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From 2007, New Zealand firms must report the cost of granting employee stock options (ESOs). Market‐based option pricing models assume that option holders are unconstrained in their portfolio choices and thus are indifferent to the specific risk of any firm. By contrast, ESO holders are frequently required to hold portfolios that are over‐exposed to the firm that employs them and so adopt exercise policies that reflect their individual risk preferences. Applying the model of Ingersoll (2006) to hypothetical ESOs, we show that ESO cost can be extremely sensitive to employee characteristics of risk aversion and under‐diversification. This result casts doubt on the usefulness of any market‐based model for pricing ESOs, since such models, by definition, produce option values that are independent of employee characteristics. By limiting employee discretion over the choice of exercise date, vesting restrictions help reduce the magnitude of this problem.

This article investigates the most appropriate accounting treatment for expensing the fair value of employee share options (ESOs) in financial statements. The debate centres around whether the grant date or the exercise date is the most appropriate date for determining the value at which the ESOs are eventually accrued within the financial statements. After examining accounting models for each of the above measurement dates, the article concludes that exercise date accounting best reflects the economic substance of the ESO transaction. Therefore, the IASB should consider revising its definition of equity to encompass only existing shareholders, leaving all other financial obligations to be classified as liabilities.

Reviews previous research on the timing of employee stock option exercise decisions and share price performance before and after insider trading. Analyses the 1992‐1993 exercise behaviour of top executives at 65 large US firms using the Black‐Scholes (1973) value (less anticipated dividends) as a benchmark to compare with the intrinsic value (market price minus exercise price) at the date of exercise. Finds options are exercised when the two values are roughly equal, i.e. that executives’ decisions are not risk‐averse or biased by private information. Also shows a tendency for the subsequent change in share prices to be lower when the intrinsic value is less than the Black‐Scholes value at the time of exercise. Considers consistency with other research and the implications of the findings.

The current and widespread view in option trading is that early exercise of call options is suboptimal unless there are large dividend payments on the underlying stock (e.g., Finucane, 1997; Hull, J. C. (2008). Options, futures and other derivatives (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall; Poteshman & Serbin (2003)). Our study substantially refines this view by demonstrating that U.S. tax rules governing capital gain holding periods can create incentives for early exercise under certain conditions. Hence, this study adds to the factors that investors likely consider when making option exercise decisions. We further note that recent research documents early exercises in the absence of large dividends, and refers to these option exercises as “clearly irrational.” Predictions of early exercise from our tax-based model are consistent with the observed patterns of early exercise, suggesting that the criteria for denoting an option exercise as “irrational” should be refined to incorporate capital gain holding periods.

An option is a contract between two parties by which party A grants party B the right to buy from or sell to A, at B's discretion, a given asset at a fixed price until a fixed date after which any rights or obligations expire. The party having the discretionary right to buy or sell is the buyer of the option (in this case, B), and the party granting the right is the seller, or writer, of the option. An option to buy is known as a call option, and an option to sell as a put option. The fixed price specified in the option contract is termed the exercise or striking price, and the fixed date the expiration date. A European option is one which can only be exercised on the date when the option expires; an American option can be exercised at any time up to and including the expiration date. Though there are many different types of underlying asset on which an option could be based, it is options written on ordinary shares quoted on the Stock Market which have been of most interest. This has been greatly enhanced in recent years by the creation of organised markets for options in the main financial centres of the world. The first part of this paper considers the practical aspects of options and the main features of an organised options exchange. The second part of the paper concentrates on introducing option pricing theory in a simplified form. Finally, some of the many and varied possible applications of options and option pricing theory are briefly reviewed.

Accounting for stock options is a controversial issue. The FASB recognized that the “intrinsic value” method, which had been used for years, failed to adequately account for the costs involved. To rectify the problem they suggested the use of a “fair value” method. Their proposal met with strong objections from companies, which were concerned with the impact of the proposed standard on their reported profits. Consequently, the board relented and allowed the use of either method. Unfortunately, both the intrinsic value and fair value approaches have deficiencies, particularly in regard to how they measure compensation expense and gains and losses over time. This paper addresses these shortcomings by developing two alternative cost measurement approaches that apply an option‐pricing model on an iterative basis over the life of the option. Both approaches represent specific ways to implement exercise‐date measurement techniques for stock options. The paper argues that both approaches provide more relevant and reliable measures of an option’s cost than either intrinsic or fair value methods.

The World Health Organization issued its global action plan on physical activities 2018–2030, emphasizing the importance of context-specific evidence on the subject. Accordingly, this study aims to provide unique and important policy insights on trends and drivers of participation in physical exercises by academic community in Sri Lankan universities.

For this purpose, we collected cross-sectional data (n = 456) in 2020 using a survey, and first, estimated a double-hurdle model to uncover covariates influencing likelihood and intensity of physical exercises overall. Second, count-data models are estimated to capture regularity of key exercises.

The results reveal that about 50% of members do not participate in any general physical exercise. Older members (marginal effect (ME) = 3.764, p < 0.01), non-Buddhists (ME = 54.889, p < 0.01) and alcohol consumers (ME = 32.178, p < 0.05) exhibit a higher intensity of participating in exercises overall. The intensity is lower for rural members (ME = −63.807, p < 0.01) and those with health insurance covers (ME = −31.447, p < 0.05). Individuals diagnosed for chronic illnesses show a higher likelihood of exercising but, their time devotion is limited. The number of children the academic staff members have as parents reduces the likelihood, but for those who choose to exercise have higher time devotion with increased number of children. The covariates play a similar role in determining regularity of key exercises: walking, jogging and exercising on workout machines.

The results imply a need to promote exercising in general and particularly among younger, healthy, insured and female individuals living in rural sector.

The study covers an under-researched professional sub-group in an under-researched developing context, examining both the likelihood and regularity of exercising as both dimensions are equally important for individuals to maintain healthy lives.

This paper aims to derive firm value implications for various kinds of employee stock options (ESOs) in a framework that considers uncertainty, non‐diversification and the US statutory tax treatment.

The authors extend the analysis of ESOs from the case of perfect capital markets to two cases of imperfect capital markets using the Benninga‐Helmantel‐Sarig framework.

It is found that ESOs are inferior to cash compensation and that the degree of option inferiority depends on employee diversification. In addition, incentive stock options (ISOs) are generally inferior to non‐qualified stock options (NSOs). This relative profitability of the NSO versus ISO increases as market imperfections are added. The authors also find that in general firm hedging of ESOs is suboptimal.

The paper highlights the firm value of employee stock options.

In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.

Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.

In the last 15 years, legislation has been passed in many Western European countries clarifying the tax treatment of stock options. The intent of the legislation has been to encourage holders of stocks and shares to take a long‐term investment outlook. A general background to how these stock option and profit‐sharing schemes are taxed in Europe is provided and some of the dangers and advantages of such schemes are indicated.