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This study aims to research the effects of unemployment wages current account and consumer price index (CPI) on the real gross domestic product (RGDP), which, in the optimum currency area (OCA) theory, supposes that countries with higher factor mobility can significantly profit from the currency area. However, in this study, it is shown that the considered optimum currency crisis (OCC) model is affected by mobility factors, as the defined theory has not been perfectly realised in the Eurozone.

In this study, Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey and Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests are used for supporting the survey for better estimation of the panel cointegration tests, where Pedroni's (1995, 1997) technique is used. The unit root tests are employed, of which the Phillip–Perron and augmented Dickey–Fuller tests (unit root test, Dickey, D. and W. Fuller, 1979) are considered.

It can be concluded that demand shocks will tend to be more asymmetric instead of being symmetric, even though they are in the customs union (CU). However, Polish workers in a given scenario may move to Germany, but because of the rigidity of the labour market and qualification differences between workers, the interregional integration of member countries is reduced, and this reduces the absorption of asymmetric shocks. In Germany, where strong employment protection and rigidity are observed in comparison to Poland, although there has been historical migration and economical collaboration, unfortunately, the integration of the two countries’ economies has not been realised.

Quantitative research on fiscal union and the estimation of its effects is not possible because there is no practical experience of fiscal union throughout the European Union (EU). However, quantitative research is used for estimating the effects of OCA in the Eurozone. Quantitative investigation is particularly focused on the monetary union and single currency and its impact on growth rate. In this study, the ordinary least squares (OLS) method and panel cointegration test are employed for estimating the effects of the considered variables.

The Eurozone and the application of a single currency throughout the EU was a considerably difficult task. In addition, the adoption of a single currency was not easy for those member countries that fulfilled the “convergence criteria” (or “Maastricht criteria”) and who joined the Eurozone, because only adoption is not enough; maintenance of those criteria is also required. This study analysed the application of the Eurozone in the light of the OCA of Mundel's theory.

The OCA is important for member countries’ economic relations. However, the application of a single currency is not easy and needs to be controlled and regulated to ensure best practises throughout the Eurozone. Monetary integration is not a simple process, and Eurozone countries’ financial difficulties affect each other’s markets’ indifferent aspects. Particularly in any market recession, demand shocks tend to have different effects. Furthermore, in comparison to the monetary union, the CU has a considerable impact on trade enlargement.

In this study, the effects of the independent variables “wages, unemployment, CPI and capital flow” on the dependent variable “RGDP” is considered, which, in the OCA theory, supposes that countries with higher factor mobility can significantly profit from the currency area. In application, it was turned into crisis because of inadequate monetary and fiscal application. In this paper OCA is questioned in the light of the Eurozone for bringing better understanding to these difficulties. The considered model and estimations are used for evaluating to create sustainable monetary integration for economic growth.

The currency crisis literature now comprises three main schools of thought; first‐generation models consider the depletion of foreign exchange reserves as a consequence of incompatible exchange rate and monetary policies. Second‐generation models are based on speculative theories whereby the belief of investors that monetary policy will be modified as a result of an attack makes the attack possible. Third‐generation models have been designed in an attempt to explain the nature of the Asian crises of 1997/1998. Each school of thought considers the nature of a speculative attack. However, this model uses a search framework to explain the timing of an attack in terms of an information externality in the foreign exchange market. It then assesses the efficacy of a Tobin tax in delaying and thereby possibly preventing such a crisis.

This chapter argues that monetary integration must precede, rather than follow, monetary unification, in order to avoid the occurrence of structural and systemic crises. It briefly overviews the relevant literature on european monetary union (EMU) with regard to the criteria to set up an optimum currency area (OCA) according to the mainstream view. It then points out that adopting the euro as single currency for a number of heterogeneous countries led inevitably to a number of major negative effects, so much so because of the counterproductive financial constraints induced by the Euro-area fiscal and monetary policies framework. Particularly, the lack of fiscal transfers between these countries and the dogmatic attitude of the European Central Bank (ECB) as regards its policy strategy and goal increase, rather than reducing, the unemployment rate, and the degree of financial instability across the euro area. In fact, a way out of the euro area exists without renouncing to the (long-run) benefits of monetary integration. It implies that countries whose population suffers most of “fiscal consolidation” introduce their national currencies again, limiting the use of the euro to their central banks only, in order for them to settle all international trade and financial-market transactions carried out by residents in these countries. This monetary–structural reform will be instrumental in increasing financial stability and employment levels across Europe, thereby inducing positive effects also for trade and public finance.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the “following” behavior of six currencies in East Asia to RMB before and after the “financial crisis”.

Using foreign exchange spot rate data from 2005 to 2013, the authors investigate the dynamic relationship of RMB and six East Asia currencies with method of DCC-GARCH and quantile regression.

The authors get such conclusions: first, most currencies indeed “follow” RMB in whole sample period but the correlation is “time-varying”; second, the degree of co-movement increased as a whole, which reflects that the influence of China in East Asia rose continuously; third, the East Asian currencies behaved differently before the crisis, but reveal some similarities after the crisis, and prefer to “follow” when RMB depreciates and reluctant to follow when RMB appreciates at a comparatively large degree. The authors argue that it may be related to the different macroeconomic environment faced by East Asia region before and after the crisis, the rising economic influence of China and the development of RMB internationalization’s practice.

The effort could strength the understanding to the “following” behavior of East Asia currencies to RMB, the authors also point out that RMB has been as regional currency anchor, but the role of anchor is unstable, and is affected by international economic circumstance, China should adapt some methods to strength RMB’s influence to East Asia currency.

Norway is a small nation state on the northernmost coastline of Western Europe, integrated in the Western world economy. For centuries Norway's integration in the world economy had been based on exports of raw materials such as fish and timber, as well as shipping services. In the early 20th century, furnace-based metals (made possible by cheap hydropower) were added to this export basket. Just as the world economy entered an increasingly unstable phase in 1970s, another natural resource was discovered in Norway: petroleum – that is, oil and natural gas from the North Sea. This chapter analyses the challenges and possibilities inherent in the Norwegian strategy of developing an oil economy in a world economic situation influenced by new and stronger forms of international integration through the four decades between 1970 and 2010.

This paper investigates the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policies. It identifies an anti-growth bias in the ECB’s monetary policy approach: the ECB is quick to hike, but slow to ease. Similarly, while other players and institutional deficiencies share responsibility for the euro’s failure, the bank has generally done “too little, too late” with regard to managing the euro crisis, preventing protracted stagnation, and containing deflation threats. The bank remains attached to the euro area’s official competitive wage repression strategy which is in conflict with the ECB’s price stability mandate and undermines the bank’s more recent unconventional monetary policy initiatives designed to restore price stability. The ECB needs a “Euro Treasury” partner to overcome the euro regime’s most serious flaw: the divorce between central bank and treasury institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the impact of the single currency on the institutional design of the banking union, through evidence on the financial integration process.

Data analysis uses multiple sources of data on key drivers of financial fragmentation. The paper starts from a snapshot the status of financial integration and then identifies the main components of this trend.

Evidence shows that financial integration in the euro area between 2010 and 2014 retrenched at a quicker pace than outside the monetary union. Home bias persisted. Under market pressures, governments compete on funding costs by supporting “their” banks with massive state aids, which distorts the playing field and feed the risk-aversion loop. This situation intensifies frictions in credit markets, thus hampering the transmission of monetary policies and, potentially, economic growth. Taking stock of developments in the euro area, this paper discusses the theoretical framework of a banking union in a single currency area with decentralised fiscal policy sovereignty. It concludes that, when a crisis looms over, a common fiscal backstop can reduce pressures of financial fragmentation, driven by governments’ moral hazard and banks’ home bias.

Additional research is required to deepen the empirical analysis, with econometric modelling, on the links between governments’ implicit guarantees and banks’ home bias. This is an initial data analysis.

Under market pressure, governments in a single currency area tend to be overprotective (more than countries with full monetary sovereignty) towards their own banking system and so trigger financial fragmentation (enhancing banks’ home bias). To revert that, a common fiscal backstop is an essential element of the institutional design. The paper shows empirical evidence and theory, as well as it identifies underlying market failures. It links the single currency to the institutional design of a banking union. This important dimension is brought into a coherent framework.