Search results

Purpose – Ascertaining the extent to which the generalized decline in union density, as well as the erosion in centralized bargaining structures and developments in other labor institutions, have contributed to rising within-country inequality.

Methodology – Econometric analysis of a newly developed dataset combining information on industrial relations and labor law, various dimensions of globalization, and controls for demand and supply of skilled labor for 51 Advanced, Central and Eastern European, Latin American, and Asian countries from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, followed by an analysis of 16 advanced countries over a longer time frame (from the late 1970s to the early 2000s).

Findings – In contrast to previous research, which finds labor institutions to be important determinants of more egalitarian wage or income distributions, the chapter finds that trade unionism and collective bargaining are no longer significantly associated with within-country inequality, except in the Central and Eastern European countries. These findings are interpreted as the result of trade unionism operating under more stringent structural constraints than in the past, partly as a result of globalization trends. In addition, despite much talk about welfare state crisis, welfare states, historically the result of labor's power and mobilization capacity, still play an important redistributive role, at least in advanced countries.

Practical implications – Union attempts at equalizing incomes by compressing market earnings seem ineffective and impractical in the current day and age. Unions should seek to increase the workers’ skill levels and promote an egalitarian transformation of the workplace. This type of “supply-side” egalitarianism is not a new strategy for unions, but is very much embedded in the unions’ DNA.

We study the potential effects of pension underfunding on corporate investment, financial constraints and improved employee bonding using 10 Pacific-Basin countries (including the United States, Australia, and eight Asian countries) at heterogeneous economic development stages and different regulatory environments. We document that corporate pensions are significantly underfunded in most countries of our sample in the period of 2001–2017, when interest rates were ultralow in most countries. In addition, firms from countries with stronger employee protection and more generous retirement benefits tend to show higher levels of underfunding in their defined benefit (DB) pension plans. To the extent of pension underfunding imposing constraints on corporate investment, we find that firms in these countries can face more constraints on investment when their pension is underfunded.

Politeness rituals can be understood as socially facilitative, performative speech acts that operate at the meso-level of Goffmanian interaction order, translating macro-level cultural scripts into micro-social action. Whereas previous research has focused on individual face-saving, this chapter examines the implications of politeness for the group face of speech communities, demonstrating the concept of collective facework. Taking Swedish culture as an example, I observe a tension between two sets of rules: the Nordic code of Jante Law, which frowns upon boasting and encourages humility, and the values of honesty and conversational directness. This is dramaturgically resolved through polite forms of talk, such as strategic reticence and sanctioning verbal domination. These interaction rituals perform collective facework to address negative and positive collective face needs.

In recent years, the European Commission and various Member States, citing increasingly integrated markets and higher levels of cross-border activity within the European Union (“E.U.”), have called for the adoption of effective collective redress mechanisms for victims of violations of E.U. law. Although many Member States have already adopted collective action procedures under national law, these procedures have been ineffective in stimulating private enforcement of E.U. law and are often divergent in their approach to consolidating claims. E.U. lawmakers, after a lengthy period of investigation and study, have identified a set of guiding principles for the Member States to use in enacting new collective redress procedures within their national systems. The studies and papers solicited from the public during the Commission’s deliberations are explicit in their rejection of the U.S.-style opt-out class action mechanism. In their effort to avoid similarly calamitous results, European lawmakers propose that Member States adopt “opt-in” class actions, while rejecting many of the economic incentives that some believe lead to filing nonmeritorious claims, such as punitive damages and contingency fee arrangements. The European proposal is unlikely in the authors’ view to stimulate private enforcement of European law or increase victims’ access to compensation, given the flaws inherent in the opt-in class action device. Instead of looking to adopt a “U.S.-lite” approach to victim redress which is fundamentally incompatible with many judicial systems within the E.U., the authors propose that Europeans consider adopting a regulatory administered compensation system, modeled after such U.S. examples as the Securities and Exchange Commission Fair Funds and the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. The authors also propose that regulatory administered funds can provide more effective and efficient restitution to victims than traditional litigation.