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This paper aims to present a model of shareholders’ willingness to exert effort to reduce the likelihood of bank distress and the implications of the presence of contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds in the liabilities structure of a bank.

This study presents a basic model about the moral hazard surrounding shareholders willingness to exert effort that increases the likelihood of a bank’s success. This study uses a one-shot game and so do not capture the effects of repeated interactions.

Consistent with the existing literature, this study shows that the direction of the wealth transfer at the conversion of CoCo bonds determines their impact on shareholder risk-taking incentives. This study also finds that “anytime” CoCos (CoCo bonds trigger-able anytime at the discretion of managers) have a minor advantage over regular CoCo bonds, and that quality of capital requirements can reduce the risk-taking incentives of shareholders.

This study argues that shareholders can also use manager-specific CoCo bonds to reduce the riskiness of the bank activities. The issuance of such bonds can increase the resilience of individual banks and the whole banking system. Regulators can use restrictions on conversion rates and/or requirements on the quality of capital to address the impact of CoCo bonds issuance on risk-taking incentives.

To model the risk-taking incentives, authors generally modify the asset processes to introduce components that reflect asymmetric information between CoCo holders and shareholders and/or managers. This paper follows a simpler method similar to that of Holmström and Tirole (1998).

The objective of this paper is twofold: first, to model the value of the firm in the presence of contingent capital and multiple growth options over its life cycle in a stochastic universe to ensure financial stability and recover losses in case of default and second, to clarify how contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds as financial instruments impact the leverage-ratio policies, inefficiencies generated by debt overhang and asset substitution for a firm that has multiple growth options. Additionally, what is its impact on investment timing, capital structure and asset volatility?

The current paper elaborates the modeling of a dynamic problem with respect to the interaction between funding and investment policies during multiple sequential investment cycles simultaneously with dynamic funding. The authors model the value of the firm in the presence of contingent capital that provides flexibility in dealing with default risks as well as growth options in a stochastic universe. The authors examine the firm's closed-form solutions at each stage of its decision-making process before and after the exercise of the growth options (with and without conversion of CoCo) through applying the backward indication method and the risk-neutral pricing theory.

The numerical results show that inefficiencies related to debt overhang and asset substitution can go down with a higher conversion ratio and a larger number of growth options. Additionally, the authors’ analysis reveals that the firm systematically opts for conservative leverage to minimize the effect of debt overhang on decisions so as to exercise growth options in the future. However, the capital structure of the firm has a substantial effect on the leverage ratio and the asset substitution. In fact, the effect of the leverage ratio and the risk-shifting incentive will be greater when the capital structure changes during the firm's decision-making process. Contrarily to traditional corporate finance theory, the study displays that the value of the firm before the investment expansion decreases and then increases with asset volatility, instead of decreasing overall with asset volatility.

The study’s findings reveal that funding, default and conversion decisions have crucial implications on growth option exercise decisions and leverage ratio policy. The model also shows that the firm consistently chooses conservative leverage to reduce the effect of debt overhang on decisions to exercise growth options in the future. The risk-shifting incentive and the debt overhang inefficiency basically decrease with a higher conversion ratio and multiple growth options. However, the effect of the leverage ratio and the risk-shifting incentive will be greater when the capital structure changes during the firm's decision-making process.

The firm's composition between assets in place and growth options evolves endogenously with its investment opportunity and growth option financing, as well as its default decision. In contrast to the standard capital structure models of Leland (1994), the model reveals that both exogenous conversion decisions and endogenous default decisions have significant implications for firms' growth option exercise decisions and debt policies. The model induces some predictions about the dynamics of the firm's choice of leverage as well as the link between the dynamics of leverage and the firm's life cycle.

Catastrophe (CAT) events associated with natural catastrophes and man-made disasters cause profound impacts on the insurance industry. This research thus reviews the impact of CAT risk on the insurance industry and how traditional reinsurance and securitized risk-transfer instruments are used for managing CAT risk.

This research reviews the impact of CAT risk on the insurance industry and how traditional reinsurance and securitized risk-transfer instruments are used for managing CAT risk. Apart from many negative influences, CAT events can increase the net revenue of the insurance industry around CAT events and improve insurance demand over the post-CAT periods. The underwriting cycle of reinsurance causes inefficiencies in transferring CAT risks. Securitized risk-transfer instruments resolve some inefficiencies of the reinsurance market, but are subject to moral hazard, basis risk, credit risk, regulatory uncertainty, etc. The authors introduce some popular securitized solutions and use Merton's structural framework to demonstrate how to value these CAT-linked securities. The hybrid solutions by combining reinsurance with securitized CAT instruments are expected to offer promising applications for CAT risk management.

The authors introduce some popular securitized solutions and use Merton's structural framework to demonstrate how to value these CAT-linked securities. The hybrid solutions by combining reinsurance with securitized CAT instruments are expected to offer promising applications for CAT risk management.

This research reviews a broad array of impacts of CAT risks on the (re)insurance industry. CAT events challenge (re)insurance capacity and influence insurers' supply decisions and reconstruction costs in the aftermath of catastrophes. While losses from natural catastrophes are the primary threat to property–casualty insurers, the mortality risk posed by influenza pandemics is a leading CAT risk for life insurers. At the same time, natural catastrophes and man-made disasters cause distinct impacts on (re)insures. Man-made disasters can increase the correlation between insurance stocks and the overall market, and natural catastrophes reduce the above correlation. It should be noted that huge CAT losses can also improve (re)insurance demand during the postevent period and thus bring long-term effects to the (re)insurance industry.

This paper aims to study the impact of (regulatory and nonregulatory) liquidity on contingent convertible (CoCo) issuance and the relationship between CoCos and asset quality.

The analysis of this study comprises two stages. In the first stage, the authors used a logit model to test whether banks with riskier assets as well as lower solvency and (regulatory and nonregulatory) liquidity are more likely to issue CoCos. In the second stage, the authors used univariate analysis and fixed effects regression to measure the impact of Additional Tier 1 (AT1) CoCos on the quality of the issuer’s assets.

The study shows that regulatory liquidity ratios are negatively related to CoCo issuance. This study also finds that the likelihood to issue CoCo is higher when banks have lower regulatory capital or are less risky. Asset quality is found to not change significantly after the issuance. All in all, these results suggest that while solvency regulation is primarily regarded as the main motivation for CoCo issuance, liquidity regulation also matters.

Despite the fact that CoCos have been emerging as an alternative way to help banks meet regulatory capital requirements, the paper argues that the relation between liquidity regulation and CoCos should be taken into account.

This study presents an empirical analysis on the CoCos instrument, focusing on the relationship between AT1 CoCos and liquidity regulation. Therefore, it serves to fill a gap in the literature on the underlying forces behind CoCo issuance. Moreover, this study measures the impact of AT1 CoCos issuance on bank risk, particularly on the quality of the issuer’s assets.

Based upon recent statements made by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, a group of well-known professors coming from ten European countries, during the period 2012-2017, this paper aims to analyze from a European perspective the adequacy and credibility of the proposed framework.

This paper is a summary and interpretation of statements from the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee.

The authors argue that the credibility of the bail-in mechanism is likely to be limited. Because of this, unexpected losses may not be absorbed by unsecured debt holders. Therefore, there is still a need for relatively high equity capital buffers.

The issue of how to raise loss absorption capacity for banks is prominent on the international policy agenda. International regulators are aiming for a combination of equity capital, typically raised by issuing shares, retaining profits and issuing contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds and bail-in debt where unsecured creditors such as holders of subordinated and common bonds are supposed to take losses in case of a bankruptcy or restructuring of a bank.

This paper aims to describe a resolution process for faltering financial firms that quickly allocates losses to bondholders and transfers ownership of the firm to them. This process overcomes the most serious flaws in resolution plans submitted by banks under Dodd–Frank Title I and in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) receivership procedure in Dodd–Frank Title II by restoring the balance sheet of a failing financial institution and immediately replacing the management and board of directors who allowed its demise.

Feasibility of the proposed resolution procedure is assessed by comparing long-term bonds outstanding for the largest American banks just before the 2008 crisis to the capital needed by these banks to restore their balance sheets after their losses prior to and during the crisis.

In almost all bank failures, this process would eliminate the need for government involvement beyond court certification of the reorganization. The procedure overcomes the serious incentive distortions and inefficiencies created by bailouts, and avoids the destruction of value and financial market turmoil that would result from the bankruptcies and liquidations that Dodd–Frank requires for distressed and failing banks.

Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act would require liquidation of any banks that enter into its resolution process. The case of Lehman Brothers indicates the severity of losses to investors that liquidation imposes and the disruption to financial markets and the economy. The procedure developed in this paper would avoid the disruptions that Dodd–Frank requires, preserving core functions of faltering financial firms and maintaining them as going concerns, even in a severe financial crisis.

This article investigates the most appropriate accounting treatment for expensing the fair value of employee share options (ESOs) in financial statements. The debate centres around whether the grant date or the exercise date is the most appropriate date for determining the value at which the ESOs are eventually accrued within the financial statements. After examining accounting models for each of the above measurement dates, the article concludes that exercise date accounting best reflects the economic substance of the ESO transaction. Therefore, the IASB should consider revising its definition of equity to encompass only existing shareholders, leaving all other financial obligations to be classified as liabilities.

The purpose of this paper is to define the key components of an effective regulatory regime.

The paper takes the form of a critical analysis.

Regulatory arbitrage has been one of the major factors contributing to the severity of the crisis. Given the ever more complex set of future regulatory constraints, it may keep generating costly negative spillover effects on the whole economy. Moreover, rules‐based regulation, however carefully constructed, will unfortunately never prevent bank failures. Neither should it attempt to do so. An effective overall regulatory regime must be sufficiently comprehensive and well‐balanced. It must not put too much emphasis on lowering the probability of individual bank failure. The key components of an effective regulatory regime must be: Basel‐type rules robust to off‐balance‐sheet arbitrage; little forbearance in monitoring and supervision by regulatory agencies, with a focus on systemic risk control; automatic and quick intervention as well as resolution mechanisms. While all components are necessary, none is sufficient; and without strong international coordination, none will be effective.

Enhanced supervision of banks.

Less costly bank failures.

The paper presents a critical review of current financial reforms in the banking sector.

This study aims to research the effects of unemployment wages current account and consumer price index (CPI) on the real gross domestic product (RGDP), which, in the optimum currency area (OCA) theory, supposes that countries with higher factor mobility can significantly profit from the currency area. However, in this study, it is shown that the considered optimum currency crisis (OCC) model is affected by mobility factors, as the defined theory has not been perfectly realised in the Eurozone.

In this study, Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey and Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests are used for supporting the survey for better estimation of the panel cointegration tests, where Pedroni's (1995, 1997) technique is used. The unit root tests are employed, of which the Phillip–Perron and augmented Dickey–Fuller tests (unit root test, Dickey, D. and W. Fuller, 1979) are considered.

It can be concluded that demand shocks will tend to be more asymmetric instead of being symmetric, even though they are in the customs union (CU). However, Polish workers in a given scenario may move to Germany, but because of the rigidity of the labour market and qualification differences between workers, the interregional integration of member countries is reduced, and this reduces the absorption of asymmetric shocks. In Germany, where strong employment protection and rigidity are observed in comparison to Poland, although there has been historical migration and economical collaboration, unfortunately, the integration of the two countries’ economies has not been realised.

Quantitative research on fiscal union and the estimation of its effects is not possible because there is no practical experience of fiscal union throughout the European Union (EU). However, quantitative research is used for estimating the effects of OCA in the Eurozone. Quantitative investigation is particularly focused on the monetary union and single currency and its impact on growth rate. In this study, the ordinary least squares (OLS) method and panel cointegration test are employed for estimating the effects of the considered variables.

The Eurozone and the application of a single currency throughout the EU was a considerably difficult task. In addition, the adoption of a single currency was not easy for those member countries that fulfilled the “convergence criteria” (or “Maastricht criteria”) and who joined the Eurozone, because only adoption is not enough; maintenance of those criteria is also required. This study analysed the application of the Eurozone in the light of the OCA of Mundel's theory.

The OCA is important for member countries’ economic relations. However, the application of a single currency is not easy and needs to be controlled and regulated to ensure best practises throughout the Eurozone. Monetary integration is not a simple process, and Eurozone countries’ financial difficulties affect each other’s markets’ indifferent aspects. Particularly in any market recession, demand shocks tend to have different effects. Furthermore, in comparison to the monetary union, the CU has a considerable impact on trade enlargement.

In this study, the effects of the independent variables “wages, unemployment, CPI and capital flow” on the dependent variable “RGDP” is considered, which, in the OCA theory, supposes that countries with higher factor mobility can significantly profit from the currency area. In application, it was turned into crisis because of inadequate monetary and fiscal application. In this paper OCA is questioned in the light of the Eurozone for bringing better understanding to these difficulties. The considered model and estimations are used for evaluating to create sustainable monetary integration for economic growth.

This paper is a survey of recent academic developments in the literature on green bonds, which have become an important financial instrument in socially responsible investment. This study provides a review of papers that study the market pricing of green bonds, the economic and environmental effects of green bond financing, as well as legal and institutional issues in the green bond market. The literature on market pricing focuses mainly on the existence of greenium, which represents the extent to which green bonds carry a price premium over otherwise identical non-green counterparts. The literature on the economic and environmental effects mainly concerns stock market reaction to green bond issuance and associated economic value implications to other stakeholders, as well as investment in green projects. This paper discusses current issues in the green-bond market and avenues for future research.