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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of firm-specific (i.e. firm size, profitability, leverage, dividend, growth opportunities, management quality and firm age) and country-specific (i.e., gross domestic product [GDP] growth) variables on compensation/remuneration offered to chief executive officers (CEOs) working in different industries of Pakistan.

Panel data techniques, namely, pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects and random effects methods are used to estimate the results. Moreover, Hausman test is used to choose which estimation method, either fixed effects or random effects, is better to explain the results.

Firm size, profitability, leverage, growth opportunities and age are some important firm-specific factors that have mixed (i.e. positive/negative) impact on CEO compensation in different industries. Variations in results are due to industry dynamics. However, it is important to mention that three key variables, namely, dividend, management quality and GDP growth have shown consistent positive impact on CEO compensation in most of the industries. In sum, results show that firm-specific and country-specific variables have material effects on CEO compensation. Moreover, results are found consistent with the predictions of agency theory and human capital theory.

The authors are sure that findings of this study provide some support to the board of directors to determine the pay slice for CEOs. Moreover, findings provide support to the regulatory authorities in formulating mechanisms to determine the compensation package for CEOs working in different industries and to improve the Code of Corporate Governance.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no empirical study in Pakistan has yet estimated the effects of firm-specific and country-specific variables on compensation offered to CEOs working in different industries. Thus, industry-wise analysis provides some new insights to the decision-makers and lays some foundation upon which a more detail analysis could be based.

The authors extend the recent research using the risk component of human resource’s (HR’s) compensation plans to examine the effects of risk components on two strategic outcomes: within-firm temporal change, or strategic variation, and firm strategic divergence from the industry, or strategic deviation. In addition, the authors examine the role of previous financial performance as a boundary moderator condition of the effects of risk components in the compensation plan and firm strategic outcomes.

To examine the effects of low- and high-risk components of executive compensation on strategic variation and deviation over time, the authors collected data from 2,510 companies listed in the Standard and Poor’s 500 index in a panel data format of a 12-year period. The authors gathered financial and other firm-level data from COMPUSTAT, and executive compensation and executive-level data from ExecuComp.

The findings support the main effects of risk components on strategic change, while both high- and low-risk components act on strategic deviation contingent on the moderating role of total shareholder return (TSR). In the theoretical framework, the authors test the moderating role of total shareholder return (TSR) as a boundary condition of the effects of risk components in the compensation plan. In doing so, the authors provide a fine-grained understanding of the influence of compensation plan risk components on outcomes proximal to executives, such as the maintenance of the status quo and the search for financial gains.

New studies can explore a three-way moderating effect on performance indicators, such as TSR, Tobin’s Q and return on asset. The authors addressed this limitation and did a comparative analysis, but the authors did not include additional moderating mechanisms in these interactive effects.

By disaggregating the executive’s compensation based on the risk components, boards of directors can mitigate any possible unwanted biases in the relationship between principal and agent.

By considering the influence of both low- and high-risk components of compensation plans on strategic outcomes –instead of firm performance – this study expands strategy literature supporting the influence of compensation schema on a firm’s outcomes. This path is new because it offers a moderating perspective to understand the strategic deviations and changes that chief executive officers imprint in their firms.

Los autores amplían la investigación reciente usando el componente de riesgo de los planes de compensación de RH para examinar los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en dos resultados estratégicos: cambio temporal dentro de la empresa, o variación estratégica, y divergencia estratégica de la empresa de la industria, o desviación estratégica. Además, examinamos el papel del desempeño financiero anterior como una condición moderadora límite de los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en el plan de compensación y los resultados estratégicos de la empresa.

Para examinar los efectos de los componentes de alto y bajo riesgo de la compensación ejecutiva en la variación y desviación estratégica a lo largo del tiempo, recopilamos datos de 2510 empresas que figuran en el índice Standard & Poor's 500 en un formato de datos de panel de un período de 12 años. Los autores recopilaron datos financieros y de otro tipo a nivel de empresa de COMPUSTAT, y compensación de ejecutivos, y datos a nivel ejecutivo de EXECUCOMP.

Nuestros hallazgos respaldan los efectos principales de los componentes de riesgo en el cambio estratégico, mientras que los componentes de alto y bajo riesgo actúan sobre la desviación estratégica dependiendo del papel moderador del rendimiento total del accionista. En el marco teórico, los autores prueban el papel moderador del Retorno Total del Accionista como condición límite de los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en el plan de compensación. Al hacerlo, brindamos una comprensión detallada de la influencia de los componentes de riesgo del plan de compensación en los resultados próximos a los ejecutivos, como el mantenimiento del statu quo y la búsqueda de ganancias financieras.

al considerar la influencia de los componentes de bajo y alto riesgo de los planes de compensación en los resultados estratégicos, en lugar del desempeño de la empresa, este estudio amplía la literatura de estrategia que respalda la influencia del esquema de compensación en los resultados de una empresa. Este camino es nuevo porque ofrece una perspectiva moderadora para entender las desviaciones y cambios estratégicos que los CEOs imprimen en sus firmas.

los nuevos estudios pueden explorar un efecto moderador de tres vías en los indicadores de rendimiento, como TSR, Tobin's Q y ROA. Abordamos esta limitación e hicimos un análisis comparativo, pero no incluimos mecanismos moderadores adicionales en estos efectos interactivos.

al desagregar la compensación del ejecutivo en función de los componentes de riesgo, las juntas directivas pueden mitigar cualquier posible sesgo no deseado en la relación entre el principal y el agente.

Os autores estendem a pesquisa recente usando o componente de risco dos planos de remuneração de RH para examinar os efeitos dos componentes de risco em dois resultados estratégicos: mudança temporal dentro da empresa, ou variação estratégica, e divergência estratégica da empresa do setor, ou desvio estratégico. Além disso, examinamos o papel do desempenho financeiro anterior como uma condição moderadora dos efeitos dos componentes de risco no plano de remuneração e nos resultados estratégicos da empresa.

Para examinar os efeitos dos componentes de baixo e alto risco da remuneração executiva na variação e desvio estratégico ao longo do tempo, coletamos dados de 2.510 empresas listadas no índice Standard & Poor's 500 em um formato de dados de painel de um período de 12 anos. Os autores coletaram dados financeiros e de outros níveis da empresa da COMPUSTAT, remuneração executiva e dados de nível executivo da EXECUCOMP.

Nossos resultados suportam os principais efeitos dos componentes de risco na mudança estratégica, enquanto os componentes de alto e baixo risco atuam no desvio estratégico contingente ao papel moderador do Retorno Total ao Acionista. No referencial teórico, os autores testam o papel moderador do Total Shareholder Return como condição limite dos efeitos dos componentes de risco no plano de remuneração. Ao fazer isso, fornecemos uma compreensão refinada da influência dos componentes de risco do plano de remuneração nos resultados próximos aos executivos, como a manutenção do status quo e a busca por ganhos financeiros.

ao considerar a influência dos componentes de baixo e alto risco dos planos de remuneração nos resultados estratégicos -em vez do desempenho da empresa- este estudo expande a literatura de estratégia que apoia a influência do esquema de remuneração nos resultados de uma empresa. Esse caminho é novo porque oferece uma perspectiva moderadora para entender os desvios e mudanças estratégicas que os CEOs imprimem em suas empresas.

Novos estudos podem explorar um efeito moderador de três vias em indicadores de desempenho, como TSR, Q de Tobin e ROA. Abordamos essa limitação e fizemos uma análise comparativa, mas não incluímos mecanismos moderadores adicionais nesses efeitos interativos.

Ao desagregar a remuneração do executivo com base nos componentes de risco, os conselhos de administração podem mitigar possíveis vieses indesejados na relação entre principal e agente.

The authors analyze the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair and CEO compensation. The analysis is motivated by the continuing debate about the reasonableness of executive pay patterns and the growing emphasis on the role of compensation committees.

The authors define three expert categories—accounting, finance, and generalist—and collect data on the compensation committee (CC) chairs of the S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. The authors run an ordinary least square model and regress CEO total and cash compensation on the three expert categories.

The authors find that firms in which the CC chair has expertise in accounting, finance, and general business favor performance measures that are more aligned with accounting, finance, and general business, respectively. There is little evidence that CC chairs who are CEOs of other firms endorse more generous pay for the host CEO; the authors find some evidence that CC chairs tenure relative to the host CEO's is negatively associated with the level of the CEO's pay.

This study suggests that firms and regulators should consider the background of the compensation committee chair to understand the variations in top executive.

Companies desiring to link executive compensation to particular areas of strategy must also consider matching the functional background of the compensation committee chair with the target strategy areas. From regulatory standpoint, requiring compensation committees to operate independent of inside directors can reduce attempts by inside directors to skim the process, but a failure to also consider the impact of compensation committees' discretion over the pay-setting process can distort the executives' pay-performance relation.

This is the first study to examine the effects of the functional background of the compensation committee chair on CEO compensation.

The question over who “owns” and controls consumer data on the internet is emerging as an important issue as individuals increasingly share more of their personal information with marketers in return for services and benefits. This paper aims to examine how compensating consumers for their personal information affects their expectations for data ownership and privacy control.

The authors conduct two online scenario-based experiments with a sample of adult consumers. The results were analyzed using multivariate and univariate analysis of variance.

The findings show that receiving compensation, especially when it is a monetary reward, reduces consumer expectations for privacy protection. These effects depend on whether the information provided to marketers is perceived to be sensitive in nature.

While a number of privacy studies have investigated the effects of compensation on encouraging self-disclosure on the internet, there is a lack of research that examines the effect of compensation on privacy expectations. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first paper to test empirically the construct of information ownership in the context of privacy exchanges.

Previous research suggests that the compensation offered to customers after a service failure has to be substantial to make customer satisfaction surpass that of an error-free service. However, with the right service recovery strategy, it might be possible to reduce compensation size while maintaining happy customers. The aim of the current study is to test whether an anchoring technique can be used to achieve this goal.

After experiencing a service failure, participants were told that there is a standard size of the compensation for service failures. The size of this standard was different depending on condition. Thereafter, participants were asked how much they would demand to be satisfied with their customer experience.

The compensation demand was relatively high on average (1,000–1,400 SEK, ≈ $120). However, telling the participants that customers typically receive 200 SEK as compensation reduced their demand to about 800 SEK (Experiment 1)—an anchoring effect. Moreover, a precise anchoring point (a typical compensation of 247 SEK) generated a lower demand than rounded anchoring points, even when the rounded anchoring point was lower (200 SEK) than the precise counterpart (Experiment 2)—a precision effect.

Setting a low compensation standard—yet allowing customers to actually receive compensations above the standard—can make customers more satisfied while also saving resources in demand-what-you-want service recovery situations, in particular when the compensation standard is a precise value.

This study aims to analyse the gender pay gap among CEOs, VPs and potential top executives. The authors seek to analyse how much of the gap is explained by differences in individual characteristics and how much is explained by firm characteristics and discriminatory processes.

The paper estimates compensation functions based on a panel of employer‐employee data set covering all Danish companies in the private sector with more than 50 employees during the period 1996‐2005.

The authors document that when controlling for a large number of observable characteristics and time‐invariant characteristics, there still exists a large gender compensation gap among top executives in Denmark. For VP and potential top executives, the estimated gap increased during the period 1996‐2005 while for the small and selected group of CEOs, the corrected gender gap decreased slightly.

The study does not claim to identify causal links between top executive compensation and individual or firm specific background characteristics.

The extension of the family‐friendly schemes may have had negative boomerang effects on the compensation and careers of all women, irrespective of whether they become mothers or not. Especially for those women aiming to reach the top of the organisation, these effects may be important because potential career interruptions are expected to be more severe for this group.

This study adds to the limited empirical literature on the gender pay gap among the narrow group of top executives using a large panel employer‐employee data set of all Danish companies.

This paper aims to combine the agency theory and efficiency wage theory to explore the effects of relative compensation for executive directors with marketing experience on two marketing outcomes (marketing efficiency and market share) and the moderating roles of ownership type (private vs state-owned enterprises) and market concentration in this process.

A total of 2,753 firm-year observations from Chinese listed companies (from 2010 to 2014) were retrieved from China Stock Market and Accounting Research database and analyzed using firm random-effects with industry, year and region fixed effects.

Relative compensation has a positive effect on both marketing efficiency and market share, and these effects are moderated by ownership type and market concentration. Specifically, the positive effect of relative compensation on marketing efficiency and market share are stronger for central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) compared to local SOEs and private-owned enterprises but the results are mixed for market concentration.

This study shows that paying higher compensation to the executive directors with marketing experience can enhance marketing performance, but the data does not allow identification of the actual actions taken by these directors for this.

This study highlights the importance of appropriate compensation for directors with marketing experience to motivate them to make better marketing decisions to overcome the challenges posed by market concentration and agency conflicts.

This paper points out the importance of having directors with marketing experience and paying them suitable compensation to motivate them to be more effective.

This study aims to investigate the effect of cash versus equity compensation on audit committee decision-making after the Public Companies Oversight Board’s 2007 censure of Deloitte.

Using a sample of 2,588 firms, this paper uses two different compensation measurements to empirically examine the effect of audit committee compensation on decision-making.

The authors find that audit committee compensation effects the post-censure decision-making of Deloitte’s clients. The results support the hypothesis that cash compensation paid to audit committees influences audit committee members to retain their auditors post-censure. Additionally, there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that equity compensation increases the propensity to switch auditors post-censure.

This study will be of interest to regulators, policymakers and researchers as it provides further evidence in the area of audit committee decision-making and the effect of cash and stock compensation paid to audit committee members.

This study provides empirical evidence of the association between audit committee compensation and audit committee decision-making by investigating the effect of cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation on audit committee decision-making.

The present study compares two types of compensation – i.e. on‐the‐spot and delayed – and tries to reveal how and when firms can utilize delayed compensation effectively. For this, failure severity is considered how these two types of compensation affect satisfaction and repurchase intentions.

A scenario‐based experiment in the hotel and restaurant industries was used with a sample of 292 students.

The results show that failure severity acts as a moderating variable in a recovery process of compensation‐satisfaction‐repurchase intention. The more severe consumers perceive the failure is, the more they depend on satisfaction to decide repurchase intentions. The two types of compensation are also moderated by failure severity on their effects on satisfaction and repurchase intentions. On‐the‐spot compensation leads to more satisfaction and repatronage intentions when failures are severe, but the results are not as straightforward when failures are insignificant. Under such a condition, while delayed compensation does not engender customer satisfaction with recovery as much as on‐the‐spot compensation, repatronage intentions for both types of compensation were similar in the hotel industry and even higher in restaurant services.

Industry differences such as ease of visit, frequency of visit, competition factors, and primary value (e.g. hedonic versus utilitarian) are expected to influence the effects of on‐the‐spot versus delayed compensation.

The study provides practitioners with the implication that the timing of compensation should be approached strategically according to the severity of failure and recovery outcomes they expect to achieve.

The present study tries to focus on compensation, one of the most commonly used recovery strategies, and tries to find the effects of different timings of it.

Purpose – This study explores the probability of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders in the form of CEO compensation under an imperfect governance institution by using a novel Chinese dataset over 2001–2010.

Design/methodology/approach – We use a direct method to gauge controlling shareholders’ tunneling and expropriation of minority shareholders, and we present a simple model to link corporate governance and the degree of entrenchment by the largest shareholder. We use both Logit and Probit models to predict the likelihood of tunneling and use two-stage least square (2SLS) regression to address the endogeneity issues.

Findings – There are significant deterioration effects between controlling shareholder's tunneling and firm performance. Firms with more tunneling activities typically have larger controlling ownership, greater evidence of state control, less balance of power among large shareholders, and weaker board characteristics.

Research limitations/implications – The positive relationship between controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation implies that the controlling shareholder might divert personal benefits from the public firms at the expense of minority shareholders.

Originality/value – We focus on the effects of corporate governance restructuring on executive compensation and controlling shareholders’ tunneling in the Chinese context, and we also investigate whether these effects are stronger with the involvement of state ownership. We empirically address the issues between executive compensation and expropriation of minority shareholders.