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The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of China's securities market regulation from 1980 to 2007 and the dual role of the government in this process.

When the government is simultaneously the owner and regulator of the securities market, the evolution of securities market regulation follows a path of compulsory institutional change. China's Government authorities have played a dual role in this process by acting both as the securities market regulator and the controlling owner of the stock exchanges. The paper uses the evolution of China's securities market regulation from 1980 to 2007 to illustrate this theoretical framework.

Using the case of China, this paper provides unique evidence of how securities regulation evolves in response to government direction and supervision if the government is both the owner and the regulator of the securities market.

The paper offers insight into issues of securities market regulation in China and other emerging markets.

Following China entered the World Trade Organisation in November 2001, attention has been paid worldwide to the current Chinese legal system, political policies, and the development of economic reform. Recent debates on corporate governance in China have become a global topic of interest. The corporate governance reform is now the centre of the enterprise reform. This paper evaluates the development of corporate governance reform in China and identifies its changes in legislation on corporate control. This paper provides evidence to show that China has been making significant progress in the development of corporate governance reform. It concludes that China has established a fundamental legal framework for corporate governance. The changes in regulations on corporate control indicate that the development of a more sophisticated corporate governance system is under way. However, corporate governance reform in China is still at an early stage of development. The existing problems are still significant. Laws and legal institutions have experienced difficulties keeping up with the changes that have been taking place in China. The rights of selecting management of state‐owned enterprise still remain in the hands of the state. The reform of the banking system lags behind the development of the market economy and state‐owned banks are still under government's control. The paper argues that in Chinese context as far as the rights of selecting management remain in state's hand, the independent board of directors will have less power to achieve the goals in corporate control. Thus the agency problems will not be solved, and it is very difficult to excise and protect minority shareholders' interest. In today's Chinese market the corporate governance cannot provide the protection of minority investors' interests. This paper also argues that it is very dangerous for individual investors to invest in the Chinese market and they have to bear higher risks. This paper suggests that increasing the Sophistication of the corporate governance system of both internal and external control is the key for the Chinese market. This is because the Chinese context is very complicated. There are so many regulations and laws applied in business practice. Different companies and enterprises apply different laws. This paper points out when a national corporate governance system is established it should serve the whole economic market. Thus the further reform of state‐owned enterprises and also the banking system should take place so that China can build up a real economic market structure according to international regulations. This paper also suggests that in the long‐term, building up a cultural background for applying corporate governance system is very important in Chinese society. Improving the culture in the social environment could help to improve the corporate governance in business practices.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of illegal insider trading enforcement in China by focusing, among other things, on the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission's (CSRC) enforcement actions in the period 1993‐2006.

This paper discusses the CSRC's enforcement policies and practices of insider trading regulation, based upon administrative and judicial cases, face‐to‐face interviews with regulators, and policy documents.

A major finding of the study is the paucity of insider trading cases and the lack of convictions for insider trading offences in China. The campaign against securities offences did not actually come with the stricter enforcement of insider trading laws. A primary challenge in the insider trading regulation comes from the fact that most insider trading cases involve high‐ranking government and party officials. The CSRC lacks the power to directly administer discipline and penalties on government officials and party cadres for insider trading offences.

It is recommended that the CSRC be given more power, more resources and more trained regulators to detect and address insider trading activities. It is also recommended that the CSRC improve its surveillance capabilities by fully utilizing sophisticated computer surveillance software systems, by improving inter‐agency and inter‐market information‐sharing, and by cooperating with other countries' regulators and participating in the ISG's database to detect possible international insider trading.

The paper will be of interest to researchers in the field of financial crime and securities regulation. Regulators, the private sector and government departments will also benefit from an analysis of Chinese insider trading enforcement cases. This paper also suggests better strategies for dealing with insider trading offences in China. A fair and orderly market is crucial for investors in the Chinese market.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the emerging Chinese credit rating agencies (CRAs), and their development, regulatory regime and challenges. The Chinese financial system has made many improvements; in particular, the regulatory regime has reached a more effective level. However, it should be admitted that some aspects still require further development. Compared with other developed markets, the Chinese credit rating industry is still young. Under these circumstances, questions are raised about the performance of the CRAs in China. Whether the legal framework is effective enough? A further point, in terms of the development, is what are the major obstacles lying ahead for the Chinese CRAs?

This paper will concentrate on the study of Chinese CRAs. Starting with a brief introduction and analysis on the Chinese CRAs, it will further examine the rating methodologies of the Chinese CRAs. Following this, the regulatory regimes will be analyzed in detail, from the perspectives of the securities, banking and insurance market. Moreover, the paper will identify the key problems under the current regulatory regime. Last but not least, a conclusion and some future suggestions for the development of the regulatory regime will also be made based on the earlier observations and study.

The current development stage and future reform requirement of the Chinese credit rating industry.

Provide a full dimension and in depth analysis on the Chinese credit rating industry.

The purpose of the study is to show that divergent perceptions among regulators, the regulated and the associated regulatory bodies across multiple jurisdictions regarding the nature and functionality of cryptocurrencies hamper the development of a more comprehensive and coherent regulatory framework in curbing crimes and other related risks associated with cryptocurrencies.

The study has used a descriptive doctrinal legal research method to investigate and understand the insights of existing laws and regulations in four selected jurisdictions concerning cryptocurrencies and how these laws could be further improved and developed to reduce crypto-related crimes. Furthermore, the study has also used a comparative research method to conceptualize the contours of the new legal discourse emerging from cryptocurrencies to adopt and implement a sound regulatory framework.

The study illustrated that divergent regulatory treatment among different jurisdictions might suffocate novel digital innovations such as cryptocurrency. These fragmented regulatory approaches by various jurisdictions question the sustainability of the present national legislation adopted to regulate cryptocurrencies. Looking into other jurisdictional developments in regulating cryptocurrencies, it is apparent that a concerted regulatory approach is needed to minimize the abuse of this innovation.

The study has implications for regulators and policymakers to review the current regulatory framework for regulating cryptocurrencies to prevent regulatory arbitrage. The divergent legislative measures concerning cryptocurrency among different jurisdictions question the sustainability of these legislative initiatives, considering the evolving and borderless nature of cryptocurrency. Therefore, this paper will help regulators to consider the present legislative gaps in establishing a common global regulatory approach in the crypto sphere.

The study contributes to the existing body of literature by examining the regulatory frameworks of four jurisdictions, namely, the USA, Canada, China and the EU, related to cryptocurrencies, with a discussion on the development of cryptocurrencies-related laws among these four jurisdictions and their sustainability in curbing crimes in the Darknet.

China has achieved continuous economic growth and become more integrated with the global economy since the start of the current financial crisis in late 2008. As the second largest economy in the world, China's political policies, economic and social development have influence on global economy. Attention has been paid worldwide to the current Chinese legal system, political policies and the development of economic reform since China entered the World Trade Organisation in November 2001. The corporate governance reform is the centre of the enterprise reform. In September 1999, The Fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's 15th central Committee identified that corporate governance is the core of the modern enterprise system. In recent years China has made significant progress in developing the foundations of a modern corporate system. There are more than 1,200 companies which have successfully diversified their ownership through public listing and 80% of small and medium size companies have been transformed into non-state-owned enterprises. More and more state-owned enterprises are on the way to transforming into corporations. China has formed a legal framework for corporate governance.

The purpose of this paper is to review the criminal enforcement of insider dealing cases in People's Republic of China's (PRC) securities market and to provide feasible suggestions for improvement for a more coherent and streamlined insider dealing regulatory framework in the PRC during the enforcement of China's new Securities Law (SL 2020) in March 2020.

Through analysing the previous literature on public interest theories and economic theories of regulation, this paper examines the necessity to regulate insider dealing in China with criminal law to ensure fairness and avoid monopolies in its securities market. The paper reviews the criminalising of severe insider dealing cases in China from the Nanking National Government in the 1920s to the inception of the securities market of the PRC in the 1990s to the present day. The investigation, prosecution, enforcement and trial of criminal offences of insider dealing in China are thoroughly examined.

The paper finds a tendency for over reliance on the investigation and the administrative judgement of the China Securities Regulatory Commission in criminal investigation, prosecution and trial in the PRC.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is one of the first papers to critically and thoroughly analyse the criminal enforcement of insider dealing in China following the recent enforcement of China’s new Securities Law in March 2020.

This chapter examines China’s corporate governance and accounting environment that shapes the adoption of internationally acceptable principles and standards. Specifically, it examines international influences, including supranational organizations; foreign investors and international accounting firms; domestic institutional influences, including the political system, economic system, legal system, and cultural system; and accounting infrastructure. China’s convergence is driven by desired efficiency of the corporate sector and legitimacy of participating in the global market. Influenced heavily by international forces in the context of globalization, corporate governance and accounting practices are increasingly becoming in line with internationally acceptable standards and codes. While convergence assists China in obtaining legitimacy, improving efficiency is likely to be adversely affected given that corporate governance and accounting in China operate in an environment that differs considerably from those of Anglo-American countries. An examination of the corporate governance and accounting environment in China suggests heavy government involvement within underdeveloped institutions. While the Chinese government has made impressive progress in developing the corporate governance and accounting environment for the market economy, China’s unique institutional setting is likely to affect how the imported concepts are interpreted and implemented.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the trial implementation of stock index futures trading, margin trading and securities lending in China – approved in principle by the State Council and confirmed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) on January 8, 2010.

The paper describes various preliminary rules and regulations for stock index futures trading, margin trading, and securities lending that have been issued starting in 2006 and the latest regulatory developments, requirements and timing related to the trial implementation.

The stringent requirements imposed by CSRC highlights its cautious approach to the trial process for margin trading and securities lending. By defining “securities lending” as the borrowing of securities and the subsequent sale of those securities in the 2006 Trial Administrative Measures, the regulator appears to leave open the possibility of short selling.

The Announcement has been warmly welcomed by market participants because index futures trading, margin trading and securities lending are expected to significantly add to the Chinese equity market's liquidity and price discovery process in the long run.

The paper provides practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers.

The paper aims to explain regulatory issues and considerations as to future regulatory changes that Chinese regulators may implement with regard to the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) regime.

The paper describes: the regulators responsible for QFII; the relevant regulations; the qualification process, including eligibility requirements and the regulators' preference for qualifying long‐term, buy‐side institutional investors (usually pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds); the concept of the “open‐ended China fund”; rules governing the remittance and repatriation of capital and the lock‐up period; a provision that prohibits QFIIs from transferring or selling their quotas (for example, to create structured products offering their customers synthetic exposure to the Chinese securities market); available account structures; the investment process, including investment restrictions, required disclosure of interests, the short swing profit rule, over‐purchases and erroneous trades, stock index futures trading, and insider dealing and manipulation of the market; withholding taxes; and recent developments.

China's QFII regime has been a key component of China's staged opening up of its financial markets, in particular its public securities market, permitting foreign investors to gain access to the previously restricted RMB denominated A share market under relatively strict regulatory oversight.

Practical guidance from an experienced financial services lawyer is provided.