

One of the noteworthy developments in the world economy is the cryptocurrency in general and the bitcoin in particular. Although several types of cryptocurrency are in operation in the current digital economy, the most prevalent is the bitcoin, which was launched formally in 2009 by an individual or group known under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. The value of bitcoin has increased to such an extend that it reached 19.7 billion US dollars by January 2, 2018 (Statista, 2018). As the bitcoin price touches a new high day by day, various terrorist organizations are using this cryptocurrency to anonymously finance their grotesque terrorist activities around the world by bypassing the surveillance mechanism of the banking system of the respective countries. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims to understand the mechanism of cryptocurrencies in general and the bitcoin in particular. Finally, it also endeavors to identify the trend of the bitcoin economy and its impact on nefarious activities in general and terrorism financing in particular. It has been revealed from the study that cryptocurrency economy has become so popular across the world that it has created an alternative virtual economy devoid of regulations from a specific country or a group of countries. By using vector error correction model (VECM), it had been observed that there exists a statistically significant long-run association between terrorist incidences and bitcoin transaction/circulation in the panel of 12 countries for 2010–2016. However, there is a huge concern over its way of operation and its unholy nexus with terrorism financing.

The objective of this chapter is to explain how an innovation-driven economic development model can help to mitigate corruption and facilitate competitiveness in Nigeria.

With the use of descriptive narratives, Nigeria was examined in comparison with other countries such as South Korea. The chapter argues that Nigeria has not experienced development as much as South Korea because of her primary dependence on crude oil for economic sustenance.

Evidence from the statistics showed that innovation-driven economies are more competitive and less corrupt compared to natural resource-driven economies such as Nigeria. Nigeria has performed poorly in terms of competitiveness, transparency, and governance owing to her dependence on natural resources as a major means for economic sustenance.

Helps to explain why an innovation-driven economic development model is the solution to mitigating corruption and facilitating competitiveness in Nigeria.

In the current competitive era of industrialization, a significant level of innovation is necessary to meet the growing competition. There are many economic forces that determine the pace of innovation within a country. Among others, this study aims to focus on exploring the relevant role of corruption control (CC) in determining the innovation level.

For empirical analysis, the authors sample the 24 years of data (1996–2019) of Asian economies and use the fully modified ordinary least square (OLS) and dynamic OLS models to check the regression among variables. The selection of both techniques is based upon the empirical suggestions offered by unit root testing and the Johansen cointegration test.

The empirical findings infer the positive and statistically significant role of CC in boosting innovation. Strengthening the corruption-free environment encourages innovation activities within the country. In addition, foreign direct investment has a negative relationship with CC while financial development, economic growth, export volume and government subsidies positively determine the innovation level.

Based on empirical analysis, it is suggested that the policy officials should do more focus on CC to enhance the competitiveness of the country through more innovation.

The empirical analysis robust the findings of existing literature in an alternative data set and offers innovative views regarding the role of other factors in boosting the innovation level.

This paper aims to determine the tax potential of G20 countries and estimate the tax revenue they could generate. The study evaluates the effectiveness of tax revenue collection for G20 nations from 2008 to 2020 and investigates the relationship between tax collection efficiency and tax evasion. The study also examines the link between tax collection efficiency and a proxy for tax evasion through anti-corruption efforts.

The study assumes that tax collection is a function of gross domestic product (GDP), population, imports and price level. The study uses a stochastic frontier analysis to calculate the efficiency of tax collection. It estimates the loss in total tax collection due to inefficiency by comparing actual and best-practice tax collection.

The findings indicate that anti-corruption measures and technological advancements positively impact tax collection efficiency. Great Britain is identified as the most efficient country in tax collection, whereas Saudi Arabia is the least efficient. Germany has the highest losses in tax collection due to inefficiency, while Australia experiences the lowest losses in tax collection.

This study suggests several practical implications. For example, legislators and policymakers should pay more attention to anti-corruption policies. Also, tax agenesis should focus on better understanding variations in tax collection efficiency between countries and how they relate to tax evasion.

The theoretical debate of corruption's impact on economic growth remains unsettled, making it an empirical question. This study aims to investigate corruption's effect on BRICS countries' economic growth.

A panel dataset on BRICS countries spanning 1996 to 2020 was used. Bias-corrected estimators in small dynamic panels were employed to estimate a growth model as a linear-quadratic function of corruption that accounts for cross-sectional dependence, endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity due to country and time-specific characteristics.

The results indicate that corruption is detrimental to economic growth in BRICS countries; the quadratic relationship implies corruption is less prevalent in some countries than others. Thus, governments of BRICS countries are encouraged to embark on anti-corruption policies to boost their economic performance.

An important limitation of corruption studies is the difficulty in measuring real corruption experiences due to the secretive nature of corruption and the fact that corruption is known not to leave a paper trail. For the uncertainty of the index estimates, the analysis used a continuous corruption composite score measuring the standard deviation of the extent to which public power is exercised for public gain. Furthermore, estimation and inference are robust to small dynamic panels with a general form of cross-sectional dependence.