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The authors extend research suggesting that external funders reduce their contributions to not-for-profit (NFP) organizations in response to media-reported CEO compensation levels.

Employing a maximum archival sample of 44,807 observations from US Form 990s, the authors comprehensively assess the extent that high relative NFP CEO compensation is associated with decreases in future contributions.

The authors find that donors and grantors react negatively to high relative CEO compensation but do not react adversely to high absolute executive compensation. Contributors seem to take issue with CEO compensation when they perceive it absorbs a relatively large portion of the organizations’ total expenses, which may hinder the NFP’s mission. Additional findings suggest that excess cash held by the NFP significantly exacerbates the negative baseline relationship between future contributions and high relative CEO compensation. Finally, both individual donors and professional grantors are sensitive to cash NFP CEO compensation levels, but grantors are more sensitive to CEO noncash compensation.

The authors’ data are focused on larger NFP organizations, so this limits the generalizability of the study. Furthermore, survivorship bias potentially influences their time-series investigations because a current year large-scale decrease in funding due to high relative CEO compensation may cause some NFP firms to drop out of the sample the following year due to significant funding reductions.

The study makes three noteworthy contributions to the literature. First, the study documents that the negative association between high relative CEO compensation levels and future donor and grantor contributions is much more widespread than previous literature suggested. Second, the authors document that high relative CEO compensation levels that trigger reductions in future contributions are significantly exacerbated by excess cash held by the NFP. Finally, the authors find that more sophisticated grantors are more sensitive to noncash CEO compensation levels as compared with donors.

This paper aims to combine the agency theory and efficiency wage theory to explore the effects of relative compensation for executive directors with marketing experience on two marketing outcomes (marketing efficiency and market share) and the moderating roles of ownership type (private vs state-owned enterprises) and market concentration in this process.

A total of 2,753 firm-year observations from Chinese listed companies (from 2010 to 2014) were retrieved from China Stock Market and Accounting Research database and analyzed using firm random-effects with industry, year and region fixed effects.

Relative compensation has a positive effect on both marketing efficiency and market share, and these effects are moderated by ownership type and market concentration. Specifically, the positive effect of relative compensation on marketing efficiency and market share are stronger for central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) compared to local SOEs and private-owned enterprises but the results are mixed for market concentration.

This study shows that paying higher compensation to the executive directors with marketing experience can enhance marketing performance, but the data does not allow identification of the actual actions taken by these directors for this.

This study highlights the importance of appropriate compensation for directors with marketing experience to motivate them to make better marketing decisions to overcome the challenges posed by market concentration and agency conflicts.

This paper points out the importance of having directors with marketing experience and paying them suitable compensation to motivate them to be more effective.

This paper seeks to analyze how compensation framing influences the risk‐taking behavior of the firm's chief executive officer (CEO), and the mediating role played by risk bearing.

The study employs a sample of 108 US firms that issued an initial public offering in 1993, 1994 and 1995. Data from a survey filled out by the CEO of the firm are completed with secondary information. A structural equation model is estimated which explicitly considers the mediating effect of risk bearing on the compensation framing‐risk taking relationship.

The analyses indicate that while the performance targets included in the CEO's compensation contract indirectly influence the riskiness of the CEO's strategic decisions through its influence on the employment risk component of executive risk bearing, the level of compensation relative to peers does not. It shows that not all reference points are equally relevant in determining the CEO's willingness to take risk, nor do all the elements of risk bearing play the same role in that partial mediation.

The paper provides a refinement of previous work on modelling the risk‐taking behavior of managers.

The paper provides a guideline to think about the behavioral consequences of the pay level in the market for executives and the performance targets included in the compensation contracts.

The paper proposes and tests a model on how different reference points used to frame compensation influence CEO risk taking. It also provides the first test of a central proposition of the behavioral agency model: risk bearing partially mediates the influence of compensation framing on risk taking.

This paper aims to test the effects that different compensation policies have on managerial discretion with regard to stock options.

Hand-collected data from Securities and Exchange Commission registration statements are used to analyze the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation policies on managerial discretion used in valuing stock options.

This paper provides evidence that during the height of the initial public offering (IPO) bubble, CEO pay was associated with the undervaluation of stock options by IPO firms. The discretion varies with the relative mix of cash vs stock-based compensation. Firms with higher cash compensation tend to undervalue the unobservable market price of pre-IPO shares, leading to lower option values and a lower likelihood of reporting in-the-money options. Firms with greater stock-based compensation understate stock volatility, resulting in lower measures of the time-value component of options.

The results provide evidence that firms attempted to disguise the true value of CEO pay when making IPOs. By disguising the value of options granted to the CEO, outsiders were not aware of the actual cost incurred and the true value of the company.

This paper is the first to document that IPO firms understate the non-observable market price of pre-IPO shares to manipulate the value of stock options. It also documents the effect of discretion in estimates of volatility on stock options and the link between this discretion and CEO compensation.

Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) limits tax deductibility of executive compensation to $1 million per covered executive, with an exception for performance-based compensation. Both stock options and annual bonuses can qualify as performance-based, but they vary in the difficulty of qualification and the degree of additional compensation risk that qualification imposes on the executive. Most stock-option grants easily qualify with little change in risk, but qualification increases the risk associated with annual bonus compensation relative to what it was prior. The results of this study show that the propensity to issue stock options has increased for affected executives as a percentage of total compensation. Additional analysis suggests that this increase in stock-option compensation is substituting for lower increases in salary for affected executives, but not for annual cash bonuses. In fact, the results suggest that bonus compensation is also increasing as a percentage of total compensation. In summary, the results indicate that firms and their executives are acting in a way consistent with the incentives provided by section 162(m).

You may think you're doing well by hitting your performance targets, but if the underlying target‐setting process is flawed, you could be seriously underperforming.

This paper aims to compare the relative importance of tangible compensation across the offline and online service mediums, and assess tangible compensation as a trust recovery tactic.

This study is based on a 3 (compensation level: 20%, 50%, 100%) × 2 (compensation type: refund, coupon) × 2 (service medium: offline, online) scenario-based experimental design.

The offline and online customers exhibit different satisfaction for the respective values of both the immediate and delayed compensation types. Moreover, offline customers exhibit more trust in the firm when they receive a refund, whereas their online counterparts demonstrate a higher trust when provided with a coupon.

For a service failure such as the one presented in the experimental study’s scenario, a lower (higher) value coupon will generate more (less) satisfaction compared to providing the same value as a refund. Firms will be better off by providing partial compensation in the form of a coupon, rather than a refund.

Unlike most studies of service recovery, this research takes into account the perceived differences of various tangible compensations to provide a comparison of offline and online customers’ recovery preferences. Furthermore, the previous studies have not focused on trust restoration and assessed causes and effects of trust based on trust at one point in time i.e. trust after recovery. While this study has included restored trust as a variable in the conceptual model.

Esta investigación tiene como objetivo comparar la importancia relativa de la compensación tangible en los medios de servicio offline y online, y evaluar la compensación tangible como táctica de recuperación de la confianza.

Este estudio se basa en un diseño experimental basado en 3 (nivel de compensación: 20%, 50%, 100%) x 2 (tipo de compensación: reembolso, cupón) x 2 (medio de servicio: offline, online).

Los clientes offline y online muestran una satisfacción diferente para los valores respectivos de los tipos de compensación inmediata y diferida. Además, los clientes offline muestran más confianza en la empresa cuando reciben un reembolso, mientras que sus homólogos online demuestran una mayor confianza cuando se les proporciona un cupón.

Para un fallo del servicio como el presentado en el escenario del estudio experimental, un cupón de menor (mayor) valor generará más (menos) satisfacción en comparación con proporcionar el mismo valor como reembolso. Las empresas saldrán ganando si ofrecen una compensación parcial en forma de cupón, en lugar de un reembolso.

A diferencia de la mayoría de los estudios sobre la recuperación de servicios, esta investigación tiene en cuenta las diferencias percibidas de varias compensaciones tangibles para ofrecer una comparación de las preferencias de recuperación de los clientes offline y online. Además, los estudios anteriores no se han centrado en el restablecimiento de la confianza y han evaluado las causas y los efectos de la confianza basándose en la confianza en un momento determinado, es decir, la confianza después de la recuperación. En cambio, este estudio ha incluido la confianza restaurada como una variable en el modelo conceptual.

本研究旨在比较有形补偿在离线和在线服务媒介中的相对重要性, 并评估有形补偿作为一种信任恢复策略。

本研究基于3（补偿水平：20%, 50%, 100%）×2（补偿类型：退款, 优惠券）×2（服务媒介：线下, 线上）的情景实验设计。

线下和线上的顾客对即时和延迟补偿类型的各自数值表现出不同的满意度。此外, 离线顾客在收到退款时表现出对公司的更多信任, 而他们的在线顾客在得到优惠券时表现出更多的信任。

对于像实验研究中提出的那种服务失败, 与提供相同价值的退款相比, 价值较低（较高）的优惠券会产生更多（更少）的满意度。企业通过以优惠券的形式提供部分补偿, 而不是退款, 会有更好的效果。

与大多数关于服务恢复的研究不同, 这项研究考虑到了各种有形补偿的感知差异, 以提供离线和在线顾客恢复偏好的比较。此外, 以前的研究没有关注信任的恢复, 而是基于一个时间点的信任, 即恢复后的信任来评估信任的原因和影响。而本研究将恢复的信任作为概念模型中的一个变 量。

This paper aims to examine the relationship between CEO compensation and employee attitudes.

Based upon equity/organizational justice theories and the CEO compensation literature, hypotheses were developed which suggest that executive compensation and employee attitudes will be related. These hypotheses were tested by linking a large‐scale survey of employee attitudes to CEO compensation data for public companies based in the USA.

Employee attitudes appear to be related to some measures of CEO compensation, although sometimes the relationship that was found was negative and sometimes it was positive, but in all cases the effect size was quite small. Specifically, change in CEO salary was negatively related to evaluation of senior management and general satisfaction. However, change in total CEO compensation was positively related to evaluation of senior management and general satisfaction, while CEO bonus level was positively related to general satisfaction.

Limitations of this study include the inability to show a causal relationship, limited external validity, equations that explain only a small amount of variance and attitudinal measures that are single source. Future research which helps understand what employees know and why differences across organizations exist would be helpful.

From an employee attitude perspective, changing performance‐based components of CEO compensation (e.g. bonus) is better than changing CEO salary. However, if salary is going to be increased, a communication plan for employees should be developed.

Whether executive compensation has an impact on employees' attitudes has not been explored previously.

Prior studies show that accounting considerations related to executive compensation impact managerial incentives, which in turn can impact real investment. These studies, however, largely omit the role of one key incentive: the duration of executive compensation. This study addresses this gap by examining the impact of accounting costs on duration. The findings have important implications not only for the determinants of duration but also the potential role duration plays in incentivizing corporate investment.

This study exploits a plausibly exogenous increase in the accounting cost of option compensation under accounting rule FAS 123R to determine the impact of accounting considerations on managerial incentives and particularly the duration of executive compensation. Heterogeneity in firm-level exposure to the rule is exploited under a difference-in-difference framework. The sample comprises S&P 500 firms for the years 2002–2008.

The analysis shows that under FAS 123R, which increased the accounting cost of option compensation, duration is impacted more for affected firms than are delta and vega, two other key incentives highlighted in the literature. While duration, delta and vega are all highly intertwined making disentangling the individual impact of each incentive difficult, cross-sectional evidence suggests changes in research and development (R&D) spending are more likely attributable to changes in duration rather than vega or delta.

The evidence in this study shows how accounting considerations shape managerial incentives, particularly duration, and provides new insights into the relationship between duration and R&D spending.

This study aims to examine the perceived fairness of overcompensation for severe service failures. The mediating effect of perceived fairness in the overcompensation‐negative word‐of‐mouth (NWOM) intent relationship is also explored.

An experimental design approach was utilized to test the study's hypotheses. Overcompensation amount was manipulated at three levels (50 percent, 100 percent, 200 percent of purchase price), with two forms of overcompensation (cash or credit) tested.

Cash‐based overcompensation yielded higher perceptions of distributive justice than full compensation, with no significant difference in distributive justice perceptions across cash amounts. Credit‐based overcompensation was perceived as no fairer than full compensation. Perceived distributive justice fully mediates the overcompensation‐NWOM intent relationship.

The study's findings are based on a single service context. Further research across different service environments is needed to confirm the robustness of the results. The results are based on scenarios rather than real events. A longitudinal field study that examines consumer reaction at the point of service recovery and tracks actual subsequent behaviors is merited.

The study's findings suggest that, when a severe service failure occurs, service firms should consider going beyond full compensation, offering the consumer an additional cash amount. However, more is not necessarily better – a small additional cash amount may induce similar perceptions of fairness to larger amounts.

This study yields insights into the perceptions of distributive justice associated with different amounts and forms of overcompensation for severe service failure, and demonstrates the mediating effect of perceived distributive justice in the overcompensation‐NWOM intent relationship.