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All clients are to some extent subject to their attorney's construction of their interests. This state of affairs reaches the extreme in the case of the class action because the class action permits masses of individual claims to be combined in one proceeding to promote efficiency and solve collective action problems. Class action scholars have long debated the role of class members without conclusion. The doctrine on whether and when the class member is considered a “party” to the litigation is incoherent. Neither courts nor commentators are clear on limits of the ethical duty of class counsel – does it run to individual class members or to the class as a whole? And if such a duty runs to the class as a whole, is the class an entity, like a corporation, or an aggregation of individuals each of whom is entitled to enforce class counsel's attorney–client obligations?

To explain the impacts of the class action, as recently amended by the Italian Parliament, and help financial institutions to develop a compliance approach in order to avoid and/or mitigate the relevant risks.

This article provides an overview on the Italian class action, as recently amended by the Italian Law No. 31/2019, examines the relevant impact for financial institutions (taking into account some recent case law) and identifies possible compliance solutions to avoid/mitigate the relevant risks.

The recent amendments to the Italian class action may increase risks for financial institutions.

Financial institutions should examine their relationships with stakeholders in the light of the new Italian class action in order to implement policies and procedures to prevent the relevant risks.

Practical guidance from an experienced lawyer in the litigation and compliance fields.

The purpose of this paper is to expand our understanding of the motivations for corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) reporting.

This paper provides a conceptual exploration of the motivation for corporations to provide ESG reports and proposes deterrence theory and avoidance as a complementary explanatory motivation for such reports.

Within this paper it is argued that part of the motivation for some corporations to increase ESG disclosures is to avoid, or mitigate, the risk of class actions and the associated financial penalties. This paper proposes that in Australia the deterrence impact, and ancillary avoidance behaviour, of civil litigation class action provides a further motivation for improving both corporate ESG disclosure and sustainability performance.

This paper extends the social and environmental accounting (SEA) reporting literature by proposing deterrence theory and avoidance as a corporate motivation for environmental, social and governance (ESG) reporting. Deterrence is proposed as a different, yet complementary, motivation to the oft‐cited variations of stakeholder and legitimacy theory which are dominant in the SEA reporting motivation literature.

This paper aims to provide an analysis of securities class action filings in 2017 along with related trends over time and a comprehensive current view of the securities class action landscape.

The paper details 2017 securities class actions and related trends by measures including the number and size of filings; market capitalization losses; litigation likelihood for US versus non-US exchange-listed companies; status and outcomes of filings (settled, dismissed, continuing); core versus merger and acquisition filings; individual versus institutional investors as lead plaintiffs; and concentration of class action activity by industry sector, stock exchange and court circuit.

The number of federal securities class action lawsuits filed in 2017 reached a record high for the second straight year. The jump was spurred by a sharp increase in lawsuits targeting mergers and acquisitions. The 412 securities class action filings in 2017 represented a more than 50 per cent increase from the previous record of 271 filings in 2016.

This paper details analysis by legal and industry experts.

To provide an analysis of securities class action filings in 2015 along with related trends over time and a comprehensive current view of the securities class action landscape.

Details 2015 securities class actions and related trends in terms of the number and size of filings; market capitalization losses; the litigation exposure of IPOs; the classification of complaints; litigation likelihood for US exchange-listed companies; resolutions (settlements, dismissals or trial verdict outcomes); timing of dismissals and settlements; filing lags; filings against foreign issuers; number of mega filings; recent rulings related to class certification; and concentration of class action activity by industry sector, stock exchange and court circuit.

The number of filings in 2015 was the largest since 2008. The Disclosure Dollar Loss Index® (DDL Index®), the Maximum Dollar Loss Index® (MDL Index®) and the number of mega filings rose sharply in 2015 after declines in 2014. The Consumer Non-Cyclical sector had the most filings in 2015 while filings against companies in the Financial sector were below historical averages. Dismissal rates appear to be trending down. The median filing lag has never been shorter than in 2015. Filings against foreign issuers remain at high levels. Filings against S&P 500 companies remained below the historical average.

Detailed analysis by legal and industry experts.

In recent years, the European Commission and various Member States, citing increasingly integrated markets and higher levels of cross-border activity within the European Union (“E.U.”), have called for the adoption of effective collective redress mechanisms for victims of violations of E.U. law. Although many Member States have already adopted collective action procedures under national law, these procedures have been ineffective in stimulating private enforcement of E.U. law and are often divergent in their approach to consolidating claims. E.U. lawmakers, after a lengthy period of investigation and study, have identified a set of guiding principles for the Member States to use in enacting new collective redress procedures within their national systems. The studies and papers solicited from the public during the Commission’s deliberations are explicit in their rejection of the U.S.-style opt-out class action mechanism. In their effort to avoid similarly calamitous results, European lawmakers propose that Member States adopt “opt-in” class actions, while rejecting many of the economic incentives that some believe lead to filing nonmeritorious claims, such as punitive damages and contingency fee arrangements. The European proposal is unlikely in the authors’ view to stimulate private enforcement of European law or increase victims’ access to compensation, given the flaws inherent in the opt-in class action device. Instead of looking to adopt a “U.S.-lite” approach to victim redress which is fundamentally incompatible with many judicial systems within the E.U., the authors propose that Europeans consider adopting a regulatory administered compensation system, modeled after such U.S. examples as the Securities and Exchange Commission Fair Funds and the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. The authors also propose that regulatory administered funds can provide more effective and efficient restitution to victims than traditional litigation.

Drawing on “Strategic Alliance” literature and qualitative research methods, the purpose of this study is to examine the initiation and operations phases of the relationship between Australian litigation funders and class law firms. The initiation phase examines factors such as complementarity between needs and assets compatibility between the funder and the class law firm goals of the alliance trust and alliance structure. The operations phase considers factors such as governance, communication and risk management and accountability. Because of its focus on the fairness of settlement, case law provides limited understanding of the drivers of the class law firm and funder relationship. An “inside look” of how the funder-law firm is initiated and made operational provides a more accurate picture and has important implications for the management of the ethical issues that arise during the course of that relationship.

This paper is a content analysis and contains qualitative interviews.

The strategic alliance between class law firms and litigation funders has evolved within an institutional climate that has acknowledged the benefits that the alliance can bring to the conduct of class actions. That same institutional environment has led to an alliance which is informal and transactionally oriented, where each of the parties maintains a demarcation in function. Although they share aspects of the strategic management of class actions, funders continue to be diligent monitors of class law firms, and class law firms continue to advance the legal rights of class members.

It is observed that the size of the sample is small driven by a number of market participants.

The paper confirms that the litigation funder–law firm strategic alliance works well as a result of institutional constraints.

Each of the alliance partners was keen to ensure that neither they nor their partner acted in a way which might attract judicial disapproval. Each also believed that they played a positive role in promoting class member interests, albeit that their primary motivation was to earn fees or a commission. The success of the alliance between class law firms and litigation funders has substantially improved access to justice in Australia for small claims holders.

The paper provides insight into a strategic alliance which is formed primarily for the benefit of third parties. This is one of the first papers to consider the litigation funder–law firm relationship through the lens of strategic alliance literature.

In class action antitrust litigation, the standards for acceptable economic analysis at class certification have continued to evolve. The most recent event in this evolution is the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1435 (2013). The evolution of pre-Comcast law on this topic is presented, the Comcast decision is thoroughly assessed, as are the standards for developing reliable economic analysis. This article explains how economic evidence of both antitrust liability and damages ought to be developed in light of the teachings of Comcast, and how liability evidence can be used by economists to support a finding of common impact for certification purposes. In addition, the article addresses how statistical techniques such as averaging, price-dispersion analysis, and multiple regressions have and should be employed to establish common proof of damages.