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This article analyzes the difference between the budgetary expense and the opportunity cost of defense inputs. If inputs are obtained by the government from a market economy with undistorted prices, the price paid for the last unit of each input acquired equals the opportunity cost. However, taxes create a distortion between opportunity cost and unit price. An additional complication, discussed using the case of military personnel, is that premarginal units may have an opportunity cost lower than the unit price determined at the margin. Principles used to determine the social discount rate are also discussed in the analysis.

This paper develops a model that explains how the creation of a futures clearinghouse allows traders to reduce default and economize on margin. We contrast the collateral necessary between bilateral partners with that required when multilateral netting occurs. Optimal margin levels balance the deadweight costs of default against the opportunity costs of holding additional margin. Once created, it may be optimal for the clearinghouse to monitor the financial condition of its members. If undertaken, monitoring will reduce the amount of margin required but need not affect the probability of default. Once created, it becomes optimal for the clearinghouse membership to expel defaulting members. This reduces the probability of default. Our empirical tests suggest that the opportunity cost of margin plays an important role in clearinghouse behavior particularly their determination of margin amounts. The relationship between volatility and margins suggests that participants face an upward-sloping opportunity cost of margin. This appears to dominate the effects that monitoring and expulsion might have on margin setting.

Previous research argues that customer switching costs play an important role in the firm’s ability to retain customers and achieve competitive advantage. Research also indicates that in the increasingly networked environment, switching costs are changing in important ways. Despite switching costs’ recognized role in contributing to competitive advantage and its increasingly strategic characteristics in the expanding networked environment, we find a lack of coherence and completeness in the conceptual tools and models developed to understand its role and help effectively to manage the phenomenon. In this paper we attempt to address these needs by expanding and refining the conceptualization of customer switching costs and developing a more useful and comprehensive framework for managers.

Literature shows that the economics of early failures in maintenance and electric utilities have not been deeply analyzed. This study aims to focus on quantifying the economic impact that early failures in current transformers have on total maintenance costs. The empirical study is conducted in a regional transmission division of an electric utility located in Mexico.

The utility's database was accessed to collect 219 maintenance records. Clustering techniques were used to identify early failures from a bimodal distribution of failures. Confirmatory goodness-of-fit procedures followed the analysis, and finally, direct and opportunity costs were estimated by adapting the cost-of-quality (PAF) Model.

Around 11% of all maintenance activities are triggered by early failures, and they account for up to US$2.2m during the eight-year period under study, which represents 16% of total maintenance costs. Additionally, opportunity costs represent close to two-thirds of the total costs due to early failures. This was obtained after finding and validating a clear-cut border of 3.5 months between early failures and the rest.

Failures in energy grids and power transmission can have a large economic impact on the power industry and the society in general. Thus, the maintenance function in equipment such as current transformers is a crucial entry of the budget of any electric utility. This study is one of the very few that highlights the magnitude and importance of direct and opportunity costs derived from early failures.

Entrepreneurs in a competitive economy face three fundamental problems. They need to search for and discover a business opportunity (Kirzner, 1973), evaluate it (Knight, 1921), and then seize the opportunity to reap entrepreneurial profits (Schumpeter, 1911) (Langlois, 2007). The problem that we address is how the ability to exploit business opportunities is influenced by entrepreneurial search and the economic organization of entrepreneurship (Arrow, 1962; Lippman & Rumelt, 2003b; Aghion et al., 2005; Foss, Foss, & Klein, 2007). In many cases, the discovery for a new business opportunity needs to be motivated by expected gains, since the search and evaluation of business opportunities is a costly, resource-consuming process (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; Foss & Klein, 2005; Teece, 2007; Foss & Foss, 2008).¹ We show the critical role of expectations for understanding of the economic organization of entrepreneurship, and argue that transaction cost economics, with its insistence on bounded rationality, but farsighted contracting offers useful insights and presents rich opportunities for further theoretical and empirical research (cf. also Furubotn, 2002).

Reports the results of two experimental tests of the extent to which the large disparity between people’s valuation of gains and losses, and related fairness determinations, are used in judging the acceptability of alternative negotiating or conflict resolution proposals. Participants acted as arbitrators and selected their preferred resolution of conflicts, involving either the division of gains or sharing responsibility for losses. Different cases were presented in which one or the other party incurred varied combinations of direct or opportunity costs, or received varied forms of payments. Contrary to conventional economic assumptions, but consistent with earlier behavioural findings, direct costs incurred by one party to the negotiation were far more important than opportunity costs in setting the terms of a more acceptable resolution. The results strongly suggest that recent behavioural findings might be used to improve the design of negotiating and conflict resolution proposals.

Purpose – Although some literature exists on how consumers may interpret firm-generated signals about the unobservable quality of their product, there has been little effort to examine whether and how managers deploy signals about unobservable quality to compete.Design/methodology/approach – In this chapter, we address this issue by examining whether managers consciously use signals to compete with other firms, and how they choose between the vast number of signals available to them. We develop a formal model that allows us to generate a set of predictions drawn from information economics and behavioral decision theory. The predictions specify a pattern of managerial behavior according to which signals belonging to some categories are relatively attractive (for economic as well as psychological reasons).Findings – We report on the results of a series of three experiments in which executives are given the opportunity to deploy signals to communicate unobservable quality to skeptical consumers in a competitive market.Value/originality – The results of the studies provide compelling evidence in support of the formal argument.

The purpose of this study is to examine tolerance of channel partners’ opportunistic behaviors as a viable governance mechanism and to test contingent transaction benefit and cost factors to determine tolerance of opportunistic behaviors.

Through the theoretical lenses of governance value analysis and transaction cost economics, this study theorizes that a supplier’s tolerance of its reseller’s opportunistic behaviors should depend on transaction benefit factors (e.g. new product creativity and marketing program creativity) and transaction cost factors (e.g. performance ambiguity and opportunity cost). The author empirically tests the moderation model using data from a large-scale survey of 141 mobile phone suppliers in South Korea.

The empirical results largely support the predictions on the moderating effects. For transaction benefit factors, marketing program creativity increases the supplier’s tolerance, while new product creativity does not increase the supplier’s tolerance. For transaction cost factors, the supplier’s concerns about opportunity cost increase the level of tolerance, while performance ambiguity of a business partner decreases the tolerance level.

Theorizing opportunistic behaviors as a policy variable subject to benefit-cost assessment rather than an assumption provides new insights to interfirm governance research.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first kind to consider transaction benefit and cost factors together in a single contingency framework in tolerance research. Also, this research provides a new perspective on a microlevel marketing factor (i.e. creativity) as an influential factor in governance mechanisms.

An increasing number of users join and become immersed in WeChat official accounts, but many users quit using these services as well. Nevertheless, most of the previous studies mainly focussed on the usage behavior. The purpose of this paper is to fill the gap by examining factors affecting users’ unfollow intentions for WeChat subscriptions in a Chinese context.

Structural equation modeling is used in our study. A field survey with 260 WeChat users is conducted to test the research model and hypotheses.

The results show the following interesting key findings: first, the effect of actual cost on users’ unfollow intentions is larger than the effect of opportunity cost; second, users’ unfollow intentions will decrease with the increase of users’ perceptions of information usefulness; third, the results of the control variables showed that only landing frequency has a negative effect on users’ unfollow intentions; and fourth, users’ demographic differences are also examined in regard to how they may affect users’ unfollow intentions.

First, this paper studies factors influencing users’ unfollow intentions for WeChat subscriptions from a social exchange theory perspective; the authors considered both extraneous factors and users’ internal perception factors potentially affecting users’ unfollow intentions, which has rarely been researched. Furthermore, the authors examined significant differences among users’ demographic characteristics in affecting users’ unfollow intentions. The results of the study provide a more comprehensive understanding of the influencing factors of users’ unfollow intentions.