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1 – 10 of 26Arifur Khan, Sutharson Kanapathippillai and Steven Dellaportas
The purpose of this study is threefold: to examine the impact of a remuneration committee (RC) on the level of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration; whether firms with a RC…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is threefold: to examine the impact of a remuneration committee (RC) on the level of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration; whether firms with a RC, pay a premium to CEOs with different skill sets (general or specific); and whether a pay premium mitigates the potential for CEO turnover.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses a sample of 5,305 firm-year observations on a data set drawn from companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange for the period 2007 to 2014. The authors use ordinary least squares as well as logit regression techniques to test the formulated hypotheses. Difference in difference and propensity score matching techniques were undertaken to address the endogeneity concerns.
Findings
The findings show that firms with a RC pay a higher total remuneration to CEOs compared to firms without a RC. Furthermore, firms with a RC, value and reward CEOs with general skills by paying a premium not offered to CEOs with industry-specific skills. Paying a premium, in turn, mitigates CEO turnover by strengthening the CEO’s commitment to the organisation.
Originality/value
The study helps us to understand the critical role played by the RC in the remuneration of CEOs. The findings show that RCs act as an effective governance mechanism to deal with issues of executive remuneration and to retain skilled CEOs. Additionally, CEOs who acquire and develop general managerial skills will be able to extract higher pay from improved bargaining power. The findings will be of relevance to shareholders, regulators and company management who have an interest in executive pay and performance.
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Aisha Khursheed and Nadeem Ahmed Sheikh
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of firm-specific (i.e. firm size, profitability, leverage, dividend, growth opportunities, management quality and firm age…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of firm-specific (i.e. firm size, profitability, leverage, dividend, growth opportunities, management quality and firm age) and country-specific (i.e., gross domestic product [GDP] growth) variables on compensation/remuneration offered to chief executive officers (CEOs) working in different industries of Pakistan.
Design/methodology/approach
Panel data techniques, namely, pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects and random effects methods are used to estimate the results. Moreover, Hausman test is used to choose which estimation method, either fixed effects or random effects, is better to explain the results.
Findings
Firm size, profitability, leverage, growth opportunities and age are some important firm-specific factors that have mixed (i.e. positive/negative) impact on CEO compensation in different industries. Variations in results are due to industry dynamics. However, it is important to mention that three key variables, namely, dividend, management quality and GDP growth have shown consistent positive impact on CEO compensation in most of the industries. In sum, results show that firm-specific and country-specific variables have material effects on CEO compensation. Moreover, results are found consistent with the predictions of agency theory and human capital theory.
Practical implications
The authors are sure that findings of this study provide some support to the board of directors to determine the pay slice for CEOs. Moreover, findings provide support to the regulatory authorities in formulating mechanisms to determine the compensation package for CEOs working in different industries and to improve the Code of Corporate Governance.
Originality/value
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no empirical study in Pakistan has yet estimated the effects of firm-specific and country-specific variables on compensation offered to CEOs working in different industries. Thus, industry-wise analysis provides some new insights to the decision-makers and lays some foundation upon which a more detail analysis could be based.
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Wen-Ting Lin and Kuei-Yang Cheng
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the compensation level and the gap between the chief executive officer (CEO) and the top management team (TMT) with respect…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the compensation level and the gap between the chief executive officer (CEO) and the top management team (TMT) with respect to the rhythm of firm internationalization.
Design/methodology/approach
The approach takes the form of an empirical analysis. The authors use longitudinal data (1997-2006) of a sample of 345 publicly-listed firms in Taiwan.
Findings
The results show that higher CEO compensation will lead to regular foreign expansion. The CEO–TMT compensation gap has a curvilinear effect on the rhythm of firm internationalization.
Research limitations/implications
These findings highlight that the compensation structure has a significant influence on a firm ' s internationalization strategy. This research contributes to the literature linking strategic human resource management and corporate strategy in terms of firm internationalization.
Practical implications
When firms consider regular foreign expansion, the compensation committee should design a high total compensation level and appropriate the compensation gap between the CEO and TMT members.
Originality/value
This study sheds light on how the compensation of the upper echelons determines whether the internationalization rhythm is regular or irregular. Moreover, the study examines how internal contingencies, such as performance, moderate the relationship between the upper echelons’ compensation and the internationalization rhythm.
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This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).
Design/methodology/approach
Based on agency and upper echelons theory, the heterogeneous monitoring function of specific types and the nature of institutional investors on board composition, compensation and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics will be focused.
Findings
The author found that most studies have referred to archival studies, analyzed the impact of board governance on IO, focused on CEO characteristics, neglected IO heterogeneity and advanced regression models to address endogeneity concerns. In line with the theoretical framework, the relationship between total IO and board governance is heterogeneous. However, specific types such as foreign, dedicated and pressure-resistant institutions represent active monitoring tools and push for increased board governance.
Research limitations/implications
The author provided useful recommendations for future research from a content and methodological perspective, e.g. the need for analyzing the impact of IO on sustainable board governance and other characteristics of top management team members, e.g. the chief financial officer.
Practical implications
As many regulatory bodies implemented regulations to promote shareholder rights and board governance, this literature review highlights the connections of both corporate governance mechanisms. Managers should conduct a careful and timely investor analysis and change the composition and compensation of the board of directors in line with institutional investors’ preferences.
Originality/value
This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on IO and board governance, whereas the author structured the heterogeneous variables and results within the structured literature review. The authors guides researchers, regulatory bodies and business practice in this corporate governance topic.
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Evan H. Offstein and Devi R. Gnyawali
To provide insight, explanation, and empirical evidence into how and why CEOs get paid the amounts that they do.
Abstract
Purpose
To provide insight, explanation, and empirical evidence into how and why CEOs get paid the amounts that they do.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper blends several methodologies. Using qualitative interviews with several high level managers, it develops a coding listing to capture how pharmaceutical firms compete within their industry. The paper then uses a structured content analysis approach to capture the specific and observable competitive moves that pharmaceutical firms launch.
Findings
Base pay and bonus of the CEO are greater for firms that launch higher volumes of competitive actions. Furthermore, the variety of competitive moves appears to influence a CEO's base salary.
Research limitations/implications
This study has limited external validity since the firms in this sample are all large US pharmaceutical firms. The research implication is that, to date, firm size and past performance were identified as the single greatest predictors of CEO pay. Findings from this study suggest that how a firm behaves in a competitive context is as important as static characteristics of the firm (e.g. size) in predicting CEO pay levels.
Practical implications
Findings of this study begin to inform how directors may arrive at compensation decisions for CEOs. Since governance and CEO pay is becoming a more salient topic, this study suggests that directors can be trained or counseled on how to make more appropriate and refined decisions regarding CEO pay.
Originality/value
This paper employs a unique methodology to arrive at a question that is important, but under‐researched. Namely, we inform audiences who are concerned with how and why CEO's get paid what they do. Because CEO paychecks are a significant organizational expense, more research into how and why CEOs get paid a certain level is important theoretically and practically.
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Jörn Obermann and Patrick Velte
This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers…
Abstract
This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.
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Krishna Reddy, Sazali Abidin and Linjuan You
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) compensation and corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) compensation and corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies in New Zealand for the period 2005-2010.
Design/methodology/approach
Prior literature argues that corporate governance systems and structures are heterogeneous, that is, corporate governance mechanisms that are important tend to be specific to a country and its institutional structures. The two corporate governance mechanisms most important for monitoring CEO compensation are ownership structure and board structure. The authors use a generalised least squares regression estimation technique to examine the effect ownership structure and board structure has on CEO compensation, and examine whether ownership structure, board structure, CEO and director compensation have an effect on company performance.
Findings
After controlling for size, performance, industry and year effects, the authors report that internal features rather than external features of corporate governance practices influence CEO compensation. Companies that have their CEO on the board pay them more than those who do not sit on the board, suggesting CEOs on boards have power to influence board decisions and therefore boards become less effective in monitoring CEO compensation in the New Zealand context. Companies that pay their directors more tend to reward their CEOs more as well, thus supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.
Research limitations/implications
The results confirm the findings reported in prior studies that institutional investors are ineffective in monitoring managerial decisions and their focus is on decisions that benefit them on a short-term basis.
Practical implications
The findings indicate that although the proportion of independent directors on boards does not significantly influence CEO compensation, it does indicate that outside directors are passive and are no more effective than insiders when it comes to the oversight and supervision of CEO compensation.
Originality/value
Being a small and open financial market with many small- and medium-sized listed companies, New Zealand differs from large economies such as the UK and the USA in the sense that CEOs in New Zealand tend to be closely connected to each other. As such, the relationship between pay-performance for New Zealand is found to be different from those reported for the UK and the USA. In New Zealand, the proportion of institutional and/or block shareholders is positively associated with CEO compensation and negatively associated with company performance, suggesting that it is not an effective mechanism for monitoring CEO compensation.
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Ferdy Putra and Doddy Setiawan
This paper aims to synthesize the diverse literature on nomination and remuneration committees and provide avenues for future research.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to synthesize the diverse literature on nomination and remuneration committees and provide avenues for future research.
Design/methodology/approach
This study provides a comprehensive literature review of theoretical and empirical studies published in reputable international journals indexed by Scopus.
Findings
The literature review reveals several aspects of the nomination and remuneration committee. These aspects have been classified into the definition of the nomination and remuneration committee, dimensions of the nomination and remuneration committee, measurement and research review results, reasons for conflict empirical findings, company dynamics and research on moderators, as well as recommending future research.
Research limitations/implications
Our literature review shows that nomination and remuneration committees play a role in improving board performance and company performance, reducing agency conflicts and improving corporate governance to provide implications for companies, regulators and investors and pave the way for future research.
Originality/value
This paper identifies issues related to nomination and remuneration committees, their theoretical and practical implications and avenues for future research.
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Hanene Ezzine and Bernard Olivero
The authors provide evidence for the effects of social norms on corporate governance risk by studying “sin” stocks publicly traded companies involved in producing alcohol…
Abstract
Purpose
The authors provide evidence for the effects of social norms on corporate governance risk by studying “sin” stocks publicly traded companies involved in producing alcohol, firearms, biotechnology, gambling, military, nuclear power and tobacco. There is a societal norm against funding operations that promote vice and expropriation by controlling shareholders.
Design/methodology/approach
The sample is representative of S&P 500 firms in 2014. The authors use Datastream to obtain a sample of sin stocks. The authors’ descriptive analysis is completed by four variations of the basic ordinary least squares regression model according to dependent variable corporate governance risk score.
Findings
The authors find that non-financial incentives alone do not explain corporate governance risk. The authors provide strong empirical support for an alignment of financial and non-financial incentives. The authors show that when sin firm’s current performance is good, suggesting that the market holds a positive belief in firm’s future profitability, managers will likely have more incentive to expropriate shareholders.
Research limitations/implications
Belonging of firm to a sin industry does not reflect the acceptance level of social norms. The evolution of social norms towards sin stocks overcomes the drawback of assuming a constant social norms level over time. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to use the changes in consumption of sin products as a proxy for the evolution of social norms and examine does sin matter in corporate governance issue in other countries.
Practical implications
Well-planned and well-managed philanthropy sin industries to creating education programmes for the disadvantaged to protecting the environment, in the name of corporate social responsibility has become a necessary ingredient in virtually every large corporation’s business plan.
Originality/value
This paper fulfils an identified need to study does sin matter issue in corporate governance issue.
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Antonio Dell'Atti, Mariantonietta Intonti and Antonia Patrizia Iannuzzi
Following the subprime crisis and the detrimental role played by remuneration practices, an important reform concerned bank remuneration committees, especially in “significant…
Abstract
Purpose
Following the subprime crisis and the detrimental role played by remuneration practices, an important reform concerned bank remuneration committees, especially in “significant financial institutions”. In light of this consideration, this paper aims to investigate the scope and format of this renewal in order to verify whether and how those bodies are conforming to the new regulatory framework while improving their efficiency and functionality.
Design/methodology/approach
The study was carried out on 30 top European banks through the elaboration of a qualitative analysis model that takes into account both the procedural and the compositional aspects of remuneration committees. The model was used as a benchmark for assessing the effectiveness of the remuneration committees operating within a sample. This assessment was carried out according to the content analysis approach.
Findings
The results show a high diffusion of these bodies within the banks and a gradual expansion, during the time under investigation (three years 2008-2010), of the information provided by them on their tasks and decision-making. In the same time, the study highlights some important criticalities concerning both the composition of the banks' remuneration committees, how they carry out their functions, and the level of disclosure addressed to shareholders and the market in order to formalize the results of their work.
Originality/value
The added value of the analysis is related to the implementation of an “effectiveness remuneration committee rating” applied to a sample of top European banks during the financial crisis.
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