Search results

We use normal accident theory to analyze the financial sector, especially that part of the financial sector that processed home mortgages, and the mortgage meltdown. We maintain that the financial sector was highly complex and tightly coupled in the years leading up to the mortgage meltdown. And we argue that the meltdown exhibited characteristics of a system or normal accident; the result of a component failure (unusually high mortgage defaults) that, in the context of unique conditions (which included low interest rates and government policy encouraging home loans to less credit-worthy households), resulted in complex and tightly coupled interactions that financial elites and government officials were ill-equipped to control. We also consider the role that agency and wrongdoing played in the design of the financial system and the unfolding of the mortgage meltdown. We conclude that a fundamental restructuring of the financial system, so as to reduce complexity and coupling, is required to avert future similar financial debacles. But we also conclude that such a restructuring faces significant obstacles, given the interests of powerful actors and the difficulties of labeling those responsible for the meltdown as wrongdoers.

Social scientists have long been interested in how political institutions affect economic performance. Nowhere are these effects more apparent today than in the current U.S. financial meltdown. This article offers an analysis of the meltdown by showing how government regulation among other things helped cause it. Specifically, the article shows how regulatory reforms closely associated with neoliberalism created perverse incentives that contributed significantly to the increased lending in the mortgage market and increased speculation in other financial markets even as such behavior was becoming increasingly risky. The result was the failure of mortgage firms, banks, a major insurance company, and eventually the market for short-term business loans, which triggered a general liquidity crisis thereby thrusting the entire economy into a severe recession. Implications for future research are explored. The article also offers a few policy prescriptions and an assessment of their political viability going forward.

This paper aims to examine the influence of neoliberalist deregulation on the rash of demutualisations of the 1990s. It explores the extent to which the demutualisation of two building societies – Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley – and their subsequent demise in the wake of the credit crunch exemplify key features of the neoliberalist experiment, with a particular focus on their post‐mutualisation business models.

The analysis draws on literature that examines the neoliberal development of the financial sector and examines the media coverage of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 to study the discursive and material conditions of possibility for the development and implosion of the business models used by Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley.

The paper argues that the demutualisation of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley was part of a broader neoliberal movement which had processes of financialisation at its centre. By converting into banks, former building societies gained greater access to wholesale borrowing, to new types of investors and to the unrestricted use of financial instruments such as securitisation. The collapse of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley is interpreted in the light of their access to these new sources of funding and their use of financial instruments which were either unavailable for, or antithetical to, the operation of mutual societies.

The paper comments on the contemporary features and current effects of the 2007/2008 crisis of liquidity, whose full long‐term consequences are uncertain. Further research and future events may offer confirmation or serve to qualify or correct its central argument. The intent of the paper is to provide a detailed analysis of the conditions and consequences of building society demutualisation in the context of the neoliberal expansion of the financial sector that resulted in a financial meltdown. It is hoped that this study will stimulate more critical analysis of the financial sector, and of the significance of financialisation more specifically.

The paper adopts an alternative perspective on the so‐called “subprime crisis”. The collapse of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley is understood in relation to the expansion, and subsequent crisis, of financialisation, in which financial instruments such as collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps were at its explosive centre, rather than to the expansion of subprime lending per se. Demutualisation is presented as a symptom of neoliberalism, a development that, in the UK, is seen to have contributed significantly to the financial meltdown.

In this article, we examine the different causal chains leading to the crisis in the United States and around the world, emphasizing the market developments, political decisions, and organizational factors that led to the financial and economic meltdown. We argue that a series of political, regulatory, and organizational decisions and events prepared the ground for a major breakdown of financial and economic institutions, a “normal accident” that produced systemic reverberations across markets around the world. In the United States, political, regulatory, and organizational decisions made during the 1990s led to a situation of simultaneously high complexity and tight coupling in the financial system. The global economy also became more complex and tightly coupled during the 1990s, contributing to the rapid spread of the crisis across countries. We propose that solutions to the crisis will need to be tailored to the specific ways in which countries experienced the meltdown and the political preferences of interest groups and citizens. For the United States, the best approach would be to allow for a complex and innovative financial system but with a much reduced degree of coupling so as to avoid another financial normal accident.

On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and nearly caused a meltdown of the financial system. This article looks at the situation before Lehman went bankrupt and how this event came to trigger a financial panic during the fall of 2008 and early 2009. Two key ideas inform the analysis. The first is that what triggers financial panics are typically hidden losses. The second is that confidence plays a key role in financial panics and that confidence can be conceptualized as a belief that action can be based on proxy signs, rather than on direct information about the situation itself.

The purpose of this paper is to provide insights about corporate finance decision-making of Icelandic private firms that have experienced a dramatic financial crisis in 2008–2010. It observes the capital budgeting methods and cost of capital techniques for private firms after a systemic financial crisis. Moreover, the paper identifies the main determinants of capital structure and capita rationing during this period.

This paper surveys corporate finance practices of 80 out of the 250 largest bank-centred private firms after the financial crisis.

Highly leveraged private firms that have experienced a dramatic financial crisis in 2008–2010 use payback and net present value techniques almost at a similar rate when assessing new investments. The sample firms largely rely on the cost of debt to determine the cost of invested capital. However, capital asset pricing model is the most popular method among the few sample firms that estimate the cost of equity. The need to maintain financial flexibility and cost associated with financial distress are the most influential factors regarding capital structures, whereas investment practices avoid capital rationing associated with the financial crisis.

The limitations of the study are that it is country specific and absence of data over the period before the financial crisis that may have been applied to present more insight into this topic.

Sample firms fail to incorporate appropriate cost of capital methods and as the result they are likely to apply incorrect “hurdle rate” which could undervalue or overvalue new investments. This paper indicates that capital budgeting decisions by managers of the bank-centred Icelandic private firms who tend to be major shareholders do not reflect the tendency to expropriate outside and minority investors. Private firms that have emerged from the meltdown of the financial system highlighting the importance of “special” lending relationship in assisting bank-centred firms to avoid the severity of financial constraints.

This study employs a failure of the banking system to provide new knowledge about corporate finance practices of private firms after the financial crisis that have curtailed the access to both internal and external sources of capital.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the need for good corporate governance (CG) as one of the mechanisms to combat corporate misconduct and, by extension, to encourage economic growth and development, with special emphasis on Jamaica, which not only has seen the greatest financial sector meltdown in the region, but has also seen the greatest response to the need for CG initiatives.

For the past 20 years, CG has been at the forefront of discussions, legislation and moral suasion regarding corporate transparency and accountability, especially in the wake of spectacular scandals from the Maxwell debacle in the United Kingdom (1992), to Enron in the USA (2001), to the world economic crisis (2008). Codes have been adopted and legislation drafted to meet the concerns regarding corporate abuse, which have not only had an impact on the corporations and their shareholders, but also on a wider group of stakeholders, which includes, in some cases, the countries in which they operate. Not only have these scandals rocked the developed world, but corporate misconduct has taken an especially debilitating toll on developing economies, such as those found in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The cost of corporate misconduct in the region has included government bailouts, loss of jobs and loss of confidence in the markets. These, in turn, have had some negative impact on the development of many of the countries, which includes slow, stagnant or negative economic growth.

The attention to CG in the Commonwealth Caribbean has grown tremendously in the past 10 years by the introduction of codes and legislation with a focus on transparency and accountability in accordance with international standards. The challenge now appears to be the need to link these initiatives with the anti-corruption project. This may be best achieved through the acknowledgment of the need for the private sector to play a greater role in the prevention of corruption through CG initiatives. Put another way, there may be need for an increased focus on the demand side of bribery and corruption rather than simply on the supply side. Finally, the development of emerging economies relies heavily on the stemming of corruption and mismanagement both in the public sector and the private sector.

The original value of this paper is the development of CG principles in the region.

The global recession has strongly affected the credibility of the international banking system, damaging also the real economy.

Developing countries, not fully integrated with international markets, seem less affected and local microfinance institutions might also allow for a further shelter against recession, even if foreign support is slowing down and collection of international capital is harder and more expensive.

Intrinsic characteristics of microfinance, such as closeness to the borrowers, limited risk and exposure and little if any correlation with international markets have an anti-cyclical effect. In hard and confused times, it pays to be little, flexible and simple.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the impact of the recent financial crisis and the need for prudential management and effective supervisory and regulatory measures in ensuring the stability and integrity of the financial sector, especially financial institutions, such as banks. The aim is to increase awareness about the global Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards and the efforts at enforcing these standards.

The paper examines the impact of the global financial crisis of 2009 and relates it to inadequate enforcement of prudential and regulatory measures. The paper argues that effective implementation of the core and key FATF Recommendations would assure some modicum of stability, productivity, and integrity of the financial system. It also discusses briefly the monitoring process of the implementation of these standards. The paper adopts a policy approach with a view to explaining the importance and benefits of implementing these standards in all jurisdictions. Thus, it covers the work of the anti‐money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) global network in promoting financial sector stability.

The mutual evaluation process is a demonstration of the commitment of member states to implement the FATF standards and remedy deficiencies in their systems. However, many countries, in particular low‐capacity countries, face challenges in the implementation of the FATF standards. These are: competing priorities for scarce government resources; severe lack of resources and skilled workforce to implement government programmes, including AML/CFT programmes; weaknesses in legal institutions; the dominance of the informal sector and a cash‐based economy; poor document and data‐retention systems; and in some cases, very small financial sector with limited exposure to the international financial system.

For the AML/CFT standards to be enforced more effectively, developing countries need more technical assistance, especially in preventing the flow of proceeds of corruption to developed countries' financial systems. The strategy to recover the proceeds of crime has proven to be problematic, but no better approach has yet been articulated. This should constitute an issue for further research.

The paper aims to increase awareness to the FATF standards and the work of all the global network organizations involved in the fight against ML/TF. It is useful particularly to financial institutions who wish to protect the integrity of their system and promote stability.